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The Jeffersonian Moment: Feudalism and Reform in Virginia, 1774-
1786 
 





In his autobiography, Thomas Jefferson argued that his goal in the American Revolution had been 
to eliminate “feudal and unnatural distinctions” in colonial American society as part of the struggle 
for independence. This thesis focuses on Jefferson’s years as a revolutionary legislator in the new 
state of Virginia, and argues that while he was correct in labelling Virginia a feudal society, his 
reforms were insufficient to the scale of social reformation that he identified. Material addressed 
includes Jefferson’s synthesis of British feudal and mercantile history that he constructed during 
the early years of the revolution, his proposed constitution for the state of Virginia, and his 
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In	 February	 1771,	 Thomas	 Jefferson,	 a	 young	 Virginian	 from	 Albemarle	 County,	
wrote	to	a	London‐bound	friend	to	request	a	coat	of	arms.	Jefferson	believed	himself	to	
be	 a	 descendant	 of	 a	 member	 of	 the	 English	 gentry,	 and	 accordingly	 instructed	 his	
friend	“to	search	the	Herald’s	office	for	the	arms	of	my	family.”	Jefferson	had	done	his	
own	preliminary	 research,	 and	while	 he	was	 confident	 that	 arms	would	 be	 found,	 he	
acknowledged	 that	 “it	 is	 possible	 that	 there	 may	 be	 none.	 If	 so	 I	 would	 with	 your	
assistance	become	a	purchaser,	having	Sterne’s	word	for	it	that	a	coat	of	arms	may	be	
purchased	as	cheap	as	any	other	coat.”1	
This	 letter	 is	striking,	both	 for	what	 it	says	about	 Jefferson	and	what	 it	says	about	
Virginia’s	 colonial	 society	on	 the	eve	of	 the	American	Revolution.	As	a	member	of	 the	
Virginia	 gentry,	 Jefferson	 was	 concerned	 with	 demonstrating	 his	 family’s	 genteel	
pedigree,	 although	 he	 was	 willing	 to	 cut	 corners	 if	 a	 legitimate	 genealogy	 was	 not	
available.	 The	 letter	 also	 shows	 that	 a	 Virginia	 gentleman	 in	 1771	 was	 very	 much	




Although	 Jefferson	 retained	a	personal	 interest	 in	his	 familial	 coat	of	 arms	 for	 the	
rest	of	his	 life,	 the	American	Revolution	 forced	him	 to	 rethink	whether	 reconstituting	















of	 the	defects	 in	 the	 feudal	 law	upon	which	 the	British	Empire	had	been	constructed.	
Second,	 while	 it	 was	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 various	 constituent	 parts	 of	 the	
British	 Empire	 that	 alerted	 Jefferson	 to	 the	 feudal	 law’s	 importance,	 upon	 further	
reflection	 it	was	 a	matter	 of	 domestic	 concern	 as	well.	 Feudal	 law	had	 corrupted	 the	
internal	 constitution	 of	 the	 Virginia	 colony	 itself,	 and	 1776	 was	 the	 time	 to	 correct	
defects	that	had	been	embedded	in	English	law	for	the	past	seven	centuries,	and	which	
had	been	passed	on	 to	Virginia.	This	moment,	which	 I	 call	 the	 “Jeffersonian	moment”,	
was	the	point	in	time	when	Jefferson	attempted	to	break	with	Virginia’s	feudal	heritage	
through	 a	 comprehensive	 reform	 of	 the	 colonial	 legal	 code.	 Virginia	 in	 1776	 was	 an	
imitation	of	the	reformed,	late‐stage	feudal	system	of	Tudor‐Stuart	England;	if	Jefferson	
succeeded,	 he	would	 eliminate	 these	 “feudal	 and	 unnatural	 distinctions”	 and	 create	 a	
society	“more	wholly	republican”.2		
Unlike	 J.G.A.	 Pocock’s	 “Machiavellian	 moment”,	 in	 which	 a	 newly	 established	
republic	 must	 confront	 the	 inevitability	 of	 its	 own	 future	 decline,	 the	 Jeffersonian	
moment	was	backward‐looking,	 primarily	 concerned	with	breaking	 the	 connection	 to	
the	historical	system	of	feudalism.	It	was	also	located	in	a	specific	moment	in	time.	By	






the	 people	 from	 transplanted	Old	World	 oppressions.	 The	 danger,	 as	 he	wrote	 to	 his	
mentor	George	Wythe,	was	that,	independence	being	achieved,	the	people	would	lapse	
into	 thinking	 that	 “kings,	 nobles	 and	 priests”	 were	 “conservators	 of	 the	 public	
                                                     












This	 thesis	 is	 a	 study	 of	 the	 Jeffersonian	moment	 that	 existed	 between	 1774	 and	
1786,	 in	 the	 period	 between	when	 Jefferson	 identified	 feudal	 law	 and	 society	 as	 the	
central	 issue	of	 the	colonial	 crisis	and	 the	point	at	which	his	effort	 to	 reform	colonial	
society	came	 to	an	end.	 Its	purpose	 is	 to	understand	the	ways	 in	which	 the	society	of	
colonial	 Virginia	 was	 itself	 an	 outgrowth	 of	 late‐stage	 English	 feudalism,	 and	 to	
understand	 why	 Jefferson	 thought	 that	 the	 break	 with	 Britain	 required	more	 than	 a	
formal	 Declaration	 of	 Independence.5	 	 It	 tracks	 Jefferson’s	 efforts	 at	 reform	 from	 his	
draft	 constitution	 of	 1776	 through	 his	 Revisal	 of	 the	 Laws	 of	 1777‐1786,	 and	
demonstrates	 that,	 while	 seemingly	 an	 unusual	 topic	 for	 an	 eighteenth‐century	
politician	 to	 think	 about,	 Jefferson	 operated	 within	 a	 well‐established	 tradition	 of	









Gordon	 S.	 Wood	 came	 closest	 to	 such	 a	 study	 in	 the	 first	 hundred	 pages	 of	 The	
Radicalism	 of	 the	 American	 Revolution,	 but	 even	 Wood	 stopped	 short	 by	 studying	
“monarchical”	society,	with	its	implied	focus	on	the	patriarchy	of	the	monarchy,	instead	




pre‐dated	 the	 English	 Civil	 War	 and	 the	 abolition	 of	 most	 feudal	 tenures	 by	 the	
Restoration	 Parliament	 in	 1660.	 This	 late‐stage	 feudalism,	 characterised	 by	 the	 twin	
Tudor	reforms	of	Crown	centralisation	and	the	rise	of	the	gentry	as	a	counterweight	to	
the	nobility,	was	 the	 type	of	 feudalism	practised	 in	England	when	 the	Virginia	 colony	
was	 planted	 in	 1607.	 If	 Tudor	 feudalism,	 coming	 after	 Saxon,	 Norman,	 and	 bastard	
feudalism,	was	 the	 fourth	 stage	of	 English	 feudalism,	 then	 colonial	 feudalism	was	 the	
fifth	 stage.	 It	 was	 characterised	 by	 the	 adaptation	 of	 secular	 and	 ecclesiastical	









Feudalism	 itself	 is	 a	 tricky	 term	 with	 multiple	 meanings.	 One	 definition	 is	 that	
feudalism	 was	 a	 social	 system	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 Middle	 Ages,	 characterised	 by	 the	
absence	of	organised	government	and	the	presence	of	violence,	but	also	containing	the	
basic	 premises	 of	 modern	 government’s	 contractual	 relationship	 between	 ruler	 and	
ruled.	 Another	 is	 that	 feudalism	 was	 a	 more	 narrowly	 defined	 legal	 system	 dealing	
specifically	with	a	 tripartite	 relationship	between	political	 allegiance,	military	 service,	
and	 property	 ownership,	 expressed	 in	 the	 local	 law	 of	 a	 feudal	 society	 ‐	 in	 this	 case,	
England’s	common	law.7	Furthermore,	feudalism	was	a	comparative	enterprise	‐	there	
were	 many	 different	 feudalisms.	 There	 was	 an	 English	 feudalism	 and	 a	 Scottish	
feudalism,	an	 Irish	 feudalism,	a	Canadian	 feudalism,	and	a	Virginian	 feudalism.8	While	




of	 England	 in	 1066,	 that	 it	 was	 characterised	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 secular	 and	
ecclesiastical	aristocracy	established	by	this	Normanised	common	law,	and	that	 it	was	
heavily	reliant	on	the	royal	prerogative	in	order	to	function.	In	essence,	feudalism	was	
                                                     
6	 	Gordon	S.	Wood,	The	Radicalism	of	 the	American	Revolution.	New	York:	Vintage,	
1991.	
7	 The	 legal	 definition	 of	 feudalism	 is	 best	 described	 in	 J.G.A.	 Pocock,	 The	 Ancient	
Constitution	 and	 the	 Feudal	 Law	 :	 A	 Study	 of	 English	 Historical	 Thought	 in	 the	
Seventeenth	Century:	A	Reissue	with	a	Retrospect	 .	Cambridge	 :	University	Press,	1987.	
Social	 feudalism	 is	 most	 comprehensively	 discussed	 in	 Marc	 Bloch,	 Feudal	 Society.	 2	
vols.	 Chicago:	 University	 Press,	 1961.	 Elizabeth	 A.R.	 Brown	 disputes	 the	 use	 of	
feudalism	 as	 a	 term,	 arguing	 that	 its	 meaning	 has	 been	 stretched	 to	 the	 point	 of	
meaninglessness,	in	"The	Tyranny	of	a	Construct:	Feudalism	and	Historians	of	Medieval	
Europe."	 The	 American	Historical	 Review	 79,	 no.	 4	 (1974):	 1063‐108.	 More	 recently,	
Susan	Reynolds	has	 argued	 that	 feudalism	was	entirely	 separate	 from	a	warrior	 code	
and	 was	 instead	 the	 product	 of	 property	 relationships	 in	 Fiefs	 and	 Vassals.	 Oxford:	
University	Press,	1996.	
8	A	comparative	study	of	various	European	feudal	regimes	forms	the	core	of	Book	III,	






the	 feudal	 law	 and	 the	 attendant	 local	 social	 order	 based	 on	 that	 law.	 This	
understanding	 of	 feudalism	 was	 informed	 by	 Jefferson’s	 legal	 training,	 and	 his	
understanding	of	feudal	law	was	in	the	tradition	of	Sir	Henry	Spelman,	identified	as	the	
founder	of	Anglophone	feudal	studies	by	J.G.A.	Pocock,	and	later	criticised	by	Elizabeth	
A.R.	 Brown.	 In	 deference	 to	 Brown,	 I	 concede	 that	 this	 definition	 of	 feudalism	 is	 as	





posited	 that	 American	 politics	 exhibited	 an	 unconscious	 Lockean	 liberalism.9	 Hartz’s	
goal	was	to	understand	why	the	United	States	had	not	developed	a	prominent	socialist	
movement	 and	 instead	 had	 retained	 a	 Lockean	 liberal	 consensus	 into	 the	 twentieth	
century.	 He	 concluded	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 was	 because,	 whereas	 socialist	
movements	 had	 developed	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 both	 feudalism	 and	
market	liberalism,	feudalism	had	never	existed	in	America,	and	hence	there	had	been	no	
need	 for	 America	 to	 move	 past	 liberalism	 into	 socialism.	 The	 historians	 of	 the	
“republican	revisionist”	school,	led	by	Bernard	Bailyn,	Gordon	Wood,	and	J.G.A.	Pocock,	
disputed	Hartz’s	conclusion	that	the	American	Revolution	was	a	Lockean	liberal	event	
because,	 they	 countered,	 the	 revolution	 had	 actually	 been	 an	 episode	 in	 the	 ongoing	
history	 of	 civic	 republicanism,	 in	 which	 the	 rational	 individualism	 of	 Locke	 was	 a	
decidedly	 inferior	concern	to	 the	classical	 republican	principles	of	communitarianism,	
duty,	 and	 virtue.10	 This	 claim	 progressively	 grew	 stronger	 with	 Bailyn	 arguing	 for	
republicanism	 as	 an	 influence,	 Wood	 naming	 it	 the	 most	 important	 influence,	 and	
Pocock	claiming	it	to	be	the	only	influence.		
The	 republican	 revisionists’	 criticism	 bypassed	 the	 historiographical	 premise	 of	
Hartz’s	 claim	 ‐	 that	 America	 did	 not	 have	 feudalism	 and	 that	 this	 was	 sufficient	 to	
explain	 its	 intellectual	development	 ‐	 in	 favour	of	attacking	his	 focus	on	 liberalism.	 In	
                                                     
9	 Louis	 Hartz,	 The	 Liberal	 Tradition	 in	 America.	 New	 York:	 Harcourt,	 Brace	 and	
Company,	1955.	
10	See	Bernard	Bailyn,	The	Ideological	Origins	of	the	American	Revolution.	Cambridge,	
MA:	 Belknap	 Press,	 1967;	 Gordon	 S.	 Wood,	 The	 Creation	 of	 the	 American	 Republic.	





that	America,	 uniquely	 of	 all	 the	 nations	 in	 the	Western	world,	 did	 not	 have	 a	 feudal	
past.	 	Hartz,	 in	turn,	proceeded	from	too	narrow	a	definition	of	feudalism.	By	focusing	








adapted	 itself	 to	 new	 surroundings,	 retaining	 its	 core	 attributes	 but	 developing	
situation‐specific	characteristics	as	well.	
In	 Virginia,	 feudalism	 slowly	 and	 quietly	 gathered	 strength.	While	 this	 strain	was	
weaker	 and	 less	 developed	 than	 its	 English	progenitor,	 its	 legal	 core	was	 strong,	 and	
whereas	 England	 became	 less	 feudal	 over	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 centuries,	
Virginia	became	more	 feudal.12	One	of	 Jefferson’s	greatest	 insights	was	his	 realisation	
that	the	Virginian	gentry	were	exploiting	the	tools	the	feudal	 law	put	at	their	disposal	
and	were	working	assiduously	to	raise	themselves	up	into	a	full	American	aristocracy.	
Furthermore,	 given	 their	 attempts	 to	 gain	 control	 of	 westward	 expansion,	 this	 new	
Virginian	aristocracy	would	have	continental	reach	and	would	pose	a	threat	to	the	other	
new	republics	struggling	for	their	independence.	Hence,	Jefferson	made	it	his	priority	to	
challenge	 and	 destroy	 this	 budding	 aristocracy	 through	 legal	 reform	 before	 it	 could	
mature.	
I	 would	 be	 remiss	 if	 I	 did	 not,	 at	 this	 early	 juncture,	 clearly	 state	 the	 important	
differences	 between	 the	 English	 and	 Virginian	 feudal	 systems.	 In	 England,	 the	
                                                                                                                                                                     
Machiavellian	 Moment:	 Florentine	 Political	 Thought	 and	 the	 Atlantic	 Republican	
Tradition.	2nd	edn.	Princeton:	University	Press,	2003.	
11	This	was	given	some	attention	by	Charles	M.	Andrews	 in	the	1960s,	but	has	not	
been	 developed	 further.	 See	 Charles	 M.	 Andrews,	 The	 Colonial	 Period	 in	 American	
History:	The	Settlements,	Vol.	I.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1964.	
12	 My	 interpretation	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 John	 Murrin’s	 Anglicisation	 thesis	 in	















Given	 that	historians	 such	as	Wood	and	Hartz	have	 consciously	 chosen	not	 to	use	
feudalism	 as	 an	 interpretive	 approach,	 it	 could	 reasonably	 be	 asked:	why	 start	 now?	
More	 to	 the	 point,	 is	 there	 evidence	 that	 Jefferson	 perceived	 of	 a	 “feudal”	 issue	 as	 a	
substantive,	as	opposed	to	a	rhetorical,	problem?	The	occasions	when	he	used	the	word	
suggest	 that	 he	 meant	 it	 as	 an	 analytical	 descriptor	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 ancient	
constitution	school	of	English	historical	and	legal	thought.	It	also	appears	that,	while	by	
the	end	of	his	 life	he	equated	 “feudal”	with	 “aristocratic”,	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	American	






the	 1770s.14	 No	 less	 than	 forty‐two	 entries	 in	 the	 book,	 dating	 from	 the	 early	 1760s	
through	1776,	reference	his	readings	on	feudal	law.	The	readings	concentrate	on	feudal	
property	 tenure,	 but	 some	of	 the	 later	 entries	 expand	 in	 scope	 to	 include	 institutions	
such	as	the	church,	courts,	and	military.	This	indicates	that	Jefferson’s	earliest	exposure	
to	 the	 concept	 of	 feudalism	 was	 as	 a	 holistic	 description	 of	 social	 and	 political	
organisation.	His	understanding	was	legal	and	analytical,	not	polemical	or	rhetorical.		
                                                     








The	 earliest	 usage	 of	 “feudal”	 as	 part	 of	 his	 own	 thinking	 appears	 to	 be	 in	 1774,	
when,	 in	 the	 Summary	View	 of	 the	Rights	 of	British	America,	 Jefferson	 used	 the	word	







creating	 the	 feudal	 tenure	 in	 the	 first	place.	 So	 it	 is	 clear	 that,	 by	1774,	 Jefferson	had	
expanded	his	understanding	of	“feudal”	to	include	not	only	tenures	and	institutions,	but	
also	social	relationships	and	the	constitutional	construct	of	the	prerogative.	
Jefferson	 returned	 to	 the	 topic	 of	 feudalism	 in	 a	 correspondence	 with	 fellow	
Virginian	Edmund	Pendleton	in	August	1776,	two	months	after	Jefferson	wrote	his	draft	
constitution	 for	 Virginia,	 which	 proposed	 to	 abolish	 feudal	 tenure	 and	 the	 royal	
prerogative,	 and	 two	months	 before	 Jefferson	 took	 his	 seat	 in	 the	 Virginia	 Assembly,	
where	 he	 introduced	 legislation	 seeking	 to	 enact	 those	 provisions	 of	 his	 draft	
constitution	that	had	not	been	adopted	in	the	Virginia	Convention’s	final	version	of	the	
constitution.16	The	“feudal	system”,	he	wrote	to	Pendleton,	had	been	enacted	at	the	time	
of	 the	 Norman	 Conquest	 to	 institute	 a	 “military	 system	 of	 defence”	 which	 had	
“afterwards	been	made	an	engine	of	 immense	oppression”.	While	 feudalism’s	military	
formations	were	no	 longer	 in	use,	 its	 “legal	effects”	upon	society	persisted.	Therefore,	





and	 a	 term	 as	 a	 member	 of	 Congress	 in	 1784,	 Jefferson	 went	 to	 Paris	 to	 serve	 as	
American	minister	to	France.	Living	in	France	allowed	Jefferson	to	observe	a	European	
feudal	society	first	hand,	and	it	hardened	his	opposition	to	the	feudal	system.	His	letters	







to	 correspondents	 in	 Virginia	were	 laced	with	 criticism	of	 French	 feudalism,	 some	 of	
which	was	against	the	aristocracy	of	“kings,	nobles,	and	priests”,	whom	he	denounced	as	
“an	 abandoned	 confederacy	 against	 the	 happiness	 of	 the	mass	 of	 people”.18	 Yet	 other	
parts	of	Jefferson’s	criticism	were	against	the	feudal	system	itself,	as	when,	in	a	letter	to	
James	 Madison,	 he	 described	 an	 encounter	 with	 a	 peasant	 woman.19	 The	 woman,	
representative	of	France’s	large	underclass,	was	poor	because	feudal	tenures	had	locked	
up	 economic	 production	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 landowning	 aristocracy.	 The	 tenure	
therefore	had	an	impact	on	the	entire	system	of	social	and	economic	relations,	Jefferson	
maintained,	and	was	not	simply	a	problem	of	the	aristocracy	alone.	
After	 returning	 from	 France	 and	 entering	 national	 politics,	 Jefferson	 continued	 to	
inveigh	 against	 “aristocracy”	 and	 “monarchy”,	 while	 “feudal”	 dropped	 out	 of	 his	
nomenclature.	He	reintroduced	the	topic	of	feudalism	in	his	retirement	correspondence	
with	 John	 Adams.	 In	 a	 letter	 of	 October	 1813,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 discussion	 of	 aristocracy,	
Jefferson	 made	 clear	 to	 Adams	 that	 he	 did	 not	 oppose	 aristocracy	 as	 a	 concept,	 but	
rather	 aristocracy	 in	 its	 feudal	 form.	 Jefferson	 accepted	 the	 Greek	 definition	 of	
aristocracy	as	rule	by	those	of	the	greatest	“virtue	and	talents”,	and	even	accepted	that,	
at	 a	 time	when	 “bodily	powers”	were	 the	best	mark	of	 excellence,	 the	 feudal	noblesse	
d’epee	 had	 been	 a	 natural	 aristocracy,	 but	 that	 since	 “the	 invention	 of	 gunpowder”,	
physical	 strength	 was	 no	 longer	 a	 mark	 of	 virtue.	 The	 various	 forms	 of	 feudal	
aristocracy	 now	 formed	 an	 “artificial”	 social	 ordering,	 best	 replaced	 by	 a	 “natural	
aristocracy”	 of	 individuals	 with	 the	 “virtue	 and	 wisdom”	 necessary	 for	 civic	
leadership.20	In	his	Autobiography	of	1821,	Jefferson	referred	back	to	his	efforts	of	the	
1770s	as	an	attempt	to	“eradicate”	the	old,	artificial	aristocracy,	 in	part	by	eliminating	




Much	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 concerned,	 not	 just	 with	 Jefferson’s	 thought,	 but	 also	
evaluating	that	thought	within	the	context	of	society	as	it	actually	existed	in	Virginia	in	















important.	 He	 was	 not	 claiming	 that	 Virginia	 was	 a	 feudal	 society	 in	 the	 image	 of	
Norman	England	or	the	High	Middle	Ages	in	Europe.	He	openly	acknowledged	that	the	
military	 aspects	 of	 feudalism	no	 longer	 existed	 in	 England	 and	 never	 had	 in	Virginia.	
Instead,	he	claimed	that	the	land	tenure	of	feudalism,	and	the	non‐military	parts	of	the	
social	 organisation	 that	 resulted	 from	 it,	 had	 continued	 down	 the	 ages,	 undergoing	
reforms	through	statute,	but	never	actually	ceasing	to	exist.	Claiming	that	England	and	
Virginia	 were	 better	 societies	 for	 what	 had	 “hitherto	 [been]	 abolished	 of	 the	 feudal	
system”,	Jefferson	now	advocated	for	completing	the	process	of	feudal	abolition.22	
It	 is	 challenging	 to	 say	 precisely	 what	 Jefferson	 thought	 this	 feudal	 system	 was	
composed	of	in	its	entirety.	The	land	tenure,	the	royal	prerogative	by	which	the	tenure	
was	granted,	 and	 the	 feudal	 law	built	 up	around	both	prerogative	 and	 tenure	are	 the	
most	obvious	elements	from	the	Summary	View,	and	ones	which	he	devoted	substantial	




law	as	part	of	 the	secular	code,	and	 the	Virginian	church’s	close	relationship	with	 the	
secular	 aristocracy,	 all	 of	 which	 Jefferson	 wrote	 of	 repeatedly	 in	 France	 and	 in	 his	
retirement.	On	 the	other	hand,	 Jefferson	did	not	 seem	to	 identify	 slavery	as	a	 form	of	
unfree	labour	akin	to	serfdom	or	villeinage,	nor	plantations	with	the	manorial	political	
economy	 that	 characterised	 feudal	 England.	 While	 his	 opposition	 to	 slavery	 and	 his	
support	 for	 yeoman	 farming	 indicate	 that	 slavery	 and	 plantations	 may	 have	 been	
implicit	parts	of	the	feudal	system,	he	did	not	label	them	as	such.	
	






Jefferson’s	 contemporaries	were	unconvinced	by	his	 views,	 differing	with	him	not	
over	 the	 diagnosis	 of	 a	 feudal	 system	 but	 the	 prognosis	 of	 whether	 it	 was	 an	 issue	
urgently	 in	 need	 of	 attention.	 Edmund	 Pendleton	 was	 a	 member	 of	 Jefferson’s	
committee	 for	 the	Revisal	of	 the	Laws,	 as	well	 as	Speaker	of	 the	House,	 and	 it	was	 in	
their	August	1776	correspondence	that	 Jefferson	revealed	his	concern	over	feudalism.	
Pendleton’s	response	to	Jefferson’s	letter	on	feudal	society	may	have	been	indicative	of	
the	 views	 of	 other	 conservative	 members	 of	 the	 Virginia	 Assembly	 who	 resisted	




without	 the	 concomitant	 military	 organisation,	 or	 even	 whether	 the	 feudal	 system	
might	actually	be	put	towards	good	use.	It	was	“the	slavish	nature	of	the	Feuds	which	
made	 them	 oppressive	 to	 the	 tenant	 and	 inconsistent	 with	 freedom,	 and	 the	
establishment	 of	 a	 Military	 force	 independant	 [sic]	 of	 the	 legislature”	 that	 made	
feudalism	in	its	original	form	so	pernicious,	Pendleton	wrote.	In	contrast,	“I	am	not	able	








better	 to	 update	 the	 feudal	 system	 rather	 than	 attempt	 to	 turn	 back	 the	 clock	 and	
reinstitute	the	Saxon	system,	as	Jefferson	proposed.	Indeed,	Pendleton	saw	in	the	feudal	
system	 the	 roots	 of	 Virginia’s	 stability,	 writing	 to	 another	 correspondent	 that	 “the	
Feudal	system	had	placed	the	legal	title	to	the	lands”	within	the	royal	prerogative,	and	
that	 the	 territorial	 authority	 of	 the	 new	 Virginian	 government	 itself	 was	 therefore	










Pendleton,	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	 Jefferson	 intended	 “feudal	 system”	 and	 “feudal	 and	




“natural”	 as	 antithetical	 concepts	 had	 basis	 in	 legal	 theory.	 It	 would	 be	 unwise	 to	
mistake	his	use	of	either	as	only	rhetorical.	
As	detailed	thoroughly	by	Charles	A.	Miller,	Jefferson	used	the	word	“natural”	in	an	
unsystematic	 but	 broadly	 consistent	 way,	 using	 it	 to	 refer	 to	 something	 as	 being	 “in	
contrast	to	socially	determined	tradition”,	in	particular	“the	legacy	of	medieval	science,	
the	 power	 of	 organized	 religion,	 and	 the	 feudal,	 class‐based	 institutions	 of	 state	 and	
society.”25	Social	formations	could	be	evaluated	according	to	their	consistency	with	the	
tenets	 of	 natural	 law,	 an	 approach	 adopted	 contemporaneously	 by	 the	writers	 of	 the	
Scottish	 Enlightenment	 whom	 Jefferson	 read	 as	 a	 student.	 Yet	 Jefferson	 was	 not	 as	
systematic	 as	 the	 Scottish	 literati,	 invoking	 nature,	 as	 Miller	 describes	 it,	 “always	 on	








may	partly	be	due	 to	 the	absence	of	 an	exposition	on	natural	 law	 that	 is	as	 clear	and	
concise	as	Jefferson’s	discourse	on	the	feudal	system	in	the	middle	of	the	Summary	View,	
                                                     
24	“To	Joseph	Jones”,	10	February	1781,	in	EP	Papers,	Vol.	I,	pp.	328‐338.	





or	 in	 his	 correspondence	 with	 Pendleton	 in	 1776.	 Much	 of	 that	 correspondence	 has	
been	lost,	as	Pendleton	did	not	retain	all	of	Jefferson’s	letters	to	him.	What	we	do	have	
indicates	that	while	Jefferson	was	still	not	precise,	he	had	a	definite	“feudal	system”	in	
mind,	whereas	he	did	not	have	 a	 “natural	 system”,	 holding	nature	 instead	 as	 a	 vague	
ideal	to	work	towards	while	the	feudal	system	was	a	concrete	arrangement	of	laws	and	
institutions	to	be	reformed.	
Jefferson’s	purpose	 in	his	use	of	 “feudal”	 thus	 seems	 clear,	 and	he	did	not	use	 the	
word	 loosely	 as	 an	 epithet	 or	 otherwise	 insincerely.	 At	 many	 points	 in	 the	 1770s,	
Jefferson	 asserted	 that	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	 feudal	 system	 infringed	 natural	 law	 or	
natural	 right	 (the	monarch’s	 claim	 to	 the	 allegiance	 of	 émigrés	was	 a	 violation	 of	 the	









Before	 closing	 this	 section,	 I	 should	 say	 a	 few	 words	 as	 to	 why	 I	 have	 chosen	
feudalism,	 as	 opposed	 to	 aristocracy,	 for	 my	 interpretation	 of	 Jefferson’s	 legislation.	
This	 is	 especially	 important	 considering	 that	 aristocracy	 is	 the	more	 familiar	 term	 in	
Jeffersonian	 scholarship.28	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 study,	 aristocracy	 is	 too	 limited	 a	
                                                                                                                                                                     
26	Ibid.,	p.	183.	
27	Ibid.,	p.	5.	
28	 It	 is	 noteworthy,	 however,	 that	 for	 all	 of	 its	 use	 in	 discussions	 of	 other	 topics,	
there	 is	 little	 focused	 discussion	 of	 aristocracy	 as	 its	 own	 topic.	 Shuffleton’s	
Bibliography	 contains	 only	 a	 few	 references	 to	 aristocracy‐focused	 entries	 in	 the	
Jefferson	literature	up	until	1990;	those	references	are	almost	exclusively	regarding	the	
sub‐topic	 of	 “natural	 aristocracy”.	 See	 Frank	 Shuffleton,	 Thomas	 Jefferson:	 A	
Comprehensive,	Annotated	Bibliography	of	Writings	About	Him	(1826‐1980).	New	York	&	
London:	Garland	Publishing,	Inc.,	1983;	and	Thomas	Jefferson,	1981‐1990:	An	Annotated	
Bibliography.	 New	 York	 &	 London:	 Garland	 Publishing,	 Inc.,	 1992.	 Subsequent	
scholarship,	 including	 the	many	recent	survey	volumes	on	 Jefferson,	do	not	contained	
dedicated,	 chapter‐length	 discussions	 of	 Jefferson	 and	 aristocracy,	 nor	 does	 the	 term	






upper‐class	 people	 supported	 by	 favourable	 property	 arrangements,	 often	 but	 not	
always	 bearing	 titles	 of	 nobility.	 “Feudalism”,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 a	 more	
encompassing	 term	 that	 includes	 the	 royal	 prerogative	 and	 the	 constitutional	 system	
within	 which	 the	 aristocracy	 exists.	 Furthermore,	 “feudal	 system”,	 a	 synonym	 for	
feudalism,	was	 the	 term	 Jefferson	himself	used	 to	describe	Virginia	during	 the	1770s.	
For	this	reason,	“feudalism”	is	a	better	term	than	“aristocracy”;	but	since	aristocracy	is	




with	 “monocrat”)	 his	 favourite	 epithet	 for	 political	 opponents.	 His	 use	 of	 the	 word	
softened	later	in	life,	though,	after	an	exchange	of	letters	with	John	Adams,	in	which	he	
admitted	that	his	opposition	was	really	 to	the	artificial	aristocracies	created	by	 feudal	
land	 tenure	 and	 church	 establishment,	 not	 the	 “natural	 aristocracy”	 of	 the	 best	 and	
brightest	 whom	 he	 hoped	 would	 be	 promoted	 through	 the	 education	 system.29	
Jefferson’s	 interest	 in	 aristocracy	 has	 attracted	 the	 notice	 of	 countless	 scholars	 who	
have	mentioned	aristocracy	in	passing.	One	historian	in	particular,	Peter	Onuf,	has	made	
it	a	centrepiece	of	his	more	recent	work.	
Onuf’s	work	 on	 aristocracy	 is	most	 focused	when	 discussing	 Jefferson’s	 theory	 of	
generational	sovereignty.	After	observing	the	feudal	system	in	France,	 Jefferson	wrote	
to	James	Madison	that	he	believed	feudal	tenures,	particularly	entails,	to	be	a	violation	
of	 a	 natural	 order	 in	 which	 landowners	 had	 only	 a	 lifetime,	 “usufruct”	 right	 to	 their	
                                                     
29	 See	 “To	 John	Adams”,	 28	October	 1812,	 in	 Cappon,	 Vol.	 II,	 pp.	 387‐392.	 Dumas	
Malone	writes	 that	 Jefferson	opposed	“all	 the	artificialities	of	aristocracy”,	and	that	 “it	
did	 not	 take	 him	 long	 to	 discover	 that	 native	 ability	 and	 high	 character	 are	 the	 sole	
possession	 of	 no	 class”.	 See	 Malone,	 Jefferson	 the	 Virginian.	 London:	 Eyre	 &	
Spottiswoode,	 1948,	 p.	 xiv.	 More	 recently,	 Garrett	 Ward	 Sheldon	 has	 explained	
Jefferson’s	natural	 aristocracy	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 syllogism:	 “Man	 is	naturally	 social,	 the	
social	qualities	are	wisdom	and	virtue;	hence,	the	most	wise	and	good	man	is	the	best	
and	 most	 natural,	 or	 the	 natural	 aristocrat.”	 See	 Sheldon,	 The	 Political	 Philosophy	 of	
Thomas	 Jefferson.	 Baltimore:	 Johns	 Hopkins	 University	 Press,	 1994,	 pp.	 79‐80.	 A	 full	








land.30	 This	 led	 Jefferson	 to	 a	 generational	 theory	 of	 politics	 in	 which	 different	
generations	 were	 as	 sovereign	 from	 each	 other	 in	 time	 as	 nations	 were	 in	 space.31	
According	to	Onuf,	Jefferson	believed	that	aristocracy	blocked	the	natural	transference	
of	 assets	 from	 generation	 to	 generation.	 “Under	 aristocracy,”	 Onuf	writes,	 “the	 rising	
generation	 [as	 a	 whole]	 could	 never	 hope	 to	 exercise	 its	 rightful	 authority	 as	 a	
generation,	 but	 individual	 children	 would	 at	 least	 come	 into	 their	 particular	
inheritances,	unequal	and	unearned	as	they	might	be.”32			
Onuf’s	 explanation	 of	 Jefferson’s	 generational	 theory,	 that	 aristocracy	 allowed	 the	
“founders	of	great	…	families”	to	“attempt	to	rule	from	beyond	the	grave”	is	an	attractive	
one,	but	was	the	generational	theory	actually	about	aristocracy?33	At	least	one	scholar,	
Herbert	 Sloan,	has	 argued	 that	 it	was	 about	one	entire	 generation,	not	 just	particular	
families,	 determining	 the	 general	 arrangements	 of	 another,	 putting	 emphasis	 on	 the	
discussion	of	national	debt	 that	 formed	 the	core	of	 Jefferson’s	 letter	on	 the	 topic.34	 In	
light	of	these	different	emphases	on	aristocracy	and	indebtedness,	a	turn	to	the	source	
material	shows	that	an	interpretation	more	expansive	than	any	one	issue	is	correct.	Yes,	
Jefferson	 wrote	 that	 generational	 sovereignty	 concerned	 whether	 “the	 nation	 may	
change	 the	 descent	 of	 lands	 holden	 in	 tail”,	 thereby	 establishing	 an	 aristocratic	
connection.	But	Jefferson	went	on	to	include	“the	church	…	hospitals,	colleges,	orders	of	
chivalry,	 and	otherwise	…	 the	 charges	 and	privileges	 attached	on	 lands,	 including	 the	
whole	 catalogue	 ecclesiastical	 and	 feudal	 ….	 hereditary	 offices,	 authorities	 and	
jurisdictions	…	hereditary	orders,	distinctions	and	appellations	…	perpetual	monopolies	
                                                     
30	“To	James	Madison”,	6	Sept.	1789,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	XV,	pp.	392‐398.	
31	Onuf	errs,	though,	by	interpreting	Jefferson	as	believing	that	the	relation	between	











34	 Herbert	 Sloan,	 “The	 Earth	 Belongs	 in	 Usufruct	 to	 the	 Living”.	 In	 Jeffersonian	








is	 to	 simplify	 the	 richness	 of	 his	 description	 of	 what	 Sloan	 describes	 as	 “feudal	
privileges”	and	“feudal	abuses”.35	
Aside	 from	 generational	 sovereignty,	 Onuf’s	 other	 discussions	 of	 Jefferson	 and	
aristocracy	 focus	more	on	aristocracy	as	a	 social	 than	a	 legal	 institution.	 In	 Jefferson’s	
Empire,	 Onuf	 argued	 that	 one	 of	 Jefferson’s	 main	 concerns	 during	 the	 American	
Revolution	 was	 dismantling	 the	 Virginian	 aristocracy	 by	 ending	 feudal	 tenure	 in	
Virginia,	 particularly	 though	 his	 bills	 abolishing	 primogeniture	 and	 entail.36	 Onuf	 did	
not	 make	 feudal	 tenure	 the	 focus	 of	 his	 enquiry,	 however,	 choosing	 instead	 to	
emphasise	 how	 Jefferson	 thought	 American	 Indian	 men	 formed	 an	 “unnatural	
aristocracy”	on	the	western	frontier,	as	did	the	stockholders	of	land	companies.37	While	
there	was	some	merit	to	the	inclusion	of	the	stockholders,	the	argument	concerning	the	
Indians	 involved	 redefining	 aristocracy	 to	 encompass	 Jefferson’s	 description	 of	
American	Indian	warriors	as	“a	standing	army”	 living	off	of	 the	 labour	of	women.38	 In	
doing	 so,	 Onuf	moved	 the	 focus	 from	 aristocracy	 as	 a	 social	 group	 grounded	 in	 land	
laws,	as	he	had	previously	defined	it	in	Virginia,	to	a	wider	definition	that	encompassed	
gender	and	labour	relations	that	were	not	codified	in	law.	
Returning	 to	 the	 topic	 of	 aristocracy	 in	The	Mind	 of	 Jefferson,	 Onuf	 again	 defined	
aristocracy	as	“the	dominion	of	privileged	families	whose	estates	were	preserved	across	
                                                     
35	Ibid.,	pp.	286,	294.	Likewise,	Michael	Grossberg,	in	his	discussion	of	generational	
theory	and	Jefferson’s	reforms	to	inheritance	law,	refers	to	“artificial	feudal	hierarchy”,	









an	aristocracy.	 In	 republican	 thought,	 a	 standing	army	was	a	despotic	 alternative	and	
threat	 to	 an	 aristocracy,	 which	 consisted	 of	 part‐time	 landed	 warriors.	 See	 the	
discussion	 of	 standing	 armies	 and	 aristocracies	 in	 J.G.A.	 Pocock,	 "Machiavelli,	
Harrington	and	English	Political	Ideologies	in	the	Eighteenth	Century."	The	William	and	
Mary	Quarterly	22,	no.	4	(1965):	549‐583,	at	pp.	558‐563.	Without	direct	quotation	of	






shifted	 from	 using	 “aristocracy”	 to	 refer	 to	 this	 specific	 group	 of	 landed	 Anglo‐
Virginians,	 however,	 and	 instead	 used	 it	 to	 refer	 to	 groups	 as	 diverse	 as	 populist	
politicians	 (“artful	aristocrats”)	and	American	 Indians	 (“frontier	aristocrats”).40	Onuf’s	






while	offering	some	promising	 leads,	 clearly	 considers	aristocracy	 from	a	wide	social,	
rather	 than	 narrow	 legal,	 approach.	 It	 also	 exaggerates	 the	 importance	 of	 aristocracy	
within	 Jefferson’s	 theory	 of	 generational	 sovereignty	 and	 does	 not	 give	 proper	
treatment	 to	 feudal	 land	 tenure	 or	 the	 royal	 prerogative.	 Finally,	 as	Merrill	 Peterson	
notes,	 the	 theory	 of	 generational	 sovereignty	 “grew	 out	 of	 the	 European	 situation,	
specifically	 the	 situation	 of	 France	 in	 1789”.41	 To	 impose	 Onuf’s	 interpretation	 of	
generational	 sovereignty	 on	 Jefferson’s	 work	 fifteen	 years	 earlier	 therefore	 risks	
anachronism,	 as	 Jefferson’s	 thinking	 had	 not	 yet	 developed	 that	 far.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	
                                                     
39	Onuf,	Mind	of	Jefferson,	p.	169.	In	her	important	study	of	entails	in	Virginia,	Holly	
Brewer	 makes	 her	 position	 unambiguous:	 “Entail	 and	 primogeniture	 were	 feudal	
institutions	 critical	 to	 the	 growth	 and	 perpetuation	 of	 aristocracy	 and	 slavery	 in	 the	
South.”	 Holly	 Brewer,	 “Entailing	 Aristocracy	 in	 Colonial	 Virginia:	 ‘Ancient	 Feudal	
Restraints’	 and	 Revolutionary	 Reform."	 The	 William	 and	 Mary	 Quarterly	 54,	 no.	 2	
(1997):	307‐346,	at	311.	I	have	two	observations	on	this	statement.	First,	Brewer	treats	
entail	and	primogeniture	as	 the	 foundations	of	aristocracy	and	slavery	separately,	but	
not	 necessarily	 of	 a	 larger	 system	 incorporating	 both.	 Second,	 she	 treats	 entail	 and	
primogeniture	in	a	similarly	compartmentalised	fashion,	at	no	point	identifying	them	as	
part	of	a	larger	system	of	socage	tenure.	
40	 This	 is	 clearly	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Onuf	 formally	 defined	
“aristocracy”	at	the	beginning	of	his	chapter.	Male	American	Indians	assuredly	did	not	
benefit	 from	 a	 system	 of	 feudal	 land	 tenure.	 For	 “artful	 aristocrats”	 and	 “frontier	
aristocrats”,	see	Mind	of	Jefferson,	pp.	36,	220.	
41	 Merrill	 Peterson,	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 New	 Nation:	 A	 Biography.	 Oxford:	
University	Press,	1970,	p.	383.	Boyd	et	al.,	in	their	essay	accompanying	Jefferson’s	letter	
to	 Madison,	 also	 note	 that	 the	 generational	 theory	 was	 “irrelevant	 to	 the	 existing	
situation	in	America”.	While	I	agree	with	Onuf	that	actually	it	was	relevant,	Boyd	et	al.	
are	 correct	 in	 pointing	 out	 that	 it	was	 an	 idea	 Jefferson	 conceived	 in	 response	 to	 the	

















identified	 “the	 feudal	 issue	 as	 one	 whose	 consideration	 in	 American	 history	 is	 long	
overdue.”42	Hartz	defined	feudalism	narrowly,	declaring	that	it	“refers	technically	to	the	
medieval	 era”,	 and	 that	 “aspects	of	 the	decadent	 feudalism	of	 the	 [late	Middle	Ages]”,	
including	 “primogeniture,	 entail,	 and	 quitrents,	 were	 present	 in	 America	 even	 in	 the	
eighteenth	 century.”43	 Having	 stated	 this,	 however,	 Hartz	 went	 on	 to	 minimise	
feudalism’s	actual	importance	to	Americans,	noting	that	colonists	emigrating	to	British	
America	had	been	motivated	by	a	desire	to	escape	the	restrictions	of	feudalism	and	that	
feudalism	 had	 not	 actually	 been	 established	 in	 the	 New	 World.	 As	 a	 result,	 “the	
outstanding	thing	about	the	American	effort	of	1776	was	bound	to	be,	not	the	freedom	
to	which	it	led,	but	the	established	feudal	structure	it	did	not	have	to	destroy.”44	
The	 flaw	 in	 Hartz’s	 thesis	 was	 his	 overly	 narrow	 definition	 of	 feudalism.	 While	
acknowledging	 that	 “wide	 variations	 take	 place”	 within	 European	 feudalism,	 Hartz	
dismissed	 the	presence	 of	 feudalism	 in	America	 by	 arguing	 that	 all	 that	 existed	were	
“relics”	 such	 as	 primogeniture	 and	 entail,	 and	 that	 the	 absence	 was	 further	 proved	
because	“the	American	‘aristocracy’	could	not,	as	Tocqueville	pointed	out,	inspire	either	
the	‘love’	or	the	‘hatred’	that	surrounded	the	ancient	titled	aristocracies	of	Europe.”45	By	
defining	 feudal	 institutions	 as	 “relics”,	 Hartz	 assumed	 their	 insignificance	 without	
substantiating	the	claim,	and	led	him	to	state	tautologically	that	“it	is	the	fact	that	feudal	







relics	 such	 as	 primogeniture	 abolished	 by	 the	 American	 revolutionaries	were	 indeed	
relics	‐	which	explains	the	nature	of	their	abolition.	And	this	fact	ramifies	outwards	into	
every	other	phase	of	the	revolutionary	experience.”46	Of	course,	it	was	the	abolition	of	
primogeniture	 that	 made	 it	 a	 relic	 –	 it	 was	 an	 important	 part	 of	 Virginia	 property	
inheritance	 throughout	 the	 colonial	 period,	 and	 continued	 in	 private	wills	 for	 a	 good	
time	thereafter.47	
The	years	 following	the	publication	of	The	Liberal	Tradition	 saw	the	publication	of	




had	attendant	consequences	 for	 the	colonial	 legal	 systems	built	on	 the	English	model.	
Had	Hartz	been	able	to	take	Pocock’s	findings	into	account,	he	might	have	reconsidered	
his	 blanket	minimisation	 of	 feudalism’s	 presence	 in	 the	 colonies.	He	would	 also	 have	
benefited	from	French	historian	Marc	Bloch’s	definition	of	feudalism	in	his	two‐volume	
Feudal	Society,	translated	from	the	French	and	published	in	the	United	States	in	1961.49		
Bloch	 argued	 that	 feudalism	 was	 more	 comprehensive	 than	 a	 simple	 relationship	
between	 Crown	 and	 nobles	 characterised	 by	 land	 tenure	 in	 exchange	 for	 military	
service;	 instead,	Bloch	showed,	 feudalism	 involved	all	 three	estates	of	nobility,	 clergy,	
and	commons,	the	relationships	within	and	between	each	one	affecting	the	others.		
Pocock	and	Bloch,	however,	 remained	 focused	on	Europe	and	did	not	 address	 the	
feudal	 offshoots	 in	 the	 American	 colonies.	 Therefore,	 given	 the	 flaws	 in	 Hartz’s	
approach,	a	truly	focused	interrogation	of	American	feudalism	was	still	unavailable	and	
has	remained	so.	Gordon	Wood	came	very	close	to	doing	so	in	his	comprehensive	study	
of	 the	 transformation	 of	 American	 civil	 society	 in	 The	 Radicalism	 of	 the	 American	
                                                                                                                                                                     
45	Ibid.,	p.	52.	
46	Ibid.,	p.	67.	
47	 For	 a	 thorough	 study	 of	 property	 reform	 in	 Virginia,	 I	 have	 turned	 to	 Holly	
Brewer,	 "Entailing	 Aristocracy	 in	 Colonial	 Virginia:	 ‘Ancient	 Feudal	 Restraints’	 and	
Revolutionary	 Reform”;	 and	 C.	 Ray	 Keim,	 "Primogeniture	 and	 Entail	 in	 Colonial	
Virginia."	The	William	and	Mary	Quarterly	25,	no.	4	(1968):	545‐586.	Brewer	and	Keim	








probing	 such	 issues	 as	 hierarchy,	 patriarchy,	 and	 patronage	 before	 the	 American	
Revolution.	 It	 could	 have	 been	 a	 major	 breakthrough	 in	 the	 study	 of	 feudalism	 in	





Kames,	 and	 the	 philosopher	 Adam	 Smith.	 These	 writers	 devoted	 substantial	 parts	 of	
their	 treatises	 to	 feudalism	 ‐	Kames	 to	 the	development	of	 feudal	 law	and	 its	 shaping	
effect	 on	 social	 institutions	 and	 Smith	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 feudal	 system	 of	
agricultural	production	and	its	distorting	effect	on	European	economic	development.	In	
the	American	colonies	as	well,	feudalism	was	recognised	as	a	relevant	issue	in	colonial	
society,	prompting	 John	Adams	to	pen	A	Dissertation	on	 the	Canon	and	Feudal	Law,	 in	
which	 he	 characterised	 colonial	 disobedience	 as	 resistance	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	
feudalism	 into	New	England.51	 Adams	did	 not	 think	 that	 feudalism	already	 existed	 in	
Massachusetts,	a	colony	founded	by	Puritans	who	were,	amongst	other	things,	eager	to	
escape	feudalism	in	England,	but	he	identified	the	threat	of	feudalism	as	a	prime	mover	
of	 revolutionary	 sentiment	 and	 feared	 its	 spread	 from	 recently‐conquered	 Quebec.	
James	Wilson,	an	immigrant	from	Scotland,	probed	the	complex	web	of	feudal	allegiance	
that	 bound	 the	 colonies	 to	 the	mother	 island;	 and	 of	 course,	 Jefferson	 himself	 made	





well	 as	 by	 the	 late	 Saxon	 clergy.	 Socially,	 Jefferson	 saw	 feudalism	as	 contained	 in	 the	












two	 aristocracies:	 the	 “artificial	 aristocracy”	 of	 the	 hereditary	 landed	 gentry	 and	 the	
“aristocracy	of	the	clergy”	of	the	Established	Church,	and	in	the	subservient	relationship	
of	 the	 great	 masses	 of	 the	 commons	 with	 this	 “Pseudo‐aristocracy”,	 or,	 as	 Jefferson	
pithily	put	 it,	 the	“Pseudalists”.53	 It	seems	that,	when	Jefferson	referred	to	aristocracy,	
he	 really	 meant	 the	 gentry,	 who	 held	 their	 lands	 by	 feudal	 tenure	 and	 monopolised	
control	of	civil	and	ecclesiastical	offices;	the	role	of	the	frocked	clergy	was	a	much	more	




the	corruption	of	governance	 through	 the	use	of	prerogative	powers	by	 the	executive	
and	 judicial	 branches.	He	 singled	 out	 the	 English	monarchy’s	 assumption	 of	 properly	
legislative	powers	as	examples	of	executive	prerogative,	and	of	judges’	improper	use	of	
pardons	and	discretionary	sentencing,	such	as	the	right	of	clergy,	as	judicial	prerogative.	
Further	 complicating	matters	was	 the	 feudal	 system	of	 allegiance	and	protection,	 still	
operative	in	1776,	and	which	bound	common	subjects	to	the	Crown	by	birth	rather	than	
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be	 collectively	 described	 only	 as	 “liberal”	 in	 a	 way	 that	 “republican”,	 with	 its	
communitarianism,	cannot.	
Vaguer	terms	such	as	“liberty”	and	“freedom”	are	similarly	inadequate	for	capturing	
the	 intellectual	 consistency	 of	 Jefferson’s	 views	 ‐	 he	 was	 not	 committed	 to	 a	 loose	
conception	 of	 liberty,	 but	 had	 a	 highly	 developed	 liberal	 outlook	 that	 ensured	
consistency	across	his	constitutional	and	 legislative	 thought	during	this	 time	period.55	
There	 is	 a	 philosophy	 of	 self	 underpinning	 Locke’s	 liberalism,	 as	 in	 Jefferson’s,	 that	
cannot	 be	 found	 in	 vaguer	 terms,	 nor	 in	 republican	 thought,	 with	 its	 focus	 on	 the	
community	and	things	external	to	the	individual	such	as	property‐holding	and	military	







among	 them,	 and	 was	 expanded	 and	 developed	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 human	 activity	 by	




Hartz’s	The	Liberal	Tradition	 in	America.	Responding	 in	part	 to	Progressive	historians	
who	denied	the	motivating	role	of	ideas	in	American	political	history,	Hartz	countered	
that	 the	 United	 States	 had	 a	 political	 culture	 defined	 by	 liberalism.	 This	 “irrational	
Lockianism”,	as	Hartz	put	it,	was	so	deeply	ingrained	that	Americans	were	not	conscious	
of	it,	nor	aware	that	without	the	countervailing	influence	of	an	equivalent	to	Sir	Robert	
Filmer’s	 absolute	monarchism,	 the	meaning	 of	 Lockean	 liberalism	 itself	was	 changed,	
losing	 its	 original	 function	 as	 a	 rebuttal	 to	 the	 legacy	 of	 feudalism	 in	 early	 modern	
England.56		
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Indeed,	 Hartz	 posited	 that	 while	 the	 southern	 slave‐holding	 states	 formed	 the	
closest	 thing	 America	 had	 to	 European	 feudalism,	 it	 was	 not	 actually	 the	 same	 and	
therefore	failed	to	exert	the	same	“conservative”,	ancien	regime‐preserving	influence	as	
that	of	conservatism	in	Britain.	“[The	South]	has	been	an	alien	child	in	a	liberal	family,”	
Hartz	 wrote,	 “tortured	 and	 confused,	 driven	 to	 a	 fantasy	 life	 which,	 instead	 of	
disproving	the	power	of	Locke	in	America,	portrays	more	poignantly	than	anything	else	
the	tyranny	he	has	had.”57	In	this,	Hartz	understated	the	case	for	the	South’s	feudalism;	
as	 I	shall	show	throughout	 this	 thesis,	 the	 legal	structure	of	 feudalism	 in	Virginia	was	
strong	 even	 if	 the	 social	 norms	 associated	 with	 feudalism	 were	 either	 dormant	 or	
adapted	to	the	needs	of	the	gentry,	who	despite	their	lack	of	noble	titles	were	perfectly	
able	and	willing	to	assume	the	role	of	aristocrats.	





towards	 change	 that	 the	whole	provides.	 It	 lapses	 into	 a	 kind	of	 immobility.”58	These	
static	societies,	embodying	the	archetype	of	a	nation	in	a	particular	point	in	time,	were	
“unrecognizable	 in	 European	 terms”.	 Therefore,	 a	 “feudal	 fragment”	 such	 as	 French	
Canada	would	have	feudal	traits	without	being	subject	to	the	same	reformist	impulses	
as	 the	 original	 feudal	 society	 in	 Europe,	 and	 a	 “liberal	 fragment”,	 such	 as	 the	 future	
United	 States,	would	 have	 a	 national	 identity	 confined	within	 liberalism’s	 intellectual	
boundaries.	“A	part	detaches	itself	from	the	whole,”	Hartz	explained,	“the	whole	fails	to	
renew	itself,	and	the	part	develops	without	inhibition.”59	
So	Hartz	proposed	 that	 feudal	 societies	 could	exist	 in	 colonial	 settings,	but	denied	
that	any	of	the	American	colonies	had	been	one	of	these	feudal	fragments.	The	proposed	
“feudal	 revival”	 came	 a	 few	 years	 later,	 in	 an	 essay	 by	 Rowland	 Berthoff	 and	 John	
Murrin.	Murrin’s	interpretation	reflected	his	“Anglicisation”	thesis,	which	held	that	the	
colonies	were	 becoming	more	 similar	 to	 Old	World	 society	 as	 they	 developed,	 while	










levels	 of	 social	 mobility	 during	 the	 colonial	 era,	 relative	 to	 mobility	 in	 subsequent	
centuries,	although	with	greater	individual	equality	than	in	Europe.60	Rebutting	Hartz’s	
declaration	of	American	liberalism,	Berthoff	and	Murrin	hypothesised	that	there	was	a	
“feudal	 revival”	 in	 British	 America	 between	 the	 granting	 of	 the	 proprietary	 colonies	
during	the	Stuart	Restoration	and	the	legislation	of	the	colonial	crisis.	
Berthoff	and	Murrin	specifically	disagreed	with	what	 they	characterised	as	Hartz’s	
assessment	 that	 “feudalism	was	 too	 anachronistic	 to	 survive	 in	 the	 free	 air	 of	 a	 new	
world.”	 Instead,	 they	argued	 that	 seventeenth‐century	America	was	 “too	primitive”	 to	
sustain	feudal	institutions,	but	by	the	late	eighteenth	century	the	colonies	could	sustain	
the	 “differentiation	of	 function”	 required	 for	 a	 feudal	 society.61	The	maturation	of	 the	
colonies	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 made	 the	 feudal	 charters	 and	 land	 patents	 that	
established	the	colonies	“incredibly	lucrative”,	and	feudal	forms	were	revitalised	for	the	




seized	 what	 surviving	 obligations	 could	 be	 enforced	 for	 the	 income	 they	 might	
produce.”63	By	the	1760s,	many	colonial	proprietors	enjoyed	rent	incomes	equivalent	to	
those	 of	 the	 English	 nobility.	 It	 differed	 from	 “mere	 land	 speculation”	 in	 its	 reliance	
upon	feudal	custom	and	the	 imposition	of	duties	upon	old	settled	areas	as	well	as	 the	
frontier.64	
Taken	 hand	 in	 hand,	 Hartz’s	 fragment	 thesis	 and	 Berthoff’s	 and	 Murrin’s	 revival	
thesis	lay	the	groundwork	for	further	study	of	American	feudalism,	a	study	that	will	be	
conducted	 in	 the	 shadow	of	American	 liberalism.	The	 fragment	 thesis	 shows	 that	 the	
exportation	of	a	feudal	system	into	a	colonial	environment	was	possible,	and	the	revival	
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thesis	 shows	how	 feudal	 forms	 could	be	 adapted	 to	 capitalist	 ends	without	becoming	
liberal.	This	thesis	will	largely	be	a	demonstration	that	Virginia	was	a	feudal	fragment,	




Beginning	 in	 the	 late	 1950s,	 historians	 began	 to	 move	 towards	 what	 Robert	
Shalhope	 has	 termed	 a	 “republican	 synthesis”	 of	 liberalism	 and	 republicanism.65		
Around	 the	same	 time	as	Hartz	was	deeming	America	Lockean,	Caroline	Robbins	was	
completing	her	 study	The	Eighteenth‐Century	Commonwealthman,	 in	which	she	 traced	
the	 evolution	 of	 a	 core	 set	 of	 republican	 political	 ideas	 from	 the	 Puritan	 Revolution	
through	 the	 American	 Revolution.66	 American	 revolutionaries,	 including	 Jefferson,	
participated	in	a	single	tradition	with	their	English	cousins,	Robbins	argued,	and	were	







complex	 and	 incorporating	 multiple	 influences,	 had	 a	 strong	 republican	 tradition	
bequeathed	 by	 the	 commonwealthmen.67	 Bailyn	 characterised	 the	 commonwealth	
discourse	 as	 being	 a	 debate	 over	 power	 and	 liberty	 ‐	 how	 much	 and	 what	 kinds	 of	
power	the	state	could	exercise	without	threatening	the	liberties	of	the	governed.		
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65	 Robert	 E.	 Shalhope,	 "Toward	 a	 Republican	 Synthesis:	 The	 Emergence	 of	 An	
Understanding	 of	 Republicanism	 in	 American	Historiography."	The	William	and	Mary	
Quarterly	 29,	 no.	 1	 (1972):	 49‐80;	 Shalhope,	 "Republicanism	 and	 Early	 American	
Historiography."	 The	 William	 and	 Mary	 Quarterly	 39,	 no.	 2	 (1982):	 334‐356;	 and	
Shalhope,	 "In	 Search	 of	 the	 Elusive	 Republic."	 Reviews	 in	 American	History	 19,	 no.	 4	
(1991):	468‐473.	







of	 the	 American	 Republic.68	 While	 Bailyn	 had	 characterised	 republicanism	 as	 a	
constitutional	 relationship	 between	 ruler	 and	 ruled,	Wood	 expanded	 that	 analysis	 to	
include	examining	republicanism	as	an	ethos.	This	ethos	primarily	embraced	virtue	as	
the	organising	principle	of	 a	 citizen’s	 life,	 one	 that	 the	 republic	 itself	was	expected	 to	
promote.	The	revolution	was	an	attempt	“to	realize	the	traditional	Commonwealth	ideal	
of	 a	 corporate	 society,	 in	 which	 the	 common	 good	 would	 be	 the	 only	 objective	 of	
government.”69	 This	 ideal	 was	 “refracted”	 through	 the	 writings	 of	 Renaissance	 and	
Commonwealth	 translators	 of	 classical	 texts,	 presenting	 a	 “highly	 selective”	
interpretation	of	republicanism	in	which	the	“history	of	antiquity	thus	became	a	kind	of	
laboratory	 in	which	 autopsies	 of	 the	 dead	 republics	would	 lead	 to	 a	 science	 of	 social	
sickness	and	health	matching	the	science	of	the	natural	world.”70	
Integrating	 the	 Italian	 Renaissance,	 English	 Commonwealth,	 and	 American	
Revolutionary	interpretations	into	a	single	republican	discourse	was	J.G.A.	Pocock’s	goal	
several	years	later	when	he	produced	The	Machiavellian	Moment.71	Pocock	described	a	
“Machiavellian	 moment”	 as	 the	 point	 in	 time	 at	 which	 a	 republic	 “was	 seen	 as	
confronting	 its	 old	 temporal	 finitude,	 as	 attempting	 to	 remain	morally	 and	 politically	
stable”	 amidst	 change.72	 In	many	 respects,	The	Machiavellian	Moment	was	 positioned	
after	 Wood’s	 The	 Creation.	 It	 was	 published	 six	 years	 later,	 and	 whereas	 Wood	 had	
focused	on	the	role	of	virtue	at	the	moment	of	a	republic’s	creation,	Pocock	focused	on	
fortune	and	corruption	as	a	republic	aged	and	declined.	Pocock	placed	emphasis	on	the	
role	 of	 James	Harrington,	who,	 he	 says,	 “brought	 about	 a	 synthesis	 of	 civic	 humanist	
thought	 with	 English	 social	 and	 political	 awareness”,	 in	 particular	 by	 integrating	
“Machiavelli’s	 theory	of	arms	with	a	common‐law	understanding	of	 the	 importance	of	
freehold	property.”73	
Strongly	 present	 in	 both	Wood’s	 and	 Pocock’s	 accounts	 of	 republicanism	was	 the	
strength	of	its	communitarian,	as	opposed	to	libertarian,	imperatives.	Wood	went	so	far	
as	to	declare	that	the	“sacrifice	of	individual	interests	to	the	greater	good	of	the	whole	










formed	 the	 essence	 of	 republicanism	 and	 comprehended	 for	 Americans	 the	 idealistic	
goal	of	their	Revolution.”74	Important	concepts	such	as	duty	and	obligation,	also	found	
in	 feudalism,	 were	 recast	 as	 part	 of	 republicanism.	 Liberty	 framed	 in	 a	 republican	
context,	 meanwhile,	 was	 not	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 rational	 individualism	 characteristic	 of	
liberalism.	It	was	framed	specifically	as	an	issue	of	constitutionalism,	and	often	involved	
collective	rights	as	well	as	individual	ones.	Accordingly,	Shalhope	characterises	Bailyn’s	







describe	 Jeffersonian	 republicanism	 in	her	1976	article	 “Liberalism	and	 the	American	
Revolution”.75	Appleby	criticised	the	republican	revision	for	being	“a	passive	complex	of	
concepts	unable	 to	move	men	by	 itself	….	Examining	 the	 content	of	 the	 revolutionary	
mind	does	not	relieve	the	historian	of	the	responsibility	for	explaining	what	compelled	
belief,	 what	 triggered	 reactions,	 what	 stirred	 passions,	 and	 what	 persuaded	 the	
colonists	of	the	truth	of	their	interpretation	of	events.”	Appleby	concluded	that	the	only	
social	 tension	 within	 liberalism	 was	 “the	 explicit	 and	 unwarranted	 intrusion	 of	
authority	 upon	 individual	 freedom.”76	 It	 was	 a	 series	 of	 such	 intrusions	 during	 the	
colonial	crisis	that	accounted	for	the	American	Revolution.	
These	 intrusions	 were	 primarily	 economic,	 at	 least	 to	 begin	 with,	 and	 Appleby’s	
economic	interpretation	reads	like	an	updated	version	of	the	property‐centric	Lockean	
ethic	 found	 in	 Hartz;	 and	 building	 upon	 Hartz,	 she	 articulated	 a	 theory	 of	 liberty	 in	
rebuttal	 to	 that	 of	 the	 republican	 revisionists.	 In	 Capitalism	 and	 a	New	 Social	Order,	
Appleby	identified	three	modes	of	liberty,	the	first	of	which,	group	liberty,	was	a	relic	of	
feudal	 corporatism	 that	was	 still	 embodied	 in	modern	 struggles	 to	protect	 communal	









to	 the	 public	 realm,	 not	 the	 private”	 and	 was	 part	 of	 citizenship.	 The	 third	 mode,	
personal	 liberty,	 was	 entirely	 private	 and	 was	 “bounded	 only	 by	 such	 limits	 as	 are	
necessary	if	others	are	to	enjoy	the	same	extensive	personal	freedom.”78	
While	 Appleby	 came	 to	 a	 liberal	 interpretation	 through	 her	 reading	 of	 economic	
history,	 the	 liberal	 thesis	 was	 broadened	 in	 the	 1980s	 by	 John	 P.	 Diggins	 and	 Isaac	
Kramnick.79	Diggins	pointed	out	that	the	“social	and	economic	implications	of	the	liberal	
tradition	have	been	examined	almost	to	the	exclusion	of	its	moral	content	and	even	its	
psychological	 depth.”	 Diggins’	 most	 important	 insight	 was	 in	 noticing	 that	 liberalism	
and	Calvinism	had	tangled	roots,	and	that	the	liberal	ethic	was,	in	part,	a	Calvinist	ethic.	
“In	 studying	 American	 liberalism,	 most	 historians	 have	 focused	 almost	 solely	 on	
political	 ideas	 and	 have	 therefore	 slighted	 the	 religious	 convictions	 that	 often	




	Kramnick	 returned	 to	 the	 economic	 interpretation,	 arguing	 that	 while	
“republicanism	 is	 historically	 an	 ideology	 of	 leisure	 ….	 Liberalism,	 at	 its	 origin	 [in	
Locke],	 is	 an	 ideology	 of	 work.”81	 This	 Protestant‐liberal	 work	 ethic	 was	 the	
underpinning	 of	 a	 “social	 order	 of	 competitive	 individualism”	 in	 which	 “a	 society	 of	
achievement”	accepted	“social	mobility	[as	the]	rightful	reward	for	ingenious	people	of	
talent	and	hard	work.”82	Such	a	competitive	society	required	equality	of	opportunity,	or	
at	 least	the	appearance	of	equality	of	opportunity,	 to	maintain	 its	moral	viability	‐	but	
therein	 lay	 liberalism’s	 and	 republicanism’s	 fundamental	 incompatibility.	 “Equality	 of	
opportunity	 presumes	 a	 non‐cooperative	 vision	 of	 society,”	 Kramnick	 argued.	 “It	
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encompasses	 no	 ideal	 of	 community	 or	 quest	 for	 the	 common	 good.	 Individuals	
compete	on	an	equal	footing,	and	as	in	any	race,	some	win,	others	lose.”83		
Like	Diggins,	 Kramnick	 noted	 the	 importance	 of	 Protestantism	 in	 providing	 the	
assumptions	behind	 liberalism,	 but	declined	 to	 follow	up	 further	on	Diggins’	 insights,	
although	he	did	acknowledge	Appleby,	Diggins,	and	himself	as	a	triumvirate	of	liberals,	
at	least	in	the	eyes	of	opposing	republicans	such	as	Wood,	Pocock,	and	Bailyn.84	He	also	





	 The	 distinction	 between	 labels	 may	 break	 down	 even	 further.	 By	 emphasising	





Protestants,	 and	 they	 too	 embraced	 ideas	 such	 as	 yeoman	 property	 ownership	 and	
liberty	 of	 conscience,	 which	 became	 hallmarks	 of	 liberalism.	 If	 eighteenth	 century	
liberalism	and	republicanism	could	find	such	common	ground,	were	they	in	fact	distinct	
ideologies,	 or	 were	 they	 interpretations	 of	 a	 single	 ideology	 coming	 out	 of	 Calvinist	
England	in	the	mid‐1600s?	
	 Without	 following	 that	 line	 of	 reasoning	 exactly,	 subsequent	 scholarship	 has	
largely	 reconciled	 the	 liberal	 and	 republican	 viewpoints.	 In	 The	 Spirit	 of	 Modern	
Republicanism,	 Thomas	L.	 Pangle	 argued	 that	 the	 entire	 liberal‐republican	divide	was	
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the	 result	 of	 a	 misunderstanding	 by	 Pocock.87	 Pangle	 hit	 Pocock	 on	 several	 fronts,	
remarking	 that	 “one	 cannot	 avoid	 being	 struck	 by	 the	 ignorance”	 of	 Pocock	 and	 his	
historiographical	followers	towards	the	foundation	texts	of	republicanism,	and	arguing	
that	 Pocock	 had	 privileged	 Aristotle’s	 Politics	 over	 all	 other	 competing	 versions	 of	





the	 way	 that	 Pocock	 needed	 them	 to	 be	 for	 his	 oppositional	 interpretation	 of	
republicanism	and	liberalism	to	work.	Pangle	noted	that	Machiavelli’s	The	Prince	ends,	
and	the	epigraph	to	Locke’s	Second	Treatise	begins,	with	the	same	passage	from	Livy	on	
martial	 virtue.	 This	 indicates	 “kinship”	 between	 the	 two	works,	 and	 that	 “Locke	 thus	
signals	that	the	Two	Treatises	take	up	where	Machiavelli’s	The	Prince	left	off.”89	Pangle’s	
illustration	 is	 tantalising,	 but	 an	 epigraph	 is	 not	 part	 of	 an	 argument,	 not	 did	 Pangle	
provide	a	citation	for	which	edition	of	the	Second	Treatise	 the	epigraph	is	from,	which	






the	 1980s,	 and	 a	 “republican	 synthesis”,	 in	 which	 liberalism	 and	 republicanism	 are	
intertwined,	is	now	accepted.	The	question	now	is	what	balances	were	struck	between	
individualism	 and	 communalism	 in	 political	 thought	 and	 in	 legislation.	 Especially	 as	
regards	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 Virginians,	 this	 involves	 understanding	 their	 thought	 as	 a	
synthesis	 of	 various	 influences	 including	 liberalism	 and	 republicanism,	 not	 a	 binary	
system	featuring	Locke	(or	Machiavelli)	against	everything	else.		
                                                     












that	 already	 exists	 on	 the	 topic.	 When	 the	 Virginia	 Company	 was	 taken	 over	 by	 the	
Crown	 in	 1626,	 the	 new	 royal	 authorities	 in	 the	 colony	 set	 up	 governing	 institutions	
such	 as	 county	 courts,	 church	 parishes,	 and	 a	 privy	 council	 in	 imitation	 of	 their	
analogues	in	England.	Likewise,	the	Virginia	colony	adopted	England’s	common	law	and	
copied	many	of	its	statutes	for	colonial	usage.	The	process	of	the	assimilation	of	English	





Jack	 P.	 Greene,	 who	 has	 made	 the	 same	 institutions	 his	 focus,	 but	 in	 the	 eighteenth	
century,	 and	 found	 in	 the	development	of	 the	 southern	 colonial	 assemblies	 a	political	
culture	 in	which	 the	assemblies	 actively	 contested	 royal	 governors	 for	power	 in	 each	
colony,	their	members	eventually	going	on	to	lead	the	resistance	to	British	rule.93	
With	the	development	of	Virginia’s	governing	institutions	came	the	development	of	
a	governing	class,	 and	 the	general	 consensus	amongst	decades	of	historians	 including	
Rhys	 Isaac,	 Robert	 and	 Katherine	 Brown,	 Charles	 Sydnor,	 Thomas	Wertenbaker,	 and	
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Role	 of	 the	 Lower	Houses	 of	Assembly	 in	Eighteenth‐Century	Politics."	The	 Journal	of	
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time	 of	 the	 American	 Revolution.94	 This	 budding	 aristocracy	 was	 kept	 in	 power	 via	
feudal	tenure	laws	that	preserved	estates	intact	from	generation	to	generation,	allowing	
the	 formation	 of	 an	 hereditary	 ruling	 class.95	 In	 addition	 to	 their	 control	 of	 land,	 the	
aristocracy’s	 vast	 holdings	 in	 black	 slaves	 put	 further	 resources	 at	 their	 disposal	 to	
maintain	 economic	 dominance.96	 In	 power,	 this	 ruling	 class	 exploited	 the	 coercive	
power	of	the	state	to	shape	society	for	its	own	benefit.	As	Gordon	Wood	showed	in	The	
Radicalism	 of	 the	 American	 Revolution,	 the	 entire	 social	 order	 in	 Virginia	 was	 built	
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around	 a	 culture	 of	 patriarchy	 and	 deference.	 A	 threat	 to	 the	 aristocracy	 became	 a	
threat	to	the	constitution	of	society	as	well.	
This	 rigid	 ordering	 of	 society	 extended	 from	 civil	 government	 to	 ecclesiastic	
government	as	well.	John	K.	Nelson’s	A	Blessed	Company	emphasises	the	strong	role	of	
the	church	parish	in	Virginian	life,	including	its	complementary	responsibilities	and	the	
identical	 membership	 rolls	 of	 the	 parish	 vestries	 and	 the	 county	 courts.97	 Like	 the	
county	courts,	the	parishes	had	been	largely	copied	from	English	models.	Nelson	wrote	
in	response	to	other	historians	such	as	James	Horn,	W.M.	Gewehr,	and	Rhys	Isaac	who	
have	 emphasised	 the	 challenge	 that	 Dissenters	 posed	 to	 the	 Established	 Church’s	
control	 during	 and	 after	 the	 Great	 Awakening.98	More	 recently,	 John	Ragosta	 and	 J.L.	
Spangler	have	emphasised	the	agency	of	the	Dissenters	and	tracked	how	their	rise,	and	




Jefferson’s	 role	 as	 a	 reformer	 of	 Virginia’s	 aristocratic	 society	 has	 attracted	
recurrent	attention	from	biographers	and	historians,	but	interestingly	this	attention	has	
been	either	cursory,	in	the	case	of	his	biographers,	or	episodic,	in	the	case	of	historians,	
and	 sometimes	 it	 has	 been	 both.	 Generally,	 Jefferson’s	 biographers	 have	 given	 his	
reforms,	and	in	particular	the	Revisal	of	the	Laws	which	Jefferson	oversaw	from	1777	to	
1779,	in	a	manner	that	mentions	the	key	aspects	of	his	reforms	but	go	into	little	or	no	
detail	 about	 the	 content	 of	 the	 reforms	 nor	 how	 they	 fit	 together	 as	 a	 coherent	
legislative	 program.	 Historians	 of	 Jefferson	 and	 of	 “Jeffersonianism”	 have	 given	 quite	
particular	 attention	 to	 the	 details	 of	 individual	 pieces	 of	 his	 reforms,	 especially	 the	
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Virginia,	1690‐1776.	Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2001.	
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with	 contextualising	 them	within	 the	whole	 program.	 This	 is	 all	 the	more	 perplexing	
given	that	 Jefferson	designed	his	statutes	 to	complement	one	another,	and	provided	a	
lengthy	explanation	of	them	in	his	Autobiography.	
Given	 that	 Jefferson	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 out‐spoken	 critics	 of	 feudalism	 in	
revolutionary	America,	and	that	he	was	perhaps	alone	in	perceiving	the	depths	to	which	
it	 had	 permeated	 Virginian	 society	 in	 particular,	 it	 was	 inevitable	 that	 Louis	 Hartz	
would	single	Jefferson	out	in	The	Liberal	Tradition,	and	that	he	would	do	so	not	only	to	
level	criticism	but	to	express	mockery.	Attempting	to	identify	Jefferson’s	reforms	with	
the	 anti‐feudalism	of	 European	 revolutionaries	 “makes	 the	 remarkable	 success	 of	 the	
movement	 practically	 unintelligible”,	 Hartz	 wrote,	 going	 on	 to	 label	 Jefferson’s	





as	 1785	 rather	 than	 1776	 or	 1777,	 his	 analysis	 seems	 to	 overlook	 the	 decade	 of	
opposition	Jefferson	received	to	many	of	his	proposals.		
Jefferson’s	biographers	have	been	 less	critical	but	not	much	more	willing	 to	probe	




amount	 of	 space	 he	 devoted	 to	 them.103	 Malone	 generally	 recounted	 the	 content	 of	
Jefferson’s	draft	constitution	and	subsequent	legislation	in	four	short	chapters,	but	his	
intent	seems	to	simply	have	been	to	bridge	the	time	between	Jefferson’s	Congressional	
service	 and	 his	 governorship	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible,	 without	 going	 into	 the	 detail	 or	














his	 reforms,	while	 incomplete	 for	 the	 task	 at	 hand,	 “did	 remove	 legal	 vestiges	 of	 Old	




Historians	of	 Jefferson	have	 fared	better	 than	Hartz	or	 the	biographers.	Generally,	
historians	who	have	studied	a	particular	aspect	of	 Jefferson’s	intellectual	 life	‐	say,	his	
political	philosophy,	or	his	ethics	and	moral	philosophy	‐	have	discussed	at	least	one	of	




properly	 contextualise	 Jefferson	 now	 that	 the	 liberal‐republican	 dispute	 has	 been	
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behind	Jefferson’s	 legislation.109	My	own	goal	 is	 to	build	upon	Sheldon’s	and	Bassani’s	
focused	 assessments	 of	 Jefferson’s	 thought	 by	 going	 more	 into	 the	 details	 of	 his	
legislation	and	of	Virginian	society.	
Other	 historians	 have	 focused	 on	 particular	 issues	 with	 which	 Jefferson	 grappled	
rather	than	attempt	comprehensive	surveys	of	his	mind.	Studies	of	Jefferson	and	slavery	
are	 legion	 and	 generally	 revolve	 around	 Jefferson’s	 early	 opposition	 to,	 and	 later	
accommodation	with,	slavery.110	There	are	also	numerous	studies	of	 Jefferson	and	the	
issues	of	religion	and	education,	sometimes	treated	distinctly	and	sometimes	jointly.111	
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are	 less	 useful	 for	 relating	 Jefferson’s	 thought	 to	 the	 reform	 of	 actual	 religious	 and	








Jefferson	as	a	 lawyer	which	provide	good	context	 for	his	 legal	 education	and	outlook,	
but	these	studies	by	F.L.	Dewey	and	Edward	Dumbauld	are	both	somewhat	dated	and	





for	 understanding	 Jefferson’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 particular	 process	 of	 Anglo‐
American	civilisation	and	of	the	development	of	societies	generally;	the	work	of	Douglas	
Wilson	 is	 helpful,	 in	 conjunction	 with	 Colbourn’s,	 for	 understanding	 how	 Jefferson	
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interacted	 with	 particular	 historians	 as	 well	 as	 the	 way	 in	 which	 he	 kept	 his	
commonplace	book	of	historical	and	legal	reading.	
These	 studies	 are	 supplemented	 by	 some	 excellent	 work	 on	 Jefferson’s	
constitutional	 thought.	 One	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	more	 subject‐specific	 studies	 on	
“Jefferson	and	religion”,	“Jefferson	and	education”,	etc.	is	that	Jefferson’s	thoughts	on	an	
issue	 are	 rarely	 connected	 to	 his	 larger	 constitutional	 theory;	 all	 of	 his	 keynote	
legislation	 began	 as	 points	 within	 his	 1776	 draft	 constitution,	 and	 so	 it	 should	 be	
interpreted	 as	 an	 outgrowth	 of	 that	 holistic	 approach.	 David	 N.	 Mayer’s	 The	
Constitutional	 Thought	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 is	 a	 fairly	 complete	 assessment,	 much	
improved	 over	 C.P.	 Patterson’s	 The	 Constitutional	 Principles	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson,	
although	for	 the	purposes	of	 this	 thesis	 the	shortcoming	of	both	books	 is	 their	 lack	of	
clear	differentiation	between	Jefferson’s	state	constitutionalism	in	the	1770s	and	1780s	
and	his	 federal	 constitutionalism	 in	 the	1790s	and	early	1800s.114	On	 the	other	hand,	
Jeremy	Bailey’s	Thomas	Jefferson	and	Executive	Power	handles	the	issue	of	time	clearly,	
devoting	 two	 chapters	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 Jefferson’s	 ideas	 during	 the	 revolutionary	
period,	with	a	key	emphasis	on	how	his	term	as	governor	changed	views	that	had	until	




In	 this	 section	 I	will	 explain	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 thesis,	 review	my	major	 primary	







rather	to	 the	thematic	content	of	 Jefferson’s	reforms.	Thus	the	beginning	recounts	 the	









genesis	of	 Jefferson’s	 ideas	on	 feudalism,	 the	middle	recounts	his	efforts	 to	 tear	down	
the	old	 feudal	system,	and	the	ending	explains	his	attempts	 to	raise	a	new	republican	
order	in	feudalism’s	place.		
Chapter	 one	 is	 the	 beginning	 both	 chronologically	 and	 content‐wise.	 It	 covers	 the	
years	 1774‐1776,	 from	 Jefferson’s	 authorship	 of	 the	 Summary	 View	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	
British	America	 in	 July	1774	 through	 the	opening	of	 the	Virginia	Assembly	 in	October	
1776.	 It	 is	concerned	primarily	with	 Jefferson’s	development	of	what	 I	call	his	 feudal‐
mercantile	 synthesis	 of	 British	 history,	 an	 interpretation	 that	 held	 that	 the	 American	
Revolution	was	a	response	to	defects	in	the	English	constitution	instituted	at	the	time	of	
the	Norman	Conquest,	 internalised	within	 the	 common	 law,	 and	 spread	 to	Virginia	 at	
the	 time	 of	 colonisation.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 Norman‐imposed	 laws	 became	 the	
constitutional	basis	utilised	by	Parliament	to	justify	English	legal	dominion	over	Ireland	
and	provided	the	legal	framework	for	the	subsequent	British	empire	in	North	America.	
Virginia’s	 involvement	 in	 the	 colonial	 crisis,	 Jefferson	 claimed,	 stemmed	 from	 these	
defects	 in	 the	 English	 constitution	 that	 provided	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	mercantilism	 and	
Parliament’s	attempt	to	legislate	for	the	colonies	under	the	mercantilist	regime.		
When	 Virginia	 became	 independent,	 Jefferson	 took	 the	 opportunity	 to	 extirpate	
feudalism	 from	Virginia’s	 laws	by	supervising	a	wholesale	revision	of	 its	 statute	code.	
The	 middle	 chapters	 (two	 through	 four)	 assess	 his	 attempts	 to	 eliminate	 feudal	
holdovers	in	Virginia’s	governance,	property	laws,	and	religious	Establishment.	Chapter	
two	 visits	 the	 new	 republican	 constitution,	 both	 the	 draft	 constitution	 written	 by	
Jefferson	 and	 the	 significantly	 more	 conservative	 one	 actually	 adopted	 by	 the	 state	
Convention,	 and	 focuses	 on	 how	 Jefferson	 attempted	 to	 design	 state	 institutions	 that	
would	 be	 independent	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 local	 oligarchies	 that	 had	 formed	 in	 the	
colonial	 county	 courts.116	 Chapter	 three	 examines	 Jefferson’s	 signature	 effort	 to	
undermine	those	local	oligarchies’	base	of	power	by	breaking	up	large	estates,	through	
the	mechanism	of	abolishing	feudal	 forms	of	 land	tenure.	Chapter	 four	continues	with	
the	local	oligarchies	by	focusing	on	the	parish	vestry	as	the	ecclesiastical	equivalent	of	
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inherited	 wealth	 and	 preferment	 to	 a	 more	 meritocratic	 system	 based	 on	 personal	
improvement	 or	 refinement.	 Given	 that	 there	 was	 really	 no	 temporal	 narrative	 to	
Jefferson’s	 reforms	 ‐	 the	 laws	 were	 considered	 in	 piecemeal	 fashion	 over	 a	 ten	 year	
period	and	were	passed	or	rejected	unsystematically	 ‐	 this	 is	 the	 logical	ending	to	the	





Jefferson’s	 life	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 exceptionally	 well‐documented	 of	 any	 political	
figure	 in	American	history.	The	Papers	of	Thomas	 Jefferson,	 begun	 in	 the	1940s	by	an	
editorial	 team	lead	by	 Julian	P.	Boyd,	has	now	produced	thirty‐six	volumes	containing	
Jefferson’s	 papers	 from	 1760	 to	 1802,	which	will	 continue	 through	 to	 the	 end	 of	 his	
presidency	 in	 1809.117	 A	 second	 series,	 the	 Papers	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson:	 Retirement	
Series,	edited	by	a	team	led	by	J.	Jefferson	Looney,	picks	up	from	Jefferson’s	last	day	as	
President	of	the	United	States	in	March	1809	and	will	continue	through	to	his	death	in	
1826.118	 These	 two	 survey	 series	 are	 supplemented	 by	 a	 number	 of	 single‐volume	
primary	 sources,	 including	 Jefferson’s	 commonplace	 and	 memoranda	 books,	 his	
Autobiography,	and	his	Notes	on	the	State	of	Virginia,	as	well	as	out‐of‐date	collections	of	
Jefferson’s	 papers	 published	 in	 the	 nineteenth‐	 and	 early	 twentieth‐centuries	 and	
numerous	single‐volume	anthologies	of	his	most	noteworthy	papers.119	
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This	 thesis	 has	 relied	 on	 the	 slice	 of	 this	 major	 body	 of	 work	 that	 relates	 to	
Jefferson’s	activities	in	the	1770s	and	1780s,	most	notably	the	first	ten	volumes	of	the	
Boyd	 series,	 the	 Notes	 on	 Virginia,	 the	 Autobiography,	 and	 Jefferson’s	 legal	









Jefferson	wrote	a	draft	 appeal	 to	 the	Crown	 that	was	 intended	 to	be	proposed	by	 the	








The	 Notes	 on	 Virginia	 were	 written	 at	 the	 tail	 end	 of	 the	 Revolution,	 during	
Jefferson’s	governorship	in	1779‐1781,	 in	response	to	a	query	the	French	ambassador	
Francois	 Barbe‐Marbois	 sent	 to	 each	 of	 the	 thirteen	 state	 governors	 asking	 for	
information	 on	 their	 territories.	 Jefferson	 responded	 to	 Marbois’	 requests	 with	 an	
account	of	Virginia’s	natural	and	human	geography.	 In	addition	 to	containing	detailed	
descriptions,	the	middle	chapters	of	the	Notes	contain	Jefferson’s	account	of	his	reform	
programme	and	his	 rationale	 for	 it.	 It	 constitutes	 valuable	 supplementary	material	 to	
the	content	of	the	laws	themselves	and	to	the	earlier	pamphlets.	Published	in	France	in	
1785,	 in	 some	 respects	 it	 also	 represents	 the	 summation	 of	 Jefferson’s	 intellectual	
                                                                                                                                                                     
Together	 with	 a	 Summary	 of	 the	 Chief	 Events	 in	 Jefferson's	 Life.	 Also	 see	 Thomas	




journey	 from	 a	 pamphleteer	 writing	 for	 a	 British	 audience	 in	 1774	 to	 an	 amateur	
scientist	writing	 for	 a	 cosmopolitan	 European	 audience.	 In	 its	 content,	 however,	 it	 is	
remarkably	consistent	with	the	aims	laid	out	in	the	early	writings	and,	together	with	the	
laws	themselves,	comprises	a	coherent	body	of	political	thought.	
A	major	source	of	 supplementary	evidence	 is	 the	Legal	Commonplace	Book	edited	
by	 Chinard.	 It	 is	 somewhat	 dated	 in	 its	 approach,	 and	 also	 very	 selectively	 edited	 ‐	
Chinard	 included	 only	 the	 entries	 that	 he	 deemed	 most	 relevant	 to	 understanding	
Jefferson’s	 political	 views.	 This	meant	 that	while	 he	 included	 excerpts	 from	works	 of	
history	 and	 philosophy,	 he	 provided	 citations	 but	 excluded	 complete	 excerpts	 from	
what	 he	 considered	 to	 be	 more	 prosaic	 works	 of	 law	 such	 as	 Coke’s	 Institutes	 and	
Blackstone’s	Commentaries	on	the	Laws	of	England.	These	defects	will	be	ameliorated	by	
a	forthcoming	edition	of	the	Legal	Commonplace	Book	released	as	part	of	the	Papers	of	
Thomas	 Jefferson	 series,	 which	 will	 reproduce	 the	 commonplace	 book	 in	 full;	 in	 the	
meantime,	I	have	utilised	Chinard’s	book	as	a	guide	to	the	digital	manuscript	edition	of	
the	commonplace	book	available	from	the	Library	of	Congress,	and	for		the	illuminating	
notes	 Chinard	 appended	 to	many	 of	 Jefferson’s	 entries.120	 The	 commonplace	 book	 is	




One	 final	 primary	 source,	 that	 plays	 a	 minor	 but	 important	 role	 in	 the	 thesis,	 is	
William	 W.	 Hening’s	 Statutes	 at	 Large,	 a	 collection	 of	 Virginia’s	 colonial	 legal	 code	
assembled	largely	from	Jefferson’s	own	archives	in	the	1810s.121	The	Statutes	at	Large	
have	a	dual	utility:	they	are	useful	for	telling	us	what	the	content	of	Virginia’s	statutes	
were,	and,	since	 they	were	researched	and	published	 from	Jefferson’s	 library	with	his	
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active	 encouragement,	 they	 give	 us	 some	 indication	 of	 what	 Jefferson	 himself	 would	
have	 known	 about	 the	 development	 of	 Virginian	 law	 during	 the	 colonial	 period.	
Hening’s	 collection	 can	be	 cross‐referenced	with	 the	 list	of	 “Histories,	Memorials,	 and	
State	Papers”	in	Query	XXIII	of	the	Notes	on	Virginia	to	gain	further	understanding	of	the	
archival	resources	available	to	Jefferson	in	the	1770s.	I	have	cited	from	Hening	when	it	






post‐1789	 letters	 out	 of	 context.	 While	 the	 volume	 of	 his	 correspondence	 provides	
ample	source	material	for	his	views	on	government,	after	1789	and	through	the	end	of	
his	presidency	 in	1808	 Jefferson	commented	almost	exclusively	on	government	at	 the	
national	 level.	 Jefferson’s	 views	 on	 federalism	 and	 the	 federal	 government	 were	
frequently	distinct	from	his	views	on	local	and	state	government,	and	were	formulated	
two	decades	after	the	legal	reforms	studied	in	this	thesis.122	In	light	of	the	great	gap	in	
time	 and	 intent,	 I	 have	 largely	 refrained	 from	 citing	 these	 letters,	 even	 when	 on	 a	
relevant	topic,	because	it	would	be	anachronistic	to	treat	them	as	having	any	meaning	
for	 state	 laws	 written	 twenty	 years	 or	 more	 earlier.	 After	 his	 presidency,	 however,	
Jefferson	began	 to	 reminisce	on	 the	 events	 of	 the	1770s	 themselves,	 and	 I	 have	been	
much	more	willing	to	include	these	reflections	as	source	material,	though	noting	when	
their	 content	 seems	 to	 contradict	 statements	 made	 in	 the	 1770s	 and	 1780s.	 This	
includes	 his	 Autobiography,	 written	 in	 1821	 and	 comprising	 Jefferson’s	 definitive	
statement	of	his	intent	during	the	Revolution.	
I	have	been	constantly	aware	of	the	difficulties	of	attributing	causality	or	correlation	
to	entries	made	 into	 the	Legal	Commonplace	Book	 (LCB).	An	excellent	analysis	of	 the	
LCB	 by	 Douglas	 L.	 Wilson,	 based	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 Jefferson’s	 handwriting,	 has	
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levels	are	exactly	opposite.	The	purity	of	the	common	law	being	a	core	focus	of	his	as	a	
state	 legislator,	while	 as	 President	 he	 opposed	 any	 introduction	 of	 common	 law	 into	









real‐time	 examples	 of	 Jefferson	 doing	 research	 into	 the	 relevant	 issues	 of	 the	 year	 in	
which	 Wilson	 has	 dated	 each	 entry.	 Entries	 1‐731	 can	 be	 dated	 to	 the	 1760s	 and	
provide	contextual	 information	 for	how	 Jefferson	came	 to	his	essential	views	on	 legal	
history	and	philosophy	under	the	tutelage	of	George	Wythe,	and	entries	732‐879	reflect	
specific	 issues	upon	which	 Jefferson	conducted	 research	during	 the	 revolution.	 I	have	





trail	 than	 he	 did	 ‐	 only	 James	 Madison	 comes	 close	 ‐	 and	 that	 therefore	 it	 is	 often	






This	 thesis	 takes	 place	 within	 many	 genres	 of	 history	 ‐	 imperial,	 political,	 legal,	
religious,	 and	 social	 ‐	 but	 my	 primary	 approach	 is	 within	 the	 two	 disciplines	 of	
intellectual	and	constitutional	history.	In	terms	of	intellectual	history,	I	refer	not	to	the	
history	 of	 high	 political	 thought,	 but	 the	 study	 of	 vernacular	 political	 ideas.	 I	 broadly	
conceive	of	constitutional	history	as	not	just	the	state	but	other	major	institutions	that	
“constitute”	 society	 ‐	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 significance	 of	 social	 structures	 and	
institutions,	such	as	entailed	property	or	the	parish	vestry,	within	a	context	of	political	
power	 relationships.	 It	 is	 not	 institutional	 history	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 narrative	 of	 the	







history	 of	 a	 particular	 institution,	 such	 as	 the	 Church	 of	 England	 in	 Virginia.	 I	 have	
provided	such	narratives	only	when	necessary	to	establish	context.	
As	 an	 approach,	 I	 have	 used	 intellectual	 history	 both	 to	 understand	 the	 political	
ideas	 Jefferson	 was	 conversant	 with,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 legal	 ideas.	 There	 was	 a	 close	
relationship	 between	 law	 and	 political	 language	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 perhaps	





seventeenth	 century	 English	 commonwealthmen	 who	 connected	 republicanism	 and	
anti‐feudalism	in	a	single	political	programme.	
Where	I	have	tried	to	improve	on	the	approaches	of	other	historians	is	to	anchor	the	
ideas	 Jefferson	considered	 in	 the	actual	 institutional	context	of	Virginia.	While	Pocock	
and	 others	 have	 contextualised	 ideas	 by	 placing	 them	 alongside	 other	 ideas,	 with	 a	
focus	on	language,	my	goal	here	is	to	contextualise	ideas	by	attaching	them	to	things	in	
society.	 A	 commitment	 to	 liberalism	 becomes	 more	 meaningful	 when	 property	 is	
entailed,	 or	 an	 Established	 Church	 actively	 persecutes	 its	 Dissenters,	 as	 opposed	 to	





For	 example,	 I	 prefer	 to	 speak	 of	 a	 “liberal”	 outlook	 rather	 than	 a	 “Lockean”	 one,	 a	
“republican”	mindset	 versus	 a	 “Harringtonian”	 or	 “Machiavellian”	 one.	My	 reason	 for	
this	 is	 that,	 as	 Louis	 Hartz	 was	 criticised	 for,	 the	 moment	 one	 invokes	 a	 particular	
author’s	name,	there	is	immediately	the	expectation	that	some	sort	of	influence	will	be	
demonstrated.	 While	 the	 influence	 of	 Locke	 is	 apparent	 in	 Jefferson’s	 thought,	
particularly	in	his	direct	engagement	with	Locke’s	Letter	on	Toleration,	to	label	Jefferson	
“Lockean”	would	be	to	imply	that	Locke	held	some	sort	of	pride	of	place	in	Jefferson’s	
overall	 thinking.	On	the	contrary,	 the	Legal	Commonplace	Book	shows	that	 Jefferson’s	
reading	was	 rich	and	 that	 it	would	be	a	mistake	 to	 identify	him	with	any	one	author.	




other	 labels.	 Instead,	 I	have	preferred	to	avoid	the	question	of	authorial	 influence	and	
instead	refer	to	the	schools	of	thought	‐	feudalist,	liberal,	and	republican	‐	within	which	





to	 eliminate	 feudalism	 in	 Virginia	 through	 his	 revolutionary	 legislation,	 and	 that	 this	
was	 a	 defensible	 assessment	 by	 Jefferson	 of	 Virginian	 society	 at	 the	 time,	 but	 his	
reforms	were	dogged	by	opposition	and	were	insufficient	remedies	for	the	scale	of	the	
problem	 he	 identified.	 To	 support	 the	 argument,	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	 reconstruct	
Virginian	society	from	secondary	studies	while	concurrently	reconstructing	Jefferson’s	
thought	 from	his	writings	so	as	 to	create	a	detailed	picture	of	what	he	was	doing	and	
why.	 I	 have	 also	 situated	 each	 chapter	 within	 the	 historiographical	 debate	 over	
liberalism	and	republicanism,	and	will	 show	that	while	 Jefferson	used	the	 language	of	





I	will	 argue	 that	 Jefferson	 constructed	 a	 “feudal‐mercantile	 synthesis”	 in	 his	 early	
public	writings,	and	that	this	interpretation	of	history	provided	the	intellectual	context	
and	motivation	for	his	reforms.	Empowered	by	a	comprehensive	historical	world‐view	
that	 allowed	 him	 to	 place	 the	 events	 of	 the	 colonial	 crisis	 within	 a	 compelling	 and	
urgent	narrative,	 Jefferson	 then	saw	history	 repeating	 itself	within	Virginia,	 its	gentry	
attempting	 to	 set	 up	 an	 aristocracy	 in	 the	 local	 and	 state	 governments	 that	 would	
spread	 itself	 through	 land	 speculation.	 Having	 established	 this	 worldview,	 in	 the	
subsequent	chapters	 I	will	argue	that	 Jefferson’s	draft	constitution	would	have	 largely	
addressed	this	problem,	but	that	its	rejection	meant	he	had	to	deal	with	the	problems	of	









the	 decades	 leading	 to	 the	 revolution,	 and	 that	 Jefferson	 accurately	 perceived	 this.	
Second,	 I	will	 argue	 that	 Jefferson’s	 solution,	while	 systematically	 laid	out	 in	his	draft	
constitution,	 was	 diluted	 in	 his	 subsequent	 legislative	 proposals,	 and	 that	 both	 his	
proposed	solutions,	and	the	bills	that	actually	passed,	were	inadequate	to	the	challenge	
which	 he	 had	 identified.	 Importantly,	 Jefferson’s	 liberalism,	 in	 part	 derived	 from	
interpretations	of	John	Locke,	was	a	response	to	feudalism,	not	something	that	was	the	









	 In	 October	 1769,	 a	 ship	 bound	 from	 London	 docked	 at	 the	 port	 in	 Norfolk,	
Virginia	 and	 unloaded	 its	 cargo.	 That	 spring,	 the	 royal	 governor	 had	 disbanded	 the	
colonial	 assembly	 for	 agreeing	 to	 resolves	 that	 criticised	 royal	 rule.	 In	 response,	 an	
extraordinary	association	had	declared	a	boycott	of	manufactured	goods	coming	 from	
the	mother	 country.	 Fortunately	 for	 one	 of	 the	 young	 participants	 in	 the	 association,	






10s,	 Jefferson	 had	 purchased	 a	 shelf	 of	 books	 on	 politics	 that	 would	 aid	 him	 as	 the	
assembly	sought	to	navigate	the	colonial	crisis	of	the	1770s.1	
	 Jefferson	was	 both	 a	 reader	 and	 a	writer.	 His	 own	written	 contribution	 to	 the	
revolutionary	effort	would	include	a	pamphlet,	state	papers,	a	draft	constitution,	and	a	
revised	 legal	 code.	 These	 were	 no	 pieces	 of	 hack	 writing,	 nor	 were	 they	 mere	
compilations	of	the	work	of	others.	Although	he	modestly	denied	any	great	ingenuity	on	
his	 own	 part,	 Jefferson	 possessed	 a	 worldview	 that	 was	 his	 own	 synthesis	 of	 legal,	
historical	and	philosophical	thought.	It	was	dominated	by	two	key	concepts:	feudalism	
and	 natural	 law.	 Jefferson	 paired	 them	 in	 his	 mind,	 arguing	 repeatedly	 that	 feudal	




enquiry,	 but	 the	 latter	 hardly	 at	 all,	 and	 what	 is	 extant	 has	 focused	 more	 on	 “Whig	
history”	 than	 on	 feudalism	 and	 the	 law.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	will	 attempt	 to	 reconstruct	
Jefferson’s	 worldview	 as	 it	 existed	 in	 the	 mid‐1770s	 through	 his	 research	 and	 his	
writings,	with	an	eye	towards	establishing	the	context	necessary	to	understand	his	draft	






1779.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 Jefferson	 constructed	 his	 own	 narrative	 of	 British	 history	 in	
which	 natural	 rights	 protected	 by	 the	 ancient	 constitution	 of	 the	 Saxons	 had	 been	
usurped	by	feudalism,	in	which	feudalism	provided	the	legal	basis	for	mercantilism,	and	
in	which	a	republicanism	premised	on	the	eradication	of	feudalism	was	the	only	hope	of	
bringing	 about	 a	 political	 order	 based	 on	 the	 law	 of	 nature,	 as	 Saxon	 England’s	 had	
been.	
This	 chapter	 is	 presented	 in	 four	 parts.	 First,	 I	will	 examine	 Jefferson’s	main	 pre‐














a	 plea	 for	 the	 king’s	 protection	 from	 the	 advances	 of	 Parliament	 and	 was	 to	 be	
presented	 by	 the	 Virginian	 delegates	 to	 Congress;	 the	 “Declaration	 of	 the	 Causes	 and	
Necessity	 for	Taking	Up	Arms”	of	 July	1775	stated	the	grounds	 for	armed	rebellion	to	
parliamentary	rule;	the	“Refutation	of	the	Argument	that	the	Colonies	Were	Established	
at	 the	Expense	of	 the	British	Nation”	of	 January	1776	developed	 the	 claim	within	 the	
Summary	 View	 and	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Causes	 that	 the	 colonies	 were	 formed	
                                                     






independently	 of	 state	 support;	 and	 the	 “Declaration	 of	 Independence”	 of	 July	 1776	
announced	the	abolition	of	the	monarchy	in	the	colonies.3	
Despite	being	written	at	different	times	during	a	rapidly	developing	political	crisis,	




1774	 and	 1776,	 even	 as	 he	 expanded	 the	 object	 of	 the	 grievances	 to	 include	 both	




intent	 of	 demonstrating	 Jefferson’s	 consistency	 and	 the	 usefulness	 of	 these	 four	 state	





                                                     
3	While	 the	scholarship	on	 the	Declaration	of	 Independence	 is	practically	 limitless,	




to	 his	 emergent	 republican	 constitutionalism,	 as	 opposed	 to	 his	 opposition	 political	
activities.	 See	W.H.	 Bennett,	 "Early	 American	 Theories	 of	 Federalism."	The	 Journal	 of	
Politics	4,	no.	03	(1942):	383‐395;	B.A.	Black,	"The	Constitution	of	Empire:	The	Case	for	
the	 Colonists."	 University	 of	 Pennsylvania	 Law	 Review	 (1976):	 1157‐1211;	 H.	 Trevor	
Colbourn,	 "Thomas	 Jefferson's	 Use	 of	 the	 Past."	 The	 William	 and	 Mary	 Quarterly:	
Magazine	of	Early	American	History	(1958):	56‐70;	Colbourn,	The	Lamp	of	Experience:	
Whig	 History	 and	 the	 Intellectual	 Origins	 of	 the	 American	 Revolution.	 Liberty	 Fund	
Edition.	Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1965,	pp.	193‐225;	R.R.	Johnson,	
"’Parliamentary	 Egotisms’:	 The	 Clash	 of	 Legislatures	 in	 the	 Making	 of	 the	 American	
Revolution."	 The	 Journal	 of	 American	 History	 74,	 no.	 2	 (1987):	 338‐362;	 Michael	 G.	
Kammen,	 "The	 Colonial	 Agents,	 English	 Politics	 and	 the	 American	 Revolution."	 The	
William	and	Mary	Quarterly:	A	Magazine	of	Early	American	History	22,	no.	2	(1965):	244‐







The	 Summary	View	 was	 Jefferson’s	most	 important	 statement	 of	 political	 thought	
prior	to	the	Declaration	of	Independence,	and	anticipated	the	latter	 in	many	of	 its	key	
themes.	The	 intent	of	 the	Summary	View	was	 to	 introduce	 the	concept	of	a	confederal	
empire	of	many	realms	tied	together	in	the	person	of	the	king,	and	to	appeal	for	the	king	
to	 intervene	 on	behalf	 of	 the	 colonies	 by	 exercising	 his	 veto	 power	 on	parliamentary	
legislation	 that	 concerned	 the	 internal	 affairs	 of	 the	 colonies	 and	 the	 tenure	 of	 their	
assemblies.	Once	the	king	had	intervened	to	stop	the	escalation	of	the	crisis,	 Jefferson	
proposed	that	there	then	be	negotiations	for	a	treaty	of	union	amongst	all	of	the	British	
realms	 that	 would	 establish	 a	 common	 market	 while	 guaranteeing	 the	 autonomy	 of	
local	 legislatures,	 in	 effect	 formalising	 the	 confederal	 arrangement	which,	 he	 claimed,	
already	existed.4	
The	 argument	 of	 the	 Summary	 View	 was	 predicated	 upon	 the	 existence	 of	 two	
natural	 rights:	 the	 right	 of	 expatriation	 from	 one’s	 homeland,	 and	 the	 right	 to	 trade	
freely	 upon	 the	 oceans.5	 By	 subjecting	 the	 colonies	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 home‐country	
                                                                                                                                                                     




to	King	George	 III.	 She	 also	 argues	 that	 the	Summary	View	 is	 an	 example	 of	 Jefferson	
portraying	history,	specifically	Anglo‐Saxon	England,	as	part	of	a	“continuum”	in	which	
examples	from	the	past	can	be	timelessly	transposed	into	the	present	for	the	purposes	
of	 moral	 instruction.	 See	 Hannah	 Spahn,	 Thomas	 Jefferson,	 Time,	 and	 History,	
Charlottesville:	 University	 of	 Virginia	 Press,	 2011,	 pp.	 117‐121.	 While	 there	 is	 some	
merit	to	this	overall	analysis	of	Jefferson’s	use	of	history	in	the	1770s,	I	believe	Spahn	to	
be	mistaken	 in	 this	 particular	 case.	 Instead,	 as	 John	 Phillip	 Reid	 has	 pointed	 out,	 the	
Summary	 View	 is	 an	 analysis	 of	 constitutional	 law	 in	 which	 examples	 may	 appear	
timeless	because	they	are	being	used	to	illustrate	a	legal	principle	‐	which	would	be,	by	
the	 standards	of	 legal	 scholarship,	 timeless	 in	 its	nature	of	 “always”	having	been	 law.	
See	 John	 Phillip	 Reid,	 Constitutional	 History	 of	 the	 American	 Revolution	 (Abridged).	
Madison:	University	of	Wisconsin	Press,	1986,	pp.	 ix‐xx.	 In	addition	to	Reid’s	point	on	
the	 importance	 of	 constitutionalism	 as	 a	 distinct	 viewpoint	 from	historicism,	 it’s	 also	
important	to	point	out	that	Jefferson	does	in	fact	periodise	history	in	the	Summary	View,	
laying	 out	 an	 argument	 of	 comparative	 history	 between	 various	 conquests	 and	
colonisation	efforts,	as	well	as	constructing	a	narrative	of	the	growth	of	Parliamentary	
interference	 in	colonial	affairs.	Spahn’s	characterisation	of	 the	Summary	View	 is	 really	
limited	 in	 scope	 to	 its	 initial	 paragraphs,	 and	 even	 then	 she	 overlooks	 the	 point	 of	
Jefferson’s	constitutional	argument.	






legislature,	 and	 by	 restricting	 their	 trade	 upon	 the	 seas,	 Parliament,	 through	 the	
mercantile	 system,	was	 actively	 infringing	 upon	 both	 of	 these	 rights.	While	 Jefferson	
was	 willing	 to	 grant	 Britain	 the	 right	 of	 first	 refusal	 upon	 American	 goods	 as	




The	 structure	 of	 the	 Summary	 View	 was	 not	 straightforward	 and	 it	 is	 an	 easily	




Crown	within	 a	 social	 contract	 and	declaring	 that	 the	king	 “is	no	more	 than	 the	 chief	
officer	of	the	people,	appointed	by	the	laws,	and	circumscribed	with	definite	powers,	to	




country	 in	 which	 chance,	 not	 choice,	 has	 placed	 them,	 of	 going	 in	 quest	 of	 new	
habitations,	and	of	there	establishing	new	societies,	under	such	laws	and	regulations	as	
to	them	shall	seem	mostly	likely	to	promote	public	happiness.”7	To	establish	the	basis	of	
this	 right	within	 history,	 as	well	 as	 philosophy,	 Jefferson	 invoked	 the	 example	 of	 the	
Saxon	emigration	to	Britain,	who	“in	 like	manner,	 left	 their	native	wilds	and	woods	in	
the	 North	 of	 Europe,	 had	 possessed	 themselves	 of	 the	 island	 of	 Britain	 ….	 And	 had	
established	there	that	system	of	law	which	has	so	long	been	the	glory	and	the	protection	
of	 that	 country.”8	To	 reiterate	 the	 similarity	between	 the	 free	 Saxons	 and	 the	English	
colonists	of	the	seventeenth	century,	Jefferson	noted	that	“America	was	conquered,	and	
                                                     





as	 it	 does	 on	 the	 Saxon	movement	 to	 Britain	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 internal	 balance	 of	











that	 therefore	 the	 laws	and	 taxes	of	Parliament	 could	not	be	 justified	as	being	due	 to	
Parliament’s	 role	 in	 protecting	 the	 colonies	when	 they	were	 too	 immature	 to	 protect	
themselves.	 Jefferson	noted	 that	 similar	naval	 support	had	been	 rendered	 to	Portugal	
and	other	allies	in	the	wars,	“yet	these	states	never	supposed	that,	by	calling	in	her	aid,	
they	thereby	submitted	themselves	to	her	sovereignty.”10	
Jefferson	 then	 switched	 from	 constitutional	 theory	 to	 exposition	 of	 some	 of	 the	
specific	ways	 in	which	 colonial	 rights	 had	 been	 infringed.	 He	 noted	 the	 policy	 of	 the	
Stuart	 kings	 in	 creating	 proprietary	 colonies	 out	 of	 the	 territories	 of	 the	 old	 Virginia	
Company.11	The	majority	of	his	complaints	pertained	to	the	actions	of	Parliament	itself,	
starting	with	the	Navigation	Acts	and	continuing	through	the	beginning	of	Parliament’s	
expansion	 into	 the	 internal	 affairs	 of	 the	 colonies	with	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 inter‐
colonial	 post	 office	 in	 1711.	 From	 that	 time,	 Parliament	 had	 become	more	 and	more	
involved	in	colonial	affairs	and,	by	the	1770s,	it	was	now	moving	to	abolish	or	suspend	
the	colonial	legislatures	themselves,	beginning	with	New	York	and	Massachusetts,	while	
suspending	 trial	 by	 jury	 by	 expanding	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 admiralty	 courts	 to	 inland	
affairs.12	
But	 Jefferson’s	 grievances	were	not	with	Parliament	and	 the	deposed	Stuart	kings	



















in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 king,	 often	 refusing	 to	 call	 new	 elections,	 while	 the	 last	 reigning	
monarch	to	dissolve	Parliament	had	been	King	William	III	in	1701.14	Jefferson	also	took	







would	 establish	 a	 common	 market	 while	 ensuring	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 each	 local	
legislature.15	In	effect,	Jefferson	was	proposing	to	enshrine	in	law	what	he	considered	to	






Battle	 of	 Bunker	 Hill,	 Congress	 incorporated	 the	 various	 militia	 units	 in	 the	 field	 at	




own	 draft	 declaration,	 written	 before	 his	 and	 Dickinson’s	 ideas	 were	 reconciled	 in	
Congressional	 debate,	 shows	 how	 he	 continued	 to	 emphasise	 the	 themes	 of	 the	
                                                     
13	 Ibid.,	p.	130.	 Jefferson	offered	many	conspiratorial	explanations	 for	 this	action	 ‐	
that	 the	 king	 wanted	 to	 strip	 his	 subjects	 of	 their	 political	 and	 civil	 rights	 ‐	 while	
ignoring	the	more	apparent	one:	that	this	was	a	passive	way	of	discouraging	settlement	
across	the	Proclamation	Line.	





Summary	View	 even	 as	 the	 political	 situation	 had	 changed	 from	passive	 resistance	 to	
open	war.	
Jefferson’s	first	stroke	was	to	emphasise	that,	contrary	to	his	warning	not	to	impose	
Parliament’s	rule	by	 force,	 that	 the	“legislature	of	Great	Britain”	 [emphasis	 in	original]	





parliamentary	 statutes	 in	 the	 past	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 having	 conceded	 the	
legal	 validity	 of	 Parliament’s	 claims	 to	 supremacy.17	 Keeping	 with	 the	 theme	 of	
conquest,	Jefferson	also	raised	the	danger	that	the	colonies,	although	not	conquered	by	
the	British	state	at	their	settlement,	might	soon	be,	“the	new	ministry	finding	all	the	foes	
of	 Britain	 subdued”	 having	 taken	 up	 “the	 unfortunate	 idea	 of	 subduing	 her	 friends	
also.”18	
Jefferson	 then	 did	 something	 that	 he	 had	 not	 done	 in	 the	 relatively	 detailed	 and	
verbose	Summary	View:	 he	 gave	a	 succinct	 list	 of	 ten	enumerated	grievances	 that	 the	
colonies	had	taken	up	arms	to	protest.	These	grievances	included	Parliament’s	attempt	
to	 “give	 and	 grant	 our	 money	 without	 our	 consent”,	 the	 military	 action	 that	 had	
“interdicted	all	commerce	to	one	of	our	principle	towns”,	and	the	restriction	of	trade	so	
as	to	“cut	off	the	commercial	intercourse	of	whole	colonies	with	foreign	countries”.	The	
colonies	 were	 also	 fighting	 to	 preserve	 the	 rights	 of	 due	 process	 under	 English	 law.	
Parliament	had	“extended	the	 jurisdiction	of	 	courts	of	admiralty	beyond	their	antient	
[sic]	 limits,	 [thereby	 having	 deprived]	 us	 of	 the	 inestimable	 ….	 privilege	 of	 trial	 by	 a	
jury.”	Furthermore,	persons	accused	of	“certain	offences”	against	Parliament	could	now	
be	 “transported	 beyond	 sea	 to	 be	 tried	 before	 the	 very	 persons	 against	 whose	
pretended	 sovereignty	 the	 offence	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 committed.”	 Finally,	 Parliament	
had	“attempted	fundamentally	to	alter	the	form	of	government	in	one	of	these	colonies”,	
in	contravention	of	a	charter	secured	“on	the	part	of	the	crown	and	confirmed	by	acts	of	









it’s	 [sic]	 own	 legislature”,	while	 also	 installing	 in	Quebec	 “a	 tyranny	dangerous	 to	 the	
very	existence	of	all	these	colonies.”19		
“But	why	should	we	enumerate	their	injuries	in	the	detail?”	Jefferson	mused.	“By	one	
act	 they	 have	 suspended	 the	 powers	 of	 one	 American	 legislature,	 &	 by	 another	 have	
declared	 they	may	 legislate	 for	us	 themselves	 in	all	 cases	whatsoever.	These	 two	acts	
alone	form	a	basis	broad	enough	whereupon	to	erect	a	despotism	of	unlimited	extent.”20	
From	 here,	 Jefferson	 recounted	 the	 course	 of	 the	 fighting	 since	 the	 raid	 on	 Concord,	
including	General	Gage’s	proscription	of	the	rebels	and	proclamation	of	martial	 law	in	
Massachusetts.	 He	 closed	 with	 an	 appeal	 to	 “the	 good	 offices	 of	 our	 fellow	 subjects	





The	King’s	 speech	 declaring	 the	 colonies	 out	 of	 royal	 protection	 in	October	 1775,	
prompted	 Jefferson	 to	 write	 a	 rebuttal,	 the	 “Refutation	 of	 the	 Argument	 that	 the	
Colonies	Were	Established	at	 the	Expense	of	 the	British	Nation”	 in	 January	1776.	The	
majority	 of	 the	Refutation	 consists	 of	 a	 history	 of	 the	 unsuccessful	 English	 efforts	 at	
colonising	the	North	American	seaboard	from	Elizabeth	I’s	granting	of	letters	patent	to	
Sir	 Humphrey	 Gilbert	 in	 1578,	 through	 the	 efforts	 at	 implanting	 a	 colony	 in	 the	
Chesapeake	 region	 by	 Sir	Walter	Raleigh	 in	 the	 1580s,	 to	 Raleigh’s	 attainder	 and	 the	
reissuing	 of	 the	 letters	 patent	 to	 the	 Virginia	 Company	 by	 King	 James	 I	 in	 1606.	





                                                     
19	Ibid.,	p.	200.	
20	Ibid.,	pp.	200‐201.	









a	 feudal	due	of	 “the	 fifth	part	of	 all	 the	ore	of	gold	and	silver	which	 should	be	gotten	
there.”23	
The	 terms	 of	 these	 patents	 were	 important	 to	 Jefferson’s	 narrative	 of	 colonial	
settlement.	Significantly,	the	patent	was	issued	in	the	name	of	the	reigning	monarch	and	
the	 terms	 of	 allegiance	 and	 feudal	 dues	 were	 only	 to	 the	 Crown,	 not	 to	 Parliament.	
Likewise,	it	made	clear	that	the	only	state	support	received	by	Gilbert	and	Raleigh	was	
from	 the	Crown,	 and	 that	 it	 consisted	 solely	 of	 an	 authorisation	 to	 explore	 and	 claim	
lands,	 while	 incurring	 a	 significant	 potential	 liability	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 quit‐rent.	
Significantly,	 however,	 Jefferson	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 letters	 patent	 also	 stipulated	
that	the	colonies	should	be	governed	“as	nearly	as	convenient	agreeable	to	the	form	of	
the	laws	and	policy	of	England,	and	were	not	against	the	Christian	faith	then	professed	
in	 the	 church	 of	 England”,	 thereby	 opening	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 some	 basis	 of	
metropolitan	control	over	both	colonial	civil	and	religious	life.24	
In	the	final	paragraphs	of	the	Refutation,	Jefferson	linked	the	history	of	these	failed	
attempts	 at	 colonisation	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 to	 the	 successful	 attempts	 in	 the	
seventeenth	 century,	 and	 explained	 why	 the	 connection	 mattered.	 Raleigh	 had	 been	




James	 suspended	 the	 Company’s	 charter,	 and	 in	 1626	 King	 Charles	 I	 seized	 the	






Virginia	 Company	 patent	 superseded	 the	 forfeited	 Raleigh	 patent.	 The	 history	 of	 the	
Virginia	Company’s	 colonisation	effort,	 and	 the	 effective	 robbery	by	 the	Crown	of	 the	
Company’s	private	investment,	would	seem	to	be	all	the	evidence	Jefferson	needed	to	at	
                                                     






least	 show	 Virginia’s	 independence	 from	 Parliament.	 What	 does	 seem	 clear	 is	 that	
Jefferson	saw	benefit	in	associating	the	Virginia	Company	patent	with	the	terms	of	the	
earlier	patents,	for	he	was	attempting	to	defend	the	autonomy	not	only	of	Virginia	but	of	
“the	 other	 colonies	within	 [Raleigh’s	 patent’s]	 limits”.26	 In	 the	 Summary	View	 he	 had	
claimed	that	the	proprietary	colonies	to	Virginia’s	north	and	south	had	been	carved	out	
of	Virginia’s	own	territory.	Now	in	the	Refutation	he	was	reiterating	that	point	by	saying	
that	 not	 only	 were	 Virginia’s	 neighbouring	 colonies	 entitled	 to	 self‐rule	 by	 Virginia’s	





It	 is	 worth	 emphasising	 what	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 was	 declaring	
independence	from,	and	what	it	was	not.	In	the	context	of	Jefferson’s	earlier	writings,	it	
was	 declaring	 independence	 from	 the	 imperial	 Crown.	 It	 was	 not	 declaring	
independence	 from	Parliament,	which	 Jefferson	considered	to	already	be	 in	effect	and	
thence	not	to	require	declaring;	at	most,	the	Declaration	of	Independence	is	a	reminder	
that	 the	 colonies	 had	 never	 accepted	 the	 Declaratory	 Act	 of	 1766.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	
helpful	to	understand	that	when	Jefferson	claimed	that	there	was	“nothing	original”	in	
the	Declaration	of	Independence,	he	was	referring	to	the	ideas	within	the	canon	of	the	
colonial	 pamphleteers,	 but	 he	 could	 just	 as	 easily	 have	 been	 referring	 to	 his	 own	
personal	 canon	 of	 the	 Summary	 View,	 Declaration	 of	 Causes,	 and	 the	 Refutation.27	















new	 republican	 states	 in	 North	 America.	 The	 body	 of	 the	 Declaration	 is	 a	 standard	
accounting	 of	 natural	 rights	 philosophy	 and	 laid	 out	 a	 liberal	 vision	 of	 empowered	
individuals	 forming	government	 through	 the	 social	 contract.	 It	 lists	 the	natural	 rights	
that	 government	 is	 formed	 to	 protect,	 among	 others	 “life,	 &	 liberty,	 &	 the	 pursuit	 of	
happiness.”	It	affirmed	a	right	of	resistance	to	tyranny	while	also	disavowing	rebellion	
as	 anything	 but	 a	 last	 resort,	 and	 called	 for	 the	 monarchy	 in	 each	 colony	 to	 be	
overthrown	 in	 favour	of	 republics	 “most	 likely	 to	effect	 their	 safety	and	happiness.”28	
This	was	a	 fairly	 standard	body	of	natural	 rights	doctrine,	 although	 it	 is	notable	 that,	
while	 Jefferson	 had	 invoked	 the	 natural	 rights	 of	 expatriation	 and	 free	 trade	 in	 the	
Summary	View,	 the	 rights	 he	was	 now	 advocating	were	different	 in	 intent	 and	 scope.	
While	the	natural	rights	of	the	Summary	View	had	pertained	to	international	movement	
and	 the	 law	 of	 nations,	 the	 natural	 rights	 of	 the	Declaration	 pertained	 to	 stationary	
polities	and	their	constitutions.	
To	demonstrate	 that	 the	 colonies	were	not	declaring	 their	 independence	 from	 the	
Crown	 for	 “light	 &	 transient	 causes”,	 Jefferson	 provided	 a	 list	 of	 eighteen	 grievances	
against	 the	 king.	 The	 first	 eleven	 concerned	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 legislative	 and	
judicial	departments	of	the	colonial	governments,	and	the	various	attempts	of	the	king,	
his	Privy	Council,	and	the	royal	governors	to	bring	the	colonies	to	heel.	Strictly	speaking,	
these	 abuses	 concerned	 incidents	where	 the	 Crown	was	 acting	within	 its	 jurisdiction	
but	 had	 acted	 inappropriately,	 for	 example	 by	 dissolving	 legislatures	 without	 calling	
new	 elections,	 or	 by	 infringing	 upon	 the	 rights	 of	 due	 process.	 The	 twelfth	 item	
concerned	actions	where	the	king	had	allegedly	colluded	with	Parliament,	and	its	eight	
sub‐items	 largely	 replicated	 the	 list	 of	 grievances	 found	 in	 the	Declaration	 of	 Causes.	
Grievances	thirteen	through	seventeen	concerned	what	Jefferson	considered	to	be	war	
crimes	committed	by	the	British	military	since	the	start	of	the	war,	such	as	the	sacking	
of	 cities	 and	 the	 incitement	 of	 Indian	 and	 slave	 uprisings.	 Finally,	 the	 eighteenth	
grievance	was	 Jefferson’s	 indictment	 of	 the	 slave	 trade,	 anachronistic	 in	 its	 claims	 of	
George	 III’s	 personal	 responsibility	 for	 the	 slave	 trade,	 and	 swiftly	 cut	 out	 when	 the	
draft	Declaration	was	edited	by	Congress.29		








colonial	 crisis	peacefully.	 In	 it,	 Jefferson	hearkened	back	 to	his	own	work,	noting	 that	
“we	 have	warned	 them	 from	 time	 to	 time	 of	attempts	by	 their	 legislature	 to	 extend	a	
jurisdiction	over	these	our	states”	(emphasis	added).	The	Declaration	“reminded”	Britons	
of	“the	circumstances	of	our	emigration	&	settlement	here	….	Effected	at	the	expense	of	
our	own	blood	&	 treasure,	unassisted	by	 the	wealth	or	 the	 strength	of	Great	Britain.”	
Finally,	 Jefferson	 reiterated	 his	 federal	 theory	 of	 the	 imperial	 Crown,	 noting	 that	 “we	
had	 adopted	 one	 common	 king,	 thereby	 laying	 a	 foundation	 for	 perpetual	 league	 &	
amity”	 between	 all	 the	 English‐speaking	 realms,	 “but	 that	 submission	 to	 [Parliament]	
was	 no	 part	 of	 our	 constitution”.30	 These	 closing	 remarks	 firmly	 anchored	 the	




Jefferson’s	 first	 goal	 as	 a	 writer	 during	 the	 colonial	 crisis	 was	 to	 assert,	 and	 if	
possible	 prove,	 the	 independence	 of	 colonial	 legislatures,	 in	 particular	 Virginia’s	 own	
Assembly.	This	posed	a	problem	because,	as	he	had	 learned	as	a	 law	student,	English	
law	 considered	 Virginia	 to	 be	 a	 dependent	 realm,	 like	 Ireland,	 rather	 than	 an	
independent	 realm	 linked	 by	 the	 person	 of	 the	 king,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 seventeenth‐
century	 Scotland.	 As	 a	 dependent	 realm,	 the	 Virginian	 legislature	 thus	 served	 at	 the	
pleasure	of	 the	English	Crown,	 and	did	not	have	 a	 constitutionally	 separate	 existence	
from	its	parent	state.	





the	 Norman	 conquest	 of	 Saxon	 England	 in	 the	 eleventh	 century,	 the	 Anglo‐Norman	
conquest	 of	 Gaelic	 Ireland	 during	 the	 twelfth	 century,	 and	 the	 English	 conquest	 of	
Virginia	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 Jefferson	 did	 not	 deny	 that	 Virginia	 had	 been	
conquered,	but	hoped	to	differentiate	its	conquest	from	both	of	the	Norman	conquests	



















Much	 like	 the	 old	 saying	 that	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution	 was	 not	 so	 very	 glorious,	
Jefferson	 might	 also	 have	 said	 that	 William	 the	 Conqueror	 was	 not	 so	 very	 much	 a	
conqueror.	In	the	Summary	View,	Jefferson	argued	that	the	feudalisation	of	English	land	





                                                     
31	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 connection	 through	 the	 imperial	 Crown	was	 the	 subject	 of	 a	
recent	forum	in	the	William	and	Mary	Quarterly.	The	lead	article	by	Eric	Nelson	argues	
that	colonial	writers	during	the	years	1769‐1775	adopted	a	stance	of	“patriot	royalism”	
in	which	 they	 self‐consciously	 adopted	 elements	 of	 constitutional	 theory	 of	 the	 early	
Stuart	kings	James	I	and	Charles	I,	accepting	an	enhanced	royal	prerogative	in	order	to	




in	 American	 Political	 Thought,	 1769–75."	 The	William	 and	Mary	 Quarterly	 68,	 no.	 4	
(2011):	533‐572;	Gordon	S.	Wood,	"The	Problem	of	Sovereignty."	The	William	and	Mary	
Quarterly	 68,	 no.	 4	 (2011):	 573‐577;	 Pauline	 Maier,	 "Whigs	 Against	 Whigs	 Against	
Whigs."	The	William	and	Mary	Quarterly	68,	no.	4	(2011):	578‐582;	Daniel	J.	Hulsebosch,	






As	 befitting	 an	 ancient	 constitutionalist,	 Jefferson	 subscribed	 to	 a	 belief	 in	 the	
freedom	of	Saxon	land	tenures	in	addition	to	his	belief	in	the	antiquity	of	the	House	of	
Commons.	 “In	 the	earlier	 ages	of	 the	Saxon	 settlement	 feudal	holdings	were	 certainly	
altogether	unknown,”	he	wrote	 in	 the	Summary	View,	 “and	very	 few,	 if	 any,	had	been	
introduced	at	the	time	of	the	Norman	conquest.”	Instead,	the	minor	Saxon	gentry	held	
their	 property	 “in	 absolute	 dominion,	 disencumbered	 with	 any	 superior,	 answering	
nearly	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 those	 possessions	 which	 the	 Feudalists	 term	 Allodial.”33	 By	
qualifying	his	claim	with	the	words	“very	 few”,	 Jefferson	acknowledged	the	possibility	










                                                                                                                                                                     
and	 Eric	 Nelson,	 "Taking	 Them	 Seriously."	The	William	 and	Mary	Quarterly	68,	 no.	 4	
(2011):	588‐596.	
32	 A	 review	 of	 the	 historiography	 shows	 agreement	 on	 the	 gradual	 conversion	 of	
Saxon	tenures	into	Norman	ones	through	the	process	of	escheat	and	attainder,	followed	
by	 the	 wholesale	 collapse	 of	 the	 English	 gentry.	 Robin	 Fleming	 puts	 it	 thus:	 “Many	
English	 lords	must	have	 taken	strong	exception	 to	 the	rush	of	minor	 landholders	 into	
the	arms	of	Norman	lords	for	protection.	As	their	dues	and	retinues	shrank,	these	men	
were	 propelled	 into	 rebellion.	 Thus,	 once	 the	 Conqueror	 and	 his	 followers	 began	 to	
restructure	landholding	without	regard	to	kinship	and	commendation,	little	could	stop	
the	English	aristocracy’s	terrible	slide	towards	annihilation.”	See	Robin	Flemings,	Kings	
and	 Lords	 in	 Conquest	 England.	 Cambridge:	 University	 Press,	 1991:	 p.	 144.	 See	 also	
Brian	Golding,	Conquest	and	Colonisation:	The	Normans	 in	Britain,	1066‐1100.	London:	










Here	 a	 digression	 must	 be	 made	 from	 Jefferson’s	 text,	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 why,	
having	won	the	Battle	of	Hastings,	William	was	not	legally	the	conqueror	of	the	whole	
kingdom,	 as	 his	 sobriquet	 implied.	 As	 Jefferson	 was	 doubtless	 aware,	 the	 Duke	 of	
Normandy	 did	 not	 land	 his	 army	 on	 the	 southern	 English	 coast	 in	 1066	 out	 of	
happenstance	or	 from	a	random	outburst	of	 territorial	aggression.	Earlier	 in	 the	year,	
King	Edward	of	England	had	died	without	a	son,	and	Harold	had	inherited	the	crown	as	
Edward’s	brother‐in‐law.	William,	who	was	a	descendant	of	Edward’s	mother’s	 sister,	
chose	 to	contest	Harold’s	claim.	Thus,	he	chose	 to	 land	his	 troops	 in	 the	centre	of	 the	
realm,	 at	 Hastings,	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 trial	 by	 battle	 for	 the	 kingship.	William	
defeated	Harold	in	that	trial,	official	English	resistance	died	out	in	the	coming	months,	






up	 arms	 against	 William	 at	 Hastings	 or	 in	 the	 rebellions	 continued	 to	 enjoy	 their	
original	free	tenures.	It	was	not	long,	however,	before	these	titles	were	usurped	by	the	
centralising	 Anglo‐Norman	 state.	 The	 freeholds,	 “by	 express	 laws,	 enacted	 to	 render	
uniform	the	system	of	military	defence	…	were	made	liable	to	the	same	military	duties	
as	 if	 they	had	been	 feuds:	and	the	Norman	 lawyers	soon	 found	means	 to	saddle	 them	
also	 with	 all	 the	 other	 feudal	 burthens.”37	 In	 Jefferson’s	 telling,	 the	 true	 Norman	
Conquest	 was	 not	 effected	 by	 the	 swords	 of	 William’s	 army	 but	 by	 the	 quills	 of	 his	
lawyers.	
Since	 the	 Saxon	 gentry	 had	 not	 resisted	William’s	 rule,	 their	 lands	 “had	 not	 been	
surrendered	to	the	king,	they	were	not	derived	from	his	grant,	and	therefore	they	were	
                                                     
35	Ibid.,	p.	132.	
36	 The	 subsequent	 rebellions	 by	 the	 remaining	 Saxon	nobles	 took	 place	well	 after	










absolute	 right.”39	 This	 had	 not	 prevented	 subsequent	 kings	 from	 claiming	 that	 all	
tenures	 were	 feudal,	 regardless	 of	 history.	 According	 to	 Jefferson’s	 reasoning,	 the	
feudalisation	of	Saxon	tenures	based	upon	the	legal	fiction	of	attainted	lands’	conquest	
or	 surrender	 to	 the	 Crown	 had,	 in	 turn,	 become	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 king’s	 claimed	
prerogative	to	grant	lands.	Jefferson	argued	that	this	prerogative	had	no	basis	in	law	or	





Although	never	mentioned	 by	 name	 in	 any	 of	 Jefferson’s	 draft	 state	 papers	 in	 the	
period	1774‐1776,	 Ireland	 is	 an	 ever‐present	 spectre	 throughout	 his	 narrative	 as	 the	
prime	example	of	a	 realm	 that	was	 ruled	by	 right	of	 conquest	and	which	was,	 in	 fact,	
dependent	upon	the	Kingdom	of	England	for	its	legal	existence.	The	Declaratory	Act	of	
1766	 was	 modelled	 upon	 the	 Irish	 Declaratory	 Act	 of	 1720,	 which	 affirmed	 the	
supremacy	of	the	British	parliament	over	its	Irish	counterpart.	To	understand	the	kind	
of	 dependency	 that	 Jefferson	 was	 arguing	 against	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 colonies,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	understand	the	kind	of	dependence	that	already	existed	in	Ireland.	It	is	in	




Jefferson	 took	 an	 interest	 in	 Ireland’s	 relationship	 with	 England	 from	 the	 very	
beginning	of	 his	 involvement	 in	 the	 unfolding	 colonial	 crisis.	As	 he	 took	his	 seat	 as	 a	
newly‐elected	member	of	the	House	of	Burgesses	in	1769,	Jefferson	placed	an	order	for	
books	 to	 be	 delivered	 from	 London	 which	 he	 felt	 would	 be	 helpful	 in	 his	 duties.	
Amongst	these	volumes	were	three	histories	of	Ireland:	Ferdinando	Warner’s	History	of	






Ireland	 (1763)	 and	 History	 of	 the	 Rebellion	 and	 Civil‐War	 in	 Ireland	 (1768),	 and	 Sir	
William	Petty’s	Political	Survey	of	 Ireland	 (1719).40	Warner’s	 first	book	concerned	 the	
ancient	 history	 of	 Ireland	 before	 the	 conquest	 by	 the	 Anglo‐Normans	 in	 the	 twelfth	
century,	while	the	History	of	the	Rebellion	and	Petty’s	Survey	concerned	the	subjugation	
of	 Ireland	 in	 the	Wars	 of	 the	 Three	 Kingdoms	 and	 the	 subsequent	 annexation	 of	 its	
lands	to	the	English	aristocracy	 in	the	 late	seventeenth	century.	 In	combination,	 these	
histories	 helped	 Jefferson	 form	 an	 overall	 picture	 of	 how	 Ireland	 came	 to	 be	 a	
dependent	realm	of	England.	
The	 colonisation	of	 Ireland	was	a	 slow	process	 that	began	with	an	 invasion	by	an	
Anglo‐Norman	army	loyal	to	King	Henry	II	in	1169,	one	century	after	William’s	invasion	
of	England.	The	English	 forces,	 led	by	 their	king,	 subdued	much	of	 the	eastern	half	of	
Ireland,	 establishing	 Crown	 lands	 around	 the	 administrative	 capital,	 Dublin,	 that	
became	known	as	the	Pale.	The	hinterlands	surrounding	the	Pale	were	parcelled	out	to	
Henry’s	principal	 lieutenants,	who	received	the	lands	under	feudal	tenure	in	exchange	
for	keeping	military	control	of	 their	neighbourhoods	 in	 the	 realm.	The	eastern	half	of	
the	 island	 thus	 came	under	direct	or	 indirect	Crown	control,	while	 the	western	areas	
remained	under	 the	control	of	 the	Gaelic	natives.	The	realm	 itself	was	ruled	by	a	 lord	
lieutenant	and	was	considered	to	be	a	“lordship”	rather	than	a	proper	kingdom.	
The	situation	changed	with	 the	 rise	 to	power	 in	England	of	 the	House	of	Tudor	 in	
1485.	Soon	after	the	consolidation	of	Henry	VII’s	rule	in	England,	the	Anglo‐Irish	feudal	
lords,	descendants	of	the	Anglo‐Normans	who	had	fought	for	Henry	II,	allowed	enemies	
of	 the	Tudors	 to	 take	shelter	 in	 Ireland.	 In	response,	Henry	VII	dispatched	a	new	 lord	




this	 law,	 the	 Irish	Parliament	alienated	 its	 authority	 to	 the	king	and	Privy	Councils	 at	




Part	 I,	 1494‐1615."	 Irish	 Historical	 Studies	 2,	 no.	 8	 (1941):	 415‐424;	 James	 Kelly,	
Poynings'	Law	and	the	Making	of	Law	in	Ireland,	1660‐1800.	Dublin:	Four	Courts	Press,	






Dublin	 and	Westminster,	 effectively	 abrogating	 Irish	 self‐rule.	 Poynings’	 Law	was	 the	




that	 began	 with	 the	 Anglo‐Scottish	 Bishops	War	 of	 1639	 that	 became	 known	 as	 the	
Wars	of	the	Three	Kingdoms.	Ireland’s	subjugation	by	the	army	of	Oliver	Cromwell	and	
the	re‐division	of	its	lands	after	the	war	were	the	subject	of	both	Warner’s	and	Petty’s	
histories.	From	this	point	on,	 Ireland	was	ruled	 firmly	as	a	dependency	of	 the	English	
King‐in‐Council,	and	of	the	King‐in‐Parliament	after	the	Glorious	Revolution.	Poynings’	
Law	remained	in	effect,	and	was	bolstered	by	the	British	parliament’s	Declaratory	Act	of	
1720,	 which	 stated	 that	 the	 Westminster	 parliament	 exercised	 sovereignty	 over	 its	
Dublin	 cousin.44	 The	 state	 of	 Ireland	 remained	 in	 this	 way	 until	 Poynings’	 Law	 was	









the	 charters	were	not	binding	 land	grants	but	 instead	were	 social	 compacts,	 and	 that	
the	colonies	were	not	conquered	by	the	king’s	soldiers	but	by	independent	adventurers.	
If	he	could	prove	that	feudal	law	did	not	apply	to	America,	or	that	it	was	illegitimate,	he	
                                                     
43	 See	 Brendan	 Bradshaw,	 The	 Irish	 Constitutional	 Revolution	 of	 the	 Sixteenth	
Century.	 Cambridge:	 University	 Press,	 1979;	 Nicholas	 P.	 Canny,	 The	 Elizabethan	
Conquest	 of	 Ireland:	A	Pattern	Established,	 1565‐76.	 Hassocks:	 Harvester	 Press,	 1976;	
Canny,	Kingdom	and	Colony:	Ireland	 in	the	Atlantic	World,	1560‐1800.	Baltimore:	Johns	
Hopkins	 University	 Press,	 1988;	 and	 Colm	 Lennon,	 Sixteenth‐Century	 Ireland:	 The	
Incomplete	Conquest.	Dublin:	St.	Martin's	Press,	1995.	
44	 See	 description	 in	 Kelly,	 Poynings’	 Law,	 pp.	 193‐197.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Irish	
Declaratory	Act	 came	 after	 five	 decades	 of	 controversy	 over	 the	 English	 Parliament’s	










be,	 in	 fact,	 a	 conquered	 and	 dependent	 realm	with	 the	 same	 constitutional	 status	 as	
Ireland.45	While	a	law	student,	Jefferson	recorded	in	his	commonplace	book	a	decision	
from	William	Salkeld’s	Reports	of	the	Cases	in	King’s	Bench.	Summarising	the	decision	in	
Holt.	 Smith	 v.	 Brown	 and	 Cooper,	 Jefferson	 wrote	 that	 “The	 laws	 of	 England	 do	 not	
extend	 to	 Virginia,	 which	 being	 a	 conquered	 country,	 their	 law	 is	 what	 the	 king	




determined	 that	 feudal	 tenures	did	not	 apply	 in	America.	The	original	 Saxon	 tenures,	
having	never	 truly	been	 superseded	by	 the	 feudal	 law,	 “still	 form[ed]	 the	basis	of	 the	
groundwork	of	the	Common	law,	to	prevail	wheresoever	the	exceptions	have	not	taken	





land	 rights.	 	 “The	 fictitious	 principle	 that	 all	 lands	 belong	 originally	 to	 the	 king,	 they	
were	 early	 persuaded	 to	 beleive	 [sic]	 real,	 and	 accordingly	 took	 grants	 of	 their	 own	
lands	from	the	crown.”48	
This	misappropriation	 of	 colonial	 lands	 had	not	 been	 limited	 to	 the	 original	 royal	
charters	 for	 Virginia	 and	Massachusetts.	 It	 had	 extended	 to	 the	 allocation	 to	 English	
                                                     
















right	of	 the	crown	alone”	had	 “at	 several	 times	parted	out	and	distributed	among	 the	
favourites	 and	 followers	 of	 their	 fortunes”	 Virginian	 lands	 into	 “the	 distinct	 and	




Jefferson	was	not	above	 invoking	charters	when	 it	 served	his	purposes,	 such	as	 to	
prove	that	the	colonies	had	not	been	conquered	by	the	British	state.	Here,	the	wording	
of	 Queen	 Elizabeth	 I’s	 letters	 patent	 to	 Gilbert	 and	 Raleigh	 served	 his	 purposes,	 by	
showing	 that	 they	 had	 been	 acting	 as	 private	 explorers.51	 The	 same	 went	 for	 the	
Virginia	 Company’s	 charter	 before	 it	 was	 seized	 by	 King	 Charles	 I.52	While	 a	 charter	
could	 not	 bind	 Virginia	 to	 the	 home	 islands,	 “the	 expence	 of	 the	 British	 nation”	 in	
planting	them	could	form	the	basis	for	some	sort	of	political	obligation,	as	was	the	case	
with	 the	 feudal	 plantations	 in	 Ireland.	 Jefferson	 did	 not	 dispute	 that	 “America	 was	




Royal	 charters	 of	 any	 kind	were	unnecessary	 for	 forming	 a	 new	 society,	 Jefferson	
wrote,	because	the	natural	right	of	expatriation	with	which	he	began	the	Summary	View	
not	 only	 allowed	people	 to	 leave	 their	 homeland,	 but	 to	 set	 up	 “new	 societies,	 under	
such	 laws	 and	 regulations	 as	 to	 them	 shall	 seem	 most	 likely	 to	 promote	 public	
happiness.”54	 Indeed,	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 was	 later	 issued	 because	 the	













that	 end,	 Jefferson	was	willing	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 colonists	 had	 knowingly	 and	
with	 intent	 “continue[d]	 their	 union	with	 [England]	 by	 submitting	 themselves	 to	 the	
same	common	sovereign”,	whilst	at	 the	same	time	denouncing	those	provisions	of	the	
charters	 that	granted	 land.56	Thus,	 Jefferson	accepted	an	 idealised	version	of	charters,	
and	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 argument	 substituted	 this	 ideal	 for	 the	 flawed,	 feudal	
documents	that	actually	existed.	
This	 idealisation	 also	 involved	 re‐imagining	 the	 Crown.	 Rejecting	 the	 medieval	
legacy	 of	 divine	 right	 and	 the	 claims	 to	 absolute	 monarchy	 of	 the	 House	 of	 Stuart,	
Jefferson	adopted	a	view	of	the	king	as	a	“chief	magistrate”	who	was	“appointed	by	the	
laws,	and	circumscribed	with	definite	powers,	to	assist	in	working	the	great	machine	of	
government.”57	 This	 was	 consistent	 with	 his	 view	 of	 England’s	 ancient	 constitution,	
under	which	he	thought	the	kingship	had	been	an	elective	office	chosen	by	a	council	of	
petty	nobles	and	gentry.	While	it	is	unclear	whether	Jefferson	thought	that	the	ancient	
constitution	 itself	 extended	 to	 America	 ‐	 his	 comment	 that	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution	
restored	the	“British	constitution”	to	its	“free	and	antient	principles”	suggests	that	it	did	
not	apply	 in	the	colonies	‐	 it	 is	clear	that	 Jefferson	thought	the	office	of	 the	king	to	be	
similarly	limited	under	the	colonial	charters.58		
This	model	 of	 a	 king	 limited	 in	 powers,	 bound	 by	 a	 social	 compact,	 and	with	 less	
authority	than	was	claimed	by	the	Stuart	kings	who	had	presided	over	colonisation,	was	
analogous	to	but	different	from	the	King‐in‐Parliament	within	Britain.	Unlike	the	British	
constitution,	 in	 which	 the	 king	 was	 one	 of	 three	 feudal	 estates	 represented	 in	
Parliament,	 Jefferson’s	colonial	king	was	a	simple	magistrate	with	utilitarian	duties	as	
chief	 executive,	 no	 balancing	 role	 to	 play	 between	 nobility	 and	 commons,	 and	 a	












This	 universalisation	 of	 the	 form	 of	 government	 amongst	 political	 units	 of	 equal	 and	
uniform	 standing	 was	 a	 decisive	 turn	 away	 from	 the	 feudal	 conglomeration	 of	




His	 assessment	 of	 feudalism	 provided	 Jefferson	 with	 the	 basic	 principles	 of	 his	
political	thought.	The	colonies	had	been	established	by	private	enterprise,	and	therefore	
enjoyed	 the	 political	 independence	 of	 expatriated	 communities.	 The	 colonial	 charters	
had	retained	the	Crown	as	a	link	between	England	and	the	new	realms,	but	the	Crown’s	
authority	 in	 the	 colonies	 could	not	 exceed	 that	which	 it	 had	within	England,	where	 it	
was	limited	by	the	ancient	constitution	of	the	Saxons.	The	ancient	constitution	did	not	





This	 circularity	 was	 not	 a	 closed	 philosophical	 system,	 because	 Jefferson	 was	
arguing	 as	 a	 political	writer,	 not	 a	 philosopher.	 Proving	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 colonies	 by	
denying	 the	 feudal	 law	was	 a	 necessary	 but	 not	 sufficient	 condition	 of	 defending	 the	
colonial	cause.	Jefferson	also	had	to	link	that	deeper	history	to	the	more	recent	history	
since	 colonisation.	 That	 involved	 drawing	 a	 connection	 between	 feudalism	 and	
mercantilism	in	the	constitutional	 law	of	British	imperialism.	His	account	of	 feudalism	
concluded	 chronologically	with	 the	 division	 of	 Virginia’s	 charter	 lands	 by	 the	 Stuarts	
after	 the	 Restoration.	 His	 account	 of	 mercantilism	 began	 with	 the	 passage	 of	 the	
Navigation	Acts	by	the	Stuarts’	foes,	the	Commonwealth	of	England,	and	proceeded	up	
to	the	year	of	the	Declaration	of	Independence	itself.59	The	importance	of	the	mercantile	
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legislation	 was	 not	 just	 in	 its	 content,	 but	 in	 that	 it	 showed	 that	 Parliament	 was	
arrogating	authority	that	did	not	belong	to	it	‐	authority	that	could	only	be	justified	by	
Parliament’s	appropriation	of	feudal	authority	previously	reserved	to	the	Crown.	
In	 this	 section,	 I	will	 trace	 the	history	of	mercantilist	 imperialism	as	portrayed	by	
Jefferson	from	the	early	1650s	to	June	1776.	First,	we	shall	see	how	Jefferson	saw	the	
Navigation	Acts	and	subsequent	mercantilist	legislation	as	a	gradually	expanding	effort	
by	 Parliament	 to	 claim	 imperial	 authority	 over	 the	 colonies.	 This	 parliamentary	
legislation	 culminated	 in	 the	 Declaratory	 Act	 of	 1766,	 in	 which	 Parliament	 formally	
declared	 that	 it	 enjoyed	 the	 same	 supremacy	 over	 the	 colonies	 as	 it	 did	 Ireland.	
Parliament’s	attempt	to	arrogate	to	itself	by	legislation	what	the	law	of	nations	gave	the	
Crown	by	 right	of	 conquest	 ‐	 i.e.,	 the	 final	 constitutional	 authority	 in	 colonial	 affairs	 ‐		
provides	 the	 crucial	 link	 between	 feudal	 land	 rights	 and	mercantilist	 legislation	 in	 a	
single	imperial	constitution.	It	was	also	a	major	turning	point	in	the	colonial	crisis,	 for	
until	 then	 Parliament	 had	 exercised	 authority	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis,	 rather	 than	
claiming	final	authority	“in	all	cases	whatsoever”.	In	response,	Jefferson	conducted	legal	
research	that	satisfied	him	that	the	colonies	had	the	rights	of	palatinates	under	feudal	





By	 Jefferson’s	 telling,	 the	 last	 acts	 of	 Crown	 feudalism	 with	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
proprietary	 colonies	 in	 the	 1660s	 post‐dated	 the	 beginning	 of	 Parliamentary	
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mercantilism	 in	March	1651.	After	 the	death	of	King	Charles	 I	and	the	creation	of	 the	
English	 Commonwealth,	 many	 of	 the	 English	 colonies	 continued	 to	 recognise	 the	
Stuarts.	 The	 “Parliament	 of	 the	 Common‐wealth	 took	 the	 same	 in	 high	 offence,”	
Jefferson	 wrote	 in	 the	 Summary	 View,	 “and	 assumed	 upon	 themselves	 the	 power	 of	
prohibiting	 their	 trade	 with	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 except	 the	 island	 of	 Great	
Britain.”60	 The	 Commonwealth	 initially	 attempted	 to	 impose	 “this	 arbitrary	 act”,	 but	
later,	 “by	 solemn	 treaty”	 Virginia	 agreed	 to	 a	 modified	 version	 of	 this	 mercantilist	
regime,	 securing,	 as	 Jefferson	 quoted	 from	 the	 treaty,	 “free	 trade	 as	 the	 people	 of	
England	 do	 enjoy	 to	 all	 places	 and	 with	 all	 nations	 according	 to	 the	 laws	 of	 the	
Commonwealth.”61		




passing	 an	 act	 for	 inhibiting	 their	 trade	 with	 foreign	 nations,”	 Jefferson	 wrote.	 “This	
succession	to	the	exercise	of	the	kingly	authority	gave	the	first	colour	for	parliamentary	
interference	with	the	colonies,	and	produced	that	fatal	precedent	which	they	continued	
to	 follow	after	 they	had	retired,	 in	other	respects,	within	 their	proper	 functions”	after	
the	Restoration	in	1660.62	When	the	Stuarts	regained	the	throne,	the	parliament	of	the	
restored	monarchy	passed	 the	Navigation	Acts,	 at	which	point	 the	 colonies’	 “rights	of	
free	 commerce	 fell	 once	more	 a	 victim	 to	 arbitrary	 power.”63	 The	 “exercise	 of	 a	 free	
trade	with	all	parts	of	the	world”	was	a	“natural	right”,	Jefferson	contended,	“which	no	
law	of	 [the	colonies’	own]	had	 taken	away	or	abridged.”64	The	acts	of	 the	Restoration	
Parliament	to	take	away	that	right,	“shew	[sic]	what	hopes	[colonies]	might	form	from	
the	 justice	 of	 a	 British	 parliament	 were	 its	 uncontrouled	 [sic]	 power	 admitted	 over	
these	states.”65	
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The	 beginnings	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	 that	 uncontrolled	 power	 began	 innocuously	
enough,	with	 Parliament’s	 creation	 of	 an	 intercolonial	 post	 office	 during	 the	 reign	 of	
Queen	Anne.	While	the	Navigation	Acts	had	limited	their	 jurisdiction	to	external	trade	
upon	 the	oceans,	 the	post	office	 act	 “intermeddled	with	 the	 regulation	of	 the	 internal	
affairs	 of	 the	 colonies.”66	 This	 act	 “seems	 to	 have	 had	 little	 connection	 with	 British	
convenience,	 except	 that	 of	 accomodating	 [sic]	 his	 majesty’s	 ministers	 and	 favorites	
with	 the	 sale	 of	 a	 lucrative	 and	 easy	 office.”67	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that,	 while	
Jefferson	had	asserted	a	natural	right	to	trade	freely,	he	was	here	denying	Parliament’s	
right	 to	 even	 stimulate	 trade	 through	 a	 public	 service	 such	 as	 a	 post	 office,	 on	 the	
grounds	 that	 it	was	 an	 infringement	 upon	 each	 colony’s	 territorial	 integrity	 and	 that	
post	officers	would	be	mere	placemen	of	the	Crown	and	its	ministers.	
The	danger	of	Parliament	regulating	the	internal	affairs	of	the	colonies,	or	even	their	
economic	 relations	 with	 each	 other,	 came	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 “moderation	 [with	 which	
Parliament]	are	like	to	exercise	power,	where	they	themselves	are	to	feel	no	part	of	it’s	
[sic]	 weight.”68	 For	 evidence	 of	 this,	 Jefferson	 pointed	 to	 the	 Restraining	 Acts	 that	
formed	corollaries	 to	 the	Navigation	Acts.	 In	particular,	he	pointed	to	 the	Hat	Act	and	
the	 Iron	Act,	which	 he	 claimed	 “prohibit	 us	 from	manufacturing	 for	 our	 own	 use	 the	
articles	we	raise	on	our	own	lands	with	our	own	labor.”69	Jefferson	concluded	that	the	





Jefferson’s	 portrayal	 of	 the	 Restraining	 Acts	 is	 somewhat	 contorted,	 and	 suggests	
that	he	was	stretching	the	meaning	of	the	acts	to	suit	his	argument;	it	is	also	noteworthy	
that	the	acts	did	not	directly	concern	Virginian	commerce	and	were	therefore	out	of	his	
area	 of	 expertise.	 In	 The	 Navigation	 Acts	 and	 the	 American	 Revolution,	 Oliver	 M.	
Dickerson	notes	that	the	Hat	Act	was	a	response	to	over‐production	by	New	England	hat	
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legitimate	 means	 of	 assisting	 colonial	 economic	 development;	 Jefferson’s	 hostility	 to	






manufacturers.	 The	 Act	 “prohibited	 the	 transportation	 of	 hats	 from	 one	 colony	 to	
another”	and	created	production	regulations	“essentially	the	same	as	those	practiced	in	
England.”	 In	 particular,	 “the	 act	 is	 specific	 in	 not	 interfering	 with	 that	 part	 of	 the	
industry	 that	 was	 local	 and	 essentially	 domestic	 in	 character,	 and	 the	 regulations	
concerning	apprentices	did	not	apply	to	members	of	a	worker’s	own	family.”70	Likewise,	
“the	 iron	 bill	 should	 be	 considered	 chiefly	 as	 a	measure	 to	 encourage	 an	 infant	 steel	
industry	in	England	rather	than	an	attempt	to	destroy	a	colonial	enterprise.”	Dickerson	
notes	 that	 “important	 steel	manufacture”	 did	 not	 exist	 in	 America	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	
colonial	crisis,	and	would	not	for	decades	after	independence.71	
The	 third	 and	 final	 expansion	 of	 Parliamentary	 authority	 came	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	
Stamp	Act.	While	 the	 post	 office	 sought	 to	 regulate	 and	 stimulate	 intercolonial	 trade,	
and	 the	Restraining	Acts	 sought	 to	 regulate	economic	 activity	within	each	 colony,	 the	
Stamp	 Act	 attempted	 to	 tax	 within	 each	 colony.	 It	 was	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 taxation	
power	 that	prompted	the	 first	stirrings	of	colonial	revolt.	 Jefferson	had	comparatively	
little	to	say	about	the	Stamp	Act,	other	than	that	it,	along	with	other	pieces	of	mid‐1760s	
legislation,	 “form	a	 connected	chain	of	parliamentary	usurpation.”72	This	 is	 consistent	
with	 Jefferson’s	 larger	argument	that	mercantilism	was	 illegitimate	by	 its	very	nature.	
While	 other	 colonial	 writers	 might	 draw	 distinctions	 between	 Parliament’s	 right	 to	




Immediately	 following	 the	 repeal	 of	 the	 Stamp	 Act	 in	 1766,	 Parliament	 issued	 a	
Declaratory	Act	binding	the	colonies	to	the	will	of	the	British	legislature.	This	act	marks	
a	turning	point	in	Jefferson’s	history	of	mercantilism,	as	both	he	and	Parliament	agreed	
that	 the	constitutionality	of	 the	Townshend	and	Coercive	Acts	hinged	on	 this	point.	 It	
was	 the	 Declaratory	 Act	 that	 marked	 the	 decisive	 shift	 from	 piecemeal	 mercantile	
regulation	to	a	“connected	chain	of	parliamentary	usurpation”.73	In	so	doing,	Parliament	
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for	 its	 authority	 over	 the	 American	 colonies.	 It	 had	 not	 done	 this	 before,	 when	 the	
powers	 it	 exercised	 were	 ostensibly	 regulatory	 rather	 than	 legislative	 or	 involving	
revenue	taxation.	
The	 American	 Declaratory	 Act	 of	 1766	 closely	 followed	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 Irish	
Declaratory	Act	of	1720,	and	the	operative	clauses	of	the	two	acts	are	nearly	identical.74	





of	 the	 Dependency	 of	 Ireland	 upon	 the	 Crown	 of	 Great	 Britain”,	 and	 the	 American	




There	 was	 a	 subtle	 difference	 in	 the	 two	 Declaratory	 Acts	 that	 retains	 their	
similarity	but	prevents	 their	being	 identical.	While	 the	 Irish	Declaratory	Act	 specified	
the	 dependency	 of	 Ireland	 upon	 “the	 Imperial	 Crown”	 of	 Great	 Britain,	 the	 American	
Declaratory	 Act	 assigned	 supremacy	 to	 “the	 Imperial	 Crown	 and	 Parliament”.	 It	 is	
unclear	 whether	 the	 addition	 of	 Parliament	 to	 the	 American	 Declaratory	 Act	 was	 a	
constitutional	statement	regarding	the	status	of	colonies	or	merely	reflected	an	updated	
way	 of	 speaking	 of	 the	 mixed	 constitution	 within	 Britain	 itself.	 In	 any	 event,	 both	
statutes	assigned	future	executive	and	legislative	powers	to	“the	King’s	Majesty,	by	and	
with	 the	 Advice	 and	 Consent”	 of	 both	 houses	 of	 Parliament,	 with	 “full	 power	 and	
Authority	to	make	Law	and	Statutes	of	sufficient	Force	and	Validity	to	bind”	Ireland	and	
America	 to	 the	Crown.	These	 identical	 clauses	would	 therefore	make	 it	 seem	 that	 the	
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Within	 a	 year	 of	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 American	 Declaratory	 Act,	 the	 authority	
Parliament	 granted	 to	 itself	was	 exercised	 in	 the	 New	 York	 Restraining	 Act.	 This	 act	
suspended	 the	 operations	 of	New	York’s	 colonial	 assembly	 until	 the	 colony	 complied	
with	 Parliament’s	 requirements	 for	 quartering	 and	 supplying	 military	 forces	 based	
around	New	York	City.	 Jefferson	was	 appalled.	 “One	 free	 and	 independent	 legislature	








of	 various	 court	 cases	 pertaining	 to	 Irish	 autonomy	 under	 the	 imperial	 Crown.	 In	 it,	
Jefferson	 recorded	case	 law	regarding	 Ireland’s	 legislative	 independence,	 its	 land	 law,	
and	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 its	courts.78	He	also	 looked	 to	 the	rights	of	Wales	and	counties	
palatine	 under	 customary	 law.	 Like	 the	 colonies,	 palatinates	 were	 not	 taxed	 by	
Parliament,	unless	 they	were	given	 representation.	 	This	 research	provided	a	 fallback	
position	 from	 the	 assertion	 that	 the	 colonies	 formed	 fully	 separate	 realms	 from	
England.79	
As	 always,	 Jefferson’s	 first	 priority	 was	 in	 ascertaining	 the	 nature	 of	 legislative	
power	within	a	realm.	The	Irish	realm	was	a	conquered	one,	this	could	not	be	denied,	
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77	Douglas	L.	Wilson	has	dated	the	relevant	entry	to	the	mid‐1770s.	It	follows	entries	
related	 to	 the	 court	 fee	 controversy	 of	 1774	 and	 to	 political	 confederations,	 and	
precedes	 entries	 on	 the	 Gothic	 constitution	 and	 feudal	 tenures	 that	 most	 likely	 date	




79	 Reid	 is	 surprisingly	 dismissive	 of	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning,	 arguing	 that	 palatinate	
rights	were	only	an	analogy,	which	 implies	 that	 the	comparison	was	 rhetorical	 rather	








last	 day	before,	 tamen	nota	 that	 Ireland	 is	 a	 realm	of	 itself	 and	has	 a	 [parliament[	 in	
itself.”	 	 The	 discrepancy	 could	 be	 resolved	 by	 allowing	 Ireland	 limited	 sovereignty	 in	





the	 superior	 Westminster	 parliament.	 Thus,	 “a	 ship	 with	 intent	 to	 carry	 to	 Holland	
beyond	sea	is	a	cause	of	forfeiture	immediately.”	The	underlying	principle	for	this	was	
that,	 since	 Irish	 lands	 were	 held	 of	 the	 king	 under	 feudal	 tenure,	 not	 of	 the	 English	
parliament,	they	had	a	separate	jurisdiction	under	the	Crown;	“general	statutes	do	not	
bind	 lands	 in	 antient	 demesne,	 nor	 counties	 palatine,	 nor	 the	 cinque	 ports,	 and	 the	
reason	 is	 that	 men	 of	 those	 places	 do	 not	 come	 to	 [parliament]	 as	 knights	 and	
burgesses.”	The	same	went	in	Wales,	another	conquered	realm,	the	counties	palatine	of	
which	 “do	 not	 come	 to	 [parliament	 and]	 shall	 not	 be	 bound	 by	 the	 [parliament]	 of	
England”,	though	a	statute	could	extend	to	them	“if	particularly	mentioned”.80	
This	 issue	 of	 jurisdiction	 extended	 to	 other	 areas	 of	 law,	 most	 notably	 the	




not	 by	 the	 king’s	 grant	 nor	 by	 prescription	 but	 by	 act	 in	 an	 antient	 [parliament]”	 he	
recorded,		and	therefore	“the	king’s	writ	does	not	extend	to	the	Cinque	ports.”81	If	such	a	
                                                     





81	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 assertion	 that	 the	 king	 has	 no	 right	 to	 grant	 lands.	





palatine	 right	 also	 existed	 in	 the	 colonies,	 then	 acts	 of	 Parliament	 such	 as	 the	
Administration	of	Justice	Act	(part	of	the	Coercive	Acts)	were	unconstitutional.	
From	these	entries,	 it	 is	easy	 to	 see	how	 Jefferson	came	 to	disbelieve	not	only	 the	
parliamentary	claim	of	the	right	to	levy	taxes,	but	of	their	right	to	impose	any	regulation	
at	all.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 Jefferson	 thought	 that	 it	was	at	 least	possible	 that	 colonies	were	
entitled	 to	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 unrepresented	 palatinates.	 A	 palatinate	 without	










“for	 this	 ground,	 there	 was	 no	 foundation	 in	 compact	 [or]	 in	 any	 acknowledged	
principles	of	colonization”,	and	hence	it	was	inadequate	for	use	in	the	kind	of	political	
theory	he	had	attempted	 in	 the	Summary	View.	 Furthermore,	 it	 failed	 to	acknowledge	




the	Union”	 of	 1707.85	 This	model	 of	 empire	was	 not	 a	 relic	 of	 a	 discarded	 Stuart‐era	
constitution,	 for	 it	was	 also	 the	 “same	 as	 [England’s]	 present	 relations	with	Hanover,	
having	the	same	Executive	chief	but	no	other	necessary	political	connection.”	This	entire	
analysis	was	predicated	on	his	 theoretical	 understanding	of	 the	 rights	 of	 expatriation	
from	one	jurisdiction	in	order	to	create	a	new	and	separate	one.	
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Instead,	 the	 colonies	 were	 the	 subject	 of	 direct	 parliamentary	 rule	 after	 the	
Declaratory	 Act,	 which	 Jefferson	 considered	 to	 be	 an	 outright	 usurpation	 of	 colonial	
powers.	 The	 theme	 of	 parliamentary	 usurpation	was	 one	 that	 he	 developed	 from	 the	
Summary	 View	 through	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence,	 and	 the	 list	 of	 grievances	
against	 Parliament	 featured	 in	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 was	 both	 a	 	 set	 of	
constitutional	grievances	as	well	as	a	critique	of	mercantilism	as	a	trading	regime.	His	
solution	 to	 these	 twin	 problems	was	 a	 plan	 of	 union,	 laid	 out	 in	 the	most	 cursory	 of	
outlines	at	the	end	of	the	Summary	View.	When	it	became	clear	that	a	union	other	than	
that	 imposed	 by	 the	 British	 military	 could	 not	 become	 reality,	 he	 turned	 to	
independence	as	the	solution	to	the	problem.	
As	 discussed	 in	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 the	 Summary	View	 contained	 the	
basic	 ideas	 of	 Jefferson’s	 grievances	 with	 Parliament.	 These	 grievances	 were	 then	
refined	into	a	list	of	ten	specific	points	in	the	Declaration	of	Causes,	and	were	repeated	
in	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence.	 In	 1774,	 Jefferson	 still	 held	 out	 hope	 for	 a	
reasonable	 solution	 if	 the	 Crown	would	 exercise	 its	 veto	 to	 prevent	 Parliament	 from	
enacting	new	 legislation	 and	by,	 presumably,	 impeding	 the	 execution	 of	 the	 offensive	
legislation	already	passed	into	law.	At	as	late	a	date	as	1774,	and	arguably	until	the	end	
of	 1775,	 a	 strong	 monarch	 was	 at	 the	 centrepiece	 of	 Jefferson’s	 plans.	 He	 was	 no	
republican,	and	no	revolutionary,	when	he	proposed	his	plan	of	union.	
Jefferson’s	call	for	a	“union	on	a	generous	plan”	was	intended	to	end	mercantilism	by	
acknowledging	 the	 sovereignty	of	 the	 colonies	under	 the	 imperial	Crown.	This	would	
also	have	ended	any	sort	of	feudal	link	with	England.	In	his	proposal,	Jefferson	struck	at	
the	 very	 heart	 of	 mercantilism	 by	 assailing	 the	 restrictions	 of	 the	 Navigation	 Acts.	
“Accept	of	every	commercial	preference	it	is	in	our	power	to	give	for	such	things	as	we	
can	 raise	 for	 their	use,	or	 they	make	 for	ours,”	he	allowed,	 “but	 let	 them	not	 think	 to	
exclude	 us	 from	 going	 to	 other	markets,	 to	 dispose	 of	 those	 commodities	which	 they	
cannot	use,	nor	to	supply	those	wants	which	they	cannot	supply.”	Asserting	the	rights	of	
both	independent	realms	and	of	unrepresented	palatinates,	he	further	stipulated	“that	
our	 properties	 within	 our	 own	 territories	 shall	 be	 taxed	 or	 regulated	 by	 [no	 other]	
power	on	earth	but	our	own.”86	
Jefferson’s	plan	of	union	relied	on	an	impartial	monarch	as	an	arbiter	between	the	





Independence	 were	 intended	 to	 show	 was	 that	 the	 British	 monarchy	 was	 no	 longer	
capable	of	performing	that	task	via	abuses	of	its	prerogative	powers	as	well	as	collusion	






towards	 refuting	 British	 claims	 by	 constructing	 a	 narrative	 of	 American	 history	 that	
would	 secure	 the	 colonies	 their	 independence	 from	 Parliament	 and	 a	 contractual	
relationship	with	the	king,	Jefferson	had	little	time	for	developing	an	idea	of	what	kind	
of	government	would	replace	the	monarchy.	 “In	truth,	 the	abuses	of	monarchy	had	so	
much	 filled	 all	 the	 space	 of	 political	 contemplation,	 that	 we	 imagined	 everything	
republican	which	was	 not	monarchy,”	 Jefferson	 recalled	 to	 his	 correspondent	 Samuel	
Kercheval	 in	 1816.87	 The	 king’s	 rejection	 of	 Congress’s	 Olive	 Branch	 petition	 in	
December	 1775	 declared	 the	 colonies	 out	 of	 the	 Crown’s	 protection,	 and	 within	 six	
months	 the	 Virginia	 delegation	 in	 Congress	moved	 for	 a	 declaration	 of	 independence	
from	the	British	Empire.		
	“We	 had	 not	 yet	 penetrated	 to	 the	 mother	 principle,	 that	 ‘governments	 are	
republican	only	 in	proportion	as	 they	embody	the	will	of	 their	people,	and	execute	 it.’	
Hence,	 our	 first	 constitutions	 had	 really	 no	 leading	 principles	 in	 them,”	 Jefferson	




rushed	 through	 three	 drafts	 of	 his	 own	 proposed	 constitution	 in	 Philadelphia,	within	
which	he	 emphasised	 reform	of	 such	 aspects	 of	 the	 feudal	 law	 that	were	of	 domestic	
concern	 in	 Virginia.	 The	 last	 of	 these	 drafts	 was	 sent	 with	 his	 mentor	 and	 fellow	
Congressional	 delegate,	 George	 Wythe,	 to	 be	 presented	 to	 the	 Convention	 for	







consideration;	 but	 Wythe	 arrived	 too	 late	 to	 influence	 the	 substance	 of	 the	
deliberations,	 and	 only	 Jefferson’s	 preamble	 and	 a	 few	 scattered	 substantive	 clauses	
made	it	into	the	constitution	the	Convention	formally	adopted	in	late	June	1776.	
As	 this	 chapter	 comes	 to	 a	 close,	 I	will	 briefly	 outline	 the	 chronology	 of	 events	 in	
1776,	 from	 the	 time	 the	 Virginian	 Delegates	 moved	 for	 independence,	 through	 the	
Virginia	Assembly	 session	 in	 autumn	1776.	 Then,	 I	will	 address	 Jefferson’s	 turn	 from	
monarchy	to	republicanism	in	his	draft	constitution,	and	attempt	to	understand	why	he	
made	 a	 break	 with	 monarchy	 after	 building	 his	 political	 theory	 around	 it	 in	 the	
Summary	View.	 Turning	 from	monarchy	 to	 feudalism,	 I	will	 then	 examine	 the	 “list	 of	
rights	public	and	private”	in	Jefferson’s	draft	constitution	and	explain	how	it	could	have	








the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 for	 Congress.	 Jefferson’s	 intent	 was	 that	 his	 draft	
constitution	would	arrive	in	Virginia	in	time	to	influence	the	Convention’s	proceedings,	
but	 by	 the	 time	 it	 was	 received	 by	 the	 Convention	 a	 select	 committee	 under	 the	
leadership	 of	 George	 Mason	 had	 already	 formulated	 a	 constitution	 as	 well	 as	 a	




The	 reason	 for	 this	was	 that	 Jefferson	 took	 too	 long	 to	 formulate	his	 constitution,	
writing	 three	 drafts	 between	mid‐May	 and	mid‐June.88	 The	 ideas	 in	 each	 draft	 were	
similar	‐	the	people	were	the	source	of	sovereignty,	powers	were	to	be	clearly	separated	
amongst	the	three	branches	of	government,	including	a	bicameral	legislature,	and	a	list	



















primarily	 to	 re‐confirm	 classic	 English	 civil	 liberties	 that	 were	 already	 protected	 by	
colonial	law.	The	constitution	itself	was	similar	to	Jefferson’s	in	its	outline,	but	its	details	







to	 constitutional	 monarchy	 as	 such.	 Indeed,	 Jefferson’s	 entire	 plan	 of	 imperial	
governance	 required	 a	 de‐politicised	monarch	 in	 order	 to	 function.	 His	 hostility	 was	
rather	 directed	 towards	 perversions	 of	 constitutional	 monarchy,	 such	 as	 the	 Crown	
abusing	 its	prerogative,	and	 its	 inactivity	 in	allowing	Parliament	to	exceed	that	body’s	
authority	 by	 asserting	 feudal	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 colonies	 through	 its	 mercantile	
regulation.	The	grievances	laid	out	from	the	Summary	View	 through	the	Declaration	of	
Independence	 concern	 specific	 problems	 of	 feudalism	 and	 mercantilism,	 not	 the	
institution	 of	 the	 Crown	 itself.	 Jefferson’s	 turn	 to	 republicanism	 thus	 at	 least	 initially	









seems	 to	 stem	 from	 the	most	 banal	 of	 explanations:	 the	 conflation	 of	 the	 sins	 of	 the	
office	 holder	 with	 the	 office	 itself.	 As	 a	 result,	 Jefferson’s	 republicanism	 defies	 easy	
categorisation,	 instead	 seeming	 to	 be	 a	 product	 of	 the	 immediate	 issues	 of	 the	 time	
rather	than	a	coherent	system	of	political	thought	in	the	vein	of	Harrington,	Sidney,	or	
Machiavelli.	
Any	 study	 of	 Jefferson’s	 draft	 constitution	 must	 begin	 with	 the	 Declaration	 of	
Independence.	 The	 two	 documents	 were	 composed	 simultaneously,	 and	 part	 of	 the	
Declaration,	 consisting	 of	 the	 grievances	 against	 the	 Crown	 and	 Parliament,	 was	
included	nearly	verbatim	as	the	preamble	to	Jefferson’s	constitution.	It	is	here	that	the	
transition	 from	 constitutional	monarchy	 to	 republicanism	 took	 place,	 in	 a	manner	 so	
unremarkable	 that	 a	 student	 of	 Jefferson’s	 later,	 astringent	 republicanism	 might	 be	
taken	 aback	 by	 the	 seeming	 lack	 of	 thought	 that	 went	 in	 to	 it.	 The	 adoption	 of	
republicanism,	 perhaps	 the	 biggest	 decision	 of	 Jefferson’s	 political	 life	 along	with	 the	
decision	to	support	independence,	bears	no	indication	of	the	careful	thought	that	went	
into	Jefferson’s	views	on	history,	law,	and	philosophy.	
Jefferson’s	 contention	 with	 the	 king	 was	 over	 his	 conduct	 in	 office.	 George	 III,	
“heretofore	 entrusted	 with	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 kingly	 office	 in	 this	 government	 hath	
endeavored	to	pervert	the	same	into	a	detestable	and	insupportable	tyranny”,	Jefferson	





office	which	all	 experience	hath	shewn	 to	be	 inveterately	 inimical”	 to	 “public	 liberty”.	
The	 constitution	 of	 Virginia	 would	 therefore	 need	 to	 be	 re‐established	 upon	 “such	
ancient	principles	as	are	friendly	to	the	rights	of	the	people”.92		
It	 is	 somewhat	 of	 a	 giant	 leap	 to	 go	 from	 criticising	 the	 actions	 of	 one	 king	 to	
abolishing	 the	 Crown;	 it	 is	 the	 equivalent	 of	 impeaching	 a	 corrupt	 public	 official	 and	
then	 abolishing	 his	 office	 for	 good	measure.	 Jefferson	 offered	 no	 real	 explanation	 for	
this	 conflation.93	 His	 writings	 betray	 no	 similar	 antipathy	 to	 the	 earlier	 Hanoverian	
                                                     
92	Jefferson’s	Third	Draft	Constitution,	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	I,	pp.	356‐357.	
93	Jeremy	Bailey	also	considers	Jefferson	to	be	confused	in	this	regard.	“If	George	III	






the	 institution	 of	monarchy	 in	 general.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 Summary	View	 Jefferson	 seems	
quite	satisfied	with	the	settlement	to	the	Glorious	Revolution,	and	his	draft	constitution	
included	 an	 executive	 “Administrator”	 that	 retained	many	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 royal	
governor	 while	 eliminating	 the	 Crown’s	 royal	 prerogative.	 The	 most	 probable	
explanation	is	that	Jefferson	decided	that	the	repeated	abuses	of	monarchy	by	William	I,	
the	 Stuarts,	 and	 George	 III	 were	 proof	 that	 monarchy,	 specifically	 its	 attendant	
prerogative	 that	placed	 it	outside	of	popular	control,	was	 inimical	 to	 “the	will	of	 [the]	
people,	and	[to	executing]	it.”94	
If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 then	 it	 shows	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 popular	 sovereignty	
underpinned	all	of	Jefferson’s	thought.	His	opposition	to	feudalism,	with	its	prerogatives	
and	aristocracies,	 can	be	explained	 in	 this	 light	as	well	 as	 in	 light	of	his	opposition	 to	
feudal	 tenure	 in	 the	 Summary	View	 and	 feudal	 law’s	 corruption	 of	 England’s	 ancient	
constitutional	monarchy	through	medieval	feudalism	and	modern	mercantilism.	This	is,	
of	course,	largely	speculative,	for	Jefferson	did	not	clearly	explain	his	reasoning,	and	he	
could	have	kept	monarchy,	 since	a	constitutional	monarchy	was	perfectly	 in	 line	with	
his	 previous	 thinking.	 The	 switch	 to	 republicanism	 suggests	 that	 he	 was	 going	 after	




In	 contrast	 to	 his	 abrupt	 denunciation	 of	monarchy,	 the	 list	 of	 “rights	 public	 and	
private”	which	Jefferson	included	as	the	fifth	and	final	section	of	his	draft	constitution	
are	 entirely	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 character	 of	 his	 earlier	 work	 and	 form	 an	 obvious	
response	to	the	grievances	against	feudal	and	mercantilist	wrongdoing.	The	problem	of	
mercantilism	 was	 theoretically	 solved	 simply	 by	 virtue	 of	 independence	 and	
confederation	with	the	other	rebelling	colonies,	but	feudalism	was	a	domestic	problem	
                                                                                                                                                                     










variety	 of	 “feudal	 and	 unnatural	 distinctions”	 within	 Virginian	 society,	 not	 just	 the	
feudal	land	tenures	he	discussed	in	the	Summary	View.95	His	proposed	land	laws	would	
have	abolished	 feudal	 tenures	and	redistributed	Virginian	 lands	via	equal	 inheritance,	
while	formally	ceding	the	lands	carved	out	of	Virginia’s	original	charter	territories	and	
given	 to	 the	proprietary	colonies	by	 the	Stuarts,	and	 forbidding	any	 future	division	of	
Virginia’s	 lands	 into	 proprietorships.	 The	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation	 would	 be	
enshrined	within	 the	 constitution,	 and	 the	 slave	 trade	 restricted.	The	 church,	with	 its	
clerical	class	and	ties	 to	metropolitan	England,	would	be	disestablished.	Military	 force	
would	 be	 vested	 in	 a	 citizen’s	 militia,	 and	 the	 kind	 of	 peacetime	 standing	 army	 that	






agrarian	 law	 that	 would	 ensure	 a	 broad	 distribution	 of	 land	 and	 power;	 liberty	 of	
conscience	and	expression;	and	a	social	order	based	on	natural,	as	opposed	 to	 feudal,	
distinctions	 in	ranks.	While	the	draft	constitution	was	not	seriously	considered	by	the	
Virginia	 Convention,	 Jefferson	 would	 go	 on	 to	 push	 for	 many	 of	 these	 rights	 to	 be	
enacted	through	ordinary	legislation.	This	effort	came	in	two	rounds,	the	first	being	the	
lightning	round	of	activity	at	the	first	session	of	the	new	General	Assembly	in	October	
1776,	 and	 the	 second	 being	 the	 marathon	 effort	 of	 the	 Revisal	 of	 the	 Laws,	 which	
Jefferson	worked	on	from	the	winter	of	1777	to	the	summer	of	1779.	
In	 the	autumn	1776	session,	 Jefferson	proposed	bills	establishing	a	 superior	court	
system,	 abolishing	 the	 use	 of	 the	 feudal	 entail	 in	 property	 inheritance,	 exempting	
Dissenters	 from	 compulsory	 taxation	 in	 support	 of	 the	 Established	 Church,	 and	
naturalising	 foreigners	 as	 citizens.97	 These	 bills	 corresponded	 to	 the	 four	 respective	
                                                     
95	Jefferson,	Autobiography,	p.	77.	
96	Jefferson’s	Third	Draft	Constitution,	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	I,	pp.	362‐364.	
97	 See	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	 I,	 for	 “Drafts	of	Bills	Establishing	Courts	of	 Justice”,	pp.	605‐
652;	“Bill	to	Enable	Tenants	in	Fee	Tail	to	Convey	Their	Lands	in	Fee	Simple”,	pp.	560‐










Virginia’s	 legal	 code.	 Jefferson	 seized	 this	 opportunity	 to	 enact	 a	 second	 wave	 of	
reforms,	 authoring	 bills	 enhancing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 jury	 in	 criminal	 trials,	 abolishing	







feudalism,	 one	 that	 was	 not	 sufficient	 to	 prevent	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 powerful	 slave	
aristocracy	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 (in	 which	 Jefferson	 was	 nonetheless	 an	 active	
participant).	Whether	it	be	by	forestalling	the	consolidation	of	existing	aristocracies	of	
landowners	 and	 clergymen,	 preventing	 abuses	 of	 prerogative	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	
omnipotent	executive	or	an	unchecked	judiciary,	or	by	encouraging	the	formation	of	a	








the	 laws	 upon	 which	 mercantilism	 found	 its	 legal	 justification,	 a	 view	 that	 was	
reinforced	through	subsequent	research	in	the	1760s	and	1770s.	This	synthesis	of	the	
                                                     
98	Revisal	of	the	Laws:	No.	20,	“A	Bill	Directing	the	Course	of	Descents”,	in	TJ	Papers,	
Vol.	II,	pp.	391‐393;	No.	64,	“A	Bill	for	Proportioning	Crimes	and	Punishments	in	Cases	






histories	 of	 feudalism	 and	 mercantilism	 became	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 his	 major	
revolutionary	 writings,	 and	 provides	 the	 motivation	 for	 his	 statements	 that	 the	
unravelling	 of	 “feudal	 and	 unnatural	 distinctions”	 and	 their	 replacement	 with	 a	
government	 “more	 wholly	 republican”	 was	 “the	 whole	 object”	 of	 the	 American	
Revolution.99	 Having	 demonstrated	 why	 feudalism	 was	 important,	 the	 rest	 of	 this	
dissertation	 will	 be	 concerned	 with	 what	 Jefferson	 proposed	 to	 do	 about	 it.	 Each	
chapter	 will	 follow	 one	 of	 the	 four	 categories	 identified	 from	 his	 draft	 constitution:	
popular	sovereignty,	the	agrarian	law,	liberty	of	conscience,	and	natural	aristocracy.		
                                                     








feudal,	 republican	principles	 into	practice	 in	 the	 three	branches	of	 government	of	 his	
draft	 constitution,	with	which	 he	 proposed	 to	 “new‐model”	 the	 Virginian	 state	 in	 the	
late	 spring	 of	 1776.1	 Jefferson	 viewed	 all	 three	 branches	 of	 Virginian	 governance	 ‐	
executive,	 legislative	and	 judicial	 ‐	as	corrupted	by	 feudal	practices	under	the	colonial	






constitution.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 colonial	 government	 was	 characterised	 by	 a	 constant	
struggle	 between	 centralist	 and	 localist	 influences,	 and	 that,	 when	 Virginia	 engaged	
wholeheartedly	 in	rebellion,	 the	balance	between	these	 two	 influences	was	one	of	 the	
casualties.	 I	 will	 then	 proceed	 through	 three	 sections	 devoted	 to	 the	 executive,	
legislative,	 and	 judicial	 branches	 of	 government.	 Throughout	 these	 sections,	 I	 will	




(Austin:	 University	 of	 Texas	 Press,	 1953)	 and	 David	 N.	 Mayer’s	 The	 Constitutional	
Thought	of	Thomas	Jefferson	(Charlottesville:	University	of	Virginia	Press,	1994).	Of	the	
two,	I	have	found	Mayer’s	more	recent	scholarship	to	also	be	more	reliable,	as	Patterson	




a	 very	 good	 job	 of	 clearly	 delineating	 the	 growth	 in	 Jefferson’s	 thought	 on	 executive	
power	through	the	different	stages	of	his	political	career.	Finally,	Willi	Paul	Adams’	The	
First	 American	 Constitutions:	 Republican	 Ideology	 and	 the	 Making	 of	 the	 State	
Constitutions	 in	 the	Revolutionary	Era	 (Translated	by	Rita	Kimber	and	Robert	Kimber.	
Chapel	 Hill:	 University	 of	 North	 Carolina	 Press,	 1980)	 has	 been	 indispensable	 for	
comparing	 the	 constitution	 designed	 by	 the	 Virginia	 Convention	 to	 other	 state	
constitutions	developed	in	the	1770s.	
 89
maintain	 that	 while	 Jefferson	 sought	 to	 proceed	 from	 a	 clean	 slate	 and	 make	 each	
branch	accountable	 to	popular	sovereignty	while	also	eliminating	 feudal	prerogatives,	




Under	 the	 colonial	 constitution,	 Virginia’s	 government	 consisted	 of	 county	 courts	
responsible	for	local	administration,	a	House	of	Burgesses	elected	by	the	gentry	of	each	
county	 and	 responsible	 for	 proposing	 legislation	 and	 raising	 taxes,	 and	 a	 Council	 of	
State	 that	 acted	 as	 an	 executive	 council,	 appellate	 court,	 and	 upper	 legislative	 house,	
which	 was	 appointed	 by	 the	 royal	 governor.	 The	 county	 courts,	 House	 of	 Burgesses,	
Council	 of	 State,	 and	 royal	 governor	 were	 all	 based	 upon	 English	 analogues,	 and	
operated	 on	 the	 same	 principles.	 In	 practice,	 Virginia	 politics	 were	 characterised	 by	
tension	 between	 the	 county	 courts	 and	 the	 governor’s	 court	 at	 Williamsburg.	 These	
localist	 and	 centralist	 interests	 remained	 in	 balance	 throughout	 most	 of	 the	 colonial	
period,	but	revolution	broke	down	that	balance.	Jefferson	identified	feudal	elements	of	









houses	 engaged	 in	 a	 successful	 quest	 for	 power	 as	 they	 set	 about	 to	 restrict	 the	
authority	of	the	executive,	undermine	the	system	of	colonial	administration	laid	down	
by	imperial	and	proprietary	authorities,	and	make	themselves	paramount	in	the	affairs	
of	 their	 respective	 colonies.”3	 Centralism	 may	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 those	 people,	
                                                     
3	Jack	P.	Greene,	“The	Role	of	the	Lower	Houses	of	Assembly	in	Eighteenth‐Century	
Politics”,	The	Journal	of	Southern	History	27,	no.	4	(1961):	451‐474,	quote	from	p.	451.	
See	 also	 Greene,	 "Foundations	 of	 Political	 Power	 in	 the	 Virginia	 House	 of	 Burgesses,	
1720‐1776."	The	William	and	Mary	Quarterly	16,	no.	4	 (Oct.	 1959):	 485‐506;	 Greene,	






with	 Jefferson’s	 democratic	 republicanism,	which	 emphasised	 individual	 participation	
in	politics,	often	at	the	local	level,	but	as	part	of	national	life,	without	the	provincialism	
or	oligarchism	of	the	gentry	localists.4		
Centralist	 and	 localist	 interests	 in	 Virginia	 were	 defined	 by	 proximity	 to	
institutions.5	 County	 courts,	 proliferating	 throughout	 the	 land,	 and	 monopolising	
political,	judicial,	and	administrative	authority	within	their	territories,	were	bastions	of	
local	elites	and	formed	centres	of	power	which	balanced	that	of	the	central	authorities.6	
                                                                                                                                                                     
Behavior	 in	 the	 British	 Colonies	 in	 the	 Eighteenth	 Century."	 The	 American	Historical	
Review	 75,	 no.	 2	 (1969):	 337‐360;	 and	 Greene,	 Pursuits	 of	 Happiness:	 The	 Social	
Development	 of	Early	Modern	British	Colonies	 and	 the	 Formation	 of	American	Culture.	
Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1988.	
4	 Jefferson’s	 definition	 of	 the	 nation	 shifted	 over	 the	 course	 of	 his	 life.	While	 as	 a	
politician	 in	 the	 federal	 government	 he	 adopted	 an	 increasingly	 American	 national	
identity,	at	this	point	 in	his	 life	he	was	still	a	 firmly	Virginian	nationalist.	This	outlook	
was	 established	 early,	 with	 the	 Summary	 View	 envisioning	 multiple	 independent	
kingdoms,	not	a	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	a	single	Kingdom	of	America.	It	continued	
through	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Notes	 on	 Virginia,	 throughout	 which	 he	 referred	 to	
Virginia,	not	America,	as	“my	country”.	
5	 This	 centralist‐localist	 tension	 (never	 properly	 a	 complete	 division)	was	 similar,	
although	 not	 identical,	 to	 the	 “Court	 vs.	 Country”	 divide	 within	 Britain	 and	 which	
historians	 such	 as	 Stanley	 Elkins	 and	 Eric	 McKitrick	 maintain	 was	 adopted	 by	
Americans	during	 the	early	 republican	period.	Elkins	and	McKitrick	define	 the	British	
Court‐Country	 mentality	 as	 a	 “viewpoint	 with	 its	 vocal	 center	 in	 the	 landed	 gentry,	
leveled	against	the	Court	establishment	of	an	entrenched	executive	ministry.”	(Stanley	
Elkins	&	Eric	McKitrick,	The	Age	of	Federalism.	Oxford:	University	Press,	1993,	p.	14)	As	
they	 note,	 this	mentality	 in	 Britain,	 as	 in	America,	 stemmed	 from	 controversy	 over	 a	
national	 bank,	which	 serviced	 a	 national	 debt.	While	 this	was	 an	 organising	principle	
during	 the	 1790s,	 it	 can	 not	 be	 said	 that	 Court	 vs.	 Country,	 as	 defined	 by	 Elkins	 and	




by	 the	 English	 Commonwealth.	 “By	 1658	 ….	 effective	 interference	 from	 outside	 had	
disappeared	and	the	supreme	authority	had	been	assumed	by	an	Assembly	which	was	
in	effect	a	league	of	local	magnates	secure	in	their	control	of	county	institutions.”	After	
the	 Restoration,	 local	 elites	 retained	 this	 power	 within	 their	 counties.	 See	 Bernard	
Bailyn,	”Politics	and	Social	Structure	in	Virginia."	In	Seventeenth‐Century	America:	Essays	

















The	 balance	 between	 localism	 and	 centralism	 was	 finally	 upended	 amidst	 the	
colonial	 crisis	 of	 the	 late	 1760s.	 Jefferson’s	 grievances	 in	 the	 Declaration	 of	
Independence,	 which	were	 appended	 to	 the	 front	 of	 the	 constitution	 adopted	 by	 the	
Virginia	 Convention,	 often	 reference	 activities	 that	 cumulatively	 undermined	 the	
balance	 between	 local	 and	 central	 authority:	 the	 royal	 demand	 that	 newly	 formed	
counties	give	up	their	rights	to	representation,	the	dissolution	of	constituent	assemblies	
without	recall,	and	the	subordination	of	local	judiciaries	to	royal	control.	The	patronage	
power	 itself	was	also	an	 issue,	 for	 the	British	government	had	“erected	a	multitude	of	
new	 offices	 by	 a	 self‐assumed	 power,	 &	 sent	 hither	 swarms	 of	 officers	 to	 harass	 our	
people	&	eat	out	their	substance.”10	
	
                                                     
7	Warren	M.	Billings	has	written	a	biography	of	one	of	Virginia’s	most	preeminent	
colonial	 governors,	William	 Berkeley,	 which	 illustrates	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 royal	
governor	truly	functioned	as	a	proxy	monarch	with	a	considerably	developed	court.	See	
Warren	 M.	 Billings,	 Sir	William	 Berkeley	 and	 the	 Forging	 of	 Colonial	 Virginia.	 Baton	
Rouge:	Louisiana	State	University	Press,	2010.	
8	Warren	W.	Billings,	The	Old	Dominion	 in	 the	Seventeenth	Century:	A	Documentary	







Independence,	 following	 the	 dissolution	 of	 Crown	 control,	 posed	 a	 problem	 for	
Virginia’s	leaders	as	they	debated	a	new	constitution:	How	to	unify	and	govern	the	state	
without	 royal	 authority?	 While	 Jefferson	 saw	 the	 absence	 of	 monarchy	 as	 an	
opportunity	 to	 construct	 a	 brand‐new	 state‐level	 entity	 that	would	 stand	 on	 its	 own,	
unencumbered	 by	 existing	 local	 elites	 and	 their	 structures	 of	 power,	 the	 Convention	
produced	 a	 constitution	 that	 extended	 the	 localists’	 already	 formidable	power.11	Now	
left	unchecked	by	the	Crown,	the	localists	simply	absorbed	state‐level	offices	into	their	
zone	of	control,	using	the	county	courts	to	influence	election	to	the	state	Assembly	(as	
they	 had	 before),	 and	 then	 using	 the	 Assembly	 to	 control	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 state	
government	 (a	new	development	 impossible	when	 the	rest	of	 the	central	government	
had	been	 located	 in	the	Council	of	State	and	the	royal	governor,	and	had	answered	to	
the	Crown).	
Both	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 Convention	 moved	 decisively	 to	 dissolve	 the	 vestiges	 of	
Crown	 authority	 by	 dismantling	 the	 colonial	 Council	 of	 State	 and	 controlling	 the	
executive.	 Under	 the	 colonial	 constitution,	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 had	 been	 a	 unifying	
nexus	 both	 for	 reconciling	 localist	 to	 centralist	 interests	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 different	
branches	 of	 governance.	 Membership	 on	 the	 council	 had	 been	 the	 governor’s	
instrument	to	co‐opt	local	elites	into	the	service	of	the	central	authorities,	but	it	had	also	
been	 a	 way	 for	 those	 elites	 to	 influence	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 colony.	 As	 an	
institution,	the	council	had	assisted	the	governor	 in	his	administrative	duties,	but	also	
served	as	the	colony’s	sole	appellate	court	of	justice,	and	functioned	as	the	upper	house	




but	differed	as	 to	whether	 the	bottom	should	be	 located	at	 the	 county	 level	or	 in	 the	
people	themselves.	The	Convention’s	constitution	empowered	localism	by	retaining	the	
                                                     
11	By	way	of	 analogy,	 consider	how	Rousseau’s	 “general	will”	was	 supposed	 to	be	
something	that	was	more	than	the	aggregate	of	individual	wills.	Jefferson	envisioned	a	
state	government	 that	would	represent	 the	whole	people,	not	 just	 individual	 interests	




county	 as	 the	 basic	 unit	 of	 social	 and	 political	 organisation.	 Representation	 in	 both	
houses	 of	 the	 state	 assembly	would	 be	 organised	 by	 county,	 and	 elections	 conducted	
under	 the	 colonial	 suffrage,	which	ensured	 that	 local	 elites	would	 continue	 to	 control	






electors	 “not	 thinking	 of	 independance	 and	 a	 permanent	 republic”,	 and	 that	 the	
Convention	 had	 illegitimately	 “[passed]	 an	 act	 transcendant	 to	 the	 powers	 of	 other	
legislatures”.14	The	dissolution	of	 the	royal	government	necessitated	that	a	new	social	
contract	 be	 agreed	 to	 through	 a	 representative	 assembly	 specifically	 tasked	 with	
developing	a	new	fundamental	law.15	He	dismissed	the	idea	that	the	“necessities”	of	the	
war	were	a	 just	 reason	 for	 the	Convention	 to	subvert	popular	control	of	 constitution‐
making,	arguing	that	they	“do	not	convey	its	authority	to	an	oligarchy”	but	rather	that	
“they	 throw	 back,	 into	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 people,	 the	 powers	 they	 had	 delegated,	 and	
leave	them	as	individuals	to	shift	for	themselves.”16	




proposed	 that	 legislative	districts	 be	determined	by	population,	 that	 the	 executive	be	




15	 Ibid.,	pp.	121‐125.	Much	of	 Jefferson’s	 criticism	hinges	on	 the	 formality	 that	 the	
Convention	was	elected	in	April	1776	under	a	continuing	ordinance	passed	the	previous	
year,	 when	 independence	 was	 not	 yet	 under	 consideration,	 and	 therefore	 the	 voters	
could	 not	 have	 known	 that	 they	 were	 electing	 a	 body	 that	 would	 decide	 a	 new	
government.	 This	 seems	 flimsy	 ‐	 it	 assumes	 that	 electors	 to	 the	 Convention	 had	 no	
inkling	 that	 independence	 was	 coming,	 even	 though	 armed	 hostilities	 had	 been	
underway	 for	a	year	and	 the	Crown	had	declared	 the	colonies	out	of	 its	protection	 in	


















as	 the	 property,	 ecclesiastical	 and	 educational	 reforms	 proposed	 in	 the	 draft	
constitution’s	 list	 of	 fundamental	 rights.	 Jefferson	 targeted	 three	 specifically	 feudal	
elements	 of	 government:	 the	 royal	 prerogative,	 corporate	 representation	 in	 the	
legislature,	 and	 the	 coincidence	 of	 judicial	 office	 and	 aristocratic	 privilege.	 These	
concepts	 will	 now	 be	 introduced	 and	 later	 expanded	 upon	 in	 the	 sections	 on	 the	
relevant	branches	of	government.	
Jefferson	 defined	 “prerogative”	 quite	 expansively	 in	 his	 draft	 constitution,	 listing	
twelve	 royal	prerogatives	 that	were	 to	be	assumed	by	 the	 legislature.	 In	 the	Notes	on	
Virginia,	he	clarified	that	prerogative	referred	to	“the	exercise	of	all	powers	undefined	
by	 the	 laws”	 and	 hence	 inimical	 to	 “a	 republican	 organization.”19	 These	 twelve	
                                                     
17	See	“Third	Draft	by	Jefferson”,	in	TJ	Papers	Vol.	I,	pp.	356‐365.	








definition	 of	 prerogative	 from	Locke’s	 Second	Treatise,	 Section	 160,	 “Of	 Prerogative”.	
Jefferson	may	have	found	his	definition	here,	but	he	cites	the	Second	Treatise,	Chapter	
11	 in	 his	 Legal	 Commonplace	Book.	 This	 chapter	 consists	 of	 Sections	 134‐142	 and	 is	
titled	 “Of	 the	Extent	 of	 the	Legislative	Power”.	 See	 Jeremy	D.	Bailey,	Thomas	 Jefferson	
and	Eecutive	Power,	Cambridge:	University	Press,	2007,	p.	16	and	Jefferson’s	LCB	Entry	
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prerogatives	 match	 a	 list	 of	 grievances	 against	 the	 king	 found	 in	 the	 constitution’s	
preamble,	which	was	similar	to	that	found	in	the	Declaration	of	Independence.20	From	
this	usage	it	is	clear	that	when	Jefferson	spoke	of	prerogative,	he	was	using	it	nearly	as	a	
synonym	with	 “power”,	 but	with	 the	 twist	 in	meaning	 that	 these	were	 powers	 being	
exercised	without	oversight	and	susceptible	to	arbitrary	usage.	When	exercised	by	the	
executive	 they	 were	 “prerogatives”,	 but	 when	 exercised	 by	 the	 legislature	 Jefferson	
modified	 his	 word	 choice	 to	 “powers”,	 indicating	 that	 he	 saw	 a	 difference	 in	 their	
legitimacy	depending	on	who	was	exercising	them.21	
Since	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	 powers	 depended	 on	who	possessed	 them,	
strongly	 grounding	 the	 entire	 government	 in	 popular	 sovereignty	 was	 essential,	 and	
Jefferson	stated	the	all	government	was	“enacted	by	the	authority	of	the	people”	in	his	
draft	constitution.22	Even	after	the	original	foundation	of	government,	continued	citizen	
involvement	was	essential.	 “We	 think	 in	America	 that	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 introduce	 the	
people	into	every	department	of	government	as	far	as	they	are	capable	of	exercising	it,”	
he	wrote	to	the	Abbé	Arnoux	in	1789,	“and	that	this	 is	the	only	way	to	ensure	a	 long‐
continued	 and	 honest	 administration	 of	 it's	 [sic]	 powers.”23	 Jefferson	 proposed	 that	
Virginia’s	colonial	method	of	representation,	in	which	corporations	such	as	the	College	
of	William	and	Mary	and	the	City	of	Norfolk	held	seats	alongside	counties,	each	of	which	
enjoyed	equal	 representation,	 should	be	abolished	and	replaced	by	a	 system	of	direct	
representation	of	the	people.	Jefferson	conceded	that	counties	and	boroughs	formed	the	
most	 viable	 electoral	 districts,	 but	 specified	 that	 representation	 amongst	 counties	
should	 be	 proportional	 to	 their	 populations.	 This	 moved	 the	 representation	 system	
further	away	from	institutions	and	towards	being	based	on	persons	‐	a	key	ingredient	
for	avoiding	the	corruption	of	the	legislature	seen	in	Britain	in	“rotten	boroughs”.	















to	keep	the	 judiciary	 from	becoming	an	oligarchy	was	 to,	 in	 turn,	 limit	 their	authority	







and	 of	 the	 Convention.	 While	 the	 colonial	 House	 of	 Burgesses	 had	 existed	 as	 an	




checks	 through	 bicameralism.	 While	 both	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 Convention	 favoured	
eliminating	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 Senate,	 they	 differed	 on	 questions	 of	
representation	and	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	 legislature	would	be	bicameral.	While	 the	
Convention	 was	 satisfied	 with	 a	 solution	 in	 which	 power	 remained	 with	 the	 county	






                                                     
24	 See	 “The	 Beginnings	 of	 Representative	 Government:	 The	 Virginia	 Company	
Creates	a	General	Assembly”,	in	Billings,	The	Old	Dominion,	pp.	45‐47.	
25	 The	 best	 single	 account	 of	 changing	 perceptions	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 seventeenth‐	
and	eighteenth‐century	Anglophone	political	 thought	 is	Edmund	S.	Morgan’s	 Inventing	
the	People.	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 account	 of	 how	 the	 idea	 of	 popular	 sovereignty	was	







was	 thought	of	 in	 feudal	 terms	of	estates.	People	were	not	represented	 in	Parliament,	




estate	 and	 the	 House	 of	 Burgesses	 represented	 the	 Commons.27	 The	 Commons	 of	
Virginia,	like	those	in	Britain,	were	split	between	counties	and	royal	boroughs,	each	of	
which	consisted	of	a	different	internal	polity.	
	 As	 shown	 by	 Edmund	 S.	 Morgan,	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 things	
instead	 of	 people	 began	 to	 change	 after	 the	 English	 Civil	 War.	 The	 English	
commonwealth	tradition	of	political	 thought	began	to	develop	the	 idea	that	 it	was	the	
people,	 not	 their	 institutions,	 that	 were	 represented	 in	 Parliament,	 an	 idea	 that	 was	
taken	 further	 and	 made	 normative	 by	 theorists	 such	 as	 John	 Locke.	 	 Parliamentary	
sovereignty,	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 legislature	 itself	 is	 sovereign	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 people,	
became	a	middle‐way	compromise	between	 the	 reality	of	non‐popular	 representation	
in	Parliament	and	the	popular	ideal.28	While	British	governance	did	not	fully	adopt	the	
                                                     





27	While	 there	was	no	resident	nobility,	 approximately	one‐third	of	Virginia’s	 land	
east	of	the	Blue	Ridge	was	owned	by	an	absentee	landowner,	the	Lord	Fairfax.	Fairfax	









London:	 Methuen,	 1977,	 and	 "The	 Eighteenth‐‐Century	 Debate	 on	 the	 Sovereignty	 of	
Parliament."	 Transactions	 of	 the	 Royal	 Historical	 Society	 26	 (1976):	 189‐210.	 For	
parliamentary	 sovereignty	 before	 the	 modern	 era,	 see	 R.W.K.	 Hinton,	 "English	







old	 language	 and	 considered	 themselves	 the	 “Delegates	 from	 the	 counties	 and	
corporations	 of	 the	 colony	 of	 Virginia.”29	 The	 title	 the	 Convention	 chose	 for	 the	
constitution	 continued	 that	 language,	 reading	 that	 the	 Convention,	 consisting	 of	 “the	
Delegates	 and	 Representatives	 of	 the	 several	 Counties	 and	 Corporations	 of	 Virginia”,	
was	 now	 transferring	 power	 to	 the	 government	 contained	 in	 the	 constitution.	 The	
transition	to	popular	sovereignty	came	just	a	few	paragraphs	later,	in	the	main	body	of	
the	 constitution,	 where	 the	 conventioneers	 restyled	 themselves	 “the	 Delegates	 and	
Representatives	 of	 the	 good	 People	 of	 Virginia.”30	 This	 shift	 from	 “counties	 and	
corporations”	 to	 “people”	 marked	 a	 period	 of	 transition	 from	 the	 Conventional	
government,	 a	 body	 based	 on	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 things,	 to	 the	 Constitutional	
government,	a	body	based	on	the	sovereignty	of	persons.	This	was	further	emphasised	
by	the	accompanying	Declaration	of	Rights,	in	which	the	Convention	firmly	stated	that	




	 During	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 in	 Britain,	 two	 different	 franchises	 developed	 and	
reflected	 a	 split	 between	 incorporated	 and	 non‐incorporated	 constituencies.	 As	 G.R.	
                                                                                                                                                                     
Review	75,	no.	296	(1960):	410‐425,	and	Conrad	Russell,	"Thomas	Cromwell's	Doctrine	
of	 Parliamentary	 Sovereignty."	 Transactions	 of	 the	 Royal	Historical	 Society	 7	 (1997):	
235‐246.	For	the	adoption	of	Parliamentary	norms	in	Virginia,	see	Warren	M.	Billings,	A	
Little	Parliament:	The	Virginia	General	Assembly	 in	the	Seventeenth	Century.	Richmond:	
Library	 of	 Virginia,	 2004,	 and	 Jack	 P.	 Greene,	 Peripheries	 and	 Center:	 Constitutional	
Development	 in	 the	Extended	Polities	of	 the	British	Empire	and	 the	United	States,	1607‐
1788.	 Athens:	 The	 University	 of	 Georgia	 Press,	 1986.	 See	 also	 R.R.	 Johnson,	
"“Parliamentary	 Egotisms":	 The	 Clash	 of	 Legislatures	 in	 the	 Making	 of	 the	 American	
Revolution."	The	Journal	of	American	History	74,	no.	2	(1987):	338‐362.	For	a	glimpse	of	
how	 one	 of	 Jefferson’s	 intellectual	 colleagues	 understood	 the	 issue,	 see	 J.V.	 Jezierski,	
"Parliament	 or	 People:	 James	 Wilson	 and	 Blackstone	 on	 the	 Nature	 and	 Location	 of	
Sovereignty."	Journal	of	the	History	of	Ideas	32,	no.	1	(1971):	95‐106.	




Elton	 notes,	 in	 the	medieval	 period	 constituencies	 tended	 to	 represent	 	 communities	
that	were	 defined	 by	 their	 territory	 rather	 than	 by	 their	 people,	 and	 unincorporated	
constituencies	 	 tended	 to	 be	 counties	while	 incorporated	 constituencies	 tended	 to	 be	
royal	 boroughs.32	 In	 incorporated	 polities,	 only	members	 of	 an	 electorate	 defined	 for	
that	 particular	 constituency	 could	 vote	 for	 the	 corporation’s	 representative	 to	
Parliament.	When	 a	 royal	 borough	was	 chartered	 by	 the	 Crown,	 its	membership	was	
often	 stipulated	 as	 part	 of	 its	 incorporation,	 and	 each	 had	 its	 own	 suffrage	
requirements.33		
	 Therefore,	 to	 take	 an	 example,	 only	 the	 members	 of	 the	 corporation	 of	 the	
borough	of	Nottingham	could	vote	for	its	Member	of	Parliament.	The	franchise	did	not	
automatically	 extend	 to	 all	 freemen	 within	 the	 borough,	 nor	 to	 all	 freeholders.34	 As	
Edmund	 S.	 Morgan	 notes,	 “in	 some	 [suffrage]	 extended	 to	 virtually	 all	 free	 male	
inhabitants,	 in	others	 it	was	 confined	 to	 the	governing	 corporation	of	 the	borough.”35	
Nor	were	cities	the	only	corporations	capable	of	being	represented.	The	Universities	of	
Oxford	and	Cambridge	were	represented	 in	Parliament,	with	 their	 faculty	and	 fellows	
comprising	the	electorate	voting	for	the	representatives.36	
	 The	 county	 polities	 were	 classified	 differently.	 As	 unincorporated	 entities,	
counties	did	not	have	membership	rolls.	Therefore,	 the	electorate	 in	 the	counties	was	
determined	 by	 property	 ownership,	with	 suffrage	 limited	 to	 freeholders	with	 estates	




                                                                                                                                                                     
31	“Final	Draft	of	the	Virginia	Declaration	of	Rights”,	in	GM	Papers,	Vol.	I,	p.	287.	
32	 Elton,	 Studies,	 pp.	 40‐41.	 For	 an	 older	 account	 of	 the	 medieval	 borough	
constituencies,	 see	 May	 McKisack,	 The	 Parliamentary	 Representation	 of	 the	 English	
Boroughs	in	the	Middle	Ages.	Oxford:	University	Press,	1932.	









	 The	 Virginian	 House	 of	 Burgesses	 was	 modelled	 upon	 the	 English	 House	 of	
Commons	and	used	the	same	system	of	organising	its	electorate;	Warren	M.	Billings	has	
characterised	the	House	of	Burgesses	as	a	“mirror	that	reflected	local	interests.”38	The	
landowners	 of	 each	 county	 elected	 two	 delegates	 to	 each	 session	 of	 the	 House,	 and	
corporations,	 including	 the	 College	 of	 William	 and	 Mary	 and	 the	 boroughs	 of	
Williamsburg	and	Norfolk	elected	one	each.	Despite	the	relocation	of	sovereignty	to	the	
people,	old	ways	died	hard.	Representation	under	the	new	constitution	continued	in	the	
borough‐county	 mould	 used	 under	 the	 colony.	 While	 Jefferson	 agreed	 with	 the	
Convention	 on	 the	 location	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 the	 people,	 he	 was	 very	 critical	 of	 the	
Convention’s	 choice	 to	 retain	 the	 antiquated	 system	of	uniform	corporate	 and	county	
representation.39	
	 The	House	of	Burgesses	was	replaced	under	the	new	constitution	by	a	reformed	
lower	 house	 called	 the	 House	 of	 Delegates,	 which	 preserved	 the	 colonial	 House’s	
representation	of	corporations	and	counties.	This	arrangement	was	slightly	modified	to	
take	into	account	the	new	popular	sovereignty.	Delegates	from	the	counties	remained,	
as	 before,	 elected	 by	 each	 county’s	 wealthiest	 landowners.	 Corporations,	 in	 contrast,	
were	significantly	reduced.	With	the	royal	charters	now	defunct,	the	Convention	took	it	
upon	 itself	 to	 define	 which	 corporations	 would	 be	 recognised	 under	 the	 new	
constitution.	 Only	 the	 boroughs	 of	 Williamsburg	 and	 Norfolk,	 large	 and	 prosperous	
towns	 in	 their	own	right,	were	considered	 to	be	populous	enough	 to	warrant	seats	 in	
the	House	 of	 Delegates.40	 Any	 further	 corporate	 constituencies,	 including	 the	 College,	
                                                     
38	 Billings,	 The	 Old	 Dominion,	 p.	 56.	 Billings	 continues:	 “Unwittingly,	 the	 General	
Assembly	 had	 adopted	 a	 theory	 of	 representation	 akin	 to	 one	 that	 had	 flourished	 in	
medieval	 England.	 On	 that	 groundwork	 Virginia	 politicians,	 like	 their	 colleagues	
elsewhere	 in	 English	 North	 America,	 continued	 to	 construct	 a	 novel	 system	 of	 direct	
representation.	But	a	early	as	 the	 fifteenth	century	 the	English	had	begun	 to	abandon	
that	medieval	conception	for	one	that	held	that	members	of	Parliament	represented	the	
whole	realm	as	well	as	 the	particular	electors	who	had	chosen	them….	Only	when	the	
constitutional	 crisis	 that	 led	 to	 revolution	 arose	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 did	 the	
diverging	 views	 of	 representation	 become	 palpable.”	 The	 Virginians	 did	 not	 undergo	
this	 same	 transformation	 before	 the	 revolution,	 and	 encouraging	 it	 was	 the	 crux	 of	
Jefferson’s	reforms.	
39	See	Jefferson,	Notes	on	Virginia,	pp.	118‐120.	
40	 The	 under‐representation	 of	 urban	 and	 semi‐urban	 communities	 is	 one	 of	 the	
most	 startling	 aspects	 of	 the	 Virginia	 constitution.	 While	 the	 Convention	 limited	 the	
initial	 number	 of	 borough	 constituencies	 to	 two,	 the	 English	 Parliament	 had	 112	




overwhelmingly	 composed	 of	 county	 gentry,	 concentrated	 in	 the	 eastern	 counties.	
These	 gentry,	 averse	 to	 diluting	 their	 power	 by	 dividing	 the	most	 populous	 western	
counties,	 which	 were	 outside	 of	 their	 control,	 into	 smaller	 constituencies,	 thereby	
increasing	 western	 representation	 in	 the	 House,	 were	 presumably	 also	 averse	 to	
empowering	boroughs	that	would	further	dilute	their	already	tenuous	power.41	
	 All	settled	areas	of	the	state	were	part	of	a	county,	and	therefore	any	landholder	
within	 a	 county	 was	 represented	 by	 his	 two	 delegates	 to	 the	 House,	 plus	 a	 Senator	
representing	a	district	of	 several	counties	composited	 together.	However,	 it	 is	easy	 to	
give	more	 credit	 to	 the	 reformed	House	 than	 is	 due.	While	 the	Convention	had	 taken	
some	 measures	 towards	 eliminating	 the	 worst	 abuses	 of	 the	 system	 inherited	 from	
England,	many	shortcomings	remained.	The	counties	often	had	dramatic	inequalities	in	
population,	 especially	 the	 further	 west	 one	 went.	 As	 Jefferson	 noted,	 “the	 county	 of	
Warwick,	 with	 only	 one	 hundred	 fighting	men,	 has	 an	 equal	 representation	with	 the	
county	 of	 Loudoun,	 which	 has	 1746.	 So	 that	 every	 man	 in	 Warwick	 has	 as	 much	
influence	in	the	government	as	17	men	in	Loudon.”42	The	electorate	remained	confined	
to	a	small	group	of	propertied	gentry	who	ensured	their	continued	hegemony	through	
feudal	 inheritance	 laws.43	 And	 a	 borough	 whose	 population	 fell	 below	 half	 that	 of	 a	
neighbouring	county	could	be	reabsorbed	into	that	county	and	thereby	lose	its	seat	in	
                                                                                                                                                                     
For	a	perspective	on	why	there	were	so	few	towns,	see	John	C.	Rainbolt,	"The	Absence	of	
Towns	 in	 Seventeenth‐Century	 Virginia."	 The	 Journal	 of	 Southern	 History	 35,	 no.	 3	
(1969):	343‐360.	





of	western	 representatives	 in	 reaching	 the	 Assembly	 at	Williamsburg	meant	 that	 the	




English	property	 requirements	had	been	set	at	40s	by	Act	of	Parliament	 in	1430.	 See	
Hirst,	Representatives	of	the	People,	pp.	29‐33,	and	Elton,	Studies,	pp.	41‐42	for	further	
explanation	 on	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 property	 requirement.	 For	 the	 adaptation	 of	 these	








	 Having	 decided	 that	 the	Assembly	would	 represent	 counties	 and	 corporations,	
and	 that	 the	 franchise	 would	 extend	 to	 a	 very	 small	 propertied	 electorate,	 the	
Convention	also	decided	to	vest	supreme	power	in	an	Assembly	that,	while	consisting	of	
an	 upper	 and	 lower	 house,	 was	 functionally	 unicameral.	 In	 addition,	 the	 executive	
branch	 was	 nominated	 by	 the	 Assembly	 and	 enjoyed	 no	 independence	 from	 the	






“legislative,	 executive,	 and	 judiciary	 departments,	 be	 separate	 and	 distinct”,	 and	 that	
“the	 legislature	shall	be	 formed	of	 two	distinct	branches”.46	Yet,	 the	 	 two	houses	were	
unequal,	with	 the	 constitution	 vesting	 virtually	 all	 power	 in	 the	General	Assembly,	 of	
which	 the	 lower	house,	 the	House	 of	Delegates,	 enjoyed	 the	preponderance	 of	 power	
versus	 the	 upper	 house,	 the	 Senate.	 The	 House	 of	 Delegates	 had	 the	 power	 of	
originating	all	legislation	and	money	bills;	the	Senate	could	only	amend	legislation	and	
submit	 money	 bills	 to	 an	 up‐or‐down	 vote.	 	 Meanwhile,	 the	 colonial	 upper	 house’s	
authority	 over	 nominations	 to	 higher	 office	 had	 been	 removed	 to	 the	 new	 executive	
Council	 of	 State,	 and	 the	 right	 to	 judge	 in	 impeachments	was	 removed	 to	 the	 judicial	
General	 Court.	 Effectively,	 the	 Senate	 could	 act	 only	 as	 a	 negative	 in	 the	 legislative	
process.	 Additionally,	 the	 gubernatorial	 veto	 had	 been	 entirely	 removed	 and	 the	
                                                     
44	 Jefferson	 also	 came	 to	 believe	 that	 executive	 legitimacy	 required	 a	 popular	
mandate,	 independent	 of	 legislative	 appointment.	 See	 Bailey,	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 and	
Executive	Power,	pp.	1‐27.	
45	 In	 this	 judgment,	 I	 am	 at	 odds	with	Willi	 Paul	 Adams,	who,	 in	 his	 comparative	
study	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 constitutions,	 credits	 the	 Virginia	 Convention	with	writing	
the	first	American	constitution	that	truly	respected	separation	of	powers	in	form	as	well	
as	 rhetoric,	with	 an	 independent	upper	 house	 and	 independent	 judiciary.	 See	Adams,	
The	First	American	Constitutions,	pp.	267‐268.	
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joint	 ballot	 of	 the	 two	houses,	 the	mode	of	which	would	be	 that	 each	 vote	would	 “be	
taken	 in	 each	 House	 respectively,	 deposited	 in	 the	 conference	 room,	 the	 boxes	
examined	jointly	by	a	committee	of	each	House,	and	the	numbers	severally	reported	to	
them.”48	 By	 combining	 the	 votes	 of	 both	 houses	 into	 a	 single	 joint	 ballot,	 the	 Senate	
could	not	exercise	a	check	upon	the	House’s	greater	numbers.	Effectively,	the	Assembly	
functioned	 as	 a	 unicameral	 body	 when	 it	 selected	 the	 state’s	 highest	 officers,	 with	
members	of	the	House	of	Delegates	casting	the	vast	majority	of	votes	in	the	joint	ballot.	
	 All	told,	the	House	of	Delegates	possessed	six	exclusive	enumerated	powers,	and	
exercised	 a	 seventh	 enumerated	 power,	 nominations,	 in	 joint	 ballot	 with	 the	 Senate,	





“the	 Senate	 as	 well	 as	 lower	 (or	 shall	 I	 speak	 truth	 and	 call	 it	 upper)”	 House	 of	





	 Both	 Jefferson	 and	 his	 colleagues	 recognised	 the	 Senate	 for	 what	 it	 was	 –	 an	
ineffectual	body	of	little	real	constitutional	significance,	overshadowed	by	the	House	of	








Delegates.	 “I	 agree	 our	 Senate	 is	 not	 on	 the	 independant	 [sic]	 footing	 I	 wished,	 tho’	
perhaps	we	should	differ	as	to	the	proper	change,”	Edmund	Pendleton,	who	had	been	at	
the	Convention,	wrote	 to	 Jefferson	 in	August	1776.	 “My	principal	 fear	now	 is	 that	 the	
Delegates	will	 have	 too	much	 influence	 in	 the	 Senate	 Elections,	 as	 I	wish	 them	 to	 be	
totally	independant	[sic]	of	each	other	and	to	say	the	truth	of	the	people	too,”	going	on	
to	explain	how	he	had	 favoured	an	 independent	Senate	with	 life	 tenure.51	 In	contrast,	
Jefferson	had	proposed	selecting	 the	Senate	directly	 from	the	House	of	Delegates,	but	




have	 rendered	 them	 independent	 of	 the	 annually	 elected	House	 of	 Delegates;	 he	 had	
only	 selected	 them	 from	 the	House	 in	 order	 to	 remove	 them	 from	 popular	 pressure,	
similar	 in	 spirit	 to	 the	 electoral	 colleges	 that	 George	 Mason’s	 original	 outline	 to	 the	
Convention	had	proposed.52	Greater	 longevity	 than	 the	annually‐elected	House	would	
gradually	 remove	 each	 class	 of	 Senators	 from	 its	 influence.	 Lamenting	 the	 adopted	
constitution,	with	its	virtually	powerless	Senate	elected	from	the	same	constituency	and	
at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 House,	 Jefferson	 sighed	 “so	 much	 for	 the	 wisdom	 of	 the	
Senate.”53		In	the	Notes	on	Virginia,	Jefferson	explained	further	that	the	“senate	is,	by	its	
constitution,	 too	homogeneous	with	the	house	of	delegates.	Being	chosen	by	the	same	
electors,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 and	out	 of	 the	 same	 subjects,	 the	 choice	 falls	 of	 course	on	
men	of	the	same	description.	The	purpose	of	establishing	different	houses	of	legislation	
is	 to	 introduce	 the	 influence	 of	 different	 interests	 or	 different	 principles.”54	 Neither	
Pendleton	nor	Jefferson	were	under	any	illusions	about	the	balance	of	power	chosen	by	




under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 House	 of	 Delegates.	 “[The	 Convention]	 received	 in	 their	







creation	 no	 powers	 but	 what	 were	 given	 to	 every	 legislature	 before	 and	 since.	 They	
could	not	therefore	pass	an	act	transcendant	[sic]	to	the	powers	of	other	legislatures.”55	
In	so	doing,	the	Convention	had	exceeded	its	mandate,	and	had	imposed	a	constitution	
upon	 the	 state	 that	 entrenched	 control	 of	 the	 Convention’s	 own	 gentry	 membership	
through	a	malleable	legislative	supremacy	vested	in	the	House	of	Delegates.	
	 Jefferson	warned	that	the	Convention	had	designed	the	Assembly	so	as	to	allow	
for	 the	 rise	 of	 an	 oligarchy.	 The	 Assembly	 “exercises	 a	 power	 of	 determining	 the	
Quorum	 of	 their	 own	 body	which	may	 legislate	 for	 us,”	 Jefferson	wrote	 in	 the	Notes.	
“The	house	of	delegates	therefore	have	lately	voted	that,	during	the	present	dangerous	
invasion,	 forty	members	shall	be	a	house	to	proceed	to	business.”	Forty	was	 less	 than	
half	of	the	one	hundred	and	thirty‐odd	delegates	seated;	it	was	also	the	quorum	of	the	
British	House	of	Commons.56	 “But	 this	danger	 could	not	 authorize	 them	 to	 call	 that	 a	
house	which	was	none:	and	if	they	may	fix	it	at	one	number,	they	may	at	another,	till	it	
loses	 its	 fundamental	character	of	being	a	representative	body…	From	forty	 it	may	be	
reduced	to	four,	and	from	four	to	one:	from	a	house	to	a	committee,	from	a	committee	to	
a	chairman	or	speaker,	and	thus	an	oligarchy	or	monarchy	be	substituted	under	forms	
supposed	 to	be	 regular.”57	By	way	of	 example,	 Jefferson	pointed	 to	Venice,	 a	 republic	
that	 had	 fallen	 into	 oligarchy	 by	 allowing	 an	 aristocracy	 to	 rise	 up	 through	 a	 rump	
legislative	branch.		
	 A	 further	 concern	 was	 that	 lack	 of	 separation	 of	 powers	 meant	 that	 the	
legislature,	even	if	not	a	rump,	could	interfere	in	the	activities	of	the	other	branches,	or	
even	 direct	 them	 outright.	 There	 was	 “no	 barrier”	 between	 the	 three	 branches	 of	
government,	Jefferson	claimed,	because	“the	judiciary	and	executive	members	were	left	
dependant	on	the	legislative”	for	salaries	and	in	some	cases	their	very	“continuance”	in	
office.	As	 a	 result,	 “all	 the	powers	of	 government,	 legislative,	 executive,	 and	 judiciary,	
result	 to	 the	 legislative	 body.”58	 In	 short,	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 legislature	 to	 control	 the	
other	branches	of	government,	and	in	the	process	to	override	the	constitution	itself,	was	
to	“exercise	power	undefined	by	the	laws”,	 just	as	Jefferson	had	defined	prerogative.59	
                                                     
55	Jefferson,	Notes	on	Virginia,	p.	122.	













this	 idealised	 monarchy	 was	 a	 reformed	 monarchy	 which	 would	 be	 stripped	 of	 its	
prerogative	powers	while	 retaining	 its	 full	executive	powers.	 In	his	draft	 constitution,	
Jefferson	 used	 this	 concept	 as	 a	 model	 for	 his	 own	 state‐level	 executive,	 the	
Administrator.	 The	 Virginia	 Convention,	 however,	 went	 even	 further	 by	 creating	 a	





	 In	reconstructing	the	office	of	 the	governor,	 the	Virginia	Convention	took	pains	
to	make	the	governor	of	the	commonwealth	the	opposite	of	his	royal	predecessor	in	all	
but	 title.	 Rather	 than	 serving	 at	 the	 king’s	 pleasure,	 which	 in	 effect	 often	 meant	 a	
lengthy	term	that	could	stretch	for	a	governor’s	entire	 life,	 the	Convention	 limited	the	
governor	to	a	year‐long	term,	limited	him	to	three	consecutive	terms	in	office,	and	made	







	 Likewise,	 executive	 powers	 were	 restrained,	 and	 many	 of	 the	 prerogative	
powers	of	the	royal	governor	were	vested	by	law	in	the	House	of	Delegates.	The	pardon	
power	was	removed	to	the	legislature	and	the	legislative	veto	was	removed,	as	was	the	
right	 to	dissolve	or	prorogue	 the	 legislature;	 the	 governor’s	 one	 remaining	 legislative	
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of	State	 in	 the	constitution.	The	eight	members	of	 the	council	had	complete	oversight	
over	all	executive	activities,	no	matter	how	mundane.	Colonial	governors	had	routinely	
withheld	their	royal	instructions	from	the	Council	of	State;	now	the	Governor	could	not	
do	 anything	 without	 the	 Council’s	 acquiescence,	 including	 sending	 official	
correspondence	in	the	post.62		
	 In	 contrast	 to	 American	 constitutional	 tradition	 before	 and	 since,	 with	 its	
emphasis	 on	 presidential	 government	 and	 the	 “unitary	 executive”,	 the	 Virginia	
Convention	 created	 a	 plural	 executive	 where	 no	 one	 person	 was	 responsible	 for	




councils	 in	 their	 constitutions,	 but	 Virginia’s	 compared	 only	 to	 Pennsylvania’s	 plural	
executive	in	the	extent	to	which	it	reduced	the	governor	to	near‐powerlessness.		
	 In	the	Massachusetts	Constitution	of	1780,	designed	by	John	Adams,	the	office	of	
Governor	 was	 a	 powerful	 one	 with	 a	 legislative	 veto,	 appointment	 power,	 pardon	




Virginia,	 p.	 49.	 For	 an	example	of	 the	 governor’s	 lack	of	 independent	powers,	 see	 the	
letter	by	Gov.	Patrick	Henry	in	JM	Papers,	Vol.	I,	pp.	219‐221.	
63	 This	 type	 of	 executive	 was	 also	 used	 in	 Pennsylvania’s	 radically	 democratic	
constitution;	 curiously,	 this	 radical	 element	 of	 the	 Virginia	 constitution	 has	 escaped	
equal	 notoriety.	 For	 the	 federal	 tradition	 of	 the	 unitary	 executive,	 see	 Stephen	 G.	
Calabresi	 and	 Christopher	 S.	 Yoo,	 The	 Unitary	 Executive:	 Presidential	 Power	 From	
Washington	to	Bush.	New	Haven	&	London:	Yale	University	Press,	2008,	especially	pp.	
64‐76	 for	 Jefferson’s	 invocation	 of	 the	 unitary	 executive	 as	 President	 of	 the	 United	
States.	
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power,	 and	 military	 power	 as	 commander‐in‐chief.	 Most	 strikingly,	 the	 fear	 in	






legislative	 duties	 in	 order	 to	 take	 their	 seats	 in	 the	 Council.	 The	 proceedings	 of	 the	
Council	 were	 also	 available	 for	 review	 by	 the	 legislature,	 and	minority	 reports	 were	
included	 in	 the	 proceedings.	 But	 that	was	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 Council	 acted	 as	 a	
check	on	the	Governor.	The	Council	operated	more	as	a	traditionally	subservient	Privy	
Council	than	as	an	equal	partner	in	governance.64	
	 The	 Virginian	 Governor‐in‐Council	 bore	 superficial	 resemblance	 to	 the	
Pennsylvanian	 “president	 and	 council”	 empowered	 by	 that	 states’	 commonwealth	
constitution	 of	 the	 same	 year,	 but	 the	 similarities	 ended	 there.	 	 The	 president	 and	
council	were	directly	elected	by	the	state’s	freeholders	for	short,	fixed	terms,	and	here	
the	 executive	 had	 more	 power	 than	 in	 Virginia.	 The	 president	 and	 council	 had	
appointment	power,	executive	power,	appellate	jurisdiction,	power	of	reprieve	(but	not	
pardon),	 and	military	power	with	 the	president	 serving	as	 commander‐in‐chief.	Thus,	




As	 we	 saw	 in	 chapter	 one,	 Jefferson’s	 views	 on	 constitutionalism	 were	 heavily	






                                                     
64	 Roots	 of	 the	 Republic:	 American	 Founding	 Documents	 Interpreted.	 Stephen	 L.	
Schechter,	ed.	Madison,	WI:	Madison	House,	1990,	pp.	194‐226.	
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According	 to	 Molesworth,	 constitutional	 monarchies	 were	 defined,	 in	 part,	 by	
incorporating	 some	 element	 of	 elective	 monarchy	 into	 their	 constitution.	 From	
Molesworth’s	 Account	 of	 Denmark,	 a	 classic	 of	 the	 commonwealth	 genre,	 Jefferson	
recorded	that	“Denmark	was,	till	1660,	governed	by	a	king	chosen	by	the	people	of	all	
sorts”;	 the	estates	of	 the	realm	would	meet	 in	an	electoral	college	 to	choose	 the	most	
meritorious	 member	 of	 the	 deceased	 king’s	 family	 to	 be	 his	 successor.	 Molesworth	
noted	that	 the	Danes	retained	 the	right	 to	depose	 their	king	 if	he	misbehaved,	 “either	
formally	by	making	him	answer	before	the	representative	body	of	the	people”,	or	“if	by	
ill	 practices,	 such	 as	making	 of	 parties,	 levying	 of	 soldiers,	 contracting	 of	 alliances	 to	
support	himself	 in	opposition	to	the	people’s	rights,	he	was	grown	too	powerful	 to	be	
legally	contended	with,	they	dispatched	him,	without	any	more	ceremony,	the	best	way	






Conquest.	 This	 suggests	 that	 Jefferson	was	 thinking	 of	 an	 idealised	 elective	monarch	
while	 drawing	 up	 his	 design	 of	 a	 republican	 executive	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 1776.	 Further	
corroboration	 can	 be	 found	 in	 his	 unusual	 choice	 of	 the	 title	 “Administrator”	 for	 his	
chief	 executive,	 rather	 than	 the	 “Governor”	 used	 by	 the	 Convention	 and	 the	 other	
colonies.	What	was	an	Administrator,	and	where	did	Jefferson	get	the	idea?	
After	discussing	the	line	of	English	kings	in	his	commonplace	book,	Jefferson	turned	
to	 another	 history	 of	 the	 northern	 kingdoms,	 that	 of	 Sweden	 in	 Thomas	 Salmon’s	
Modern	History	 of	 Europe.	 Salmon	 wrote	 of	 the	 war	 between	 Sweden	 and	 Denmark	
when	 Sweden	 withdrew	 from	 their	 combined	 monarchy	 in	 1439.	 The	 Swedish	 king,	
Charles	Canutson,	successfully	 led	the	Swedes	to	independence,	but	“after	his	death	in	
1469	 they	 discontinued	 the	 kingly	 office	 and	 chose	 a	 person	 whom	 they	 called	 an	
Administrator	who	 in	 fact	 possessed	 equal	 power	with	 the	 king.”	 The	 Administrator,	
                                                                                                                                                                     




acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 	 the	 feudal	 estates	 of	 Sweden,	 continued	 the	 wars.67	 The	
Administrators	 maintained	 Sweden’s	 independence	 until	 1523,	 when	 Denmark	
renounced	 its	 claim	 and	 the	 incumbent	 Administrator,	 Gustavus	 Ericson,	 was	 named	
king.	 Ericson	 proceeded	 to	 reduce	 the	 Swedish	 estates	 through	 use	 of	 his	 royal	





in	 naming	 his	 chief	 executive	 after	 the	 leaders	who	 had	won	 Sweden	 its	 own	war	 of	
independence	 against	 the	 forces	 of	 a	 combined	 monarchy.	 But,	 most	 important,	 the	
Administrator	was	an	example	of	a	relatively	recent	leader	of	a	landed	polity	in	which	






purged	of	 its	prerogative	powers.	As	stated	earlier	 in	 this	chapter,	 Jefferson	 identified	
twelve	 prerogatives	 of	 the	 royal	 governor	 that	 should	 be	 stripped	 away	 and	 placed	
under	 legislative	 control.70	 These	 powers	 would	 not	 be	 eliminated	 from	 government	
                                                     
67	 These	 estates	 were	 dominated	 by	 the	 clergy,	 who	 controlled	 half	 a	 dozen	
bishoprics	 that	 allowed	 them	 to	 amass	 substantial	 secular	 power	 and	 riches.	 Clerical	
aristocracy	will	be	further	discussed	in	chapter	4.	
68	LCB	Entry	755.	




prerogative	 is	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 as	 weakening	 the	 executive,	 which	 was	 what	 the	
Convention	did	with	the	Governor‐in‐Council.	In	contrast,	the	commonplace	entry	offers	
a	more	 ready‐made	 explanation	 rich	 in	 republican	 context,	 a	 sort	 of	 inside	 reference	
that	Jefferson	was	telling	himself	similar	to	the	ornate	Anglo‐Saxon	notations	he	made	
to	his	manuscript	copy	of	the	Bill	for	Proportioning	Crimes	and	Punishments.	
70	 Jeremy	 Bailey	 questions	why,	 after	 denouncing	monarchy	 in	 the	 Declaration	 of	
Independence	and	the	preamble	to	the	draft	constitution,	Jefferson	would	then	base	the	
office	 of	 Administrator	 upon	 it.	 Bailey	 notes	 that	 the	 Virginia	 Convention	 accepted	
language	 Jefferson	 used	 to	 denounce	 George	 III	 while	 rejecting	 his	 denunciations	 of	
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purview,	but	they	would	be	returned	to	the	legislature	for	inclusion	in	legislation,	where	
they	 properly	 belonged	 under	 Jefferson’s	 definition	 of	 prerogatives	 as	 authority	
“undefined”	under	the	law.	Ergo,	legislative	action	would	make	them	into	law,	which	the	
executive	 could	 then	 execute.	 Jefferson	 was	 not	 making	 an	 argument	 for	 a	 weak	
executive	or	limited	government,	but	he	was	making	an	argument	for	responsibilities	to	
be	vested	in	their	proper	places.71	Once	prerogatives	had	been	removed,	the	executive	
was	 free	 to	 carry	 out	 its	 genuinely	 executive	 responsibilities	 without	 hindrance	 ‐	 a	
major	difference	from	the	Convention’s		Governor‐in‐Council.72	
Taking	all	of	 this	 into	account,	 Jefferson’s	Administrator	ended	up	 looking	 like	 the	
preferred	executive	 in	 the	Summary	View,	when	 Jefferson	referred	 to	 the	king	as	only	
the	“chief	officer	of	the	people,	appointed	by	the	laws,	and	circumscribed	with	definite	
powers.”73	 At	 the	 time,	 it	 had	 been	 a	 fictitious	misrepresentation	 of	 the	 king’s	 actual	
status	under	British	 law,	but	 Jefferson	now	had	the	chance	 to	act	on	 that	vision	when	
creating	his	own	executive.	The	Administrator,	while	seemingly	named	after	an	obscure	
                                                                                                                                                                     
monarchy	as	a	form	of	government,	and	his	basing	the	executive	power	on	monarchy,	




71	Working	 from	a	 less	precise	definition	of	prerogative,	 Jeremy	Bailey	argues	 that	




the	 Louisiana	 Purchase	 as	 an	 example	 of	 a	 case	 where	 Jefferson	 used	 a	 form	 of	
prerogative.	Ibid.,	pp.	15‐16.	
72	 In	 later	 years	 Jefferson	would	make	 his	 proposed	 executive	 even	 stronger.	 His	
1783	draft	constitution	lengthened	the	executive’s	term	to	five	years	to	give	him	better	
independence	 from	 legislative	 interference.	 “Jefferson’s	 Draft	 of	 a	 Constitution	 for	
Virginia”,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	VI,	pp.	298‐299.	
73	 “A	 Summary	View	of	 the	Rights	 of	British	America”,	 in	TJ	 Papers,	Vol.	 I,	 p.	 121.	
Julian	H.	Franklin	notes	that	“in	a	limited	monarchy	the	king,	although	circumscribed	by	












It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 Convention	 had	 very	 different	 ideas	 about	
executive	power.	Jefferson	clearly	perceived	a	difference	between	royal	prerogative	and	
legitimate	 executive	 power.	He	 acted	 to	 end	 one	while	 leaving	 the	 other	 unhindered,	
and	did	so	with	the	example	of	responsible	elective	monarchs	and	executives	in	mind.	In	
contrast,	the	Convention	acted	out	of	apprehension	to	executive	power,	apparently	not	
perceiving	 the	 same	 difference	 between	 prerogative	 and	 executive	 authority.	 They	






influence	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 a	 textbook	 republicanism,	 emphasising	 the	 power	 of	 the	
legislature	and	fragmenting	executive	authority,	Jefferson	displayed	far	more	interest	in	
adapting	constitutional	monarchy	to	a	republican	setting.	Contrary	to	some	historians’	
                                                     
74	Keeping	in	mind	Patterson’s	description	of	the	“Whig	type	of	executive”	as	“only	
the	 administrative	 agent	 of	 the	 legislature”	 (se	 Patterson,	 Constitutional	Principles,	 p.	
83),	it	could	be	reckoned	that	Jefferson	was	using	the	title	“Administrator”	in	that	sense	
only,	 as	 a	 way	 of	 de‐emphasising	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 executive.	 I	 disagree	with	 this	
alternative	 interpretation	 because	 Jefferson	was	 not	 trying	 to	weaken	 the	 executive’s	
legitimate	 powers	 of	 execution	 and	 interpretation	 of	 the	 laws,	 he	was	 only	 trying	 to	




75	 A	 historiographical	 survey	 of	 this	 intellectual	 tradition	 must	 include	 J.G.A.	
Pocock’s	 The	 Machiavellian	 Moment	 :	 Florentine	 Political	 Thought	 and	 the	 Atlantic	
Republican	 Tradition.	 Princeton,	 NJ:	 Princeton	 University	 Press,	 2003;	 The	 Ancient	
Constitution	 and	 the	 Feudal	 Law	 :	 A	 Study	 of	 English	 Historical	 Thought	 in	 the	
Seventeenth	Century:	A	Reissue	with	a	Retrospect.	Cambridge	:	University	Press,	1987;	as	
well	 as	 his	 article	 "Machiavelli,	 Harrington	 and	 English	 Political	 Ideologies	 in	 the	
Eighteenth	 Century."	 The	William	 and	Mary	 Quarterly	 22,	 no.	 4	 (1965):	 549‐583;	 in	






plural	 approach	 to	 executive	 power,	 it	 should	 be	 pointed	 out	 that	 there	 were	 many	
similarities.	 The	 offices	 of	 attorney	 general,	 treasurer,	 and	 delegates	 to	 Congress	 all	




to	 take	 unitary	 action	 on	most	matters,	 a	 privy	 council	 would	 still	 sit	 to	 advise	 him,	
though	 its	 consent	 was	 not	 required.	 Finally,	 both	 proposed	 constitutions	 ended	 the	
royal	prerogative.	Therefore,	it	seems	that	the	one	crucial	difference	between	Jefferson	
and	his	colleagues,	on	the	matter	of	executive	authority,	was	whether	prerogative	and	






constitution,	 and	 while	 his	 proposed	 reforms	 have	 not	 won	 the	 same	 historical	
notoriety	 as	 his	work	 on	 property,	 religion,	 and	 education,	 the	 legislation	 relating	 to	
Virginia’s	 court	 system	 comprised	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 Jefferson’s	 total	 workload	 as	 a	
legislator	in	the	years	1776‐1779.	Jefferson	proposed	to	make	an	entirely	new	judiciary	
in	his	draft	constitution,	 from	the	 lowest	county	courts	all	 the	way	through	a	Court	of	
Appeals	 exercising	 final	 jurisdiction	 in	 all	 legal	matters,	 and	divided	 into	 two	distinct	
                                                     
76	 Patterson	 is	 a	 notable	 example	 in	 his	 misreading	 of	 Jefferson’s	 views	 on	 the	
executive.	Patterson	focuses	on	Jefferson’s	views	held	after	1789,	when	his	outlook	on	
executive	power	had	changed	considerably.	Bailey	persuasively	argues	that	the	ongoing	
shifts	 in	 Jefferson’s	 views	 on	 executive	 power	 had	 to	 do	 with	 his	 changing	
understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 executive	 accountability	 to	 the	 people	 without	 the	
intermediary	 influence	 of	 the	 legislature.	 David	 N.	 Mayer	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	
principle	of	rotation	in	office	present	in	all	of	TJ’s	executive	plans,	in	contrast	to	the	lack	
of	 rotation	 for	 the	 federal	 president.	 See	 Mayer,	 Constitutional	 Thought	 of	 Thomas	
Jefferson,	p.	225.	
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branches	 of	 common	 law	 and	 of	 equity.	When	 his	 draft	 constitution	was	 rejected,	 he	
made	repeated	attempts	to	enact	reform	through	legislation.	
Jefferson	was	motivated	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 ensure	 the	 judiciary’s	 independence	while	
also	 holding	 it	 accountable	 to	 the	 sovereign	 people,	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	 separation	 of	
powers	were	not	violated	by	judge‐made	law	usurping	the	role	of	the	legislative	branch.	
In	contrast	to	the	legislative	and	executive	branches,	the	basic	forms	and	procedures	of	
which	 were	 set	 in	 stone	 by	 the	 Convention’s	 constitution,	 Jefferson	 identified	 the	
judiciary	 as	 an	 area	 much	 more	 open	 to	 reform	 given	 the	 relative	 vagueness	 of	 its	
enumerated	provisions	in	the	constitution.	This	section	examines	Jefferson’s	attempt	to	
reform	the	county	courts	so	as	to	break	up	the	hold	of	the	local	county	oligarchies,	then	
moves	 on	 to	 his	 efforts	 to	 prevent	 similar	 oligarchies	 from	 forming	 in	 the	 state’s	
superior	court	system.	Finally,	it	examines	the	judiciary’s	use	of	prerogative	power	and	




County	 courts	 had	 been	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 both	 English	 justice	 and	 governance	
since	the	Middle	Ages.	The	courts,	staffed	by	justices	of	the	peace,	formed	a	patronage	
network	 that	 allowed	 the	 Crown,	 through	 appointments	 of	 the	 justices,	 to	 maintain	
control	throughout	the	kingdom	without	the	use	of	a	standing	bureaucracy.77	By	an	act	
of	the	General	Assembly	in	1634,	the	English	“shire”	system	was	replicated	in	Virginia.78	
Over	 time,	 the	 county	 courts	 were	 ceded	 increasing	 power	 from	 the	 colonial	
government,	eventually	including	the	right	to	appoint	their	own	members.79	Warren	M.	
Billings	 notes	 that	 the	 county	 courts	 were	 never	 exact	 replicas	 of	 their	 English	
                                                     
77	 For	 histories	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 English	 judicial	 system,	 see	 Robert	 C.	
Palmer,	The	County	Courts	of	Medieval	England,	1150‐1350.	Princeton:	University	Press,	
1982;	Anthony	Musson	and	W.M.	Ormrod.	The	Evolution	of	English	Justice:	Law,	Politics	
and	 Society	 in	 the	Fourteenth	Century.	 London:	Macmillan,	 1999;	Ogilvie,	 Charles.	The	
King's	Government	and	the	Common	Law,	1471‐1641.	Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell,	1958;	and	








united	 administrative,	 admiralty,	 criminal,	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	 jurisdictions	 that	 in	
England	belonged	to	a	variety	of	different	courts.”80	
By	the	time	of	the	American	Revolution,	these	county	courts	had	become	the	loci	of	
power	 for	 oligarchies	 within	 each	 county.81	 In	 an	 1816	 letter	 reflecting	 on	 the	
deficiencies	of	the	Virginia	constitution	of	1776,	Jefferson	remarked	that	“the	justices	of	
the	 inferior	 courts	 are	 self‐chosen,	 are	 for	 life,	 and	 perpetuate	 their	 own	 body	 in	




well;	 furthermore,	 local	 justices	 of	 the	 peace	were	 the	 only	 officials	 at	 the	 state	 level	
granted	an	exemption	from	separation	of	powers	and	were	allowed	to	hold	local	office	
while	 also	 sitting	 in	 the	 Assembly.83	While	 the	 Convention’s	 constitution	 granted	 the	
power	 of	 nominating	 justices	 of	 the	 peace	 to	 the	 Governor‐in‐Council,	 it	 conditioned	
that	 appointments	 were	 “to	 be	 made	 upon	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 respective	
County	Courts”,	thereby	leaving	nominating	authority	within	local	control,	and	leaving	
the	staffing	of	all	other	positions	to	the	courts	themselves.84	
The	 county	 courts	 exercised	 legislative,	 executive,	 and	 judicial	 functions,	 an	
exception	 to	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 that	 was	 explicitly	 guaranteed	 in	 the	 second	
enumerating	 paragraph	 of	 the	 Convention’s	 constitution.85	 "Yet	 these	 justices	 are	 the	
real	 executive	 as	 well	 as	 judiciary,	 in	 all	 our	 minor	 and	 most	 ordinary	 concerns,”	
Jefferson	continued.	“They	tax	us	at	will;	fill	the	office	of	sheriff,	the	most	important	of	
all	 the	 executive	 officers	 of	 the	 county;	 name	 nearly	 all	 our	 military	 leaders,	 which	
                                                                                                                                                                     















They	 are	 chosen	 by	 an	 officer	 named	 by	 the	 court	 and	 executive.	 Chosen,	 did	 I	 say?	
Picked	 up	 by	 the	 sheriff	 from	 the	 loungings	 [sic]	 of	 the	 court	 yard,	 after	 everything	
respectable	has	retired	from	it."86		
The	 impact	 of	 oligarchy	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 counties	 themselves,	 for	 the	
Convention’s	 retention	 of	 county	 representation	 from	 the	 House	 of	 Burgesses	meant	
that	the	local	oligarchs	also	were	able	to	decisively	influence	the	selection	of	delegates	
and	senators	to	the	Virginia	Assembly.	By	restricting	the	suffrage	to	those	eligible	under	
the	 colonial	 government,	 the	 constitution	 guaranteed	 continued	 control	 to	 those	
oligarchs	who	had	gained	their	position	under	the	ancien	regime.87	 Jefferson	was	 fully	




procedural	 reform	 within	 the	 county	 courts.88	 Jefferson’s	 bill	 failed,	 but	 the	 topic	 of	
reforming	 the	 county	 courts	 remained	 an	 active	 one	 throughout	 the	 1780s.	 While	
minister	to	France,	Jefferson	was	kept	informed	of	the	debate	over	county	court	reform	
by	James	Madison,	who	was	busy	shepherding	Jefferson’s	other	reform	bills	through	the	
legislature.	Madison	 informed	 Jefferson	 that,	county	court	 reform	being	dead,	another	
bill	establishing	courts	of	assizes	was	working	its	way	through	the	House	of	Delegates	in	
1785.	 These	 assize	 courts,	 based	 on	 their	 English	 namesakes,	 would	 supervise	 the	
county	 courts	 and	 provide	 a	 buffer	 between	 the	 counties	 and	 the	 constitutionally‐
mandated	superior	courts.89		






89	 Madison	 stated	 that	 the	 reform	 bill	 was	 based	 on	 one	 proposed	 by	 Edmund	
Pendleton,	 Jefferson’s	 colleague	 on	 the	 Revisal	 of	 the	 Laws,	 in	 the	 autumn	 session	 of	
1776.	 It	 is	 unknown	whether	 Jefferson	 viewed	 Pendleton’s	 bill	 as	 complementary	 or	









confessing	 to	 Monroe	 that	 “The	 Reform	 of	 the	 County	 Courts	 has	 dwindled	 into	
directions	for	going	thro'	the	docket	quarterly,	under	the	same	penalties	as	now	oblige	
them	 to	 do	 their	 business	 monthly.	 The	 experiment	 has	 demonstrated	 the	
impracticability	 of	 rendering	 these	 Courts	 fit	 instruments	 of	 Justice;	 and	 if	 it	 had	
preceded	the	Assize	Question	would	I	think	have	ensured	its	success.”92	




nothing,	 and	 is	 cheifly	 [sic]	 the	 result	 of	 efforts	 to	 render	 Courts	 of	 Assize	
unnecessary.”93	 The	 assizes	 bill,	 meanwhile,	 was	 crippled	 by	 the	 need	 for	
supplementary	 legislation,	 which	 Madison	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 ploy	 to	 prevent	 these	






and	 courts	 of	 admiralty	 were	 all	 mentioned	 as	 part	 of	 the	 legislature’s	 appointment	
power,	 the	 constitution	 itself	 did	 not	 establish	 those	 courts,	 leaving	 the	 matter	 to	
subsequent	legislation.94	That	task	was	left	to	the	legislature,	and	in	the	autumn	of	1776	
Jefferson	 seized	 upon	 the	 opportunity	 to	 take	 a	 shaping	 role	 in	 the	 state’s	 judiciary.	






Jefferson’s	own	 constitution	had	quite	 clearly	 established	 a	 system	of	 superior	 courts	
overseeing	the	counties,	and	the	county	court	reform	bill	was	part	of	a	much	larger	slate	
of	five	bills	establishing	Virginia’s	entire	judiciary.95	
Unlike	 the	 legislature,	 which	 was	 modelled	 on	 the	 House	 of	 Burgesses,	 and	 the	
executive,	which	was	modelled	on	the	royal	governor,	a	system	of	superior	courts	was	
completely	 foreign	 to	 the	 Virginian	 experience	 before	 1776.	 Under	 the	 colony,	 the	
Council	 of	 State	 had	 exercised	 all	 appellate	 functions	 along	 with	 its	 legislative	 and	
executive	duties.	The	governor	himself	convened	the	Council,	which	he	had	appointed,	
when	sitting	 in	 its	 judicial	 capacity,	 thereby	ensuring	 that	all	 justice	dispensed	by	 the	
Council	 bore	 a	 royal	 imprimatur.	 Both	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 Convention	were	 agreed	 on	
breaking	 up	 the	 Council’s	 authority	 in	 judicial	 proceedings	 and	 eliminating	 executive	
influence	over	judicial	proceedings;	Jefferson	took	an	additional	step	by	eliminating	the	
pardon	 prerogative	 from	 the	 constitution	 while	 the	 Convention	 relocated	 it	 in	 the	
legislature.	
Jefferson’s	own	research	 into	the	history	of	England’s	superior	courts	showed	that	
their	 authority	 flowed	 from	 the	 Crown.	 As	 a	 law	 student,	 Jefferson	 had	 dutifully	
recorded	chapter‐by‐chapter	excerpts	 from	 the	Historical	Law‐Tracts	 by	Henry	Home,	
Lord	Kames.96	 In	 the	Law‐Tracts,	Kames	 traced	 the	history	of	England’s	 crown	courts	
from	 their	 origin	 in	 the	 curia	 regis	 of	 the	 post‐Conquest	 period,	 and	 found	 that	 “the	
chieftain	or	king	was	originally	sole	judge	in	matters	of	importance.	But	in	the	progress	
of	society,	being	involved	in	the	greater	affairs	of	government,	he	instituted	courts,	and	




Kames’	 account	 was	 corroborated	 by	 that	 of	 William	 Dalrymple	 in	 his	History	 of	
Feudal	 Property.	 As	 Jefferson	 recorded,	 Dalrymple	 held	 that	 “the	 princes	 who	 gave	
beginning	 to	 the	 feudal	 system	 in	 Great	 Britain,	were	 at	 once	 generals	 and	 judges.	 ‐‐	
                                                                                                                                                                     







When	 the	 conquests	 were	 settled,	 their	 officers	 shared	 with	 them	 in	 a	 regular	




but	 this	 system	 had	 been	 gradually	 reformed	 and	 the	 judiciary	moved	 under	 Crown	
control.		
The	feudal,	 later	Crown,	courts	existed	concurrently,	and	in	some	tension,	with	the	
county	 courts.	As	 Jefferson	 recorded	 from	Dalrymple,	 “upon	 the	Norman	 conquest	 all	
the	 allodial	were	 converted	 into	 feudal	 lands;	 and	 consequently	 the	 lords	 acquired	 a	
jurisdiction	 in	 these	 new	 feuds	 also.	 Yet	 the	 sheriff's	 court	 was	 still	 retained,	 it	 was	
made	co‐ordinate	with	 the	 lords'	courts	 in	most	cases,	and	superior	 to	 them	 in	many.	
William	 the	 conqueror	 [sic]	 established	 a	 continuous	 court	 in	 the	 hall	 of	 his	 palace,	
called	Aula	regis,	for	all	matters,	of	crimes,	and	of	finances”.99		
Establishing	 a	 new	 superior	 court	 system	 that	 was	 independent,	 and	 not	 a	 mere	
extension	 of	 the	 executive	 branch,	 was	 therefore	 a	 major	 problem	 for	 Jefferson	 to	
overcome	 in	 his	 own	 design,	 and	 which	 he	 referenced	 in	 the	 Declaration	 of	
Independence	 with	 his	 grievances	 against	 the	 Crown’s	 manipulation	 of	 the	 colonial	
justice	 system.100	 The	 danger	 was	 that,	 in	 making	 the	 judiciary	 independent	 of	 the	
executive	 by	 giving	 judges	 life	 tenure,	 they	would	 become	 independent	 of	 the	 people	
they	were	supposed	to	serve,	and	that	the	judiciary	would	return	itself	to	its	aristocratic	




and	against	 that	will	…	we	have	made	them	independent	of	 the	nation	 itself.	They	are	
irremovable,	but	by	 their	own	body,	 for	any	depravities	of	conduct,	and	even	by	 their	
own	body	for	the	imbecilities	of	dotage.”101	
Jefferson	 grappled	 with	 this	 dilemma	 as	 best	 he	 could,	 both	 within	 his	 draft	
constitution	 and	 within	 the	 legislation	 he	 sponsored	 in	 the	 Assembly.	 In	 his	 draft	





constitution,	 he	 clearly	 laid	 out	 the	 number	 of	 judges	 on	 each	 superior	 court,	 their	




reforms	 as	 part	 of	 the	Revisal	 of	 the	 Laws	 that	 he	 oversaw	 from	1777‐1779.104	Once	
more,	 the	 reforms	 fell	 short	 of	 success,	 for	 not	 only	 did	 they	 threaten	 the	 localist	




	 The	 executive	 was	 not	 the	 only	 branch	 of	 government	 capable	 of	 assuming	
prerogative	powers	for	itself.	 Jefferson	had	great	anxiety	about	the	capacity	for	judges	
to	 overstep	 their	 authority	 as	 adjudicators	 and	 to	 begin	 to	 exercise	 executive	 and	
legislative	powers.105	 In	particular,	he	was	concerned	about	 the	potential	 for	 injustice	
by	 the	 law	 being	 inconsistently	 applied	 through	 a	 judge’s	 exercising	 of	 excessive	
discretion.	In	a	related	vein,	he	was	also	opposed	to	judicial	discretion	leading	to		judge‐
made	 law,	 in	 which	 the	 judiciary	 legislated	 from	 the	 bench	 on	 issues	 for	 which	 the	
legislature	 had	 failed	 to	 anticipate	 or	 had	 ceded	 authority.	 Finally,	 Jefferson	 had	 an	
uneasy	view	of	the	pardon	power,	and	attempted	to	get	rid	of	it	altogether.	His	solution	



















Law	 courts	 heard	 cases	 relating	 to	 statute	 and	 common	 law,	 and	 could	 look	 to	
precedents	to	decide	cases.	Equity	cases,	heard	in	courts	of	chancery,	were	different,	for	
they	operated	on	principles	of	natural	 law	and	verdicts	were	 issued	on	a	case‐by‐case	
basis	 depending	 on	 the	 chancery	 judge’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 unique	 factors	 in	 each	
case.106	 Despite	 Jefferson’s	 wishes	 to	 remove	 judicial	 discretion,	 while	 the	 law	 could	
plausibly	be	reduced	to	a	written	code	to	be	applied	without	variation,	discretion	and	




In	 law,	 at	 least,	 something	 could	be	done.	 “Let	mercy	be	 the	 character	 of	 the	 law‐
giver,	 but	 let	 the	 judge	be	 a	mere	machine,”	 Jefferson	wrote	 to	Edmund	Pendleton	 in	
August	 1776.	 “The	 mercies	 of	 the	 laws	 will	 be	 dispensed	 equally	 and	 impartially	 to	
every	 description	 of	 men;	 those	 of	 the	 judge,	 or	 of	 the	 executive	 power,	 will	 be	 the	
eccentric	 impulses	 of	 whimsical,	 capricious	 designing	man.”107	 To	 that	 end,	 Jefferson	
attempted	 to	 rewrite	 elements	 of	 Virginia’s	 statutory	 code,	 such	 as	 his	 Bill	 for	
Proportioning	 Crimes	 and	 Punishments,	 in	 order	 to	 completely	 remove	 the	 judge’s	
discretion	 in	 sentencing.108	 Jefferson	 considered	 judges’	 excessive	use	of	discretion	 in	
sentencing	to	stem	from	an	aversion	to	the	death	penalty,	which	remained	applicable	to	








                                                     








was	not	concerned	by	 this.	 “Antiently	 indeed,	before	 the	 improvement	or	perhaps	 the	
existence	 of	 the	 court	 of	 Chancery,	 [common	 law	 judges]	 allowed	 themselves	 greater	
latitude,	 extending	 the	 provisions	 of	 every	 law	 not	 only	 to	 the	 cases	 within	 it’s	 [sic]	





Jefferson’s	 concern	 was	 that,	 where	 equity	 and	 common	 law	 jurisdictions	 were	
combined,	 as	 in	 the	 county	 courts,	 there	 was	 danger	 that	 a	 judge’s	 equity‐deciding	
authority	as	a	judge	in	chancery	would	evolve	into	law‐making	powers	as	a	judge	of	law.	
Such	courts	would	adopt	“at	once	all	the	rules	of	the	Chancery,	with	the	consent	of	the	
legislature,	 or,	 if	 that	 is	witheld	 [sic],	 these	 courts	will	 be	 led,	 by	 the	 desire	 of	 doing	
justice,	to	extend	the	text	of	the	law	according	to	it’s	[sic]	equity	as	was	done	in	England	
before	the	Chancery	took	a	regular	form,”	Jefferson	predicted.	“This	will	be	worse	than	
running	 on	 Scylla	 to	 avoid	 Charybdis.	 For	 at	 present	 nine	 tenths	 of	 our	 legal	
contestations	are	perfectly	remedied	by	the	Common	law,	and	can	be	carried	before	that	
judicature	only.	This	proportion	then	of	our	rights	is	placed	on	sure	ground.	Relieve	the	
judges	 from	 the	 rigour	 of	 text	 law,	 and	 permit	 them,	 with	 pretorian	 discretion,	 to	
wander	into	it’s	equity,	and	the	whole	legal	system	becomes	incertain	[sic].”111	Chancery	
jurisdictions,	 if	 not	 properly	 quarantined	 through	 separation	 of	 powers	 between	 law	
and	equity,	had	 the	 further	potential	 to	undermine	separation	of	powers	between	the	
judiciary	and	legislature.112	
Aside	 from	the	mixing	of	equity	and	 law,	which	he	 largely	considered	to	be	one	of	
disorganisation	of	the	judiciary,	Jefferson	was	implacably	opposed	to	pardons,	which	he	




112	 Jefferson	 accused	 Lord	Mansfield,	 the	 Chief	 Justice	 in	 England,	 of	 intentionally	
seeking	 to	 bring	 about	 this	 very	 outcome	 through	 his	 combination	 of	 equity	 and	 law	
jurisdiction	on	the	Court	of	King’s	Bench.	Ibid.,	p.	71.	
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explicitly	 identified	 as	 a	 prerogative.113	 Jefferson	 criticised	 pardons	 on	 two	 grounds.	
First,	 pardons	 undermined	 justice	 by	making	 the	 execution	 of	 sentences	 a	matter	 of	
whim,	not	law.114	Second,	pardons	were	a	violation	of	separation	of	powers	by	allowing	
the	 pardoner,	 be	 it	 in	 the	 executive	 or	 legislature,	 to	 overrule	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 trial	
conducted	by	the	judicial	branch.115		
Pardons	 would	 not	 be	 necessary	 if	 punishments	 were	 not	 excessive	 and	 if	 trials	
were	 conducted	 according	 to	 exacting	 standards	 of	 fairness.	 To	 this	 end,	 Jefferson	
sought	 to	minimise	 the	potential	 role	of	 individual	 caprice	 in	a	 trial	by	making	 juries,	
not	judges,	the	determiners	of	fact	in	all	cases	in	both	law	and	chancery.116	His	attempt	









the	 bar.120	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 keeping	 in	 mind	 that	 Jefferson	 himself	 denigrated	 juries	
under	 the	 colonial	 system,	 retained	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Convention	 constitution,	 as	 “the	
                                                     
113	 On	 a	 related	 note,	 Jefferson	 was	 also	 opposed	 to	 “benefit	 of	 clergy”,	 which	







and	put	 it	under	the	control	of	 the	 legislature.	He	subsequently	removed	it	altogether.	
















Bailyn	 to	 offer,	 as	 an	 interpretive	 framework,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 centralist‐localist	
dichotomy	in	Virginia	politics	in	the	colonial	period.	External	factors	stemming	from	the	
colonial	 crisis	 of	 1763‐1775	were	 responsible	 for	 the	 breakdown	 in	 balance	 between	




royal	 authority	 within	 the	 colony	 did	 leave	 the	 forces	 of	 localism	 with	 unchallenged	
control.122	
While	 localism	 cannot	 be	 identified	 as	 the	 motivation	 for	 independence,	 the	
Convention’s	 lukewarm	 reforms	 in	 the	 new	 constitution	 adopted	 following	
independence	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 ongoing	 salience	 of	 the	 centralist‐localist	




with	 its	 attendant	 material	 and	 immaterial	 benefits,	 most	 readily	 explains	 the	
Convention’s	 aversion	 to	 an	Administrator	 or	 other	 strong	 centralising	 authority	 that	




and	 sincere	 in	 his	 effort	 to	 establish	meaningful	 separation	 of	 powers,	 seeing	 in	 the	





While	 the	 Convention	 had	 declared	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	
constitution,	it	inserted	so	many	exceptions	and	exemptions	into	the	actual	machinery	
of	government	as	to	render	the	separation	meaningless,	with	an	executive	dependent	on	
the	 county‐appointed	 legislature	 and	 a	 judiciary	 that	 was	 not	 even	 constitutionally	
independent.	 Jefferson	hewed	much	more	closely	to	the	spirit	of	separation	of	powers	
with	 his	 powerful	 and	 autonomous	Administrator,	 his	 independent	 judiciary,	 and	 the	
break‐up	 of	 county	 court	 oligarchy.	 In	 order	 to	 maintain	 the	 accountability	 of	 each	
separate	 branch,	 he	 enumerated	 strong	 popular	 controls	 on	 their	 activities	 through	
regular	elections	and	juries.	
Jefferson’s	anti‐feudal	programme	was	not	limited	to	being	anti‐aristocratic.	He	was	
keenly	 aware	 also	 that	 an	 unsupervised	 executive	 could	 quickly	 begin	 to	 exercise	
prerogative	powers	unbounded	by	the	law.	He	abolished	all	of	the	royal	prerogatives	in	
his	 draft	 constitution,	 and	 specifically	 stated	 that	 the	 Administrator,	 while	 enjoying	
nearly	 unchecked	 executive	 authority,	 was	 limited	 in	 that	 authority	 to	 exercising	 it	
within	 areas	 which	 were	 decreed	 by	 law.123	 An	 Administrator	 who	 over‐stepped	 his	
boundaries	 would	 simply	 not	 be	 returned	 for	 another	 year‐long	 term	 in	 office.	
Jefferson’s	draft	constitution	was	very	carefully	calibrated	so	as	 to	 limit	each	branch’s	
activities	while	still	retaining	their	operational	independence.	
The	 rejection	 of	most	 of	 the	 ideas	 in	 his	 draft	 constitution	meant	 that,	 aside	 from	
court	reform,	there	was	very	little	that	Jefferson	could	do	as	a	 legislator	to	change	the	
new	state’s	core	setup.	The	next	chapter	will	examine	how	Jefferson	shifted	his	 target	
from	 feudalism	within	 the	government	 to	 feudalism’s	base	of	 logistical	 support	 in	 the	
large,	heritable	estates	guaranteed	by	Virginia’s	property	laws.	
                                                                                                                                                                     
122	Allowing,	of	course,	 that	 the	War	of	 Independence	continued	for	another	seven	
years.	









The	 formal	 institutions	 of	 state,	 in	 the	 familiar	 three	 branches	 of	 executive,	
legislative,	and	judicial	government,	were	not	the	sole	emphasis	of	Jefferson’s	reforms.	












of	 Virginian	 lands	 was	 highly	 concentrated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 gentry	 aristocracy;	
generally	speaking,	landholding	was	most	concentrated	in	the	east,	where	Lord	Fairfax	
and	 neighbouring	 landowners	 held	 large	 estates	 let	 out	 to	 tenants,	 and	 least	
concentrated	in	the	west,	where	settlers	were	setting	up	small	claims	in	the	Shenandoah	
Valley	and	the	Appalachian	mountains.2	The	progress	of	westward	settlement,	however,	
                                                     
1	See	LCB	570.	
2	 In	his	recent	study	of	 the	Northern	Neck,	Albert	H.	Tillson,	 Jr.	estimates	 that	 less	
than	half	of	white	males	in	the	Northern	Neck	held	land,	and	of	those	who	did	the	vast	
majority	were	small‐hold	 tenants,	compared	to	 the	 fewer	number	of	gentry,	who	held	
two	 to	 eight	 times	 as	much	 land	 as	 the	 typical	 small‐holder.	 See	Albert	H.	Tillson,	 Jr.,	
Accommodating	 Revolutions:	 Virginia's	 Northern	 Neck	 in	 An	 Era	 of	 Transformations,	





practices	 extended	 across	 Virginia,	 with	 local	 variations.	 See	 Thomas	 J.	 Humphrey,	
"Conflicting	Independence:	Land	Tenancy	and	the	American	Revolution."	Journal	of	the	










of	 property	 that	 the	 budding	 localist	 oligarchies,	 whose	 political	 activities	 were	
discussed	in	chapter	two,	used	in	order	to	support	their	consolidation	of	local	control.	In	
advocating	 for	 his	 legislation,	 Jefferson	 could	 not	 be	 as	 direct	 in	 his	 criticism	 of	 the	
aristocrats	as	he	was	later	in	life,	when	writing	his	Autobiography.	His	reforms	came	in	




Virginia	 Assembly.	 This	 obscured	 his	 main	 intent	 of	 undermining	 aristocracy,	 and	
convinced	those	very	same	aristocrats	that	at	least	some	reform	was	in	their	own	best	
interests.	In	turn,	the	aristocrats	gave	as	good	as	they	got,	and	managed	to	turn	some	of	




holding.	Then,	 I	will	 review	 Jefferson’s	 six‐point	plan	 for	 land	reform	contained	 in	his	
draft	constitution,	and	contextualise	it	within	the	two	discourses.	Third,	I	will	look	at	the	
specific	theme	of	land	tenures	and	royal	prerogative.	Fourth,	I	will	compare	Jefferson’s	
                                                                                                                                                                     
problem	of	feudal	tenures,	with	their	accompanying	disparity	in	political	and	economic	
security	between	the	gentry	and	the	tenantry,	was	a	widespread	and	pressing	problem.	
This	 disparity	 in	 land	 was	 further	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 use	 of	 entails	 to	 preserve	
aristocratic	estates	without	fragmentation	in	the	male	line.	See	Holly	Brewer,	"Entailing	
Aristocracy	in	Colonial	Virginia:	‘Ancient	Feudal	Restraints’	and	Revolutionary	Reform."	
The	 William	 and	 Mary	 Quarterly	 (1997):	 307‐346.	 Brewer	 disproved	 the	 existing	
historiographical	 consensus	 on	 the	 unimportance	 of	 entail,	 and	 by	 extension	 feudal	
tenure,	 by	 demonstrating	 that	 the	 prevalence	 of	 entail	 in	 Virginia	 had	 been	 grossly	
undercounted.	 Based	 on	 her	 revised	 estimates,	 Brewer	 thinks	 that	 between	 fifty	 and	
seventy‐five	per	cent	of	settled	Virginian	 land	was	entailed	prior	 to	 Jefferson’s	statute	







will	 argue	 that	 Jefferson’s	 views	 on	 property	 reform	were	 a	 synthesis	 of	 liberal	 and	
republican	ideas,	and	that	while	Jefferson	can	be	understood	in	the	context	of	the	neo‐





was	 challenged	 by	 both	 republicanism	 and	 liberalism.	 In	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	
republicans	 such	 as	 James	 Harrington	 argued	 that,	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 commons	 in	
England,	 the	 feudal	 system	 of	 Crown	 and	 Estates	 should	 be	 replaced	 with	 a	 gentry	
commonwealth.	 In	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 English	 and	 Scottish	 liberals	 challenged	






liberalism	 ‐	 i.e.,	 an	 economic	 ideology	 that	 focused	 on	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 rational	
economic	 actor	 ‐	 originated	 in	 the	 pamphlet	 discourse	 of	 Restoration	 England,	 in	
opposition	 to	 the	prevailing	mercantilist	economic	 ideology	of	 the	 time.3	According	 to	
                                                                                                                                                                     




(1976):	 499‐515.	 Appleby	 later	 developed	 her	 work	 on	 liberalism	 to	 include	 the	
American	Revolution	and	early	republican	period,	eventually	collecting	her	articles	into	
a	single	volume,	Liberalism	and	Republicanism	in	the	Historical	Imagination.	Cambridge,	
MA:	 Harvard	 University	 Press,	 1992.	 In	 particular,	 her	 articles	 "Liberalism	 and	 the	
American	Revolution."	(New	England	Quarterly	49,	no.	1	(1976):	3‐26)	and	"What	Is	Still	
American	 in	 the	 Political	 Philosophy	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson?"	 (The	William	 and	 Mary	
Quarterly	39,	no.	2	(1982):	287‐309)	are	useful	for	understanding	the	contextual	role	of	





Appleby,	 mercantilism	 (a	 label	 that	 she	 uses	 interchangeably	 with	 capitalism)	 was	 a	
system	 based	 on	 production	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 accumulation	 of	 specie	 as	 capital.	
Liberal	 pamphleteers	 challenged	 the	 mercantilist	 consensus	 that	 dominated	 the	
Restoration	 period,	 arguing	 instead	 that	 production	 should	 be	 undertaken	 so	 that	
producers	could	consume	things,	that	material	self‐improvement	was	the	goal	of	human	
activity,	 and	 that	 this	 self‐improvement	 was	 best	 pursued	 through	 a	 marketplace	 in	
which	capital	and	labour	were	equally	free.	
Appleby	 argues	 that	 the	 division	 between	 mercantilism	 and	 liberalism	 was	 a	
disagreement	 over	 whether	 production	 or	 consumption	 was	 the	 proper	 goal	 of	
economic	 activity,	 with	 an	 attendant	 disagreement	 over	 whether	 economic	 activity	
should	be	state‐planned,	through	the	use	of	monopolistic	trading	companies	such	as	the	
East	 India	Company,	 or	 trusted	 to	 individual	 activity	 in	 the	marketplace.	The	 rational	
individualism	of	 the	 liberal	 option	posed	 a	 threat	 to	 social	 order	 as	Britain	made	 the	
difficult	transition	away	from	a	feudal	society,	and	she	attributes	the	rejection	of	liberal	




writers	were	at	 their	greatest	 strength	 following	 the	Glorious	Revolution,	 rather	 than	
during	the	Restoration,	although	he	agrees	that	their	influence	had	declined	by	the	reign	
of	Queen	Anne.	Furthermore,	he	dates	the	sunset	of	liberal	theory	to	the	1710s	precisely	
because	 he	 has	 determined	 that,	 by	 this	 point,	 economic	 policy	 had	 become	 a	 party	
issue,	 with	 Tories	 preferring	 mercantilism	 and	 Whigs	 preferring	 liberalism.	 Unlike	
Appleby,	who	holds	that	liberalism	died	out	as	an	economic	theory	until	it	was	revived	
by	 Adam	 Smith,	 Pincus	 argues	 that	 economic	 policy’s	 absorption	 into	 party	 struggle	
meant	 that	 liberalism	 never	 really	 went	 away,	 but	 also	 never	 returned	 to	 its	 earlier	
dominance.6	












Pincus’	 greatest	 difference	 with	 Appleby	 is	 in	 his	 assessment	 over	 what	
mercantilists	were	hoping	to	achieve	and	what	their	theory	of	value	was.	While	Appleby	
treats	 mercantilists	 as	 capitalists,	 with	 their	 focus	 being	 on	 specie	 and	 other	 liquid	
capital,	 Pincus	 argues	 that	 the	 economic	 debate	was	 one	 between	mercantilists’	 land	
theory	of	value	versus	liberals’	labour	theory	of	value.7	To	an	extent,	the	difference	is	an	
artificial	 one,	 because	Pincus	 allows	 that	mercantilists	were	 concerned	with	 “the	 raw	
materials	 derived	 from”	 land	 as	 well	 as	 the	 land	 itself,	 but	 this	 in	 turn	 blurs	 the	





intermittent,	 is	 that	 there	was	already	a	 tradition	of	 economic	 liberalism	when	Adam	
Smith’s	 Wealth	 of	 Nations,	 generally	 considered	 the	 first	 major	 work	 of	 classical	
economic	 liberalism,	was	published	 in	1776.	Smith’s	 theory	of	 the	natural	progress	of	
opulence	addressed	feudalism	and	mercantilism	in	a	way	similar	to	 Jefferson’s	feudal‐
                                                                                                                                                                     
partisan	economic	policies	 in	 eighteenth‐century	Britain.	 See	Cathy	Matson,	 "Imperial	
Political	Economy:	An	Ideological	Debate	and	Shifting	Practices."	The	William	and	Mary	
Quarterly	69,	no.	1	(2012):	35‐40;	Christian	 J.	Koot,	 "Balancing	Center	and	Periphery."	
The	 William	 and	 Mary	 Quarterly	 69,	 no.	 1	 (2012):	 41‐46;	 and	 Susan	 D.	 Amussen,	




the	 father	of	 liberalism,	Locke	does	not	easily	 fit	 into	either	the	mercantilist	or	 liberal	
mode.	With	his	labour	theory	of	value	and	his	emphasis	on	rational	individualism,	Locke	




C.B.	Macpherson	 in	The	Political	Theory	of	Possessive	 Individualism	 (Oxford:	Clarendon	
Press,	 1964).	While	Macpherson’s	 analysis	 is	 now	 dated,	 it	 influenced	 all	 subsequent	
scholarship	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 economic	 liberalism	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	
centuries,	 including	Appleby	and	Pincus.	However,	Macpherson’s	Marxist	account	of	a	
“bourgeois”	Locke	has	been	disputed	by	John	Diggins	and	Steven	M.	Dworetz,	amongst	
others,	 as	 a	 selective	 misreading	 of	 Locke’s	 holistic	 philosophy	 that	 excludes	 the	
theological	content	of	Locke’s	philosophy.	See	John	P.	Diggins,	The	Lost	Soul	of	American	






mercantile	 synthesis,	 although	 concerned	 with	 political	 economy	 rather	 than	
constitutionalism.	 Smith	 held	 that	 feudalism	 had	 perverted	 the	 progress	 of	 European	
agriculture,	 and	 that	 the	market	 in	 luxury	 items	 had	 driven	 the	 feudal	 aristocracy	 to	
liberate	 its	 tenants	 as	 a	 way	 of	 raising	 funds	 for	 consumption.	 These	 markets	 for	
overseas	goods	had	in	turn	been	corrupted	by	mercantilism,	which	confused	specie	for	
wealth.	 The	 wealth	 of	 a	 nation,	 Smith	 argued,	 was	 found	 in	 the	 value	 of	 its	 total	




with	 the	Declaration	of	 Independence	and	post‐dated	 Jefferson’s	 interpretation	of	 the	
feudal	history	of	property	in	the	Summary	View	by	two	years,	although	by	1790	he	was	






he	placed	upon	 it,	but	 if	 the	Legal	Commonplace	Book	 is	any	 indication,	Henry	Home,	
Lord	 Kames’	 writings	 played	 a	 major	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Jefferson’s	 views	
towards	 property.	 From	 the	 time	 of	 his	 being	 raised	 to	 the	 bench	 in	 1752	 until	 his	
retirement	 in	 1782,	 Kames	 wrote	 tirelessly	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 legal	 history	 and	
philosophy.	Throughout,	he	formed	an	interpretation	of	the	law	that	blended	economic	
liberalism	with	natural	law	and	moral	sense	theory.	Most	important,	Kames’	Historical	
Law‐Tracts	 and	 Sketches	 of	 the	 History	 of	Man	 were	 economic	 histories	 both	 of	 the	
institutions	of	property‐holding	and	the	ways	in	which	property	was	used	in	economic	
exchange.	 In	 this	way,	 Kames	 built	 upon	 the	work	 of	 both	 the	 economic	 liberals	 and	
historians	of	feudal	law.	
Jefferson	closely	read	Kames	as	a	 law	student,	devoting	 thirteen	 lengthy	entries	 in	
the	Legal	Commonplace	Book	to	Kames’	Historical	Law‐Tracts	and	a	substantial	portion	






of	 his	 Equity	 Commonplace	 Book	 to	 Kames’	 Principles	 of	 Equity.9	 Kames	 was	
vociferously	 anti‐feudal,	 decrying	 feudalism	 as	 a	 “violent	 and	 unnatural”	 system	 and	
singling	 out	 the	 entail	 as	 an	 institution	 in	 particular	 need	 of	 reform.10	 Anticipating	
Smith’s	argument	 that	 feudalism	perverted	the	development	of	agriculture	away	 from	
productive	ends,	and	accepting	the	liberal	axiom	that	material	self‐improvement	could	
best	 be	 pursued	 through	markets,	 Kames	 argued	 throughout	 his	writings	 that	 feudal	
landholding	was	an	obstacle	 to	national	 improvement	and	 that	 it	distorted	 trade.	 It	 is	
likely	that	Jefferson’s	own	views	on	feudalism,	particularly	the	entail,	were	substantially	
shaped	by	his	reading	of	Kames,	as	he	employed	Kames’	language	and	drew	up	an	entail	




In	his	Autobiography,	 Jefferson	singled	out	of	all	of	his	 land	 laws	his	bill	 to	abolish	
intestate	 primogeniture,	 claiming	 that	 “equal	 partition	 of	 inheritances	 removed	 the	
feudal	and	unnatural	distinctions”	of	primogeniture,	and	that	“equal	partition”	was	“the	
best	 of	 all	 Agrarian	 laws.”12	 Jefferson’s	 choice	 of	 the	 phrase	 “agrarian	 law”	 was	 no	
accident,	 for	 it	was	 an	 easily	 recognisable	 part	 of	 classical	 republican	 discourse.	 This	
choice	increases	in	significance	when	one	considers	that	the	writer	who	introduced	the	
phrase	to	Anglophone	republicanism,	James	Harrington,	proposed	his	model	republic	in	
the	Commonwealth	of	Oceana	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 the	breakdown	of	 feudalism	 in	England	
during	 the	 Civil	Wars,	 and	 that	 his	 ideas	were	 further	 developed	 by	 a	 cadre	 of	 “neo‐
Harringtonian”	writers	during	the	late	seventeenth	century.13	This	classical	republican	












13	 J.G.A.	 Pocock	 lists	 the	 Earl	 of	 Shaftesbury,	 Henry	 Nevile,	 Andrew	 Fletcher	 of	





discourse	 existed	 alongside	 the	 liberal	 discourse	 and	 competed	 with	 it	 during	 the	
American	Revolution.	
The	 fictitious	 country‐island	 of	 Oceana	was	 based	 on	 England	 of	 the	 seventeenth	
century,	 and	 the	 dialogues	within	 the	 book	were	 concerned	with	 how	 to	 construct	 a	
stable	 government	 after	 the	 fall	 of	 an	 hereditary	 landed	 aristocracy.	 J.G.A.	 Pocock	
describes	The	Commonwealth	of	Oceana	as	“both	a	civil	history	of	the	sword	and	a	civil	
history	of	property”	which	describes	 “a	 transformation	 in	 the	 social	manner	 in	which	
men	bear	 arms,	 itself	based	upon	a	 transformation	 in	 the	manner	 in	which	 they	hold	
property.	In	other	words,	to	the	Machiavellian	hypothesis	that	arms	are	the	foundation	
of	citizenship,	Harrington	adds	the	hypothesis	that	land	is	the	foundation	of	arms.”14		





the	political	and	economic	context	 for	 the	military	conflict	of	 the	Wars	of	 the	Roses.15	
The	 alienation	 of	 lands	 to	 this	 new	 body	 of	 gentry,	 holding	 their	 land	 directly	 of	 the	
Crown	in	exchange	 for	an	annual	 fee	rather	 than	military	service,	both	challenged	the	
nobility’s	monopoly	of	the	landed	resources	necessary	to	field	their	proprietary	armies,	
and	 provided	 the	 Crown	 with	 independent	 revenues	 for	 maintaining	 its	 own	
“household”	military	forces	independently	of	the	nobility	and	the	House	of	Commons.	
The	 new	 gentry,	 however,	 were	 not	 content	 to	 remain	 unarmed	 alongside	 the	
nobility	 and	 the	Crown,	 and	 in	 the	 early	 seventeenth	 century	pressed	 for	 the	 right	 to	
form	 their	 own	militia.	 The	 civil	 wars	 of	 the	 1640s	 were	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 resulting	
instability	 within	 English	 society,	 Harrington	 claimed,	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 this	
independent	 class	of	 landowners	and	 its	 attendant	demands	 for	political	 and	military	
                                                                                                                                                                     
Harrington	and	English	Political	Ideologies	in	the	Eighteenth	Century."	The	William	and	
Mary	Quarterly	22,	no.	4	(1965):	549‐583,	especially	p.	573.	
14	 J.G.A.	 Pocock,	 “‘Oceana’:	 its	 argument	 and	 character”,	 in	 The	 Political	Works	 of	
James	Harrington.	Cambridge:	University	Press,	1977,		p.	43.	








power	 had	 undermined	 the	 balance	 of	 economic	 and	military	 resources	 between	 the	
nobility	 and	 the	 king.	 As	 J.G.A.	 Pocock	 summarises	 it,	 this	 convinced	 Harrington	 that	
feudalism,	even	when	modified	to	include	the	gentry,	was	“inherently	unstable”	and	that	
“the	 Tudor	 kings	 had	 brought	 about	 a	 redistribution	 of	 land	 [to	 the	 commons]	 to	
undermine	their	nobility,	and	in	doing	so	had	undermined	themselves.”16		
Harrington	 argued	 that	 a	 new	 constitution	 must	 reflect	 the	 new	 balance	 of	
landholding	 within	 society	 by	 granting	 the	 preponderance	 of	 political	 power	 to	 the	
gentry,	 uniting	 political	 and	 military	 authority	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 same	 class	 that	
controlled	 the	 majority	 of	 society’s	 landed	 resources.	 Harrington’s	 proposed	
constitution	for	Oceana	rested	on	an	Agrarian	Law,	which	was	designed	to	ensure	that	
the	 hereditary	 landed	 nobility	 could	 not	 threaten	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 gentry	 in	 the	
future.	The	Agrarian	Law	of	Oceana	capped	the	value	of	estates	at	£2,000	annual	income	
by	 limiting	 the	 size	 of	 inheritances.17	 By	 Harrington’s	 estimation,	 such	 a	 cap	 would	












by	 the	 Levellers,	 because	 the	Agrarian	 Law	operated	 by	 limiting	 inheritance	 and	was	








Century”,	 p.	 553.	 While	 five	 thousand	 may	 still	 seem	 like	 a	 small	 number,	 it	 was	 a	
twenty‐five‐fold	increase	from	the	existing	number	of	approximately	two	hundred	titled	
nobility.	 Dividing	 landed	 property	 amongst	 thousands	 of	 gentry	 would	 ensure	 that	





seriously	outmatched	by	 the	gentry’s	militia,	a	 fact	which	exposed	 the	reality	 that	 the	
rise	of	the	gentry	made	monarchy	as	equally	untenable	as	aristocracy.	The	real	purpose	
of	 Harrington’s	 argument,	 and	 his	 true	 justification	 for	 a	 commonwealth,	 was	 to	





he	 understood	 feudalism	 as	 an	 unstable	 system	 in	 which	 the	 nobility	 and	monarchy	
were	 in	 tension	 but	 needed	 each	 other	 to	 survive,	 and	 that	 the	 monarch	 had	
miscalculated	by	liberating	the	gentry	as	a	hedge	against	the	nobility.	Second,	the	feudal	
relationship	is	fundamentally	one	of	lord	and	tenant.	Third,	that	after	the	expansion	of	
the	 gentry,	 and	 the	 reduction	 in	 importance	 of	 the	 lord‐tenant	 relationship,	 the	
monarchy	 became	 untenable,	 as	 there	 is	 a	 fundamental	 incompatibility	 between	
feudalism	and	republicanism.19	
The	monarchy’s	lack	of	viability	after	the	alienation	of	the	Crown	lands	and	the	rise	
of	 the	gentry,	was	 the	 result	of	what	Harrington	saw	as	 the	nature	of	military	power.	
The	feudal	lords’	proprietary	armies	had	been	composed	of	tenant	farmers.	By	creating	
an	expanded	class	of	 independent	 landholder,	 the	monarch	undermined	 the	power	of	
the	aristocracy,	but	given	that	the	freeholders	now	held	their	lands	outside	of	military	
tenure,	 the	 king	 could	 not	 command	 them	 either.	 The	 gentry	 and	 other	 freeholders	
risked	overpowering	the	king,	and	the	monarch	could	only	maintain	control	through	a	
standing	 army	 composed	 of	 household	 troops.	 The	 result,	 Harrington	 thought,	 was	
England’s	 civil	 war.	 The	 rise	 of	 the	 New	 Model	 Army,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 purge	 of	




of	 Shaftesbury	 as	 the	 first	 of	 the	 neo‐Harringtonians.21	 Shaftesbury,	 and	 the	
pseudonymous	author	of	the	“Letter	from	a	Person	of	Quality”	(who	is	widely	believed	







to	 be	 him),	 attempted	 to	 reconcile	Harrington’s	 views	with	 the	doctrine	 of	 the	mixed	
government	 of	 Crown,	 Lords,	 and	 Commons	 that	 was	 the	 core	 of	 ancient	
constitutionalism.	 “In	 short,”	 Pocock	 concludes,	 “Harrington	 did	 not	 believe	 in	 the	
ancient	constitution,	but	Shaftesbury	and	the	Person	of	Quality,	twenty	years	later,	did.	
They	chose,	however,	 to	present	their	 ideas	 in	Harringtonian	form,	and	the	essence	of	
neo‐Harringtonianism	 lies	 in	 the	 drastic	 revision	 of	 Harrington’s	 historical	 doctrine	
which	 this	 necessitated.”22	 This	 tradition	 of	 political	 thought	 lasted	 for	 half	 a	 century	
and	culminated	in	the	writings	of	Bolingbroke.23	
Neo‐Harringtonianism	 came	 to	 be	 defined	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 ancient	
constitutionalism	 with	 opposition	 to	 a	 standing	 army	 and	 support	 for	 a	 freeholder	
militia.	The	“central	idea	of	Harringtonian	balance”,	Pocock	writes,	“is	that	power	must	
not	 be	 distributed	 so	 that	 it	 encroaches	 on	 the	 independence	 of	 property.”	 The	 neo‐
Harringtonians	changed	it	to	read	that	the	ancient	constitution	was	calibrated	to	protect	
the	 balance	 of	 property,	 but	 that	 the	 Crown	 sought	 to	 disturb	 the	 balance	 through	
corruption	and	a	standing	army.24	This	neo‐Harringtonian	argument	was	made	by	those	
aligned	with	the	Country	in	English	politics,	who	favoured	a	strict	separation	of	powers.	
The	 Court,	 in	 contrast,	 favoured	 maintaining	 constitutional	 balance	 through	
interdependence.25		




holding,	 describes	 the	 republican	 ideal	 type	 as	 holding	 that	 “property	 is	 the	material	
foundation	 for	 creating	and	maintaining	 the	proper	 social	 order,	 the	private	basis	 for	
the	 public	 good”.26	 Isaac	 Kramnick,	 in	 his	 study	 of	 republicanism	 and	 the	 bourgeois	
ethic	 of	 late	 eighteenth‐century	 Britain,	 argued	 that	 “republicanism	 is	 historically	 an	













ideology	 of	 leisure”,	 in	 contrast	 to	 liberalism,	 “an	 ideology	 of	 work.”27	 Pocock,	 in	 a	
subsequent	study	from	his	initial	work	on	Harrington,	has	argued	that	republican	virtue	





replace,	 in	 which	 an	 estate’s	 annual	 worth	 (a	 “£200	 per	 year”	 estate,	 for	 example)	
referred	 to	 the	 value	 of	 rents	 brought	 in	 from	 tenants,	 not	 the	 market	 value	 of	 the	
farmed	produce.	Pocock	notes	that	Harrington	did	not	relate	England’s	instability	to	any	







there	was	 also	 a	 fourth	 section,	 devoted	 to	 “rights	 public	 and	 private”	 that	would	 be	
protected	as	part	of	Virginia’s	 fundamental	 law.30	These	rights	began	with	a	 list	of	six	
provisions	relating	to	land:	the	reassignment	of	the	royal	prerogative	to	grant	lands	to	
the	 Administrator‐and‐Council,	 the	 authority	 to	 grant	 fifty‐acre	 freeholds	 to	 new	
settlers,	 the	 reform	 of	 feudal	 tenure,	 the	 regulation	 of	 land	 purchases	 from	 Native	






















appropriated	 by	 the	 Administrator	 with	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 Privy	 Council.”31	 This	
ensured	that	while	the	chief	magistrate	would	still	have	the	power	to	distribute	lands,	
he	would	be	accountable	 for	his	decisions	to	another	public	body	and	could	not	grant	
lands	 freely,	 or	 in	 exchange	 for	 personal	 service,	 as	 a	 king	 or	 feudal	 lord	 using	 his	
prerogative	power	would.	
Furthermore,	 the	 lands	 at	 the	 Administrator’s	 disposal	 were	 public	 lands,	 and	
should	be	disposed	of	in	a	manner	that	was	equitable	to	the	public.	Jefferson	stipulated	
that	 “[e]very	 person	 of	 full	 age	 neither	 owning	 nor	 having	 owned	 [50]	 acres	 of	 land,	
shall	be	entitled	to	an	appropriation	of	[50]	acres	or	to	so	much	as	shall	make	up	what	
he	owns	or	has	owned	 [50]	acres	 in	 full	 and	absolute	dominion,	and	no	other	person	
shall	 be	 capable	 of	 taking	 an	 appropriation.”32	 These	 grants	 would	 provide	 the	
recipients	 with	 the	 freeholds	 necessary	 to	 qualify	 as	 voters,	 while	 preventing	 the	
concentration	of	 landed	wealth	 in	the	hands	of	a	 few	magnates	who	could	then	parcel	
the	lands	out	to	tenants.	
Under	common	law,	all	lands	were	held	under	some	form	of	feudal	obligation	to	the	
crown.	 By	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 English	 military	 tenures	 had	 been	 abolished	 by	
statute,	 but	 lands	were	 still	 held	 as	 estates	 under	 socage	 tenure,	which	 required	 the	
deed	 holder	 to	 pay	 a	 feudal	 due,	 known	 as	 a	 quit‐rent,	 to	 the	 Crown.33	 Jefferson	
proposed	to	convert	all	estates	held	under	feudal	tenure	into	allodial	estates.	This	legal	
distinction	 would	 have	 converted	 all	 estates	 that	 were	 held	 of	 a	 feudal	 superior,	 in	
exchange	 for	 the	 payment	 of	 quit‐rent	 fees,	 into	 estates	 held	 “in	 full	 and	 absolute	
dominion,	 of	 no	 superior	whatsoever.”34	 The	 conversion	 of	 socage	 to	 allodial	 tenures	



















buying	 up	 these	 lands	 to	 lease	 to	 tenants.	 The	 activities	 of	 these	 land	 companies	
complemented	 Jefferson’s	 feudal‐mercantile	 synthesis,	 whereby	 the	 advantages	 the	
gentry	 enjoyed	under	 feudal	 tenure	were	 enabling	 them	 to	 extend	 their	 influence	 via	




become	public	 and	would	 be	parceled	 out	 like	 other	 public	 lands,	 bypassing	 the	 land	
companies.	
In	 the	 Summary	 View,	 Jefferson	 had	 written	 that	 one	 of	 the	 last	 acts	 of	 feudal	
despotism	 by	 the	 Stuarts	 had	 been	 the	 dismemberment	 of	 Virginia’s	 charter	 lands	 in	
order	to	create	proprietary	colonies	to	the	north	and	south.36	These	colonies	had	been	
formed	 using	 the	 royal	 prerogative	 to	 grant	 lands.	While	 Jefferson	 hoped	 to	 formally	
abolish	 that	 prerogative,	 he	 recognised	 that	 it	 was	 useless	 to	 try	 to	 change	 history.	





                                                                                                                                                                     
equivalent	of	the	food	and	labor	payments	exacted	by	the	lord	of	the	manor.	The	very	
name	 is	 significant,	 for	 by	 the	 payment	 of	 the	 quit‐rent	 the	 tenant	was	 quit,	 i.e.	 free,	
from	all	other	annual	feudal	charges….	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	even	with	the	
payment	 of	 quit‐rents	 the	 lord	 still	 retained	 the	 feudal	 right	 to	 exact	 alienation	 or	









Finally,	 as	 well	 as	 converting	 tenures,	 Jefferson	 proposed	 to	 abolish	 the	 feudal	
inheritance	 practice	 of	 primogeniture	 and	 replace	 it	 with	 gavelkind,	 a	 form	 of	
inheritance	associated	with	both	allodial	and	socage	holding.	Gavelkind	divided	estates	
equally	 amongst	male	 children,	 in	 contrast	 to	 primogeniture,	 which	 directed	 descent	
exclusively	 to	 the	 eldest	 surviving	 male	 heir.38	 In	 an	 innovation	 upon	 gavelkind,	
Jefferson	further	stipulated	that	“females	shall	have	equal	rights	with	males.”39	Notably,	
Jefferson	did	not	restrict	this	provision	to	intestate	property,	in	which	a	landholder	died	
without	 a	 testated	will,	 but	made	 it	 the	basis	 of	 all	 inheritance,	 a	 point	which	will	 be	
elaborated	on	later	in	this	chapter.	
Comparative	Constitutionalism	
While	 Jefferson	 agreed	 with	 Harrington	 that	 republicanism	 should	 be	 framed	 in	
opposition	to	feudalism,	they	came	to	that	conclusion	through	different	ways	of	viewing	
the	 past.	 Harrington	 analyzed	 society	 in	 terms	 of	 balance	 (or	 lack	 thereof)	 between	
estates	co‐existing	within	a	feudal	constitution.	Jefferson	analyzed	society	in	terms	of	a	
unitary	 sovereignty,	 the	 people,	 and	 viewed	 the	 constitution	 of	 feudal	 England	 as	 a	
corruption	of	the	natural	political	and	social	order.	Therefore,	while	they	both	proposed	
land	reform,	which	consisted	of	nearly	identical	provisions,	they	did	so	proceeding	from	
different	 viewpoints	 and	 by	 different	 methods.	 It	 leaves	 us	 with	 the	 likelihood	 that	






                                                     
37	“Jefferson’s	Third	Draft”,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	I,	p.	362‐363.	
38	 Gavelkind	 is	 defined	 as	 “a	 species	 of	 socage	 tenure	 arising	 in	 land	 that	 has	
descended	equally	to	the	decedent’s	sons.”	Black’s	Law	Dictionary,	7th	edition.	
39	“Jefferson’s	Third	Draft”,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	I,	p.	363.	
40	 Jefferson	 was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 to	 call	 his	 proposals	 an	 agrarian	 law.	 Landon	
Carter,	one	of	Jefferson’s	most	vociferous	critics	in	the	Virginia	Assembly,	used	agrarian	






Harrington’s	 agrarian	 law,	 as	 they	are	of	 Jefferson’s	own	 fundamental	 law.41	 Jefferson	
also	specified	that	the	commonwealth	would	rely	on	a	citizen’s	militia	for	defence	and	
that	 a	 standing	 army	would	 be	 banned	 in	 peacetime.42	While	 this	 coincidence,	 along	
with	 Jefferson’s	 acceptance	 of	 feudal	 tenure	 as	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 politics,	 is	
intriguing	 and	 embeds	 Jefferson	 in	 the	 republican	 discourse,	 some	 caution	 must	 be	
exercised	due	 to	 Jefferson’s	 divergent	 view	on	 the	 ancient	 constitution	 of	 the	 Saxons.	
While	Harrington	disregarded	the	ancient	constitution	as	 just	an	earlier	manifestation	






Jefferson,	 mixed	 constitutionalism	 was	 not.	 A	 single	 power,	 the	 people,	 was	 to	 find	
representation	 in	 each	 branch	 of	 government;	 Jefferson’s	 proposed	 Senate	 did	 not	
represent	property	or	some	other	interest,	but	was	merely	a	different	manifestation	of	
the	same	popular	will	that	elected	the	lower	house.	Indeed,	Jefferson	rejected	the	notion	
that	 any	group	within	 society	 could	 lay	 legitimate	 claim	 to	 a	proprietary	 share	of	 the	
constitution.	
Jefferson’s	 adoption	 of	 popular	 sovereignty	 in	 his	 draft	 constitution	 and	 the	
Declaration	of	Independence	should	not	be	seen	as	a	rejection	of	neo‐Harringtonianism,	
but	 rather	 as	 his	 own	 personal	 development	 of	 it.	While	 Jefferson	 based	 his	 political	
thought	as	a	British	subject	on	the	ancient	constitution,	he	freely	 let	 it	go	once	he	had	
chosen	independence;	the	Declaration	of	Independence	was	the	moment	that	Jefferson	
turned	 his	 back	 on	 neo‐Harringtonianism	 and	 was	 liberated	 to	 try	 new	 ideas.	 By	
replacing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 gentry	 with	 the	 people	 at	 large,	 Jefferson	 returned	 to	
                                                     














land	 grants.	 Jefferson’s	 adoption	 of	 popular	 sovereignty	 within	 Harringtonian	




Next,	 we	 shall	 see	 how,	 the	 Convention	 having	 rejected	 the	 draft	 constitution,	
Jefferson	was	 forced	 to	pursue	his	 land	policies	 through	regular	 legislation,	 just	as	he	
did	 with	 his	 judicial	 bills.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 deal	 with	 these	 bills	
according	 to	 the	 categories	 Jefferson	 created	 in	 his	 draft	 constitution.	 First,	 I	 shall	
examine	 his	 efforts	 to	 reform	 the	 land	 prerogative	 and	 feudal	 tenures.	 Then,	 I	 will	






With	 the	 rejection	 of	 his	 draft	 constitution,	 Jefferson	 had	 another	 chance	 to	
implement	 aspects	 of	 his	 fundamental	 law,	 through	 ordinary	 legislation.	 Even	 before	
taking	his	seat	in	the	House	of	Delegates,	Jefferson	was	raising	the	issue	of	tenures	with	
the	 presumptive	 Speaker	 of	 the	 House,	 Edmund	 Pendleton.	 Pendleton,	 however,	 was	
sceptical	 of	 the	 necessity	 for	 reform	 and	 thought	 that	 Jefferson	 was	 being	 over‐
enthusiastic	 in	 his	 zeal	 for	 entirely	 reforming	 Virginia’s	 land	 law,	 favouring	 a	 more	
restrained	 approach	 by	 reforming	 the	 worst	 aspects	 of	 feudal	 tenure	 without	
completely	 changing	 the	 underlying	 system.	 An	 examination	 of	 Jefferson’s	 legal	
commonplace	 book	 shows	 that	 he	 came	 to	 an	 opinion	 on	 tenures	 as	 the	 result	 of	
substantial	 historical	 research.	 Despite	 his	 absorbing	 interest,	 tenure	 reform	was	 not	











Juridicis,	 William	 Somner’s	 A	 Treatise	 of	 Gavelkind,	 Sir	 John	 Dalrymple’s	 An	 Essay	
towards	 a	 General	 History	 of	 Feudal	 Property	 in	 Great	 Britain,	 Francis	 Stoughton	
Sullivan’s	 An	Historical	 Treatise	 on	 the	 Feudal	 Law	 and	 the	 Constitution	 and	 Laws	 of	








thought	 to	be	 found	 in	 the	 laws	of	 the	Anglo‐Saxons,”	 Jefferson	wrote,	 but	 continued,	
“[a]s	all	these	nations	therefore	drew	their	origin	from	the	Germans,	it	may	be	supposed	
that	 the	 resembling	 parts	 of	 their	 laws	 and	 customs	were	 derived	 from	 the	 common	
source.”	Basic	 forms	of	 feudal	 tenure	were	brought	by	 the	Germanic	 tribes	when	they	
moved	 into	 the	 Roman	 province	 of	 Gaul,	 and	 the	 Frankish	 kingdoms	 “enlarged	 and	
polished”	the	system,	which	was	subsequently	exported	by	William	the	Conqueror,	who	





History	 of	 Feudal	 property	 in	 Great	 Britain.	With	 a	History	 of	 the	 Introduction	 of	 the	
Feudal	System	in	Great	Britain.	London,	1757;	Henry	Home,	Lord	Kames,	Historical	Law‐
Tracts.	Edinburgh,	1758;	William	Somner,	A	Treatise	of	Gavelkind,	both	name	and	thing.	
London	 1660,	 2nd	 edition	 1726;	 Sir	 Henry	 Spelman,	De	Terminis	 Juridicis,	 1684,	 etc.;	
Francis	 Stoughton	 Sullivan,	 An	 Historical	 Treatise	 on	 the	 Feudal	 Laws	 and	 the	
Constitution	and	Laws	of	England...	In	a	course	of	lectures	read	in	the	University	of	Dublin.	






Spelman’s	 effort	 still	 left	 the	 origins	 of	 feudal	 tenure	 vague,	 and	 offered	 the	
possibility	 that	 the	Saxons	 themselves	had	used	an	early	version	of	 the	 tenures	when	
still	in	Germany,	which	would	mean	that	feudal	tenures	predated	the	Saxon	emigration	
and	were	therefore	part	of	the	original	common	law.	Turning	to	Somner	for	information	
that	 would	 relieve	 him	 of	 this	 unpalatable	 conclusion,	 Jefferson	 found	 that	 “Somner	
concurs	with	 those	who	 think	 feudal	 tenures	were	 introduced	by	 the	Conqueror	….	 If	
the	 feudal	 regulations	 prevailed	 at	 all	 among	 our	 Northern	 ancestors,	 before	 their	
irruption	into	the	Southern	countries,	it	must	have	been	in	a	very	infantine	[sic]	state.”47	
In	 the	 same	 commonplace	 entry,	 Jefferson	 noted	 that	 passages	 from	 Caesar’s	
Commentaries	and	Tacitus’	Germania	supported	Somner’s	claim,	with	Caesar	reporting	
that	 the	German	 tribes	with	which	he	 fought	 in	Gaul	 “had	no	 fixed	property	 in	 lands”	
and	therefore	Saxons	emigrating	at	that	stage	of	social	development	could	not	have	had	
feudal	tenure	in	a	recognisable,	Norman	form.48	
Jefferson	 also	 turned	 to	 Blackstone	 for	 information.	 Jefferson	 and	 Blackstone	 had	
very	different	 interpretations	of	 the	supposed	timelessness	of	the	common	law.	While	
Jefferson	envisioned	the	common	 law	as	having	had	a	pristine	beginning	 in	the	Saxon	
wilderness,	 which	 was	 only	 later	 corrupted	 by	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 Normans,	
Blackstone’s	legal	theory	assumed	that	the	common	law	as	it	existed	in	the	eighteenth	
century	was	as	it	had	always	been,	feudal	tenures	included.	Blackstone	thought	that	the		
“constitution	of	 feuds	had	 it's	 [sic]	 original	 among	 the	military	policy	of	 the	Northern	
nations,	and	was	carried	by	them	into	their	several	colonies	as	the	most	likely	means	to	
secure	 their	new	acquisitions.”	When	a	 territory	was	captured	by	a	German	 tribe,	 the	
chieftain	 doled	 out	 lands	 to	 his	 chief	 subordinates,	who	doled	out	 their	 allotments	 to	
lieutenants,	 and	 henceforth	 down	 the	 social	 hierarchy.	 What	 came	 next	 was	 exactly	





48	 Jefferson	 and	 Somner	 seem	 to	 have	 overlooked	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 Caesar’s	 and	
Tacitus’	account	of	Germanic	tribesman	during	the	age	of	the	late	Roman	republic	and	






what	 Jefferson	hoped	 for.	 “These	allotments	were	called	 ‘feoda’	 fiefs,	 fees,	or	rewards.	
The	condition	annexed	was	a	service	of	some	kind	to	him	by	whom	they	were	given,	but	




that,	 in	 its	original	 form,	 it	was	a	system	 in	which	 land	was	held	of	a	superior	 lord	 in	
exchange	 for	 military	 service.	 This	 service	 specifically	 pertained	 to	 the	 provision	 of	
knights	 for	 the	 king’s	 armies,	 and	 often	 included	 the	 provision	 of	 retainers	 and	 foot	
levies	from	a	lord’s	tenants	as	well.	By	the	sixteenth	century,	the	Tudors	were	working	
to	 phase	 this	 system	 out	 by	 requiring	 that	 the	 holders	 of	 the	 newly	 alienated	 Crown	
lands	 pay	 quit‐rent	 fees	 towards	 the	 support	 of	 standing	 household	 military	 forces	
rather	than	provide	knight‐service	or	some	similar	military	obligation.	It	was	the	form	
of	 tenure	 that	 the	 Tudors	 used	 for	 this	 alienation	 ‐	 socage,	 itself	 well‐established	 in	
feudal	use	‐	that	interested	Jefferson.	
As	a	Crown	colony,	Virginia	was	a	distinct	jurisdiction	like	a	palatinate,	but	its	lands	






parliament	was	 concerned	 ‐	 they	were	within	 the	 realm	 in	 all	 that	 pertained	 to	 their	
legal	and	tenurial	rights.”52	Therefore,	 the	 form	of	 tenure	prevailing	 in	Kent	 ‐	socage	‐	





51	 “Letters	 Patent	 to	 Sir	 Thomas	 Gates,	 Sir	 George	 Somers,	 and	 others”,	 10	 April	
1606,	in	Hening	I,	pp.	65‐66.	
52	Charles	M.	Andrews,	The	Colonial	Period	in	American	History:	The	Settlements,	Vol.	















and	cloaths,	a	part	also	was	 laboured	by	the	Villains,	or	slaves,	 for	 the	behoof	of	 their	
masters,”	 Dalrymple	 recounted.53	 Over	 time,	 the	 villeins	 were	 liberated	 and	
consolidated	with	the	Sokmen,	who	paid	their	annual	feudal	fees	in	the	form	of	a	share	
of	their	crops,	or	in	money	if	it	was	available.54	Meanwhile,	artificers	who	resided	within	
towns	were	granted	 their	own	 form	of	non‐military	 tenure,	burgage,	which	exempted	
them	 from	 military	 duties.	 In	 addition,	 clergy	 were	 exempted	 from	 their	 military	
obligations	via	a	tenure	known	as	frankalmoigne.	“Thus	the	several	orders	that	were	of	
value	 in	 the	 state,	 the	 soldiers,	husbandmen,	 artizans	and	clergy	gave	 rise	 to	 the	 four	
simple	 tenures	 of	 Knights‐service,	 socage,	 burgage,	 and	 frankalmoigne,	 into	which	 all	
others	may	be	resolved.”55	
Of	 the	 four,	only	 socage	had	widespread	use	 in	Virginia.	The	non‐military	dues	by	
landholders	took	the	forms	of	quit‐rents,	assessments	made	upon	land	that	functioned	
as	 a	 tax	 levied	 by	 prerogative,	 rather	 than	 legislative,	 authority.	 Dalrymple	 described	
England	before	the	Magna	Charta	as	a	country	in	which	the	Anglo‐Norman	kings	ruled	
without	taxation,	and	instead	were	“supported	by	the	rents	of	the	demesne	lands,	and	
incidents	of	 the	 feudal	 tenures.	Hence	when	 the	kings	 levied	 taxes,	 they	pretended	 to	
receive	 them	 as	 voluntary	 contributions.	 Things	 could	 not	 stand	 long	 on	 this	 footing:	
thro'	the	decline	of	the	feudal	system,	the	feudal	emoluments	were	become	less,	and	a	
land	 tax	was	 necessary.”56	Within	 a	 century	 after	 the	 issuing	 of	 the	Magna	 Charta	 by	





56	 LCB	 Entry	 571.	 Interestingly,	 Dalrymple	 seems	 to	 be	 dating	 the	 decline	 of	
feudalism	to	the	time	period	 immediately	preceding	the	Magna	Charta	 in	1215,	which	







This	empowerment	of	 the	nobles	 led	 to	 the	advent	of	bastard	 feudalism,	and	 then	





Dalrymple	 linked	 the	 issue	 of	 quit‐rents,	 a	 form	 of	 revenue	 derived	 from	 the	 royal	
prerogative	to	grant	lands,	to	the	issue	of	taxation	with	representation,	one	of	the	early	
issues	of	discord	between	the	colonies	and	Parliament.	A	move	for	reform	of	the	quit‐
rent	system,	 therefore,	was	consistent	with	 the	generally	stated	aims	of	 the	American	
independence	movement.	 Jefferson’s	preferred	manner	of	reforming	quit‐rents	was	to	






concerned	 inheritance,	 as	 did	 his	 bill	 abolishing	 entails,	 which	 was	 considered	 apart	
from	the	Revisal,	no	tenure	reform	was	included	in	the	Committee	of	Revisors’	report	in	
June	1779.	The	explanation	as	to	why	Jefferson	did	not	include	tenure	reform,	which	he	
considered	 so	 important	 for	 a	 commonwealth,	 lay	 with	 his	 relationship	 to	 Edmund	
Pendleton,	 the	Speaker	of	 the	House	of	Delegates,	 and	Pendleton’s	views	on	 the	same	
issue.	
After	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 was	 adopted	 by	 Congress,	 and	 a	 new	
constitution	 adopted	 by	 the	 Virginia	 Convention,	 Pendleton	 wrote	 to	 Jefferson	
attempting	 to	 convince	 him	 to	 take	 a	 seat	 in	 the	 newly	 established	 state	 judiciary.58	
Jefferson	informed	Pendleton	that	his	intention	was	to	resume	his	old	seat	in	the	House	
representing	Albemarle	County.	This	led	to	a	discussion	of	which	bills	Jefferson	would	
propose	 in	 the	upcoming	 legislative	 session	of	October	1776,	 and	 from	 there	 the	 two	






men	 quickly	 moved	 to	 Jefferson’s	 land	 reforms.	 Pendleton	 did	 not	 see	 the	 need	 to	
convert	 socage	 estates	 into	 allodial	 ones,	 nor	was	 he	 concerned	 by	 the	 issue	 of	 quit‐
rents	or	 the	distribution	of	western	 lands.	While	 Jefferson	was	a	 reformer,	Pendleton	
sought	 to	 affect	 Virginia’s	 transition	 into	 an	 independent	 polity	with	 as	 little	 internal	
disruption	as	possible.	The	final	result	of	Jefferson’s	efforts	must,	therefore,	be	seen	as	a	
compromise	between	Jefferson	and	Pendleton,	not	Jefferson’s	preferred	outcome.	
For	 Pendleton,	 the	 issue	 of	 socage	 tenure	 and	 the	 quit‐rents	 paid	 as	 feudal	 dues	
were	not	problems	he	considered	to	be	important	to	the	revolution.	Writing	to	Jefferson	




unless	 you	 release	 the	 old	 from	 the	 payment	 of	 Quitrents	 they	 have	 been	 long	
accustomed	to,	against	which	I	think	there	are	Objections	of	great	weight.”59	
Here	Pendleton	was	rather	evading	the	issue,	constructing	a	false	disparity	between	
Jefferson’s	 plans	 for	 western	 settlement	 and	 for	 existing	 estates	 in	 eastern	 Virginia.	
Jefferson	had	called	for	converting	all	estates	into	allodial;	here	Pendleton	was	claiming	




the	whole	 therefore	appears	 to	me	best	 to	 continue	 the	old	mode,	 transferring	 rights,	
former	and	future	quitrents	and	Escheats	to	the	Common	Wealth	from	the	Crown,	only	
confining	 the	 grants	 to	 small	 quantities	 to	 give	 the	 Poor	 a	 chance	 with	 the	 Rich	 of	
getting	some	Lands."60		
Jefferson	was	not	so	sanguine.	"Is	it	consistent	with	good	policy	or	free	government	
to	 establish	 a	 perpetual	 revenue?	 Is	 it	 not	 against	 the	 practice	 of	 our	 wise	 British	
ancestors?	Have	 not	 instances	 in	which	we	 have	 departed	 from	 this	 in	 Virginia	 been	
constantly	 condemned	 by	 the	 universal	 voice	 of	 our	 country?	 Is	 it	 safe	 to	 make	 the	
governing	 power	 when	 once	 seated	 in	 office,	 independant	 [sic]	 in	 it's	 revenue?"61	







Parrying	 the	 thrust,	 Pendleton	 responded	 that	 “as	 to	 a	 Perpetual	 revenue,	 I	 do	 not	
discover	 the	 danger	 of	 establishing	 a	 Revenue	 of	 that	 sort,	 provided	 the	 quantum	 be	
certainly	below	the	unavoidable	expence	of	Government,	and	the	disposition	left	to	the	
Representatives	of	the	people	annually	chosen."	The	danger	from	quit‐rents	under	the	
colonial	 government	 had	 been	 in	 entrusting	 the	 revenue	 to	 a	 royalist	 Governor	 and	
Council	 “without	Account,	 a	 body	who	 from	 their	 Constitution	were	 encouraged	…	 to	
thwart	rather	than	promote	the	Interest	of	this	people,	in	the	disposal	of	the	Fund.”62	
The	value	of	quit‐rents	paid	to	the	colonial	government	averaged	£3,500‐£4,000	per	
year.63	 An	 equal	 amount	 was	 collected	 for	 Lord	 Fairfax	 in	 the	 Northern	 Neck	
proprietary.64	In	1775,	the	last	year	in	which	the	quit‐rents	were	collected	on	behalf	of	
the	 Crown	 from	 Virginia’s	 non‐proprietary	 lands,	 the	 sum	 was	 £7,420,	 all	 of	 the	




the	 colony,	 and	would	 at	 least	 pay	 the	 governor’s	 salary,	 as	 Jefferson	 indicated;66	 but	








64	 Rowland	 Berthoff	 and	 John	 M.	 Murrin,	 "Feudalism,	 Communalism,	 and	 the	
Yeoman	 Freeholder:	 The	 American	 Revolution	 Considered	 As	 a	 Social	 Accident."	 In	
Essays	 on	 the	American	Revolution.	 Edited	 by	 Stephen	 G.	 Kurtz	 and	 James	 H.	 Hutson.	
Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1973,	p.	269.	
65	Bond,	The	Quit‐Rent	System,	pp.	248‐249.	The	all‐time	high	for	quit‐rent	collection	
was	 £15,000	 in	 1754.	 Clearly,	 quit‐rent	 collection	 was	 sporadic	 under	 the	 royal	
governors,	but	 the	potential	was	always	there	 for	 income	that,	 in	 the	colonial	context,	
amounted	 to	 a	 very	 significant	 sum	 if	 spent	 within	 the	 colony.	 Berthoff	 and	 Murrin	
estimate	 that	 only	 four	 hundred	 English	 families	 had	 rents	 of	 more	 than	 £4,000,	
meaning	that	non‐proprietary	Virginia	generated	income	equal	to	that	of	a	nobleman’s	
estate.	 See	 Berthoff	 and	 Murrin,	 “Feudalism,	 Communalism,	 and	 the	 Yeomen	
Freeholder”,	n.	27,	pp.	267‐268.	
66	 The	 combined	 salary	 of	 the	 governor	 and	 lieutenant	 governor	 was	 £3,000,	 so	
Virginia’s	quit‐rents,	if	properly	collected,	would	be	sufficient	to	maintain	the	governor	
and	his	court	without	legislative	interference.	See	Jack.	P.	Greene,	The	Quest	for	Power:	





perhaps	 Pendleton	 was	 correct	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 finances	 of	 a	 monarchy	 and	 a	
republic	worked	somewhat	differently.	A	republic,	especially	one	with	a	weak	executive	
like	 Virginia’s,	 did	 not	 have	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 king	 or	 royal	 governor	 using	 land	 grants	 as	
patronage,	nor	seeking	to	rule	without	a	representative	assembly	by	getting	his	money	
from	 sources	 other	 than	 legislatively‐levied	 taxation.	 Thus,	 in	 somewhat	 of	 a	
contradiction,	 it	 seems	 that	 Jefferson	 had	 not	 yet	 changed	 his	 thinking	 about	 finance	
from	a	feudal	one	to	a	republican	one.	
The	specific	issue	of	quit‐rents	did	not	solve	the	issue	of	allodialism	itself,	and	here	
Jefferson	 stuck	 to	 the	 principles	 he	 had	 laid	 out	 in	 the	 Summary	View.	 On	 13	 August	
1776,	 Jefferson	 wrote	 to	 Pendleton	 that	 “[t]he	 opinion	 that	 our	 lands	 were	 allodial	
possessions	is	one	which	I	have	very	long	held	...	As	to	[tenures]	was	not	the	separation	









the	Feuds	which	made	 them	oppressive	 to	 the	 tenant	and	 inconsistent	with	Freedom,	
and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 Military	 force	 independant	 [sic]	 of	 the	 Legislature,	 which	
proved	injurious	to	the	Community,	but	I	confess	I	am	not	able	to	discover	disgrace	to	
the	 tenant	or	 injury	 to	 the	Society	 from	their	holding	of	 the	commonwealth,	upon	 the	
terms	 of	 paying	 a	 small	 certain	 annual	 sum	 disposeable	 [sic]	 for	 common	 benefit,	 by	




Common‐Law	 Adjudication."	 In	 The	 Many	 Legalities	 of	 Early	 America.	 Edited	 by	
Christopher	 L	 Tomlins	 and	 Bruce	 H	 Mann.	 Chapel	 Hill:	 University	 of	 North	 Carolina	
Press,	2001.	
68	“To	Edmund	Pendleton”,	13	August	1776,	in	TJ	Vol.	I,	pp.		491‐494.	Hannah	Spahn	
argues	 that	 this	 is	 evidence	 of	 Jefferson’s	 tendency	 to	 think	 that	 history	 was	 a	
continuum	 on	 which	 actions	 of	 moral	 value	 from	 one	 period	 could	 be	 repeated	 in	





their	 own	 representatives:	 nor	 what	 this	 will	 retain	 of	 the	 old	 Feuds?”	 This	 was	
reasonable	enough,	but	Pendleton	seemed	to	miss	Jefferson’s	point	that	land	held	of	the	
commonwealth	 was	 land	 on	 which	 the	 commonwealth	 could	 put	 conditions	 and	
threaten	 to	 take	 away,	 as	 English	 kings	 had	 done	 throughout	 history	 to	 coerce	 their	
nobles	into	compliance.69	
Furthermore,	Jefferson’s	defence	of	allodialism	had	turned	into	a	bit	of	a	rant,	ending	
on	 the	 rather	 outlandish	 note	 that	 the	 ancient	 constitution	 could	 be	 reconstructed	 in	
Virginia.	Pendleton	pounced.	“I	highly	esteem	the	old	Saxon	Laws	in	General,	but	cannot	





For	 this	 moment	 at	 least,	 Pendleton	 claimed	 the	 last	 written	 word	 for	 himself,	
inviting	 Jefferson	 to	 resume	 the	 conversation	 in	 person	 when	 he	 arrived	 in	
Williamsburg	for	the	assembly	session	in	October.	There	is	no	record	of	what	transpired	
in	 conversation	 between	 the	 two	 men	 at	 the	 assembly,	 but	 this	 correspondence	 is	
insightful	 in	that	 it	offers	an	explanation	as	to	why	tenure	reform	was	not	 included	in	
Jefferson’s	 legislation.	 Jefferson	 viewed	 tenures	 as	 an	 important	 part	 of	 a	 republican	
constitution.	Pendleton	viewed	it	as	an	irrelevant	question.	He	considered	the	revenues	
from	quit‐rents	 to	 be	 too	 small	 to	 be	 significant,	 and	 as	 far	 as	 he	was	 concerned	 the	
theory	and	history	behind	socage	tenure	was	irrelevant	so	long	as	the	current	practice	
was	harmless.	
As	 Speaker	 of	 the	 House,	 and	 a	 member	 of	 Jefferson’s	 Committee	 of	 Revisors,	
Pendleton	 was	 in	 a	 position	 to	 block	 the	 inclusion	 of	 tenure	 reform	 from	 the	
committee’s	 final	 report.	 It	 also	 appears	 that	 Jefferson	 himself	 may	 have	 eventually	
come	round	to	Pendleton’s	viewpoint.	By	1785,	Jefferson	informed	James	Madison	that	




contrast,	 Pendleton	 was	 denying	 that	 such	 a	 declension	 had	 taken	 place,	 treating	
feudalism	as	of	continued	viability	if	lightly	modified.	That	the	relationship	of	vassal	and	







Autobiography,	 Jefferson	 did	 not	 mention	 tenures	 as	 an	 important	 element	 in	 his	





system	 of	 inheritance	 law	 came	 in	 two	 parts.	 The	 first	 was	 his	 successful	 effort	 to	
abolish	entails,	which	was	proposed	as	a	stand‐alone	bill	 in	the	House	of	Delegates	on	
14	October	1776.	The	 second	was	 a	 slate	 of	 ten	bills	 regulating	 inheritance	which	he	
proposed	as	part	of	his	Revisal	of	the	Laws	in	June	1779,	the	most	prominent	of	which,	
the	Bill	Regulating	the	Course	of	Descents,	abolished	intestate	primogeniture	in	favor	of	
gavelkind.	 In	 the	entail	bill’s	preamble,	 Jefferson	 justified	reform	to	 inheritance	 law	in	
terms	 of	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 economy	 and	 its	 influence	 on	 manners.	 More	 important,	
though,	 as	 he	 explained	 in	 his	Autobiography,	was	 the	bill’s	 utility	 in	 breaking	up	 the	
hereditary	 aristocracy	 that	 had	 taken	 root	 through	 large	 estates.72	 This	 section	 will	
compare	his	 liberal	and	republican	arguments	for	abolishing	entail,	before	proceeding	
to	 examine	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 his	 bill	 abolishing	 primogeniture	 and	 instituting	
gavelkind.73	 It	 will	 also	 show	 how,	 although	 he	 did	 not	 incorporate	 natural	 rights	
                                                     
71	“To	James	Madison”,	28	October	1785,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	VIII,	pp.	681‐683.	
72	The	 importance	of	entail	 in	making	aristocracy	hereditary	has	been	disputed.	C.	
Ray	 Keim	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 small	 number	 of	 entails	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 total	 wills	




a	 single	 entail	 should	 be	 counted	 multiple	 times	 under	 Keim’s	 method.	 Brewer’s	
argument	is	more	convincing	than	Keim’s	due	to	her	more	accurate	portrayal	of	how	an	
entail	 works.	 See	 Holly	 Brewer,	 "Entailing	 Aristocracy	 in	 Colonial	 Virginia:	 ‘Ancient	
Feudal	Restraints’	and	Revolutionary	Reform”,	pp.	307‐346.	
73	 There	 is	 a	 rich	 literature	 examining	 reform	 of	 feudal	 inheritance	 during	 the	
revolution	 and	 assessing	 its	 importance.	 See	 Willi	 Paul	 Adams,	 The	 First	 American	
Constitutions:	 Republican	 Ideology	 and	 the	 Making	 of	 the	 State	 Constitutions	 in	 the	
Revolutionary	 Era.	 Translated	 by	 Rita	 Kimber	 and	 Robert	 Kimber.	 Chapel	 Hill:	
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Schapiro,	"Inheritance	Laws	Across	Colonies:	Causes	and	Consequences."	The	Journal	of	






language	 into	 his	 property	 bills	 as	 he	 would	 in	 his	 bills	 on	 religion	 and	 emigration,	





the	bloodline	of	 the	 testator,	 according	 to	 the	descent	of	 primogeniture,	which	 stated	
that	 the	 inheritance	of	a	 real	estate	was	unitary	and	went	 to	 the	eldest	surviving	son.	
The	 entail	 was	 widely	 used	 in	 Virginia	 and	 was	 the	 subject	 of	 repeated	 pieces	 of	
legislation,	 both	 of	 public	 bills	 of	 Assembly	 regulating	 the	 nature	 of	 entail	 in	 general,	
and	private	bills	 of	Assembly	 introduced	 to	 “dock”,	 or	 annul,	 the	entails	 on	particular	
estates.	Major	 pieces	 of	 public	 legislation	 included	 a	 1705	 act	 converting	 slaves	 from	
chattel	into	real	property,	thus	binding	them	to	the	land	of	an	estate	in	a	similar	manner	
to	that	of	serfs,	and	a	1734	act	annulling	the	entails	of	all	estates	worth	less	than	£200.75	





was	 of	 great	 interest	 to	 Jefferson,	 forming	 one	 of	 the	 land	 provisions	 of	 the	 draft	
constitution	and	the	subject	of	considerable	research	in	the	Legal	Commonplace	Book.	
Jefferson’s	 first	 interest	 in	 gavelkind	was	 in	 its	 relationship	 to	 the	 Saxon	 constitution	
                                                                                                                                                                     
in	 the	 American	 Revolutionary	 Era."	 Michigan	 Law	 Review	 76,	 no.	 1	 (1977):	 1‐29;	
Richard	 B.	 Morris,	 "Primogeniture	 and	 Entailed	 Estates	 in	 America."	 Columbia	 Law	
Review	27,	no.	1	(1927):	24‐51;	John	V.	Orth,	"After	the	Revolution:	"Reform"	of	the	Law	
of	Inheritance."	Law	and	History	Review	10,	no.	1	(1992):	33‐44;	Claire	Priest,	"Creating	
An	American	Property	Law:	Alienability	 and	 Its	 Limits	 in	American	History."	Harvard	
Law	Review	120	(2006):	385‐459;	and	Carole	Shammas,	"English	Inheritance	Law	and	




in	 Hening	 IV,	 p.	 400.	 The	 latter	 act	 is	 unclear	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 £200	 refers	 to	 an	
assessed	market	value	or	the	value	of	annual	rents.	If	market	value,	then	these	would	be	
very	 small	 yeoman	 estates.	 If	 rent	 value,	 then	 the	 estates	 could	 be	mid‐sized	 gentry	









being	 “dower	 of	 the	 moiety,	 loss	 of	 dower	 by	 marriage,	 descent	 to	 all	 the	 sons,	 not	
forfeitable	for	felony,	power	of	alienation	at	15	years	of	age.”78		
Primogeniture,	 in	 turn,	 could	 be	 conclusively	 identified	 as	 a	 Norman	 import,	 and	
thus	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 knight’s‐service	 tenure.	 Dalrymple	 wrote	 of	 the	
”incompatibility	 of	 the	 feudal	 services	 being	 performed	 by	many,	 and	 the	 succession	
was	 restrained	 to	 one	 son	 to	 be	 chosen	by	 the	 grantor.	 This	 choice	was	necessary	 to	
prevent	 the	 danger	 of	 the	 fief's	 falling	 to	 one	 who	 might	 be	 incapable	 of	 doing	 the	
duties.”79		This	custom	had	been	introduced	at	an	early	point	in	Anglo‐Norman	history,	
before	the	testating	of	wills	became	standard	practice	as	the	legal	system	evolved,	and	
thus	 the	 inheritance	of	an	 intestate	estate	down	the	eldest	male	 line	was	essential	 for	
preserving	 unitary	 estates	 in	 such	 a	 rudimentary	 legal	 system.80	 Over	 time,	 this	
customary	practice	was	established	by	statute	during	the	reigns	of	Henry	I	and	Henry	II,	
and	became	the	practice	as	well	under	socage	tenure.81	This	was	further	explained	in	a	




When	 presenting	 the	 entail	 bill	 to	 his	 peers	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Delegates,	 Jefferson	
eschewed	the	language	of	agrarian	republicanism	in	favour	of	economic	liberalism.	The	
common	theme	of	his	 first	 two	concerns	was	 that	 the	entail	put	economic	constraints	
upon	 the	 person	 who	 was	 in	 ownership	 of	 the	 land.	 Entails	 were	 “contrary	 to	 good	
                                                                                                                                                                     
76	“Notes	on	the	Progress	of	Certain	Bills”,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	I,	p.	104.	
77	LCB	Entries	848,	870,	and	874.	
78	 LCB	 Entry	 739.	 Notably,	 entail	 altered	 this	 fifth	 provision	 in	 the	 same	 way	 in	
which	primogeniture	altered	 the	 third.	 In	addition,	both	primogeniture	and	entail	 are	











and	 “discourages	 the	 holder	 thereof	 from	 taking	 care	 of	 and	 improving	 the	 same.”	 In	




land	 as	 a	 commodity	 that	 could	 be	 bought	 and	 sold	 through	market	 interactions,	 not	
only	 conveyed	 through	 inheritance.	 Joyce	 Appleby	 points	 out	 that	 Jefferson	 joined	
“political	democracy	to	economic	freedom”	in	that	he	did	not	view	land	ownership	as	a	
static	 possession.84	 This	 was	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 agrarian	 republican	 concept	 that	 the	
utility	of	property	was	that	it	bound	its	owner	to	the	community.85	As	Jefferson	quoted	
Dalrymple	 in	 his	 commonplace	 book,	 “[t]he	 right	 of	 excluding	 all	 others	 from	 a	
particular	 spot	 of	 ground	 is	 one	 step	 in	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 property;	 but	 the	
right	 of	 transferring	 it	 to	 another,	 is	 a	 second	 and	 wider.”86	 If	 ownership	 in	 land	
guaranteed	 the	 independence	 necessary	 to	 participate	 in	 both	 political	 and	 economic	
life,	then	constraints	on	that	land,	especially	the	inability	to	sell	or	otherwise	alienate	it,	
undermined	 the	 owner’s	 independence.	 But	 here,	 Jefferson	was	 saying	 that	 land	was	
just	 another	 form	 of	moveable	 property.87	 By	muddying	 the	 distinction	 between	 real	
and	personal	estate,	Jefferson	eroded	the	rationale	for	entail,	but	in	so	doing	moved	in	
opposition	to	republican	thought.	
In	 Jefferson’s	mind,	 these	 issues	 of	 economic	 liberalism	were	 directly	 relevant	 to	
entail’s	 structural	 role	 in	 support	 of	 feudal	 hierarchy.	 According	 to	 a	 citation	 from	
Dalrymple	in	the	Legal	Commonplace	Book,	the	abolition	of	entails	in	England	had	been	
one	 of	 the	 major	 episodes	 in	 the	 history	 of	 landholding.	 The	 original	 institution	 of	
                                                     
83	 “Bill	 to	 Enable	 Tenants	 in	 Fee	 Tail	 to	 Convey	 Their	 Lands	 in	 Fee	 Simple”,	 in	 TJ	
Papers,	Vol.	I,	pp.	560‐562.	












entails,	 in	 the	 reign	 of	 Edward	 I,	 had	 come	 about	 because	 the	 “nobles	 saw	 that	 the	
allowing	land	to	come	so	much	into	commerce,	should	weaken	them	and	shift	it	into	the	
hands	 of	 people	who	 had	 been	 formerly	 little	 better	 than	 slaves.”88	 The	 entail	was	 a	
major	 factor	 in	 the	 development	 of	 bastard	 feudalism,	 for	 “in	 process	 of	 time,	 the	
property	 of	 the	 great	 families	 continually	 increasing,	 and	 never	 diminishing,	 their	
power	 grew	 to	 such	 a	 height,	 as	 enabled	 them	 totally	 to	 enslave	 the	 people,	 and	
sometimes	to	overshadow	the	crown.”		





“these	 various	 ranks	 of	 men	 did	 not	 foresee	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 dissolution	 of	













fueled	his	hopes	 that	ordinary	men	might	escape	 the	 tyranny	of	 their	social	superiors	
both	 as	 employers	 and	magistrates	…	 [Jefferson]	 recognized	 that	 hierarchy	 rested	 on	
economic	 relations	 and	 a	 deference	 to	 the	 past	 as	well	 as	 formal	 privilege	 and	 social	
                                                                                                                                                                     







custom.”90	Without	 an	 economic	 incentive	 to	 improve	 the	 land,	 the	 owner	 would	 be	
more	 likely	 to	 lease	out	his	 land	 to	 tenants	on	 short	 leases	with	 frequently	 increased	
rents,	thus	perpetuating	the	client‐based	system	of	tenures	that	Jefferson	had	sought	to	
reform	in	his	draft	constitution.		
It	did	not	necessarily	 follow	that	an	owner	bound	 to	his	 land	would	do	nothing	 to	













This	 theme	 of	 malaise	 was	 continued	 in	 Jefferson’s	 third	 observation	 that	 entails	
were	destructive	of	the	morals	of	the	designated	heirs.	Landowners	were	expected	to	be	
                                                     
90	Appleby,	“Commercial	Farming”,	p.	844.	
91	While	 I	 am	not	 aware	 of	 Jefferson	 specifically	 quoting	Kames	 on	 this	 issue,	 the	
inadequacies	 of	 the	 entail	 are	 a	 recurring	 topic	 throughout	 Kames’	 writings	 and	
Jefferson	 seems	 to	 have	 absorbed	 them	 from	 Kames	 or	 a	 similar	 source.	 See	 Henry	
Home,	 (Lord	 Kames),	 Sketches	 of	 the	 History	 of	 Man:	 Book	 III,	 Progress	 of	 Sciences.	
Natural	Law	and	Enlightenment	Classics.	Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2007,	pp.	907‐914.	
92	“To	James	Madison”,	28	October	1785,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	VIII,	pp.	681‐683.	It	is	not	
quite	 clear	 just	 what	 Jefferson	meant	 by	 this	 natural	 right.	 He	 does	 not	 emphasise	 a	
natural	 right	 to	 property	 in	 his	 other	 revolutionary	writings,	 and	 actually	 removed	 it	
from	 the	 trinity	 of	 rights	 in	 the	Declaration	 of	 Independence.	 In	 this	 letter,	 he	 also	 is	
specifically	 linking	 the	 availability	 of	 land	 to	mass	 unemployment,	 which	was	 not	 an	
issue	in	Virginia,	although	he	also	says	a	system	of	land	grants	then	would	forestall	such	
an	unemployment	crisis	in	the	future.	It	is	probably	too	much	to	say	that	he	viewed	the	
Virginian	 aristocracy	 as	 violating	 natural	 right	 at	 the	 time	 he	 wrote,	 but	 he	 could	












his	 estate,	 it	 could	 also	 be	 said	 that	 the	 entail	 discouraged	 the	 heir	 from	 improving	
himself.	Entitlement	in	property	bred	decay	in	morals.	





a	 finite	 amount	 of	 land.	 The	 same	 calculations	 did	 not	 necessarily	 apply	 to	 Virginia’s	
abundance	of	unclaimed	western	land.95	This	made	it	all	the	more	important	to	achieve	
an	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 Virginia’s	 remaining	 western	 lands	 before	 they	 could	 be	
entailed	by	large	proprietors	or	corporations.	
Jefferson	considered	the	entail	to	be	one	of	the	most	important	factors	in	the	rise	of	
the	 Virginian	 aristocracy.	 “In	 the	 earlier	 times	 of	 the	 colony,	 when	 lands	 were	 to	 be	
obtained	 for	 little	 or	 nothing,	 some	 provident	 individuals	 procured	 large	 grants,	 and,	
desirous	of	founding	great	families	for	themselves,	settled	them	on	their	descendants	in	
fee‐tail.	 The	 transmission	 of	 this	 property	 from	 generation	 to	 generation	 in	 the	 same	
name	 raised	 up	 a	 distinct	 set	 of	 families	 who,	 being	 privileged	 by	 law	 in	 the	
perpetuation	of	their	wealth	were	thus	formed	into	a	Patrician	order,	distinguished	by	









95	 This	 point	 is	 argued	 by	 Bernard	 Bailyn	 in	 "Politics	 and	 Social	 Structure	 in	






scattered	with	equal	hand	 through	all	 it's	 conditions,	was	deemed	essential	 to	a	well‐
ordered	republic."96	
This	antipathy	to	a	propertied	power	base	for	the	state’s	senior	leadership	was	not	
shared	 by	 that	 senior	 leadership,	 Edmund	 Pendleton	 among	 them.	 While	 Jefferson’s	
draft	bill	broke	all	entails	then	in	force,	Pendleton	introduced	an	amendment	to	soften	
the	bill	by	only	giving	each	 fee	 tail	holder	 the	option	of	conversion	 to	 fee	 simple.97	 In	
this,	Pendleton	was	calling	 Jefferson’s	bluff.	 If	 the	purpose	of	 the	bill	was	 to	 liberalise	
the	state’s	property	holding,	as	 Jefferson	claimed	 in	the	preamble,	 then	what	could	be	
more	 liberal	 than	 giving	 the	 owner	 the	 free	 choice	 of	 conversion	 to	 fee	 simple	 or	
remaining	 in	 fee	 tail?	 Jefferson	 correctly	 saw	 this	 as	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 unstated	 anti‐
aristocratic	motivation	for	the	bill,	for	if	some	landowners	converted	to	fee	simple	then	
the	 aristocrats	 remaining	 in	 fee	 tail	would	become	even	 stronger.	While	 there	 are	no	




Along	with	his	bill	 to	abolish	entail,	 in	 the	Autobiography	 Jefferson	also	named	the	
bill	abolishing	primogeniture,	officially	the	Bill	Directing	the	Course	of	Descents,	as	the	
chief	 bill	 in	 his	 reforms.	 The	 Bill	 Directing	 the	 Course	 of	 Descents	 is	 credited	 with	









Dumas	Malone	notes	 that	 Jefferson	 “may	have	exaggerated	 the	effects”	of	 the	bill,	but	
fails	 to	 mention	 gavelkind	 and	 the	 wider	 legal	 context	 of	 what	 Jefferson	 was	 doing	
Dumas	 Malone,	 Jefferson	 the	 Virginian.	 London:	 Eyre	 &	 Spottiswoode,	 1948,	 p.	 254.	
Merrill	 Peterson	 argues	 that	 the	 bill	 was	 one	 of	 many	 that	 “decisively	 settled	 the	
question	of	whether	 feudal	or	 freehold	tenure	would	prevail”.	This	 is	 true,	but	 fails	 to	
recognise	that	the	bill	was	an	incremental	reform	of	customary	law	that	did	not	affect	
the	 probate	 wills	 used	 by	 the	 gentry,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 primogeniture	 is	 not	 a	




Chapter	 XXXIII	 of	 the	 Acts	 of	 Assembly	 of	 1705,	 “An	 act	 for	 the	 distribution	 of	
intestates	[sic]	estates,	declaring	widows	rights	to	their	deceased	husbands	estates;	and	
for	 securing	orphans	 [sic]	 estates”,	 had	 stipulated	 that	 one‐third	of	 intestate	personal	
estate	was	to	proceed	to	the	widow	for	 life,	while	 the	remaining	two‐thirds	was	to	be	
distributed	equally	amongst	 the	 intestate’s	 sons.99	This	act	had	been	preserved	 in	 the	
revisal	of	1748,	“An	Act	for	the	distribution	of	Intestates	estates.”100	Thus	not	once,	but	
twice,	prior	Assemblies	had	seen	fit	to	enact	provision	that	intestate	estates,	i.e.,	ones	in	
which	 the	 owner	 died	 without	 leaving	 a	 will,	 would	 have	 their	 personal	 estate	
distributed	 according	 to	 gavelkind	 and	 their	 real	 estate	 distributed	 according	 to	
primogeniture.	
While	Jefferson	was	correct	to	identify	primogeniture	as	a	major	way	of	preserving	
large	estates,	 the	bill	 as	written	did	not	 solve	 the	problem	as	he	 identified	 it.	The	bill	
applied	only	 to	 intestate	estates.	Estates	 for	which	 the	 testator	had	provided	a	 legally	





the	help	of	 the	 entail,	while	 the	poorer	 sort	would	 fragment	 amongst	different	 small‐
holds.	This	was	a	possibility	he	had	been	alert	to	when	negotiating	with	Pendleton	for	
passage	of	his	bill	 on	 entails,	 fully	 aware	 that	 landowners	with	 attorneys	would	keep	
their	hereditary	estates	unified,	but	when	it	came	to	primogeniture	Jefferson	seems	to	
have	dropped	the	issue.	
This	 was	 one	 of	 the	 greatest	 oversights	 in	 Jefferson’s	 land	 programme,	 and	 the	
failure	of	his	bills	 to	stem	“antient	and	future	aristocracy”	may	be	partly	attributed	to	
                                                                                                                                                                     
University	 Press,	 1970,	 p.	 113).	 This	 misconception	 has	 also	 formed	 an	 important	
assumption	 behind	 the	 work	 in	 Brewer,	 "Entailing	 Aristocracy	 in	 Colonial	 Virginia";	
Katz,	"Republicanism	and	the	Law	of	Inheritance	in	the	American	Revolutionary	Era”,	p.	
12;	 Keim,	 "Primogeniture	 and	 Entail	 in	 Colonial	 Virginia”,	 p.	 551;	 Orth,	 "After	 the	
Revolution:	 ‘Reform’	of	 the	Law	of	 Inheritance”,	p.	36;	 Shammas,	 "English	 Inheritance	











aristocracy	 was	 being	 formed,	 and	 simply	 treated	 real	 estate	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	
personal	 estate.	 The	 other	 crucial	 changes	 concerned	 the	 status	 of	 women.	 First,	
Jefferson	 expanded	 upon	 gavelkind	 by	 including	 the	 provision	 from	 his	 draft	
constitution	 that	 daughters	 would	 inherit	 equally	 with	 sons.	 Second,	 in	 his	 zeal	 to	
protect	 daughters,	 Jefferson	 left	 out	 language	protecting	 the	widow’s	 one‐third	 share.	
The	 effect	 of	 his	 law	was	 to	 cast	widows	 out,	 reliant	 on	 the	 charity	 of	 their	 children,	
while	investing	daughters	with	land	that	they	could	not	make	practical	use	of	other	than	
as	a	dowry.		
It	 is	 unclear	 why	 Jefferson	 attributed	 such	misplaced	 grandiosity	 to	 this	 bill.	 The	
boast	in	his	Autobiography	that	he	had	been	the	one	to	abolish	primogeniture	could	be	
attributed	to	the	mistaken	recollection	of	an	old	man,	were	it	not	for	the	fact	that	a	very	
similar	 statement	 exists	 in	 the	 Notes	 on	 Virginia.103	 We	 are	 thus	 confronted	 with	
Jefferson	making	a	highly	exaggerated	claim	about	his	reforms	within	five	years	of	his	
having	submitted	 it	 to	 the	Assembly.	Presumably	 this	 is	 too	soon	 for	such	an	error	of	
memory,	 but	 it	 can	 be	 partly	 explained	 by	 Jefferson’s	 own	 recollection	 of	 the	 debate	
within	 the	 Committee	 of	 Revisors.	 While	 the	 proposed	 bill	 established	 gavelkind,	
Jefferson	wrote	 in	 the	Autobiography	 that	 Pendleton	 had	 advocated	 in	 committee	 for	
retaining	 primogeniture.	 Jefferson	 and	 Wythe	 objected,	 at	 which	 point	 Pendleton	





















rather	than	a	mere	statute,	and	there	was	no	language	 limiting	 it	 to	 intestature.	 It	can	
reasonably	 be	 inferred	 that	 Jefferson’s	 intent	was	 that	 this	 piece	 of	 fundamental	 law	





While	most	 of	 Jefferson’s	 ideas	 on	 land	 reform	were	 passed	 over	 by	 the	 Virginia	
Convention,	all	of	his	proposals	for	the	disposal	of	western	lands	were	included	in	the	
Convention’s	 final	 constitution.106	 The	 Convention	 agreed	 to	 cede	 lands	 claimed	 by	
Pennsylvania,	 Maryland,	 and	 the	 Carolinas;	 to	 fix	 Virginia’s	 borders	 according	 to	 the	
charter	of	1609	and	the	1763	treaty	ending	 the	French	and	 Indian	War;	 to	restrict	all	
purchases	 of	 Indian	 lands	 to	 agents	 of	 the	 commonwealth;	 and	 to	 allow	 Virginia’s	
westernmost	counties	to	form	a	new	state.	
This	still	left	the	areas	of	present	day	Kentucky	and	West	Virginia	to	be	disposed	of	
through	 legislation;	 furthermore,	 Virginia’s	 back	 country	 was	 turning	 into	 a	 chaotic	
mixture	of	land	companies	staking	expansive	claims	and	squatters	grabbing	what	they	
could	 hold	 on	 to.	 Jefferson	 proposed	 a	 number	 of	 bills	 for	 administering	 the	
backcountry.	 In	 particular,	 he	 proposed	 bills	 dividing	 Fincastle	 County,	 which	
encompassed	 all	 Virginian	 land	west	 of	 the	 Appalachians,	 into	 smaller	 districts	while	
also	establishing	a	Land	Office	to	sort	through	claims	and	issue	new	deeds.		
                                                     
105	There	was	one	loophole	by	which	a	testated	estate	could	still	become	subject	to	
the	Bill	 for	Directing	 the	Course	 of	Descents.	 The	 following	bill	 in	 the	Revisal,	No.	 21		
“Bill	concerning	Wills;	the	Distribution	of	Intestate’s	Estates;	and	the	Duty	of	Executors	
and	Administrators”	stipulated	that	if	a	testator	should	leave	a	child	unprovided	for	in	
his	 will,	 the	 entire	 will	 would	 be	 voided	 and	 the	 estate	 treated	 as	 intestate.	 Thus,	 a	
testator	was	obliged	to	make	an	at	least	basic	provision	for	each	of	his	children	to	avoid	






There	 is	 a	 significance	 to	 Jefferson’s	 western	 reforms	 that	 goes	 beyond	 mere	










the	 history	 of	 England	 as	 chronicled	 by	 Blackstone	 or	 fictionalised	 by	 Harrington.	
Jefferson	 had	 very	 good	 reason	 to	 view	 the	 continued	 influence	 of	 feudal	 law	 with	
trepidation.	 The	Northern	Neck,	 that	 part	 of	 Virginia	 lying	 between	 the	 Potomac	 and	
Rappahannock	rivers,	comprised	nearly	a	third	of	the	state’s	territory	east	of	 the	Blue	





a	 cancerous	 growth	within	Virginia	 that	needed	 to	be	neutralised	before	 it	 corrupted	
the	republic	at	large.	
Jefferson’s	writings	rarely	mention	the	Northern	Neck.	 In	 the	Notes	on	Virginia,	he	
comments	 that	 the	 northern	 parts	 of	 the	 Virginia	 Company’s	 original	 claims	 were	
granted	away	to	Lords	Baltimore	and	Fairfax,	but	that	only	Lord	Baltimore’s	claim,	the	
future	proprietary	colony	of	Maryland,	was	given	“the	rights	of	separate	jurisdiction	and	
government.”107	Despite	 this	 passing	 over	 of	 the	Northern	Neck,	 research	 by	Douglas	
Southall	 Freeman	 shows	 that	 the	 Proprietary	 did	 indeed	 have	 a	 separate	 jurisdiction	
while	remaining	part	of	the	Crown	colony,	which	is	further	borne	out	by	the	contents	of	
                                                     
107	 Jefferson,	 Notes	 on	 Virginia,	 p.	 113.	 Sullivan	 describes	 the	 feudal	 dues	 Lord	
Baltimore	paid	to	the	King	as	“five	Indian	arrows	and	a	fifth	of	all	gold	and	silver	found	
in	 the	 province”	 in	 LCB	 Entry	 766.	 In	 1784,	 Jefferson	 became	 aware	 of	 an	 inchoate	






from	 an	 Act	 of	 Assembly.108	 Considering	 that	 Hening’s	 volumes	 were	 compiled	 from	
Jefferson’s	archives,	and	that	Jefferson’s	list	of	“Histories,	Memorials	and	State	Papers”	
in	the	Notes	contains	numerous	references	to	the	history	of	the	Proprietary,	it	is	safe	to	
assume	that	he	knew	more	of	 its	history	 than	he	 let	on	 to	 the	readers	of	 the	Notes.109	
Indeed,	 his	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Proprietary,	 combined	 with	 his	 antipathy	 to	 feudal	
tenures,	 make	 it	 inconceivable	 that	 he	 did	 not	 have	 the	 Proprietary	 in	 mind	 when	
composing	his	laws,	even	though	he	did	not	specifically	mention	it	at	the	time.		
The	history	of	 the	Proprietary	was	one	of	 some	of	 the	 leading	 families	of	England	
exporting	 their	 ambitions	 into	 the	 Virginia	 colony	 via	 the	 acquisition,	 and	 leasing,	 of	
land.	 With	 time,	 the	 joint	 ownership	 of	 the	 Proprietary	 was	 consolidated	 under	 one	
man,	Lord	Fairfax,	and	his	descendants.	The	Proprietary’s	very	existence	disproves	the	
misconception	that	colonial	America	had	no	hereditary	aristocracy.	Indeed,	it	did,	and	in	






The	 lands	 controlled	 by	 the	 Northern	 Neck	 proprietor	 made	 him	 the	 lord	 of	




                                                     
108	 Douglas	 Southall	 Freeman,	 George	 Washington.	 Vol.	 I.	 London:	 Eyre	 &	
Spottswoode,	 1951,	 pp.	 447‐525.	 Also	 see	 W.W.	 Hening,	 The	 Statutes	 at	 Large:	 A	
Collection	of	All	the	Statutes	of	Virginia,	from	the	First	Session	of	the	Legislature	in	1619.	
(R&W&G	Bartow:	New	York)	1823.	For	example,	even	when	quit‐rents	were	abolished	
throughout	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 Proprietor	 continued	 to	 collect	 his	 dues	 in	 the	
Northern	Neck.	Hening	 IX,	p.	359.	For	 Jefferson’s	Act	of	Assembly,	 see	Revisal	Bill	No.	
126,	 “A	 Bill	 for	 Repealing	 Certain	 Acts	 of	 Parliament	 and	 of	 General	 Assembly”,	 in	 TJ	













This	 hierarchy	 also	 provided	 the	 Lord	 with	 potential	 dominance	 within	 the	 state	
itself.	 Under	Virginia’s	 constitution,	 representation	 of	 citizens	was	by	 county,	 and	 the	
delegations	 from	 the	 Northern	 Neck	 counties	 were	 elected	 by	 potentially	 pliable	
constituents.	These	eight	counties	formed	a	significant	group	in	the	House	of	Delegates	
seated	in	October	1776,	although	a	decade	later	their	influence	had	shrunk	as	Virginia’s	
western	 counties	 were	 divided	 into	 smaller	 districts,	 thus	 driving	 up	 the	 total	
membership	of	the	House.	In	addition,	the	quit‐rents	which	would	normally	have	gone	
into	the	public	treasury	were	instead	collected	by	the	proprietor	himself,	depriving	the	
state	of	 revenue.113	From	 the	perspective	of	 a	 legislator	 in	 the	1770s,	 the	Proprietary	







but	 the	 lands	 along	 the	 southern	 bank	 of	 the	 Ohio	 River	 remained	 unorganised.	
Washington,	 and	 other	 Northern	 Neck	 tenants,	 were	 stockholders	 of	 land	 companies	
which	sought	to	buy	up	vast	tracts	of	western	 land	and	lease	them	on	the	proprietary	
model.	 Washington	 himself	 intended	 to	 settle	 three	 hundred	 tenants	 on	 his	 western	
lands.114	The	result	would	be	to	concentrate	wealth	and	political	power	in	the	hands	of	a	
very	small	number	of	the	Proprietor’s	tenants,	who	in	turn	would	become	proprietors	of	
their	 own	 western	 domains.	 The	 entire	 apparatus	 was	 supported	 by	 the	 system	 of	
socage	tenure	that	upheld	manorial	feudalism	in	England.		









As	 stated	 before,	 the	 land	 reforms	 within	 Jefferson’s	 draft	 constitution	 followed	
three	themes:	the	reform	of	feudal	tenures	into	freeholds,	the	breakup	of	large	estates	
through	inheritance	law,	and	the	equitable	distribution	of	new	territories.	Thus	far,	we	
have	 seen	 how	 Pendleton	 dismissed	 Jefferson’s	 attempt	 to	 reform	 tenures,	 and	 how	
Jefferson	abolished	entail	by	operating	outside	of	the	Revisal	of	the	Laws	while	scoring	
only	 a	 symbolic	 victory	 on	 gavelkind	within	 it.	 For	 the	 third	 element,	 Jefferson	 once	
again	moved	 from	 the	 Committee	 of	 Revisors	 to	 the	 floor	 of	 the	 House	 of	 Delegates,	
exchanging	an	obstructionist	in	Pendleton	for	a	willing	ally	in	George	Mason.	




involved	 in	 the	 activities	 of	 land	 companies	 seeking	 to	 divide	 up	 Virginia’s	 western	
lands	and	lease	them	at	profit	to	tenants.	Yet,	once	independence	was	declared,	Mason	
largely	reversed	himself,	and	introduced	a	bill	that	would	have	strengthened	the	claims	
of	 western	 squatters	 against	 the	 corporate	 speculators	 seeking	 to	 uproot	 them.	 In	
addition,	 Mason	 also	 assisted	 Jefferson	 in	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 latter’s	 Bill	 for	
Establishing	a	Land	Office.	
Before	 establishing	 the	 Land	 Office,	 Jefferson	 took	 immediate	 action	 to	 neutralise	
the	 threat	 posed	 by	 one	 of	 the	 land	 companies	 in	 particular.	 Throughout	 1775,	 the	
Transylvania	 Company,	 a	 group	 of	 Virginian	 and	 North	 Carolinian	 investors	 styling	
themselves	 the	 “true	 and	 absolute	 Proprietors	 of	 the	 Colony	 of	 Transylvania”	 had	
attempted	 to	 stake	a	 claim	 to	Virginia’s	western‐most	 county	of	Fincastle,	 in	present‐
day	Kentucky.115	From	Jefferson’s	perspective,	this	would	be	worse	than	another	semi‐
autonomous	proprietary	manor	based	on	 the	Northern	Neck.	 Instead,	 it	would	be	 the	
partition	of	Virginian	territory	and	the	creation	of	a	fifth	proprietary	colony	‐	in	addition	
to	Pennsylvania,	Maryland,	and	the	Carolinas	‐	out	of	Virginia’s	sovereign	charter	lands.		
Jefferson	 responded	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 the	 Transylvania	 Company	 by	 moving	
quickly	 to	recognise	 the	 land	claims	of	western	squatters,	 thereby	enfranchising	 them	
                                                     
115	 Quoted	 in	 Boyd,	 “Editorial	 Note”,	 in	 TJ	 Papers,	 Vol.	 I,	 p.	 565.	 For	 further	
information,	see	“Notes	and	Documents	relating	to	the	Transylvania	and	Other	Claims	
for	 Lands	 under	 Purchases	 from	 the	 Indians”,	 in	 TJ	 Papers,	 Vol.	 II,	 pp.	 64‐66;	 and	





under	 the	 law	 and	 allowing	 them	 to	 vote	 for	members	 of	 the	House	 of	Delegates.	 To	
improve	 western	 administration	 and	 increase	 their	 representation,	 Jefferson	 also	
moved	to	split	Fincastle	into	Kentucky	and	Washington	counties.116	When	this	bill	was	
defeated	 by	 the	 eastern	 aristocrats,	 Jefferson	 tried	 again,	 hijacking,	 while	 still	 in	
committee,	 a	 bill	 that	 would	 legitimise	 the	 Transylvanian	 holdings,	 and	 replacing	 its	
language	with	his	own	before	sending	it	on	to	the	whole	House,	where	it	was	approved	
by	 the	 House	 and	 Senate.117	 The	 new	 bill	 went	 further	 than	 the	 old	 one,	 dividing	
Fincastle	 in	 to	 three	 counties,	 thereby	 tripling	western	 representation,	 filling	 out	 the	
House	 of	 Delegates	 back	 benches	with	members	 inclined	 to	 support	 Jefferson’s	 other	
land	reforms.	It	also	barred	persons	who	had	“taken	any	oath	of	Office	to	the	pretended	
Government”	 of	 the	 Transylvanian	 Company	 from	 taking	 public	 office,	 unless	 that	
person	made	a	public	renunciation	of	the	prior	affiliation.118	
As	 Julian	 Boyd	 observes	 in	 his	 editorial	 note	 on	 the	 Bill	 for	 Establishing	 a	 Land	
Office,	Jefferson’s	objective	was	“to	lay	down	the	foundations	of	a	broad	and	permanent	
policy”	 for	republican	 landholding	 in	 the	west.119	The	Land	Office	bill	proceeded	 from	
the	same	principles	 laid	out	 in	his	draft	constitution	as	did	the	Fincastle	bills:	that	the	
appropriation	 of	 western	 lands	 should	 fall	 to	 the	 public	 authorities,	 not	 private	




the	 effect	 of	 which	 would	 be	 to	 create	 150‐acre	 freeholds	 supporting	 entire	 families	
which,	 according	 to	 the	 Bill	 on	Descents,	would	 then	 be	 divided	 equally	 amongst	 the	
children	upon	their	parents’	deaths,	combining	and	dividing	along	new	lines	with	each	
new	 marriage	 and	 death.120	 Theoretically,	 this	 could	 create	 a	 stable	 system	 of	
freeholding	that	would	last	into	the	foreseeable	future.	














other	 elements	 of	 western	 land	 policy	 contained	 in	 the	 constitution	 could	 not	 be	











entail	 but	 his	 partial	 abolition	 of	 primogeniture	 fell	 short	 of	 the	 sweeping	 gavelkind	
reform	he	proposed	 in	 his	 draft	 constitution.	On	western	 lands,	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	




majority	 of	 the	 citizens.	 In	 that,	 he	 failed,	winning	 tactical	 victories	 against	 the	 great	




the	 full	 thrust	 of	 Jefferson’s	 reforms,	 the	 poorer	 yeomen	 could	 not,	 thereby	 ensuring	
that,	 contrary	 to	 his	 intent,	 large	 estates	 would	 remain	 intact	 while	 smaller	 ones	
                                                     
121	For	a	summary	history	of	the	fate	of	the	land	office	bill,	see	“Editorial	Note”,	in	TJ	
Papers,	 Vol.	 II,	 pp.	 133‐138.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 noting	 that,	 while	 in	 Congress	 in	 1784,	
Jefferson	sponsored	legislation	ceding	Virginia’s	western	claims	north	of	the	Ohio	River	
and	organising	the	territories	into	new	states.	While	not	part	of	his	state	legislation,	it	is	








gentry	who	 used	 feudal	 law	 to	maintain	 their	 landed	 property	while	 expanding	 their	
commercial	 ventures	 in	 land	 speculation.	 Virginian	 landholding	 in	 1785	 was	 not	
substantially	different	from	how	it	had	been	in	1775.	
Jefferson’s	 thinking	 on	 land	 policy	 seems	 to	 have	 broadened	 as	 he	 pursued	 the	
reforms	 from	 1776	 through	 1779.	 His	 draft	 constitution	 was	 similar	 to	 Harrington’s	
agrarian	 law,	with	 clear	 republican	overtones	 since	 the	ownership	of	 land	was	 firmly	
linked	to	civic	participation	in	the	commonwealth.	Yet,	by	the	time	Jefferson	proposed	
his	 entail	 bill	 a	 few	 months	 later,	 he	 emphasised	 economically	 liberal	 reasons	 for	
reform,	 and,	 by	 the	mid‐1780s	 and	 in	 his	Autobiography,	 he	was	 asserting	 a	 vaguely	
defined	 natural	 right	 to	 property.	 Just	 what	 prompted	 this	 expansion	 of	 Jefferson’s	
thinking	 is	 unclear.	 A	 possible	 explanation	 is	 that	 he	 did	 so	 in	 order	 to	 adapt	 to	
Pendleton’s	objections	presented	during	 their	August	correspondence.	Another	 is	 that	
he	 recognised	 that	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Assembly	 would	 not	 look	 favourably	 on	 his	
reforms	if	he	was	open	about	his	intent	to	fracture	the	aristocracy’s	hold	on	political	life.	
This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 liberal	 side	 of	 Jefferson’s	 argument	was	 insincere	 or	
purely	 tactical.	 Instead,	 Jefferson	 seems	 to	 have	 created	 a	 comfortable	 liberal‐
republican	 synthesis,	 holding	 both	 viewpoints	 simultaneously	 and	 extracting	 the	
elements	of	 liberalism	and	 republicanism	 that	most	 complemented	each	other.	 It	was	














modernisation	programme,	 it	was	not	 sufficient.	 As	 early	 as	 the	 1650s,	many	English	
republicans,	such	as	John	Milton	and	the	Levellers,	had	understood	that	a	revolution	in	




that	 principle	 quite	 naturally	 abjured	 dictating	 matters	 of	 conscience	 to	 its	 citizens.	
Second,	the	established	Church	of	England,	with	its	episcopal	hierarchy,	was	identified	
by	 High	 Churchmen	 and	 Dissenters	 alike	 as	 the	 ecclesiastical	 equivalent	 of	 secular	




Jefferson’s	 views	 on	 religion	 were	 complex.	 He	 was	 a	 lifelong	 member	 of	 the	
Anglican	Church	(rechartered	as	the	Protestant	Episcopal	Church	after	independence),	
but	denied	the	Holy	Trinity.	He	saw	a	prominent	role	for	religion	in	public	and	private	
                                                     
1	 Caroline	 Robbins	 and	 J.G.A.	 Pocock	 devote	 little	 attention	 to	 the	 particularly	
Protestant	 aspect	 of	 English	 republicanism,	 preferring	 instead	 to	 focus	 on	 the	
Harringtonian	tradition	 in	their	accounts.	However,	a	belief	 in	spiritual	autonomy	and	
personal	responsibility	was	quite	compatible	with	republicanism	and,	later,	liberalism.	
Michael	 P.	Winship	 has	made	 the	 link	 between	 Protestantism	 and	 republicanism	 the	
explicit	 theme	 of	 his	 recent	 research,	 particularly	 in	 regards	 to	 Puritans	 who	 left	
England	 for	America;	 see	 “Godly	Republicanism	and	 the	Origins	 of	 the	Massachusetts	
Polity."	William	and	Mary	Quarterly	63,	 no.	 3	 (2006):	 427‐462.	Other	writings	 linking	
English	 republicanism	 and	 Christianity	 in	 its	 various	 forms	 include	 Jonathan	 Scott’s	
study	of	republicanism	and	Christian	humanism,	Commonwealth	Principles:	Republican	
Writing	on	 the	English	Revolution.	 Cambridge:	University	Press,	2004.	The	subsequent	
link	 between	 Protestant	 individualism	 and	 philosophical	 liberalism	 can	 be	 found	 in	
focused	studies	on	John	Locke,	such	as	in	Andrew	R.	Murphy,	"The	Uneasy	Relationship	
Between	Social	Contract	Theory	and	Religious	Toleration."	The	Journal	of	Politics	59,	no.	
2	 (1997):	 pp.	 368‐392;	 and	 J.	 Judd	 Owen,	 "Locke's	 Case	 for	 Religious	 Toleration:	 Its	
Neglected	Foundation	 in	 the	Essay	Concerning	Human	Understanding."	The	 Journal	of	
Politics	69,	no.	1	(2007):	pp.	156‐168.	
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life,	 yet	 advocated	 for	 disestablishment	 of	 any	 state	 church.	 He	 embraced	 liberty	 of	
conscience	as	a	fundamental	principle	of	politics,	but	did	so	on	the	grounds	of	Lockean	
liberalism	 rather	 than	 Protestant	 republicanism.	 Like	 his	 views	 on	 land	 reform,	 his	
views	 on	 the	 reform	 of	 public	 religion	 were	 similar	 in	 outcome	 to	 those	 of	 the	
seventeenth‐century	English	republicans	but	differed	 in	 two	 important	respects.	First,	
whereas	 the	 English	 republicans	 found	 liberty	 of	 conscience	 through	 a	 Protestant	
understanding	of	divine	law,	Jefferson	found	it	 in	the	rational	 individualist	psychology	
of	 John	 Locke.	 Second,	 while	 the	 English	 republicans	 saw	 the	 episcopacy	 as	 an	
unreformed	 royalist	 institution	 blocking	 their	 own	 liturgical	 and	 other	 reforms,	
Jefferson	 constructed	 a	much	more	 complex	 criticism	 of	 the	 Established	 Church	 that	
added	to	that	assessment	by	also	critiquing	the	role	of	the	royal	prerogative	in	church	
patronage	and	the	meddling	of	clergymen	in	the	development	of	the	common	law.		
The	 established	 Church	 of	 England	 in	 Virginia	 in	 1776	was	 significantly	 different	
from	the	parent	church.	The	hierarchy	of	 the	Church	of	England	in	Virginia	was	much	
flatter	 than	 its	 parent	 church,	 consisting	 of	 local	 parish	 clergymen	 overseen	 by	 local	
parish	vestry	committees.	While	the	Virginian	clergy	looked	to	the	Bishop	of	London	on	




of	 a	 secular	 aristocracy,	 the	 absence	 of	 episcopacy	 did	 not	 prevent	 some	measure	 of	
ecclesiastical	 aristocracy.	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 the	 very	 same	 gentry	 who	 dominated	 the	




It	was	 in	order	to	break	up	this	 fused	aristocracy,	and	to	remove	state	support	 for	
the	 landed	 clergy,	 that	 Jefferson	 proposed	 his	 Statute	 for	 Establishing	 Religious	
Freedom.	This	statute	was	presented	as	part	of	the	Revisal	of	the	Laws	in	June	1779	and	
was	passed	under	the	direction	of	James	Madison	in	1786,	but	its	origins	lie	earlier	in	a	
single	 line	 from	 Jefferson’s	 draft	 constitution	 in	 June	 1776,	 later	 expanded	 into	 full	
legislation	in	the	October	1776	session	of	the	Assembly.	This	chapter	will	be	presented	











Jefferson’s	 thought	on	 religion	has	attracted	as	much,	 if	 not	 the	most,	 attention	as	
any	 of	 his	 areas	 of	 interest.	 Jefferson	 sought	 to	 place	 himself	 at	 the	 vanguard	 of	 a	
revolution	in	the	public	role	of	religion	in	Western	society,	authoring	Virginia’s	Statute	
for	 Establishing	 Religious	 Freedom,	 advocating	 religious	 pluralism	 to	 the	 French	




what	 influence	 John	 Locke	 had	 upon	 his	 opinion	 of	 religion’s	 proper	 place	 in	 society,	
what	Jefferson	thought	the	public	role	of	religion	should	be,	and	how	he	thought	public	
morality	should	be	encouraged	in	the	absence	of	a	state‐sponsored	church.	
The	 matter	 of	 Jefferson’s	 personal	 theology	 is	 one	 upon	 which	 there	 is	 partial	
consensus.	Like	most	of	 the	Virginia	gentry,	 Jefferson	was	a	member	of	 the	Church	of	
England	in	Virginia	during	the	colonial	period,	and	retained	his	membership	when	the	
church	was	 given	 a	 corporate	 charter	 as	 the	 Protestant	 Episcopal	 Church	 of	 Virginia	
after	the	revolution.	Despite	this	life‐long	affiliation,	Jefferson’s	personal	religious	views	
evolved	considerably,	eventually	culminating	 in	a	 rationalistic	Unitarianism	under	 the	
influence	 of	 his	 friend,	 the	 exiled	 English	 pastor	 Joseph	 Priestley.	 In	 a	 “religious	
biography”	 of	 Jefferson,	 Edwin	 S.	 Gaustad	 characterises	 Jefferson	 as	 an	 “idiosyncratic	
Anglican”,	while	Charles	B.	Sanford,	 in	an	earlier	treatment	of	 Jefferson’s	religious	 life,	
identifies	 him	 as	 a	 fairly	 conventional	 Unitarian.2	 The	 difference	 in	 the	 two	 accounts	
                                                     






On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Eugene	 R.	 Sheridan,	 a	 contributor	 to	 the	 Papers	 of	 Thomas	
Jefferson’s	edition	of	Jefferson’s	“Extracts	from	the	Gospels”,	argues	in	his	Jefferson	and	
Religion	 that	 Jefferson	 was	 a	 Deist,	 not	 a	 Protestant	 of	 Anglican	 or	 Unitarian	





Jefferson	as	not	a	Christian	 seems	 to	be	 to	accept	a	narrowly	Trinitarian	definition	of	
Christianity	 that	Unitarians	 then	and	now	would	 reject	wholeheartedly.	At	 the	 end	of	
the	 day,	 Jefferson	 thought	 of	 himself	 as	 a	 Christian,	 even	 if	 some	 Trinitarians	 don’t	
agree.4	
While	 Jefferson’s	 personal	 theology	 is	 contested,	 its	 essential	 rationalism	 is	 a	
common	 element	 of	 the	 various	 interpretations,	 as	 is	 the	 influence	 of	 the	writer	who	
reconciled	rational	Christianity	with	political	liberalism.	In	multiple	studies,	the	primacy	
of	John	Locke	in	shaping	Jefferson’s	views	on	public	religion,	as	distinct	from	his	views	
on	 theology,	 is	 undisputed,	 based	 on	 strong	 primary	 evidence	 reprinted	 within	 the	
Papers	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 as	 “Notes	 on	 Locke	 and	 Shaftesbury”.5	 The	 differences	 of	
                                                     
3	Eugene	R.	Sheridan,	Jefferson	and	Religion.	Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	
Press,	 1998.	 Reprinted	 from	 the	 introduction	 to	 Jefferson’s	Extracts	 from	 the	Gospels:	






Unitarianism	 remains	 a	 distinctly	 minority	 interpretation	 of	 Christianity,	 and	 that	
Unitarian	congregations	were	almost	exclusively	located	in	New	England,	this	important	
intention	 of	 Jefferson’s	 is	 easy	 to	 overlook.	 See	 Johann	 N.	 Neem,	 “A	 Republican	




argued	 that	 the	Statute	 for	Religious	Freedom	contained	“a	discernable	paraphrasing”	




“Letter	 Concerning	 Toleration”	 or	 whether	 Jefferson	 was	 also	 influenced	 by	 other	 of	
Locke’s	works,	as	well	as	the	relative	importance	of	other	sources	for	which	there	is	not	
as	 much	 direct	 textual	 evidence	 in	 Jefferson’s	 hand.6	 While	 direct	 textual	 evidence	
within	Jefferson’s	“Notes	on	Locke	and	Shaftesbury”	corroborates	the	importance	of	the	
“Letter”,	the	argument	in	support	of	the	influence	of	“Reasonableness”	involves	broader	
similarities	 between	 Jefferson’s	 and	 Locke’s	 religious	 ethic.	 An	 important	 distinction	
separates	 Jefferson	 from	 Locke,	 however:	 while	 Locke	 advocated	 religious	 toleration	
with	important	limitations	for	Catholics	and	atheists,	this	chapter	argues	that	Jefferson	
advocated	 full	 religious	 freedom	 based	 on	 his	 own	 development	 of	 the	 core	 Lockean	
philosophy.	 Based	 on	 this	 distinction,	 Jefferson	 was	 Lockean,	 but	 was	 not	 a	 slavish	
adherent	to	Locke’s	every	view.	





                                                                                                                                                                     
that	 Jefferson	 was	 also	 influenced	 by	 Locke’s	 essay	 on	 “The	 Reasonableness	 of	
Christianity”,	which	provided	the	rationalist	outlook	discussed	by	Gaustad,	Sanford,	and	




relations.	 See,	 	 S.	 Gerald	 Sandler,	 "Lockean	 Ideas	 in	 Thomas	 Jefferson's	 Bill	 for	
Establishing	Religious	Freedom."	 Journal	of	 the	History	of	 Ideas	21,	no.	1	 (1960):	110‐
116.;	 Sanford	Kessler,	 "Locke's	 Influence	 on	 Jefferson's	 ‘Bill	 for	 Establishing	Religious	





same	 direct	 textual	 evidence	 does	 not	 exist	 as	 does	 for	 Locke,	 Shaftesbury,	 and,	 in	 a	
much	 smaller	 role,	 John	Milton.	 See	Gilbert,	 Chinard,	Thomas	 Jefferson:	The	Apostle	of	
Americanism.	Boston:	Little,	Brown	and	Co.,	1933,	and	the	discussion	of	Chinard	in	Mott,	
“Sources	 of	 Jefferson’s	 Ecclesiastical	 Views”,	 p.	 271.	 For	 Milton,	 see	 George	 F.	
Sensabaugh,	 "Jefferson's	 Use	 of	 Milton	 in	 the	 Ecclesiastical	 Controversies	 of	 1776."	
American	Literature	26,	no.	4	(1955):	552‐559.	





the	 Danbury	 Baptists,	 in	 which	 Jefferson	 called	 for	 a	 “wall	 of	 separation”	 between	
church	and	state.	The	relative	permeability	of	 that	wall	has	 fascinated	historians,	 and	
jurists	too,	but	a	letter	written	in	1802	about	New	England	Congregationalists	and	the	





continued	 public	 religion,	 notably	 in	 the	 declaring	 of	 fast	 days,	 in	 public	 offering	 of	






                                                                                                                                                                     
and	 the	 American	 Tradition.	 Fredericksburg,	 VA:	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 Institute	 for	 the	
Study	of	Religious	Freedom,	1986.	
8	For	analysis	of	the	Danbury	letter	itself,	see	the	forum	in	the	October	1999	William	
and	 Mary	 Quarterly,	 particularly	 James	 H.	 Hutson	 and	 Thomas	 Jefferson,	 “Thomas	
Jefferson’s	 Letter	 t	 the	 Danbury	 Baptists:	 A	 Controversy	 Rejoined.”	 The	William	 and	
Mary	Quarterly	56,	no.	4	(1999):	775‐790;	Thomas	E.	Buckley,	“Reflections	on	a	Wall."	
The	William	 and	Mary	 Quarterly	 56,	 no.	 4	 (1999):	 795‐800;	 and	 Edwin	 S.	 Gaustad,	
“Thomas	 Jefferson,	 Danbury	 Baptists,	 And"	 Eternal	 Hostility"."	The	William	 and	Mary	
Quarterly	56,	no.	4	 (1999):	801‐804.	This	 forum	was	organised	 in	response	 to	a	1998	








Relations."	 North	 Carolina	 Law	 Review	 69	 (1990):	 159‐212;	 Dreisbach,	 "New	
Perspective	 on	 Jefferson's	 Views	 on	 Church‐State	 Relations:	 The	 Virginia	 Statute	 for	
Establishing	Religious	Freedom	in	Its	Legislative	Context,	A."	American	Journal	of	Legal	




clashed	 with	 Jefferson	 on	 religious	 legislation,	 or,	 less	 likely,	 that	 of	 George	 Wythe.	
Another	 flaw	 is	 that	 Dreisbach	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 consider	 that	 Jefferson	 could	 have	
supported	 the	 existence	 of	 public	morality,	 including	 the	 free	 exercise	 of	 religion	 for	
those	who	 chose	 to	 do	 so,	without	 agreeing	 that	 a	 state	 sponsorship	was	 the	way	 to	
achieve	that	public	morality.	
The	 question	 of	 what	 would	 replace	 the	 state	 church	 as	 the	 promoter	 of	 public	
morality	 has	 not	 attracted	 quite	 the	 same	 attention	 as	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Jefferson	 and	
religion	question,	but	remains	the	subject	of	several	important	enquiries.	Garry	Wills,	in	
his	 Inventing	 America,	 argued	 that	 Jefferson	 was	 guided	 by	 Scottish	 moral	 sense	
philosophy,	and	that	he	therefore	thought	that	natural	benevolence	formed	the	basis	of	
the	Declaration	of	 Independence	and	presumably	would	provide	a	 sufficient	basis	 for	
public	morality.10	 This	 interpretation	 was	 hotly	 contested	 by	 several	 historians,	 who	
argued	that	Wills	seriously	misinterpreted	the	draft	of	the	Declaration	of	Independence	
that	forms	the	basis	of	Wills’	entire	book.11	More	recently,	in	her	American	Virtues,	Jean	
Yarbrough	 has	 revived	 the	 moral	 sense	 interpretation	 of	 Jefferson’s	 views	 on	 public	
morality,	arguing	(more	persuasively	than	Wills)	from	Jefferson’s	correspondence	that	








Hamowy	 and	 Wills	 were	 referring	 to	 Locke’s	 political,	 not	 religious,	 philosophy.	
Subsequent	critical	responses	include	John	P.	Diggins,	The	Lost	Soul	of	American	Politics.	
Chicago:	University	Press,	1986,	pp.	32‐47.		Diggins	also	disagrees	that	Jefferson	was	a	
Scottish	 moralist,	 arguing	 that	 Scottish	 moral	 philosophy	 was	 based	 on	 science	 and	
Jefferson’s	was	based	on	nature.	Diggins	does	not	adequately	differentiate	between	the	






Garret	 Ward	 Sheldon,	 The	 Political	 Philosophy	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson.	 Baltimore:	 Johns	
Hopkins	University	Press,	1991,	p.	155.	
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suitable	 substitute	 for	 the	 established	 church’s	 coercive	 role	 in	 promoting	 public	
morality.	 While	 historians	 do	 generally	 agree	 that	 the	 “wall	 of	 separation”	 between	






in	 church	patronage,	 ending	 legalised	 coercion,	 and	establishing	 liberty	of	 conscience,	




Like	 the	 counties,	 the	 Anglican	 parishes	 in	 Virginia	 started	 from	 rudimentary	
beginnings	 but,	 by	 the	 mid‐eighteenth	 century,	 had	 become	 mature	 institutions.	
Historian	James	Horn	argues	that	the	Church	of	England	in	Virginia	in	the	seventeenth	
century	was	characterised	by	“weakness”	both	institutionally	and	in	the	commitment	of	




taxation,	 which	 vastly	 exceeded	 the	 analogous	 local	 tax	 levied	 by	 the	 counties.	 The	
widespread	 acceptance	 of	 such	 levies,	 Nelson	 argues,	 indicates	 that	 the	 Established	















their	 own	 power.”16	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 American	 episcopate,	 secular	 authorities	
moved	to	fill	the	gap	in	authority,	and	the	Established	Church	in	Virginia	was	regulated	
by	the	General	Assembly	and	the	General	Court.		At	the	same	time,	the	local	elites	whom	
Jefferson	mistrusted	 in	 the	 county	 courts,	 and	whose	 hereditary	 estates	 he	 sought	 to	





The	 Virginia	 Assembly	 divided	 the	 colony	 into	 parishes	 in	 the	 mid‐seventeenth	
century.	 Similar	 to	 the	 counties	 in	 size	 and	 structure,	 parishes	 were	 responsible	 for	
ecclesiastical	 administration	 as	 well	 as	 some	 aspects	 of	 civil	 administration.	 Nelson	
describes	Virginian	 local	 governance	as	a	 “parish‐county”	hybrid	 in	which	 civil	 courts	
heard	 ecclesiastical	 cases	 while	 parish	 personnel	 assisted	 in	 civil	 matters	 such	 as	




his	 criticism	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 landed	 minor	 clergy,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 landed	
aristocrats	on	the	vestry	who	formed	the	other	wing	of	the	“pseudo‐aristocracy”.18	
Many	 parishes	were	 “commensurate	with	 the	 counties”,	 Jefferson	 recorded	 in	 the	
Notes	 on	Virginia,	 “but	 sometimes	 a	 county	 comprehends	more	 than	 one	 parish,	 and	







sometimes	 a	 parish	more	 than	 one	 county.”19	 	 In	 order	 to	 facilitate	 Sunday	meetings,	
parishes	often	divided	into	multiple	congregations,	each	with	its	own	church	or	chapel,	
unlike	 in	 England	 where	 each	 parish,	 centered	 on	 a	 village	 or	 manor,	 had	 a	 single	
congregation.	 By	 Nelson’s	 count,	 Virginia	 had	 two	 hundred	 and	 forty‐nine	
congregations	 by	 1776,	 spread	 across	 its	 hundred‐odd	 parishes.20	 The	 parson	would	
rotate	amongst	 the	congregations,	 leaving	 the	others	 in	 the	hands	of	a	churchwarden.	
This	further	emphasised	lay	control	‐	in	addition	to	the	prominence	of	the	vestries,	the	
laity	 were	 in	 charge	 of	 their	 own	 services	 at	 least	 every	 other	 week,	 though	 closely	









that	many	 of	 the	 clergy,	 "secure	 for	 life	 in	 their	 glebes	 and	 salaries,	 adding	 to	 these	
generally	 the	 emoluments	 of	 a	 classical	 school,	 found	 employment	 enough,	 in	 their	
farms	 and	 schoolrooms	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 week,	 and	 devoted	 Sunday	 only	 to	 the	
                                                     












back	 pay.	 The	 resulting	 “Parsons’	 Cause”	 courtroom	 drama,	 in	 which	 Patrick	 Henry	
convinced	 a	 jury	 to	 award	 a	 single	 cent	 in	 damages,	 significantly	 poisoned	 relations	
between	the	clergy	and	the	laity,	including	the	vestrymen	who	sat	in	the	Assembly.	
23	c.	XXXIV,	22	George	II,	 “An	Act	for	the	Support	of	 the	Clergy,	and	for	the	regular	

















to	all	 ratepayers	of	 the	parish’s	 local	 tax,	whereas	 in	Virginia	 it	was	always	 limited	 to	
twelve	 parishioners	who	 selected	 their	 own	 replacements	 upon	 resignation	 or	 death.	
Nelson	attributes	 the	 innovation	of	 the	 “select	vestry”	 to	 two	causes.	First,	 geography	
was	 again	 a	 factor,	 as	 assembling	 the	 entire	 body	 of	 adult	 male	 parishioners	 was	
impractical.	Second,	the	Virginia	parishes	lacked	a	patron,	such	as	a	local	nobleman	or	




and	 [justice	 of	 the	peace],	 in	 fact,	were	often	one	 and	 the	 same	person”,	 and	 that	 the	
institutions	 supported	 one	 another	 in	 their	 administrative	 duties,	 ranging	 from	
enforcement	 of	 public	 morals	 to	 assisting	 in	 the	 conveyancing	 of	 estates	 and	 setting	
boundary	lines	between	private	lands.29	Nelson	assesses	the	vestries	as	being	effective	
at	 these	 tasks,	 arguing	 that	 they	 “shouldered	 major	 responsibilities	 which	 they	








discharged	 faithfully”,	 and	 noting	 that,	 as	 an	 unelected	 body,	 “acceptance	 of	 their	






According	to	Horn,	 there	were	five	core	administrative	duties	 for	 the	vestry.32	The	
first	responsibility	was	 to	secure	and	provide	compensation	 for	a	parson.	Second	was	
oversight	 of	 the	 construction	 and	 maintenance	 of	 sufficient	 churches	 and	 chapels	 to	










religious	 observance	 could	 also	 be	 used	 to	 enforce	 more	 general	 tenets	 of	 public	
morality.	 While	 Virginia	 lacked	 a	 dedicated	 ecclesiastical	 court	 system	 as	 existed	 in	





33	According	 to	Nelson,	 there	was	 a	brief	 period	during	 the	 early	1700s	when	 the	
Assembly	 authorised	 separate	 parishes	 for	 Dissenters	 to	 encourage	 foreign	
immigration,	mainly	 from	Germany,	 but	 these	 parishes	were	 later	 reabsorbed	 by	 the	
time	 of	 the	 Great	 Awakening	 and	 the	 example	 was	 not	 repeated.	 Nelson,	 A	 Blessed	
Company,	pp.	282‐284.	
34	 As	 John	 Ragosta	 has	 shown,	 preaching	 without	 a	 license	 from	 the	 Established	
Church	 could	 result	 in	 time	 served	 at	 the	 county	 jail,	 amongst	 other	 punitive	 actions	
that	sometimes	included	carefully	organised	state	violence	against	congregants.	John	A.		




England,	 the	 county	 courts	 took	 on	 this	 role	 in	 the	 decades	 following	 the	 initial	
colonisation.	 County	 grand	 juries	 heard	 presentments	 on	 charges	 of	 swearing,	
drunkenness,	 gambling,	 sexual	 offences,	 and	 Sabbath‐breaking.35	 	 Nelson	 notes	 that	
prosecutions	 of	 moral	 offences	 were	 particularly	 frequent	 in	 the	 Northern	 Neck,	 the	
area	 of	 Virginia	 where,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 feudal	 institutions	 were	
strongest.36		
The	 role	of	 the	parish	was	not	 simply	 coercive,	 for	 they	were	also	 responsible	 for	
administering	what	Nelson	characterises	as	“elaborate	welfare	systems”	for	the	indigent	
and	 infirm.37	 Such	welfare	 services	 including	 placing	 elderly	widows	 in	 the	 homes	 of	
families	 and	 providing	 a	 subsidy	 for	 their	 maintenance,	 binding	 out	 orphaned	 or	
indigent	children	to	 learn	a	trade,	and	maintaining	a	parish	alms	house	to	employ	the	
idle.38	This	entire	parish	apparatus	was	supported	by	dedicated	taxation	 levied	by	the	
vestry.	 On	 this	 point,	 Nelson	 argues,	 “Virginians	 taxed	 themselves	 substantially	more	
heavily	 for	 the	 support	 of	 the	 parish	 than	 for	 any	 other	 public	 purpose.”39	 Parish	
taxation	was	 typically	 levied	at	a	 ratio	of	 five‐to‐two	compared	 to	 the	county	 tax,	and	
outspent	them	two‐to‐one	on	an	annual	basis.	This	indicates	that	the	“parishes	handled	
more	 extensive	 and	 costly	 responsibilities	which	 in	 turn	 reflected	 the	 relative	 values	
Virginians	ascribed	to	these	activities.”40		
In	 light	 of	 the	 extensive	 social	 apparatus	 supported	 by	 the	 Established	 Church,	 in	
particular	 the	 role	 of	 the	 parish	 as	 a	 coequal	 part	 of	 daily	 life	 with	 the	 county,	 it	
becomes	easier	to	understand	why	Dissenters	were	viewed	by	the	Establishment	not	as	
followers	 of	 conscience	 but	 as	 threats	 to	 social	 order.	 As	 Rhys	 Isaac	 puts	 it	 in	 The	
                                                     
35	Lay	officials	of	the	parish	often	provided	depositions	for	these	presentments	and,	





38	The	 latter	 took	place	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	 strong	eighteenth‐century	attitude	 that	
idleness,	unless	part	of	a	propertied	man’s	“leisure”,	was	immoral.	As	such,	the	welfare	





down	 via	 statute	 from	 the	 General	 Assembly,	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 wilful	 decision	 of	
 183
Transformation	of	Virginia,	“the	parish	community	at	the	base	of	the	barely	consolidated	
traditional	 order	was	beginning	 to	 fracture.	The	 rise	 of	 dissent	 represented	a	 serious	
threat	 to	 the	 system	 of	 authority.”41	 Furthermore,	 since	 Dissenting	 preachers,	
particularly	Baptists,	were	“itinerants”	who	moved	from	parish	to	parish,	the	winning	of	
converts	 undermined	 communal	 solidarity	 in	 addition	 to	 elite	 authority.42	 Nelson	
shrewdly	 notes	 that	 the	 Establishment	 had	 good	 reason	 to	 oppose	 the	 breakdown	 of	








cohesive	 force	 of	 the	 Anglican	 church	 in	 the	 colony,”	 Gunderson	 writes.	 “Its	 laws	
imposed	 a	 certain	 uniformity	 upon	 the	 church	 there	 in	 temporal	 matters.	 Besides	
setting	salaries,	 regulating	 the	size	and	condition	of	glebes	and	requiring	ministers	 to	




The	 relationship	 between	 the	 church	 and	 the	 colonial	 state	 was	 sometimes	 also	
tested	through	court	cases,	the	most	infamous	of	which	was	the	Parsons’	Cause.	In	1758,	
the	 Assembly	 passed	 the	 Two‐Penny	 Act,	 which	 set	 parsons’	 compensation,	 hitherto	
paid	in	barrels	of	tobacco	which	could	be	sold	at	market	rate,	at	two	pence	per	barrel.	
The	 law	 was	 vetoed	 by	 the	 King‐in‐Council,	 and	 the	 parsons	 sued	 for	 several	 years	
worth	of	lost	pay.	While	the	court	found	for	the	plaintiffs,	the	defence	attorney,	Patrick	
                                                                                                                                                                     
Virginians	to	erect	and	maintain	such	a	large	parish	social	infrastructure	outweighs	any	
institutional	tradition	passed	down	from	the	English	parishes.	Ibid.,	44‐45.	








himself	 participated	 in	 a	 less	 renowned	 case	 in	 1771.	While	 his	 account	 of	 the	 case	
Godwin	et	al.	v.	Lunan	 is	a	 legal	opinion	and	not	a	pamphlet,	 the	brief	 is	similar	to	the	
Summary	View	in	its	style	and	its	historical	narrative.46	Like	in	that	pamphlet,	Jefferson’s	
goal	 was	 to	 trace	 the	 history	 of	 established	 religion	 in	 England	 to	 Saxon	 times,	
determine	 its	 original	 state	 before	 the	 Norman	 Conquest,	 and	 then	 investigate	 how	
kings	and	nobles	had	brought	community	parishes	under	royal	and	noble	control.	While	




ecclesiastical	 court,	 had	 the	 authority	 to	 decide	 a	matter	 of	 church	 administration,	 as	
opposed	to	ecclesiastical	crimes	and	civil	disputes.	While	he	recognised	that	the	General	
Court	had	ecclesiastical	authority,	he	“conceived	that	it	did	not	follow	thence	that	they	
might	 deprive	 the	 defendant	 of	 his	 parish,	 because	 visitation	 and	 deprivation	 are	 no	
parts	of	 the	office	of	an	ecclesiastical	 judge.”47	Therefore,	 Jefferson	wanted	to	 find	out	




developed	 for	 these	churches.	Third,	he	wanted	 to	know	who	was	responsible	 for	 the	
administration	of	each	type	of	church.48	
Under	 the	 Saxons,	 Jefferson	 reported,	 there	were	 “no	 parochial	 divisions”	 and	 the	
bishops	had	lived	“in	common”	with	the	petty	clergy.49	As	the	borders	of	Christendom	in	
Britain	expanded,	however,	and	as	 the	number	of	 the	 faithful	 increased,	 territory	was	
laid	out	by	the	clergy	into	parishes.	Using	evidence	from	Hume’s	History	of	England	and	
Blackstone’s	 Commentaries,	 Jefferson	 dated	 this	 development	 to	 the	 mid‐seventh	
century.	By	the	mid‐ninth	century,	the	Saxon	kings	and	nobles	were	building	churches	
which	their	tenants	were	expected	to	pay	tithes	to	upkeep.	These	churches	were	known	







as	donatives,	 for	 their	 executive	 authority	 lay	with	 the	patron	who	had	donated	 their	
initial	endowment.50	
“In	 process	 of	 time”,	 Jefferson	 recorded,	 many	 of	 the	 parish	 patrons	 lost	 their	
executive	authority	to	the	bishops,	who	gained	control	over	the	nomination	of	pastors.	
This	 second	 type	 of	 church	 was	 known	 as	 a	 presentative,	 because	 the	 patron	 had	 to	
present	his	nomination	to	the	bishop	for	approval.	Using	Coke’s	Institutes	and	Selden’s	
Tythes,	Jefferson	dated	this	development	to	the	reigns	of	the	Angevin	Kings	Henry	II	and	
John.51	 Therefore,	 the	 creation	 of	 presentatives	 dated	 to	 the	 time	 period	 closely	
following	the	consolidation	of	the	feudal	nobility	and	coinciding	with	the	Anglo‐Norman	
invasion	 of	 Ireland.	 Yet	 again,	 Jefferson	 found	 that	 eighteenth‐century	 practices	 had	
their	origins	in	the	century	following	the	Norman	Conquest.	
There	 was	 a	 third	 class	 of	 church	 as	 well,	 the	 collative,	 which	 accounted	 for	 the	




them	 some	 color	 for	 collating	 the	 clerk,”	 Jefferson	 noted,	 “and	 this	 having	 been	
exercised	 by	 them	 from	 the	 infancy	 of	 Christianity,	 has	 acquired	 the	 force	 of	
immemorial	 custom,	 and	 given	 reality	 to	 the	 right	 now	 known	 by	 the	 name	 of	
collation.”52	
The	different	classes	of	churches	had	different	patrons	who	exercised	the	executive	
rights	 of	 patronage,	 which	 included	 the	 nomination	 of	 the	 pastor,	 the	 donation	 or	
induction	of	 the	nominee	“with	actual	possession”	of	 the	office	and	 its	accouterments,	
including	its	glebe,	and	visitation	“which	is	the	superintending	his	conduct	after	he	is	in	




Virginia,	 so	 how	 could	 the	 Crown	 be	 the	 patron	 of	 the	 parish	 churches?	 Virginia’s	
parishes	had	all	been	 founded	and	endowed	by	an	Act	of	Assembly	 in	1661,	 Jefferson	





explained,	 and	 had	 been	 approved	 by	 the	 King‐in‐Council.	 “Again,	 if	 we	 consider	 the	
community,	 as	made	 up	 of	 King	 and	 People,	 the	 King	will	 then	 be	 the	 patron	 of	 our	
churches,	it	being	a	known	branch	of	the	royal	prerogative,	that	where	the	King	and	his	
subjects	 are	 joint	 founders,	 the	 rights	 of	 patronage	 vest	 in	 the	 King.”54	 In	 situations	
when	the	King	was	unable	to	visit	in	person,	he	could	delegate	a	visitor	pro	tempore;	if	
he	declined	 to	do	so,	 the	visitation	 fell	by	default	 to	 the	king’s	Chancellor	or	a	person	
exercising	chancery	authority.	
Since	the	Crown	had	the	right	of	patronage,	it	could	appoint	pastors	as	it	could	any	
other	 civil	 office,	 but	 this	 had	 not	 always	 been	 the	 case	 in	 practice.	 The	 Act	 of	 1661	
divided	 patronage	 responsibilities	 between	 the	 parishioners	 and	 the	 king’s	 royal	
governor,	with	the	parishioners	nominating	and	the	governor	inducting	the	clergyman;	




nomination	 was	 restored	 to	 the	 crown,	 except	 for	 the	 first	 twelve	 months	 after	 an	
avoidance,	during	which	it	was	given	to	the	vestrymen	of	the	parish.”56	
This	compromise	reflected	wider	practice	in	Virginia	government,	and	showed	just	
how	 closely	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	 government	 in	 Virginia	 had	 become	 fused	 by	 the	
1770s.	“The	King	being	considered	as	the	founder	and	patron	of	the	church,	 if	nothing	




The	 result	 of	 all	 of	 this	 was	 that	 the	 Crown	 retained	 all	 other	 rights	 of	 a	 patron,	
including	the	rights	of	visitation.	Therefore,	the	Crown	could	deprive	an	errant	pastor	if	
it	so	chose,	and	it	could	delegate	authority	in	this	matter,	as	in	all	personnel	matters,	to	










the	Chancellor;	but	 since	 the	Chancellor	was	not	 in	America	either,	 the	authority	was	
further	delegated	to	“the	members	of	this	honorable	court	who	possess	the	powers	of	
the	Chancellor:	not	indeed	sitting	on	this	bench	as	a	court	of	chancery,	but	as	a	court	of	
visitation	 at	 any	 other	 time	 or	 place,	 at	 which	 you	 shall	 think	 proper	 to	 call	 the	
incumbent	 before	 you.”58	 The	 argument	 went	 for	 naught,	 however	 as	 the	 “court	
adjudged	 that	 they	 possessed	 ecclesiastical	 jurisdiction	 in	 general,	 and	 that	 as	 an	




By	 1776,	 the	 colonial	 government,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 General	 Assembly	 and	 the	
General	 Court,	 had	 constructed	 a	 well‐articulated	 model	 of	 church	 governance	 that	
emphasised	 local	 control	 and	which	 emanated,	 via	 patronage,	 from	 the	 Crown	while	











patent	 granted	 by	 Queen	 Elizabeth	 I	 to	 Sir	 Walter	 Raleigh	 specified	 that	 colonies	 in	
America	were	 to	 be	 governed	 according	 to	 “the	 Christian	 faith	 then	 professed	 in	 the	




Sceptre:	 Transatlantic	 Faiths,	 Ideas,	 Personalities,	 and	 Politics,	 1689‐1775.	 Oxford:	
University	Press,	1962,	pp.	316‐323;	and	Nancy	L.	Rhoden	in	Revolutionary	Anglicanism:	








As	 part	 of	 the	 colonial	 settlement	 to	 England’s	 Glorious	 Revolution,	 the	 Bishop	 of	
London	 assumed	 oversight	 of	 the	 colonies	 in	 what	 Nelson	 describes	 as	 an	 “extra‐





assisted	by	a	 local	commissary.64	 In	Virginia,	 the	commissary	sat	on	 the	privy	council,	
and	the	incumbent	in	the	1760s,	James	Blair,	was	active	in	promoting	episcopacy	as	well	
as	using	the	College	of	William	and	Mary	to	train	a	new	generation	of	Virginian	clergy.	
The	 calls	 for	 an	 American	 bishop,	 who	 would	 exceed	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Bishop	 of	
London	 by	 overseeing	 the	 colonies	 directly,	 began	 in	 the	 SPG‐dominated	 northern	
colonies	and	spread	south	during	the	years	1768‐1771.	Commissary	Horrocks,	who	had	
replaced	 Blair,	 called	 a	 convention	 of	 Virginia’s	 hundred	 Anglican	 parsons	 and	 the	
faculty	 of	 the	 College	 to	 debate	 whether	 to	 join	 the	 northerners	 in	 their	 request	 to	
London.	Only	eleven	clergymen	attended	the	convention,	and	with	Horrocks	they	voted	
eight‐to‐four	to	apply	for	a	bishop.	Two	of	the	four	dissenting	clergymen,	Samuel	Henley	
and	 Thomas	 Gwatkin,	 both	 professors	 at	 the	 College,	 took	 their	 dissent	 public	 via	
Virginia’s	newspapers,	denouncing	Horrock’s	convention	as	unrepresentative.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 sensing	 a	 threat	 to	 its	 own	 authority,	 the	 General	 Assembly	
denounced	 the	 convention’s	 petition.	 Richard	Bland,	 a	 vestryman	 and	member	 of	 the	
House	 of	 Burgesses,	 noted	 that	 “if	 this	 scheme	 had	 been	 effected,	 it	 would	 have	
overturned	 all	 the	 acts	 of	 Assembly	 relative	 to	 ecclesiastical	 jurisdiction.”	 The	 entire	
“ecclesiastical	 constitution”	 of	 Virginia	 “must	 be	 altered	 if	 a	 Bishop	 is	 appointed	 in	








ministry	 in	 London	 “believed	 that	 colonial	 society	 had	 to	 be	 remodeled	 as	 much	 as	
possible	on	the	English	constitution	in	church	and	state	to	ensure	colonial	loyalty	to	the	
mother	country.”66	
For	Bland,	 the	 issue	 in	1771	was	that	episcopacy	was	a	holdover	of	Catholicism.	“I	
profess	myself	a	sincere	son	of	the	established	church,	but	I	can	embrace	her	Doctrines	
without	 approving	 of	 her	 Hierarchy,	 which	 I	 know	 to	 be	 a	 Relick	 [sic]	 of	 the	 Papal	
Incroachments	 [sic]	 upon	 the	 Common	 Law.”67	 For	 Jefferson	 in	 1776,	 the	 issue	 was	
episcopacy’s	use	as	a	tool	of	monarchy.	Quoting	John	Milton,	who	quoted	King	James	I	
before	 him,	 Jefferson	 noted	 that	 with	 “no	 bishop”	 there	 could	 be	 “no	 king”.68	 Doll	
elaborates	that	by	the	1559	Act	of	Supremacy,	Parliament	had	fused	the	legal	status	of	
subjecthood	with	membership	 in	 the	 Church	 of	 England.	 “Thenceforward	 there	 could	
not	be	two	jurisdictions,	papal	and	royal,	within	the	one	realm,”	Doll	writes,	“but	only	
the	one,	monarchical	source	of	authority.”69	
Furthermore,	 the	 imposition	 of	 a	 bishop	 was	 contrary	 to	 the	 donative	 church	
patronage	 that	 Jefferson	had	argued	 in	 the	Godwin	v.	Lunan	 case.	A	bishop	could	 take	





an	American	 episcopate	was	 an	 issue	 fraught	with	 constitutional	 implications	 for	 the	
colonies.	Nancy	Rhoden	notes	that	“since	the	creation	of	American	bishoprics	would	be	
                                                     
65	Richard	Bland,	quoted	in	Bridenbaugh,	Mitre	&	Sceptre,	p.	319.	
66	Peter	M.	Doll,	Revolution,	Religion,	and	National	 Identity:	 Imperial	Anglicanism	 in	




an	 influence	 for	 Jefferson	 is	 debatable.	 While	 there	 are	 many	 coincidences,	 a	 direct	
linkage	is	more	difficult	to	prove	than	with	Locke,	but	the	echoes	of	Milton’s	Protestant	












statutes,	 which	 suspended	many	 penalties	 on	 English	 Dissenters	 without	 challenging	
the	 authority	 of	 the	 Church	 of	 England.	 In	 the	 Virginia	 context,	 there	 was	 nothing	
particularly	groundbreaking	about	it	and	it	would	likely	have	gone	without	much	notice	





The	 original	 draft	 of	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Rights,	 written	 in	 committee	 by	 George	
Mason,	called	for	Virginians	“to	enjoy	the	fullest	Toleration	in	the	exercise	of	Religion,	
according	 to	 the	 Dictates	 of	 Conscience”,	 unless	 the	 exercise	 of	 one’s	 religious	 belief	
infringed	upon	the	rights	of	others	established	in	paragraph	one	of	the	Declaration,	and	
that	 “it	 is	 the	mutual	Duty	 of	 all,	 to	 practice	 Christian	 Forbearance,	 Love	 and	Charity	
towards	Each	other.”	The	language	adopted	in	the	committee’s	draft	was	essentially	the	
same.71	 Madison’s	 draft	 retained	 Mason’s	 preamblar	 language	 while	 substantially	
altering	the	paragraph’s	enacting	clause.	As	did	Mason,	Madison	declared	religion	to	be	
a	matter	of	private	conscience,	but	did	not	limit	government	to	protecting	dissenters	via	
toleration.	 Instead,	Madison	proposed	 that	 the	Convention	declare	 that	 “therefore,	 no	
man	 or	 class	 of	 men	 ought,	 on	 account	 of	 religion	 to	 be	 invested	 with	 peculiar	
emoluments	or	privileges;	nor	subjected	to	any	penalties	or	disabilities	unless	under	&c	
[sic]”.72	





Madison	 had	 just	 proposed	 the	 disestablishment	 of	 the	 Church	 of	 England	 in	
Virginia.	 By	 removing	 emoluments	 and	 privileges,	 the	 established	 church	 would	 be	
unable	to	draw	upon	government	revenues	for	its	support.	Meanwhile,	by	removing	the	
reference	 to	 “Christian	 Forebearance,	 Love	 and	 Charity”,	 Madison	 was	 effectively	




offered	 a	 compromise	 resolution	 restoring	 the	 language	 of	 Christian	 charity	 and	
withdrawing	 the	 “emoluments	or	privileges”	clause.	 Instead	of	gutting	 the	established	







Before	 introducing	 his	 reform	 bills	 to	 the	 House	 of	 Delegates	 in	 October	 1776,	
Jefferson	 outlined	 the	 argument	 he	 would	 make	 to	 his	 colleagues	 in	 favour	 of	
disestablishment.	These	speaking	notes,	written	in	shorthand,	are	preserved	as	part	of	
the	 Boyd	 edition	 of	 Jefferson’s	 papers.73	 They	 contain	 a	 four‐part	 argument	 against	
Establishment	 that	 would	 later	 appear	 in	 substantially	 similar	 form	 in	 the	Notes	 on	
Virginia.74	The	substance	of	Jefferson’s	argument	was	that	religion	was	an	intrinsically	
private	 affair,	 and	 therefore	 out	 of	 the	 proper	 business	 of	 the	 government	 under	 the	
social	contract.	For	guidance	in	assembling	his	argument,	Jefferson	relied	on	extensive	
notes	 from	 John	 Locke’s	 A	 Letter	 Concerning	 Toleration	 and	 miscellaneous	 other	
writings	 such	 as	 The	 Reasonableness	 of	 Christianity,	 as	 well	 as	 “A	 Letter	 Concerning	
Enthusiasm”	by	Locke’s	student,	the	3rd	Earl	of	Shaftesbury,	grandson	to	the	1st	Earl	of	





Shaftesbury	 whom	 Pocock	 numbered	 among	 the	 neo‐Harringtonians,	 as	 discussed	 in	
the	previous	chapter.75	









Episcopalians	 for	 control	of	Establishment,	 replacing	one	 form	of	 spiritual	oppression	
with	another.	
I	have	organised	Jefferson’s	written	argument	into	four	parts.	First,	he	reviewed	six	




interfere	 in	religious	matters,	arguing	 that	conscience	was	not	a	necessary	part	of	 the	
social	contract	and	explaining	why	belief	was	a	solely	private	matter.	Fourth	and	finally,	
he	 explained	 why	 Establishment	 necessarily	 meant	 the	 state	 attempting	 to	 impose	







in	 order	 to	 satisfy	 demands	 by	 Dissenters	 that	 religious	 laws	 be	 brought	 into	
accordance	 with	 Article	 XVI,	 and	 because	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 those	 demands	 was	
necessary	 to	 fully	 enlist	 Dissenters	 in	 the	 war	 effort.	 As	 John	 Ragosta	 has	 noted,	
                                                     




that	 had	 attempted	 to	 enforce	 the	 Act	 of	 Toleration	 than	 to	 a	 revolutionary	 regime	
composed	 of	 the	 very	 same	 ruling	 clique,	 the	 leading	 Virginia	 gentry,	 who	 had	 been	







Dissenters	 from	 Contributing	 to	 the	 Support	 of	 the	 Church.”	 The	 first	 bill	 removed	
criminal	liability	from	Dissenters,	who	previously	had	been	subject	to	harsh	repression	
for	 non‐attendance	 at	 Anglican	 services	 and	 for	 conducting	 their	 own	 competing	
services.	The	second	bill	relieved	Dissenters	from	taxation	in	support	of	Establishment,	
but	 made	 exceptions	 for	 taxation	 in	 support	 of	 poor	 relief	 and	 preserved	 church	
property	that	had	been	purchased	with	public	funds.	
These	 two	 bills	 were	 complementary,	 but	 were	 not	 intended	 as	 a	 single	 slate	 of	
reforms.	 Had	 the	 first	 bill	 passed	 without	 changes,	 it	 would	 have	 disestablished	 the	
Church	of	England	immediately	and	no	further	reform	would	have	been	required.	As	it	






Religious	 Freedom,	was	written	 in	 an	 unstable	 environment	 in	which	Dissenters	 had	




82	 disestablished	 the	 Church,	 and	 Bills	 Nos.	 83‐86	 sorted	 out	 various	 aspect	 of	




not	 acted	 upon	 before	 Jefferson	 left	 the	 Assembly	 to	 become	 governor,	 and	 the	




“The	 first	 settlers	 in	 this	 country	 were	 emigrants	 from	 England,	 of	 the	 English	
church,	 just	 at	 a	 point	 in	 time	 when	 it	 was	 flushed	 with	 complete	 victory	 over	 the	
religious	of	all	other	persuasions,”	Jefferson	wrote	in	the	Notes	on	Virginia,	introducing	
the	topic	of	religion	in	Query	XVII.	“Possessed,	as	they	became,	of	the	powers	of	making,	
administering,	 and	 executing	 the	 laws,	 they	 shewed	 [sic]	 equal	 intolerance	 in	 this	
country	 with	 their	 Presbyterian	 brethren,	 who	 had	 emigrated	 to	 the	 northern	





Through	 successive	 acts	 of	 the	 General	 Assembly,	 Virginia’s	 colonial	 government	
made	being	a	Quaker	a	capital	offence.	These	laws	“made	it	penal	in	parents	to	refuse	to	
have	 their	children	baptised;	had	prohibited	 the	unlawful	assembling	of	Quakers;	had	
made	 it	 penal	 for	 any	master	 of	 a	 vessel	 to	 bring	 a	 Quaker	 into	 the	 state;	 [and]	 had	
ordered	 those	already	here,	and	such	as	should	come	 thereafter,	 to	be	 imprisoned	 till	
they	should	abjure	the	country.”80	The	penalty	for	up	to	two	trespasses	was	minor,	but	
the	penalty	for	a	three‐time	offender	was	death.	Although	this	provision	was	seldom	if	




Protestants	 and	 the	 High	 Churchmen	 in	 seventeenth‐century	 England.	 The	 High	
Churchmen	considered	the	Quakers	to	be	Independents	(Congregationalists)	 in	 league	
with	 the	 Levellers.	 Their	 beliefs	 were	 “an	 appeal	 to	 God	 for	 spiritual	 nourishment	
(freely	 granted	 to	 all	men	 and	women	willing	 to	 open	 their	 hearts),	 the	 simplicity	 of	
ritual,	an	emphasis	on	the	intrinsic	equality	of	believers,	and	the	importance	placed	on	
religious	 community.”	 (Horn,	 Adapting	 to	 a	 New	World,	 pp.	 394‐399)	 In	 short,	 the	






the	 church,	 or	 spirit	 of	 the	 legislature,	 as	may	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	 law	 itself;	 but	 to	
historical	circumstances	which	have	not	been	handed	down	to	us.”81	
The	 laws	 against	 Quakers	 were	 a	 particularly	 salient	 part	 of	 Virginia’s	 criminal	
liabilities	 on	 Dissenters,	 all	 the	 more	 dramatic	 given	 Quakers’	 harmlessness	 and	
pacifism.	 In	 his	 argument	 outline,	 Jefferson	 identified	 six	 liabilities	 under	English	 law	
that	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 subsequent	 Virginia	 statutes	 against	 Dissenters	 and	
nonconformists	 of	 all	 sorts.	 These	 liabilities	 included	 the	 common	 law	 crimes	 of	
apostasy,	heresy,	and	recusancy;	the	English	statutes	against	“popery”	and	profaneness;	
and	 the	 requirement	 that	 all	 taxpayers	 pay	 towards	 the	 financial	 support	 of	 the	
Established	 Church.	 Conviction	 for	 apostasy	 led	 to	 the	 gradual	 suspension	 of	 a	





Jefferson’s	 research	 led	 him	 to	 conclude	 that	 these	 three	 common	 law	 categories	
were	not	only	crimes	against	natural	liberty,	they	were	crimes	against	the	common	law	
itself.	 In	 his	 Legal	 Commonplace	 Book,	 Jefferson	 expressed	 his	 scepticism	 that	 laws	
enforcing	 the	 Establishment	 of	 the	 church	 could	 even	 be	 part	 of	 a	 common	 law	 that	
derived	 its	 authority	 from	 its	 genesis	 in	 time	 immemorial.	 “[F]or	 we	 know	 that	 the	
Common	 law	 is	 that	 system	 of	 law	 which	 was	 introduced	 by	 the	 Saxons	 on	 their	
settlement	 in	 England,	 and	 altered	 from	 time	 to	 time	 by	 proper	 legislative	 authority	










686.	 Here	 then	 was	 a	 space	 of	 200	 years	 during	 which	 the	 Common	 law	 was	 in	
existence,	and	Christianity	no	part	of	it.”83	
	Further	 research	 into	 the	many	 other	 ecclesiastical	 crimes	 under	 English	 law	 led	
Jefferson	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 ecclesiastical	 elements	 of	 the	 common	 law	 had	 been	
inserted	by	monks	into	a	compendium	of	the	laws	of	King	Alfred,	and	that	this	“monkish	
fabrication”	 had	 gone	 overlooked	 by	 subsequent	 legal	 scholars.	 “[T]he	 very	words	 of	
Alfred	himself	prove	the	fraud,”	Jefferson	noted,	“for	he	declares	in	that	preface	that	he	
has	collected	these	laws	from	those	of	Ina,	of	Offa,	Aethelbert	and	his	Ancestors,	saying	







to	himself	 in	his	outline.	 “[Most	men	 imagine	persecution	 to	be	unknown	to	our	 laws.	




whether	 the	 people	 of	 this	 country	 would	 suffer	 an	 execution	 for	 heresy,	 or	 a	 three	
years	imprisonment	for	not	comprehending	the	mysteries	of	the	Trinity.	But	is	the	spirit	
of	 the	 people	 an	 infallible,	 a	 permanent	 reliance?”87	 Jefferson	 thought	 people	 were	
rational,	 but	he	did	not	 think	 they	were	perfect.	 “Besides,	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 times	may	
alter,	will	alter.	Our	rulers	will	become	corrupt,	our	people	careless.”		
                                                     
83	LCB	873.	
84	LCB	879.	
85	 Jefferson’s	 outline	 was	 rendered	 in	 shorthand,	 which	 I	 have	 translated	 into	
bracketed	quotes	to	the	best	of	my	ability.	I	have	provided	the	original	shorthand	for	all	
quotes	 in	 the	 interest	of	 clarity.	Original	 shorthand:	 “Gent.	wll.	b.	 surprizd	a.	detl.	yse.	








a	 republic	 in	which	 its	 citizens	 are	 at	 their	maximum	 level	 of	 virtue.	 It	was	 this	 that	
made	Disestablishment	so	urgent.	If	the	people	were	made	complacent	by	the	zeitgeist	
of	 the	 revolution,	 Jefferson	 feared,	 they	would	be	caught	unawares	at	a	 later	 time.	He	
saw	 this	 as	an	 inevitable	product	of	 the	passage	of	 time.	 “From	 the	conclusion	of	 this	
war	we	shall	be	going	down	hill.	It	will	not	then	be	necessary	to	resort	every	moment	to	
the	people	for	support.	They	will	be	forgotten,	therefore,	and	their	rights	disregarded.”88	
In	 the	 meantime,	 Jefferson	 concluded,	 the	 retention	 of	 the	 persecuting	 statutes	
served	a	very	useful	purpose	for	the	Establishment,	in	that	the	statutes	functioned	as	“in	
terrorum”	 laws	 whose	 very	 existence	 was	 sufficient	 to	 coerce	 Dissenters	 into	
conformity.	These	acts	were	not	justifiable	because	everyone	must	assume	that	the	laws	
could	 be	 executed	 at	 any	 time.	 The	 result	was	 to	 “[leave	 everyone	 at	 the	mercy	 of	 a	
bigot]”	 who	 chose	 to	 capriciously	 enforce	 the	 law.	 Furthermore,	 “[everyone	 should	
know	under	what	law	[they]	live]”	and	should	“[not	be	obliged	to	the	spirit	of	the	times	





be	 replaced	 by	 an	 ethic	 of	 toleration.	 Jefferson	 concurred	 in	 this	 assessment,	 arguing	
that	 “former	 efforts	 at	 toleration	 have	 succeeded”	 except	 in	 cases,	 such	 as	 that	 of	
Calvinist	 rule	 in	 Britain,	 whereby	 a	 dissenting	 sect	 used	 toleration	 to	 replace	 an	
established	sect	and	assume	its	place	as	a	new	oppressor.	The	“true	mode”	was	“only	for	
all	 to	 concur,	 &	 throw	 open	 to	 all”	 the	 right	 to	 worship	 freely.	 The	 different	
denominations	 ‐	 Anglican,	 Presbyterian,	 Baptist,	 Quaker	 ‐	 in	 Virginia	 society	 would	
balance	 one	 another	 and	 prevent	 a	 similar	 usurpation.	 “[The	 present	 church	 is	 too	










Writing	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Britain’s	 seventeenth‐century	 revolutions,	 which	 were	
strongly	 imbued	with	 religious	 issues	 and	 ramifications,	 Locke	was	 quite	 practical	 in	
how	 he	 thought	 toleration	 should	 be	 executed.	 “How	 far	 does	 the	 duty	 of	 toleration	
extend?”	Jefferson	recorded.	“1.	No	church	is	bound	by	the	duty	of	toleration	to	retain	
within	her	bosom	obstinate	offenders	against	her	laws.	2.	We	have	no	right	to	prejudice	
another	 in	 his	 civil	 enjoiments	 [sic]	 because	 he	 is	 of	 another	 church.”92	 The	 private	
nature	of	religious	belief	set	it	apart	from	other	areas	the	government	might	choose	to	
regulate.	 “Compulsion	 in	religion	 is	distinguished	peculiarly	 from	compulsion	 in	every	
other	 thing	 …	 I	 cannot	 be	 saved	 by	 a	 worship	 I	 disbelieve	 &	 abhor”	 [emphasis	 in	
original].93	Jefferson	was	of	a	similar	mind.	“But	it	does	me	no	injury	for	my	neighbor	to	
say	that	there	are	twenty	gods,	or	no	god.	It	neither	picks	my	pocket	nor	breaks	my	leg	
….	 Constraint	 may	 make	 [a	 Dissenter]	 worse	 by	 making	 him	 a	 hypocrite,	 but	 it	 will	
never	make	him	a	truer	man.”94	
To	 that	 end,	 Locke	 recommended	 that	 the	 law	 be	made	 as	 consistent	 as	 possible.	
“Whatsoever	is	lawful	in	the	Commonwealth,	or	permitted	to	the	subject	in	the	ordinary	
way,	 cannot	 be	 forbidden	 to	 him	 for	 religious	 uses,”	 Jefferson	 paraphrased,	 and	






could	not	 justly	 legislate	 religious	observance	because	personal	belief	was	not	part	of	
the	social	contract.	Transcribing	from	Locke,	Jefferson	wrote	that	the	“commonwealth	is	
‘a	society	of	men	constituted	for	preser[ving]	their	civil	<rights>	interests”	(emphasis	in	









original),	 which	 are	 “life,	 health,	 indolency	 of	 body,	 liberty,	 and	 property”.96	 Here,	
Jefferson	and	Locke	seem	to	be	equating	civil	rights	with	state‐protected	natural	rights,	
but	 the	 list	 is	 not	 exhaustive.	 Other	 rights,	 rights	 that	 the	 commonwealth	 is	 not	
instituted	to	preserve,	remain	outside	 its	purview.	Whereas	any	of	the	rights	 listed	by	
Locke	may	be	 circumscribed	 for	 the	good	of	 the	 community	 ‐	property	may	be	 taxed,	






rights	 were	 respected	 by	 the	 civil	 government.98	 “The	 rights	 of	 conscience	we	 never	
submitted,	 could	 not	 submit,”	 he	 elaborated	 in	 the	Notes	 on	Virginia.	 “The	 legitimate	
powers	of	government	extend	to	such	acts	only	as	are	injurious	to	others.”99	To	afford	
government	 the	 authority	 to	 police	men’s	 thoughts	would	 swiftly	 lead	 to	 attempts	 to	
impose	uniformity	of	conscience,	efforts	which	he	considered	to	be	the	source	of	much	




liberty	 were	 natural	 rights	 that	 government	 was	 instituted	 to	 protect	 from	 the	
uncertainties	of	the	state	of	nature,	which	justified	the	compromise	of	some	other	rights	
in	 order	 to	make	 effective	 government	 possible,	 “[religious	 rights	 are	 not	 necessarily	
surrendered]”	 since	 their	 surrender	was	 not	 essential	 to	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 the	 state’s	
mandate.101	This	was	a	 consistent	piece	of	 Jefferson’s	 constitutional	 thought	 from	 the	
revolution	through	his	time	as	a	leader	of	the	federal	opposition	party:	that	the	written	












that	 were	 essential	 to	 its	 mandate,	 not	 powers	 that	 were	 implied	 or	 merely	
convenient.102	
In	 keeping	 with	 both	 Reform	 Protestantism	 and	 rational	 individualism,	 Jefferson	
believed	that	 the	nature	of	 faith	 is	personal.	 “The	 life	&	essence	of	religion	consists	 in	
the	internal	persuasion	or	belief	of	the	mind,”	Locke	declared.	“No	man	has	power	to	let	
another	 prescribe	 his	 faith.	 [F]aith	 is	 not	 faith	 [without]	 believing.	 [N]o	 man	 can	







To	 equate	 the	 social	 contract	with	 cession	 of	 the	 right	 to	 one’s	 own	mind	was	 to	
fundamentally	 misunderstand	 the	 nature	 and	 limits	 of	 the	 commonwealth.	 Jefferson	
argued	 that	Establishment,	and	all	of	 the	persecuting	 laws	 that	 remained	 in	Virginia’s	
legal	code,	amounted	 to	 “religious	slavery,	under	which	a	people	have	been	willing	 to	
remain,	who	have	 lavished	 their	 lives	and	 fortunes	 for	 the	establishment	of	 their	civil	
freedom.”106	 For	 the	 revolutionary	 settlement	 in	 Virginia	 to	 be	 intellectually	 and	
morally	 consistent,	 it	 would	 have	 to	 adopt	 the	 same	 liberal	 ethos	 that	 Jefferson	was	
seeking	 to	 incorporate	 in	 his	 other	 republican	 reforms,	 and	 abjure	 any	 pretension	 to	
enforcing	 uniformity	 of	 religious	 opinion	 while	 simultaneously	 extolling	 plurality	 of	
political	opinion.	
                                                     
102	This	 insight	can	go	a	 long	way	towards	explaining	other	elements	of	 Jefferson’s	
strict	constructionist	constitutionalism,	such	as	his	opposition	to	Alexander	Hamilton’s	
Bank	 of	 the	United	 States	 in	 the	 1790s	 and	 Jefferson’s	 own	 ambivalence	 towards	 the	














Religious	 belief	 was	 thus	 an	 individual	 opinion	 reached	 through	 rational	 means.	 By	
natural	right,	Jefferson	argued,	a	man	had	as	much	right	to	his	religious	opinions	as	to	
those	 in	 any	 other	 field	 of	 knowledge.	 “Was	 the	 government	 to	 prescribe	 to	 us	 our	
medicine	 and	 diet,	 our	 bodies	would	 be	 in	 such	 keeping	 as	 our	 souls	 are”	 under	 the	
Establishment,	he	wrote	in	the	Notes	on	the	State	of	Virginia.	“Thus	in	France	the	emetic	




the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Protestant	 Episcopal	 Church	 to	 the	 Catholic	 inquisition,	
Jefferson	 held	 up	 all	 establishments,	 whether	 Protestant	 or	 Catholic,	 as	 objects	 of	
contempt.	
Instead,	 Jefferson	 argued	 that	 free	 enquiry	 was	 in	 fact	 the	 friend	 of	 rational	
Christianity,	 for	 religious	 truth	 would	 withstand	 scrutiny	 whilst	 untruth	 would	 be	
exposed.	 “Reason	 and	 free	 enquiry	 are	 the	 only	 effectual	 agents	 against	 error.	 Give	 a	





between	 his	 conception	 of	 religious	 faith	 and	 the	 various	 Enlightenment	 “enquiries”	
into	moral	philosophy	that	postulated	the	theories	of	divinely‐inspired	natural	law	and	
natural	 rights	 which	 in	 turn	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 Jeffersonian	 politics.	 Religion,	
philosophy	 and	 politics	 thus	 formed	 a	 self‐reinforcing	 circle	 of	 enquiry	 leading	 to	
constant	improvement,	if	left	uninterrupted	by	government	interference.	
                                                                                                                                                                     
106	Jefferson,	Notes	on	Virginia,	p.	159.	





This	 viewpoint	 was	 shared	 by	 other	 moderate	 Christian	 literati	 such	 as	 the	
Presbyterian	Rev.	Samuel	Stanhope	Smith,	a	correspondent	of	Jefferson’s	who	was	also	
acquainted	with	Madison	 from	 their	 time	 together	 at	 the	College	of	New	 Jersey.	 "The	
reasons	 for	a	public	 religion	have	always	seemed	 to	me	 inconclusive,”	Smith	wrote	 to	
Jefferson	as	the	Statute	for	Religious	Freedom	was	unveiled	in	1779.	“If	christianity	is	of	
divine	original	it	will	support	itself	or	forfeit	its	pretensions;	and	upon	this	principle	it	
first	undertook	 to	discipline	 the	world.	And	 if	 there	be	no	religion	of	divine	authority	
except	 the	 religion	 of	 nature,	 the	 state	 may	 well	 be	 contented	 to	 leave	 men	 in	 the	
condition	which	the	Deity	himself	hath	left	them	with	regard	to	his	worship,	and	permit	
every	man	to	be	his	own	interpreter	of	that	natural	law."109	
Indeed,	 religious	 establishment	 was	 particularly	 anathema	 to	 moderate	
Presbyterians	 like	 Smith,	 whose	 faith	was	 premised	 upon	 rejection	 of	 pretensions	 to	
infallibility	by	mortal	men.	Jefferson	ruminated	upon	how	a	thousand	states	in	history	
had	 established	 a	 thousand	 different	 sects	 as	 the	 true	 religion,	 and	 that	 “reason	 and	





For	 Jefferson,	 uniformity	 of	 religion	was	 not	 only	 the	 fount	 of	mischief,	 but	 it	 ran	
against	his	entire	liberal	inclination	in	philosophy	and	life.	“Subject	opinion	to	coercion:	
whom	will	you	make	your	inquisitors?	Fallible	men;	men	governed	by	bad	passions,	by	
private	 as	 well	 as	 public	 reasons.	 And	 why	 subject	 it	 to	 coercion?	 To	 produce	
uniformity.	But	is	uniformity	of	opinion	desireable?	No	more	than	face	and	stature.”111	
Then,	 employing	 physiognomic	 analogy,	 Jefferson	 conjured	 the	 grotesque	 image	 of	 a	
Procrustean	bed,	with	inquisitors	mutilating	the	consciences	of	their	victims	in	order	to	













through	Article	 XVI	 and	 the	 legislation	 of	 autumn	1776.	 The	 lengthy	 preamble	 to	 the	
statute	reiterated	 the	arguments	that	 Jefferson	had	made	to	 the	Assembly	 three	years	





those	 who	 sought	 to	 impose	 piety	 via	 the	 law	 were	 actually	 people	 of	 “impious	
presumption”,	who	 “being	 themselves	 but	 fallible	 and	uninspired	men,	 have	 assumed	
dominion	over	the	faith	of	others.”	Such	ecclesiastical	aristocrats	across	the	ages	“hath	
established	 and	 maintained	 false	 religions	 over	 the	 greatest	 part	 of	 the	 world	 and	
through	 all	 time.”	 Furthermore,	 having	 gain	 controlled	 of	 state	 support,	 these	
aristocrats	 then	 ruled	 through	 coercion,	 using	 taxation	 to	 prop	 up	 their	 “sinful	 and	
tyrannical”	 clerical	 orders.	 This	 coercion	 was	 underscored	 by	 the	 civil	 liabilities	
imposed	on	dissenters,	“depriving	him	injuriously	of	those	privileges	and	advantages	to	




The	 Statute	 for	 Establishing	 Religious	 Freedom	 would	 therefore	 restore	 that	
“natural	 right”	 to	 “profess,	 and	 by	 argument	 to	 maintain	 …	 opinions	 in	 matters	 of	
religion,	 and	 that	 the	 same	 shall	 in	 no	 wise	 diminish,	 enlarge,	 or	 affect	 [one’s]	 civil	
capacities.”	 Jefferson	 even	 went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 try	 to	 shame	 a	 hypothetical	 future,	
reactionary	Assembly	 from	attempting	 to	repeat	 the	Statute.	Although	“this	Assembly,	
elected	by	 the	people	 for	 the	ordinary	purposes	of	 legislation	only,	have	no	power	 to	
restrain	the	acts	of	succeeding	Assemblies	…	we	are	free	to	declare,	and	do	declare,	that	








Jefferson’s	 argument	 did	 not	 sway	his	 colleagues	 in	 the	House	 of	Delegates	 in	 the	
autumn	 of	 1776,	who	 only	 agreed	 to	 suspend	 the	 parish	 levies	 on	Dissenters	 for	 the	
duration	 of	 the	 war.	 The	 problem	 was	 two‐fold.	 First,	 and	 most	 obviously,	 the	
vestrymen	who	 sat	 in	 the	 Assembly	were	 reluctant	 to	 upend	 the	 carefully	 calibrated	
county‐parish	 system,	 and	all	 that	 it	 entailed	 for	 local	 order	 as	well	 as	 their	 personal	




Lee	 proclaimed	 that	 “the	 experience	 of	 all	 time	 shows	 religion	 to	 be	 the	 guardian	 of	
morals.”115	The	solution	proposed	by	the	proponents	of	continued	Establishment	was	to	
allow	 the	major	Dissenting	 sects	 to	 join	 the	Anglican	Church	 (swiftly	 reconstituted	as	
the	Protestant	Episcopal	Church	after	 independence)	as	part	of	a	plural	Establishment	
supported	 by	 a	 general	 assessment	 that	 would	 replace	 the	 parish	 levies.	 Jefferson	






mobilisation	and	 taxation	ended,	 and	 religious	 issues	 returned	 to	 the	 attention	of	 the	
Virginia	Assembly.	 The	 autumn	1784	 session	 concerned	 itself	with	 the	 twin	 issues	 of	
church	property	holding	and	church	finance	‐	specifically,	the	still	unresolved	status	of	
the	 real	estate	of	 the	Established	Church,	which	was	now	severed	 from	the	Church	of	
England,	and	the	status	of	ecclesiastical	taxation	that	had	been	suspended	in	the	1770s.	
The	solution	was	the	incorporation	of	the	Established	church	under	Virginia	law	as	the	
Protestant	 Episcopal	 Church,	 and	 the	 general	 assessment	 of	 all	 Virginians	 for	 the	















not	 emerge	 until	 after	 it	 had	 been	 passed,	 with	 the	 vestries	 displeased	 that	 the	
Convention	 had	 been	 granted	 the	 power	 of	 selecting	 clergy	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 laity	
petitioning	 the	 Assembly	 in	 objection	 to	 the	 undemocratic	 mode	 of	 selecting	 the	
Convention’s	membership.118		
As	 Madison	 described	 it,	 the	 House	 had	 overlooked	 the	 fact	 that	 with	 one	 lay	
delegate	and	one	clergyman	from	each	parish,	the	clergy	would	have	an	equal	say	with	
the	 vestries	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 new	 church.119	 Self‐selection	 of	 their	 own	
membership	had	been	good	enough	 for	 the	vestrymen	before	 the	revolution,	but	now	
that	 circumstances	 changed	 and	 it	 was	 the	 clergy	 who	 wanted	 to	 self‐select,	 the	
possibility	 of	 a	 self‐perpetuating	 clergy	 looked	 very	 much	 like	 a	 true	 ecclesiastical	
aristocracy.	The	 vestrymen,	whose	proxies	 in	 the	House	of	Delegates	had	missed	 this	
detail,	wanted	the	act	amended	to	double	the	number	of	lay	members	of	the	Convention.	
The	displeasure	was	more	pronounced	 in	a	 lay	petition	 to	 the	House,	denouncing	 the	
Virginia	 Assembly’s	meddling	 in	 church	 affairs	 and	 arguing	 that,	 by	 giving	 the	 clergy	
authority	 to	 legislate	 for	 the	 laity	 in	 the	 Convention,	 the	 Assembly	 had	 violated	 the	
laity’s	 “fundamental	 right	 of	 Chusing	 [sic]	 their	 own	 Legislators.”120	 The	 petition	was	
thus	a	blow	both	 to	 the	principle	of	 establishment	and	 to	 the	principle	of	episcopacy,	









The	 Incorporation	 Act	 was	 thus	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 a	 mistake,	 and	 after	
disestablishment	it	was	repealed	and	replaced	with	a	more	liberal	act	that	allowed	any	
church	 to	 incorporate	 itself	and	reserved	all	decisions	on	church	governance	 to	 those	
corporations,	 an	 obvious	 nod	 to	 the	 former	 Dissenters	 whose	 forms	 of	 governance	
varied	 widely.121	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 while	 the	 Incorporation	 Act	 had	 only	
applied	 to	 the	 Established	 Church,	 it	 was	 viewed	 by	 its	 supporters,	 such	 as	 Edmund	
Pendleton,	as	being	the	first	of	many	incorporations	of	churches	in	Virginia	and	thus	not	




in	 a	 society	 that	 had	 known	only	 a	 single	 Established	 church	 as	 a	 stabilising	 force	 in	
society.	This	stabilisation	was	both	social,	in	that	it	kept	the	social	hierarchy	intact,	but	
also	moral	in	that	state‐supported	religion	was	considered	conducive	to	the	cultivation	
of	 good	 public	morality.	 This	 nexus	 of	 public	 religion	 and	morality	 was	what	 Fred	 J.	
Hood	 has	 called	 the	 “theocratic	 concept”	 and	 it	 was	 held	 by	 many	 of	 Virginia’s	
denominations,	 not	 only	 the	 Episcopalians.123	 Hood	 argues	 that	 conservative	
Protestants	 of	 all	 denominations	 “conceived	 of	 religious	 liberty	 as	 a	 religious	 dogma	
compatible	with	an	established	religion	and	that	the	legal	separation	of	church	and	state	
did	 not	 alter	 that	 belief	 or	 its	 influence.”124	 Therefore,	 just	 as	 the	 clergy	 of	 the	
Episcopalian	 Church	 had	 supported	 the	 terms	 of	 incorporation	 before	 being	 turned	
back	 by	 their	 laity,	 the	 clergy	 of	 other	 denominations,	 notably	 the	 Presbyterians,	
supported	plural	establishment	funded	by	compulsory	taxation	before	a	revolt	in	their	
back	pews	compelled	them	to	reverse	their	position	in	favour	of	disestablishment.	










The	appeal	of	 the	plural	 establishment	 can	be	over‐stated,	however,	 and	 the	wide	
appeal	of	the	proposal	to	laymen	of	otherwise	liberal	temperament	must	be	noted	so	as	




and	 he	 must	 be	 a	 very	 inattentive	 observer	 in	 our	 Country,	 who	 does	 not	 see	 that	
avarice	 is	 accomplishing	 the	 destruction	 of	 religion,	 for	 want	 of	 a	 legal	 obligation	 to	
contribute	 something	 to	 its	 support,”	 Lee	wrote	 to	Madison,	 proceeding	 to	 frame	 his	
support	 for	 general	 assessment	 as	 consistent	 with	 Article	 XVI	 and	 the	 principle	 of	
religious	 freedom.	 “The	declaration	of	Rights,	 it	 seems	 to	me,	 rather	 contends	against	
forcing	modes	of	 faith	and	 forms	of	worship,	 than	against	compelling	contribution	 for	
the	support	of	religion	in	general.	I	fully	agree	with	the	presbyterians,	that	true	freedom	




For	 Jefferson,	 singular	 or	 plural	 Establishment	 was	 harmful	 to	 virtue	 because	 it	
imposed	uniformity,	whereas	true	virtue	was	the	product	of	 individual	character.	This	
character	would	 be	 shaped	 not	 by	 compulsory	 church	 attendance,	 but	would	 instead	
have	a	much	broader	base	by	occurring	naturally	 from	the	 lifestyles	of	Virginians	that	
he	 had	 been	 shaping	 through	 his	 other	 reforms.	 Jean	 Yarbrough,	 in	 her	 study	 of	
Jefferson’s	 moral	 thought	 entitled	 American	 Virtues,	 identifies	 naturally	 occurring	
benevolence	as	the	centre‐piece	of	Jefferson’s	plan	for	republican	virtue,	supplemented	
by	 agrarian	 virtue	 from	 the	 freehold	 farmer’s	 lifestyle	 and	 civic	 virtue	 from	
participation	 in	 local	 governance.	To	 the	extent	 that	 Jefferson	had	a	 concrete	plan	 for	
encouraging	virtue	after	disestablishment,	Yarbrough’s	account	is	generally	accurate.	
One	 of	 the	 things	 that	made	 Jefferson’s	 liberalism	work,	which	made	 him	 a	 social	
contractarian	in	the	tradition	of	Locke	and	not	of	Hobbes,	was	his	optimistic	view	that	
human	nature	was	good	and	that	human	beings	would	generally	act	upon	that	nature.	
Yarbrough,	 calling	 upon	 Jefferson’s	 commonplace	 books	 as	 well	 as	 his	 retirement	















more	proximate	 letter	 from	August	1787	 seems	 to	place	 Jefferson	within	 the	Scottish	
school	 generally	 rather	 than	 as	 an	 adherent	 of	 Kames	 in	 particular.	 In	 it,	 Jefferson	
advises	his	nephew,	Peter	Carr,	to	shun	the	study	of	moral	philosophy,	arguing	instead	
that	the	use	of	his	moral	sense	would	be	enough	to	guide	him	through	life.		
“I	 think	 it	 lost	 time	 to	attend	 lectures	 in	 this	branch.	He	who	made	us	would	have	
been	a	pitiful	bungler	if	he	had	made	the	rules	of	our	moral	conduct	a	matter	of	science,”	
Jefferson	 declared.128	 He	 then	 went	 on	 to	 make	 a	 generic	 statement	 of	 moral	 sense	
theory.	“Man	was	destined	for	society.	His	morality	therefore	was	to	be	formed	to	this	
object.	He	was	endowed	with	a	 sense	of	 right	and	wrong	merely	 relative	 to	 this.	This	
sense	is	as	much	a	part	of	his	nature	as	the	sense	of	hearing,	seeing,	feeling;	it	is	the	true	
foundation	 of	morality,	 and	 not	 the	 truth,	 &c.,	 as	 fanciful	writers	 have	 imagined.	 The	
moral	sense,	or	conscience,	is	as	much	a	part	of	man	as	his	leg	or	arm.	It	is	given	to	all	











well,	 and	often	better	 than	 the	 latter,	 because	he	has	not	 been	 led	 astray	by	 artificial	
rules.”129	
Jefferson’s	 choice	of	 a	 farmer	was	 significant,	 for	he	aimed	 to	enhance	 the	natural	
effects	 of	 benevolence	 through	 the	 virtues	 inculcated	 by	 the	 farming	 lifestyle.	 In	 the	
Notes	on	Virginia,	he	asserted	that	his	nation	of	farmers	would	replace	the	Children	of	
Israel	as	“the	chosen	people	of	God,	if	ever	he	had	a	chosen	people,	whose	breasts	he	has	
made	 his	 peculiar	 deposit	 for	 substantial	 and	 genuine	 virtue.”130	 In	 light	 of	
Disestablishment,	 this	 label	 becomes	 more	 significant,	 becoming	 a	 sort	 of	 agrarian,	
secular	 Calvinism.	 Jefferson	 saw	 the	 pursuit	 of	 yeoman	 agriculture	 as	 an	 inherently	
virtuous	pursuit,	as	it	inculcated	values	of	hard	work,	responsibility,	and	thriftiness.131	
It	 also	 served	 as	 a	 bulwark	 against	 the	 vices	 of	 commercialism,	 though	 this	 was	 not	
airtight,	for	as	seen	in	chapter	three	Jefferson	saw	land	ownership	both	as	a	republican	
means	 of	 ensuring	 personal	 independence	 and	 a	 liberal	means	 of	 earning	 a	 living	 to	
support	oneself,	including	through	the	sale	of	surplus	in	a	market.	
In	 addition	 to	 benevolence	 and	 agrarian	 virtue,	 the	 third	 element	 identified	 by	





only	 through	 participation	 in	 the	 republic	 ‐	 this	 was	 a	 standard	 part	 of	 republican	
theory.	 Yarbrough	 does	 identify	 some	 differences	 between	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 classical	
republicans.132	 While	 the	 classics	 emphasised	 the	 role	 of	 leaders	 who	 would	 inspire	
virtue	 by	 their	 example,	 Jefferson	 emphasised	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 citizen.	 He	 also	
liberalised	his	republicanism	by	using	self‐interest	as	a	virtue,	not	a	vice,	arguing	that	
rational	 individuality,	 particularly	 through	 education,	 would	 increase	 virtue	 even	
further.	
	
                                                     
129	Ibid.,	p.	15.	This	is	highly	consistent	with	the	moral	philosophy	laid	out	by	Adam	
Smith	 in	The	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	 in	which	 “natural	 sympathy”,	or	empathy	as	







Church	 of	 England	 in	 Virginia	 amongst	 his	 reforms	 to	 undo	 “feudal	 and	 unnatural	
distinctions”,	and	to	address	the	issue	of	what	the	new	republic	would	do	to	encourage	
virtue	once	there	was	no	 longer	an	Established	Church	to	make	people	moral.	To	that	




Like	 other	 elements	 of	 feudalism,	 Jefferson’s	 proposal	 for	 disestablishment	
embraced	 liberal	 solutions	 predicated	 on	 the	 rational	 individualism	 of	 the	 republic’s	
citizens.	His	argument,	 largely	 inspired	by	Locke,	was	not	 that	religion	was	 irrelevant,	
but	that	it	could	best	be	observed	through	the	dictates	of	one’s	own	conscience,	and	that	
liberty	 of	 conscience	 was	 a	 natural	 right	 not	 alienated	 under	 the	 social	 contract.	 In	
adopting	Locke’s	approach,	Jefferson	was	also	acting	in	the	tradition	of	the	seventeenth‐
century	 English	 republicans,	 who	 made	 conscience	 their	 own	 cause	 for	 war	 when	





to	 be	 a	 self‐governing	 republic	 reliant	 on	 the	 virtue	 of	 its	 own	 citizens	 in	 order	 to	
survive.	 Jefferson	 seemed	 to	 put	 his	 faith	 in	 people	 continuing	 to	 attend	 church	
voluntarily,	and	in	becoming	virtuous	through	the	lifestyle	choice	of	yeoman	farming,	as	
well	 as	 participating	 in	 civic	 life.	 Their	 natural	 benevolence	 would	 make	 up	 for	
whatever	the	parish,	the	family	farm,	and	the	local	courthouse	failed	to	provide.		
Jefferson’s	 optimistic	 outlook	 on	 people’s	 natural	 moral	 psychology	 seems	 to	
account	for	his	entire	plan	for	republican	virtue.	The	evidence	is	scant	that	he	had	any	
true	plan	 should	his	hopes	prove	unfounded	 ‐	 should	people	 refuse	 to	 attend	 church,	
should	 they	 choose	 commerce	 over	 farming,	 should	 they	 stay	 home	 rather	 than	
participate	in	civic	life.	Indeed,	his	own	outlook	on	republican	time,	that	the	process	of	
corruption	would	soon	begin,	and	 the	 time	 for	 the	reform	was	now,	simply	raises	 the	





The	 answer	 appears	 to	 be	 that	 while	 Jefferson	 had	 no	 plan	 for	 Virginia’s	 current	
generation	of	adults,	he	did	hope	to	shape	the	morals	of	succeeding	generations	through	
education.	When	the	Statute	 for	Religious	Freedom	was	passed	at	 long	 last	 in	1786,	 it	
was	accompanied	by	another	piece	of	legislation,	the	Bill	for	the	More	General	Diffusion	
of	 Knowledge,	 that	 was	 intended	 to	 set	 up	 a	 system	 of	 universal	 education.	 This	
statewide	school	system	would	inculcate	good	morals	from	a	very	early	age	through	the	









The	 land	 reforms	 and	 the	 Statute	 for	 Establishing	 Religious	 Freedom	 were	 two	
major	 blows	 against	 feudalism	 as	 Jefferson	 defined	 it,	 and	 were	 substantial	 steps	
towards	reforming	Virginian	society,	but	in	and	of	themselves	were	not	enough	to	effect	
the	 social	 revolution	 that	 Jefferson	 envisioned.	 While	 these	 laws	 concerned	 major	
institutions	in	society,	they	did	not	concern	the	relationships	between	different	classes	
of	people,	nor	did	they	conclusively	settle	the	relationship	between	the	individual	and	
the	 state.	 The	 fourth	 element	 of	 Jefferson’s	 reform	 programme	 was	 to	 redefine	
citizenship	 by	 altering	 the	 legal	 definition	 of	 allegiance,	 and	 to	 redefine	 class	 by	
organising	social	rank	based	on	an	individual’s	capacity	for	refinement.	
Jefferson’s	reforms	relied	on	a	single	 idea:	 that	relationships	within	society	should	
adhere	 as	 closely	 as	 possible	 to	 the	 law	 of	 nature.	 In	 a	 patriarchal	 society,	 such	 as	 a	
feudal	monarchy,	allegiance	was	defined	within	an	hierarchy;	but	Jefferson	considered	






Re‐ordering	 the	 ranks	 in	 society	 was	 more	 difficult,	 because,	 while	 redefining	
allegiance	was	an	expected	part	of	a	war	of	 independence,	 the	Virginian	elites	did	not	
envision	 their	 political	 revolution	 as	 also	 including	 a	 social	 revolution.	 Jefferson	
proposed	that	Virginia’s	existing	system	of	social	 ranking,	based	 largely	on	hereditary	
wealth,	 should	 be	 gradually	 replaced	 by	 a	 “natural	 aristocracy”	 cultivated	 within	 a	
public	school	system	and	based	on	a	mixture	of	wealth	and	talent.1	What	would	define	a	
person’s	place	in	this	new	social	order	was	his	capacity	for	personal	improvement	from	











their	 civil	 responsibilities,	 nor	 did	 he	 think	 that	 blacks	 could	 play	 any	 role	 in	 society	
with	whites.	While	initially	vocal	in	his	opposition	to	slavery	as	an	institution,	Jefferson	
was	 not	 in	 favour	 of	 racial	 integration,	 believing	 it	 impossible	 to	 achieve,	 and	
denigrating	those	free	blacks	who	made	the	attempt.	In	time,	he	accommodated	himself	
to	slavery	as	well,	and	the	final	versions	of	his	reform	bills	preserved	the	institution.	
While	 Jefferson	 did	 not	 use	 the	 term	 “natural	 citizenship”,	 this	 artificial	 label	
accurately	describes	the	combination	of	natural	allegiance	and	natural	aristocracy,	and	
this	 chapter	 will	 explain	 how	 he	 constructed	 this	 new	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 social	
order.	First,	I	will	review	the	existing,	feudal	form	of	natural	allegiance	then	part	of	the	
common	 law,	 and	 Jefferson’s	 redefinition	 based	 on	 the	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation.	
Second,	 I	will	 explore	 Jefferson’s	 proposed	 state	 education	 system,	 a	 replacement	 for	
Virginia’s	 patchwork	of	 religious	 schools,	 and	how	 its	 structure	would	 influence	 class	
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distinctions,	 noting	 that	 Jefferson’s	 hostility	 may	 have	 been	 rooted	 in	 childhood	
ostracism	 for	 his	 father’s	 undistinguished	 genealogy	 by	 his	 better‐bred	 maternal	








and	 the	 Statute	 for	 Establishing	Religious	 Freedom	as	 his	most	 important	works	 as	 a	
legislator.	 Historians	 have	 focused	 on	 three	 key	 themes	 of	 Jefferson’s	 education	
reforms:	 the	 secularisation	 of	 education,	 the	 structural	 consequences	 of	 the	 reforms	
(particularly	 as	 relates	 to	 natural	 aristocracy),	 and	 the	 design	 of	 an	 educational	
curriculum	for	training	good	citizens.	All	three	approaches	have	important	ramifications	
for	this	chapter.	
As	 seen	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 removing	 the	 institutional	 role	 of	 religion	 from	 civil	
government	was	Jefferson’s	major	concern	with	the	Statute	for	Religious	Freedom,	but	
he	 also	wished	 to	 remove	 it	 from	 childhood	 education.	 	 In	 keeping	with	 his	 Lockean	
views,	Jefferson	did	not	want	religious	instruction	interfering	with	a	child’s	tabula	rasa,	
variously	 being	 described	 by	 Lorraine	 Smith	 Pangle	 and	 Thomas	 L.	 Pangle	 as	
“follow[ing]	Locke	rather	closely”,	by	Roy	J.	Honeywell	as	“[holding]	several	of”	Locke’s	
educational	 views,	 and	 by	 Holly	 Brewer	 as	 basing	 his	 educational	 program	 on	 the	
Lockean	premise	that	“in	order	to	be	a	participatory	citizen,	a	person	needed	to	be	able	
to	 exercise	 reason”.3	 	 David	 M.	 Post	 argues	 that	 Jefferson’s	 adaptation	 of	 Locke	 was	
“developmental”	 in	that	he	took	Locke’s	philosophies	of	mind	and	education,	added	to	
them	natural	benevolence,	and	incorporated	them	into	a	republican	program	of	social	
engineering.4	 Robert	 M.	 Healey	 notes,	 however,	 that	 such	 engineering,	 if	 rigidly	
enforced,	could	actually	have	the	effect	of	entrenching	existing	divisions.5	 	 	 	Jefferson’s	
main	 objection	 to	 religious	 instruction	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 that	 children	 were	 too	
impressionable	 to	 intelligently	 process	 religious	 teachings;	 instead,	 they	 should	 be	
inculcated	 in	 secular	 morality	 from	 the	 classics	 and	 history.6	 The	 Pangles	 are	 quite	
                                                     
3	 See	 Lorraine	 Smith	 Pangle	 and	 Thomas	 L.	 Pangle,	 The	 Learning	 of	 Liberty:	 The	
Educational	 Ideas	of	the	American	Founders.	Lawrence,	KS:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	
1993,	pp.	106‐124,	quote	at	p.	259;	Roy	J.	Honeywell,	The	Educational	Work	of	Thomas	




4	 David	M.	 Post,	 "Jeffersonian	 Revisions	 of	 Locke:	 Education,	 Property‐Rights,	 and	
Liberty."	Journal	of	the	History	of	Ideas	47,	no.	1	(1986),	pp.	147‐157.	
5	 Robert	 M.	 Healey,	 Jefferson	 on	 Religion	 in	 Public	 Education.	 New	 Haven:	 Yale	
University	Press,	1970,	p.	201.	









While	much	has	 been	written	 on	 Jefferson’s	 sponsorship	 of	 the	University	 of	Virginia	
(UVA)	 in	1817,	his	efforts	at	 reforming	higher	education	began	during	 the	 revolution,	
first	 in	his	Bill	 for	Amending	 the	Constitution	of	 the	College	of	William	and	Mary,	and	
then	 through	 his	 membership	 on	 the	 College’s	 board	 of	 visitors	 while	 serving	 as	
governor;	UVA	was	Jefferson’s	second	attempt	much	later	in	life.8	Before	the	revolution,	
the	 college	 largely	 replicated	 the	 curriculum	 of	 an	 Oxford	 college,	 and	 Jefferson	
introduced	significant	reforms	in	order	to	bring	the	college	in	line	with	his	primary	and	
secondary	reforms,	most	notably	 the	creation	of	America’s	 first	professorship	of	 law.9	
Robert	 Polk	 Thomson	 notes	 that	 the	 strongest	 resistance	 to	 Jefferson’s	 collegiate	
reforms	 came	 from	 the	 Dissenters	 who	 benefited	 from	 the	 Statute	 for	 Religious	
Freedom,	 because	 they	 feared	 that	 the	 college’s	 Anglican	 affiliation	 would	 not	 be	
sufficiently	 severed.10	Despite	 the	 direct	 relationship	 of	 the	 college	 to	 both	 education	
and	 religious	 establishment,	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 little	 work	 has	 been	 written	 on	 the	
collegiate	 reforms,	 with	 most	 scholarly	 attention	 being	 devoted	 to	 the	 subsequent	
activity	at	the	University	of	Virginia.11	
The	 structural	 aspect	 of	 the	 educational	 reforms	 is	 somewhat	 contested.	 Harold	
Hellenbrand,	 in	 The	 Unfinished	 Revolution,	 argued	 that	 Jefferson	 conceived	 of	 his	
educational	 system	as	 an	attack	on	 the	undeserved	patrimony	of	 rich	 children	whose	
parents	 could	afford	private	education,	which	gave	 them	an	 inherited	advantage	over	
                                                     
7	Pangle	and	Pangle,	The	Learning	of	Liberty,	p.	253	
8	 Jennings	 L.	Wagoner	 gives	 substantial	 treatment	 to	 Jefferson’s	 higher	 education	
reforms,	and	notes	that	 Jefferson	 intended	the	state	university	 to	be	the	“capstone”	of	
the	 education	 system,	 but	 failed	 in	 the	 task	 of	 developing	 the	 “cornerstones”	 of	 the	




9	 See	 Herbert	 A.	 Johnson,	 “Thomas	 Jefferson	 and	 Legal	 Education”.	 In	 Thomas	
Jefferson	 and	 the	 Education	 of	 a	 Citizen.	 Edited	 by	 James	 Gilreath.	 Washington,	 DC:	
Library	of	Congress,	1999,	pp.	103‐114.	






Hellenbrand	 posits	 that	 Jefferson	 intended	 for	 the	 school	 system	 to	 function	 in	 loco	
parentis,	effectively	replacing	the	parents	of	pupils.13	This	is	a	rather	startling	claim,	but	
seems	to	form	the	basis	of	Peter	Onuf’s	analysis,	which	places	the	educational	reforms	
within	 the	 context	 of	 Jefferson’s	 generational	 theory	 of	 sovereignty.14	 Onuf	 sees	
Jefferson’s	 educational	 reforms	as	promoting	 a	new	kind	of	 republican	 fatherhood,	 in	
which	 the	 state	 redressed	 inherited	 inequalities	 through	 the	 education	 system.	While	
not	 explicitly	 endorsing	 Hellenbrand’s	 in	 loco	 parentis	 interpretation,	 Onuf’s	 is	
remarkably	similar.15		
The	 issue	 of	 patrimony	 closely	 links	 to	 the	most	 significant	 aspect	 of	 educational	
structure:	the	importance	of	“natural	aristocracy”	in	Jefferson’s	plans	for	Virginia’s	post‐
feudal	society.16	John	Carson	has	devoted	significant	attention	to	this	important	aspect	
of	 the	 Bill	 for	 the	 More	 General	 Diffusion	 of	 Knowledge,	 persuasively	 arguing	 that,	
contra	 to	 many	 interpretations,	 Jefferson	 was	 not	 interested	 in	 using	 education	 to	
promote	 democracy,	 but	 instead	 to	 promote	 a	 different	 form	 of	 aristocracy.17	 Carson	
differentiates	Jefferson’s	thinking	between	two	categories	of	democratic	“basic	political	
rights,	 which	 he	 believed	 applied	 broadly	 to	 whole	 categories	 of	 citizens”,	 and	
aristocratic	“allocations	of	civic	and	political	power,	which	he	argued	should	accrue	to	
individuals	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 particular	 set	 of	 virtues	 and	 talents”.18	 Jefferson,	 like	
many	 other	 eighteenth‐century	 educational	 theorists,	 “assumed	 the	 persistence	 of	 a	








Grossberg,	 “Citizens	 and	 Families:	 A	 Jeffersonian	 Vision	 of	 Domestic	 Relations	 and	
Generational	 Change”;	 Shuffleton,	 “Binding	 Ties:	 The	 Public	 and	 Domestic	 Spheres	 in	
Jefferson’s	 Letters	 to	His	 Family”;	 Brewer,	 “Beyond	Education”;	 and	 Lewis,	 “Jefferson,	
the	 Family,	 and	 Civic	 Education”.	 In	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 and	 the	 Education	 of	 a	 Citizen.	
Edited	by	James	Gilreath.	Washington,	DC:	Library	of	Congress,	1999,	pp.	2‐76.	
14	For	full	discussion	of	generational	sovereignty,	see	Introduction,	pp.	14‐16.	








whole	 range	 of	 hierarchies”.19	 Jefferson’s,	 by	 being	 grounded	 in	 natural	 distinctions,	
would	 therefore	 be	 just,	 in	 contrast	 to	 feudal	 or	 other	 artificial	 forms	 of	 distinction	
based	on	custom,	wealth	or	class.20	
Other	 historians	 have	 preferred	 to	 emphasise	 the	 Bill’s	 democratic	 aspects	 rather	
than	 its	 aristocratic	 ones,	 arguing	 that	 the	general	 citizenship	 training	 intended	 to	be	
available	to	elementary	school	students	was	as	important	as	the	leadership	training	to	
be	 provided	 in	 the	 grammar	 schools	 and	 college.	 For	 example,	 Cameron	Addis	 labels	
Jefferson	“the	most	democratic	of	the	Founders”,	in	part	due	to	his	educational	reforms,	




at	 least	 theoretically	 possible	 that	 even	 a	 low‐born	 student	 could	 become	 a	 natural	
aristocrat,	 were	 he	 able	 to	 earn	 the	 necessary	 scholarship	 money.22	 Jennings	 L.	
Wagoner,	Jr.	notes	that	while	Jefferson’s	proposed	curriculum	had	many	functions,	the	
most	 important	 was	 to	 promote	 good	 governance	 by	 inculcating	 student‐citizens	 in	
political	history	during	their	compulsory	elementary	education.23	
                                                                                                                                                                     
18	Ibid.,	p.	75.	
19	Ibid.,	p.	77.	
20	 Claude	 C.	 Lammers	 makes	 the	 connection	 between	 feudal	 aristocracy	 and	
Jefferson’s	 reforms	 explicit	 in	 “Jefferson’s	 Aristocracy	 of	 Talent	 Proposal”.	 The	 Social	
Studies	60,	no.	5	 (Oct.	1969),	pp.	195‐201.	Lammers	notes	 that	 there	 is	a	 real	 tension	
between	 the	 ethic	 of	 egalitarianism	 and	 the	 ethic	 of	 excellence,	 and	 that	 while	
Jefferson’s	 division	 of	 society	 into	 “the	 laboring	 and	 the	 learned”	 entrenched	 social	
division,	 the	 role	 of	 merit	 in	 determining	 class	 membership	 provided	 a	 workable	
compromise	between	the	two	ethics.	
21	 See	 Cameron	 Addis,	 “Jefferson	 and	 Education”.	 In	 The	 Blackwell	 Companion	 to	
Thomas	 Jefferson,	 Francis	D.	 Cogliano,	 ed.	 Oxford:	 Blackwell	 Publishing	 Ltd,	 2012,	 pp.	
457‐473,	at	p.	457;	and	Douglas	L.	Wilson,	“Jefferson	and	Literacy”.	In	Thomas	Jefferson	
and	 the	 Education	 of	 a	 Citizen.	 Edited	 by	 James	 Gilreath.	Washington,	 DC:	 Library	 of	
Congress,	1999,	pp.	79‐90.	
22	 Richard	 D.	 Brown,	 “Bulwark	 of	 Revolutionary	 Liberty:	 Thomas	 Jefferson’s	 and	











probably	 going	 too	 far.24	While	 Jefferson	 certainly	 wanted	 the	 public	 to	 monitor	 the	
activities	of	their	officials,	the	proposal	for	a	natural	aristocracy	seems	to	indicate	that	
he	did	not	think	that	the	mass	of	the	people	would	take	direct	part	in	governance.25	As	
Peter	 Onuf	 notes,	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 Jefferson	 really	 was	 a	 democrat	 is	 an	
unresolved	one.26	Perhaps	 it	 is	 irresolvable.	Building	on	 the	work	of	 John	Carson	and	
Claude	 C.	 Lammers,	 which	 emphasises	 the	 inequality	 within	 Jefferson’s	 reforms,	 the	
view	I	will	argue	 in	 this	chapter	 is	 that	his	primary	concern	was	 in	replacing	a	 feudal	
social	 order	 with	 one	 that	 was	 constructed	 according	 to	 (more	 or	 less)	 natural	
gradations	of	merit.	His	liberal	belief	in	rational	individuality	and	individual	capacity	for	





The	 fundamental	 problem	 of	 allegiance	was	 one	 of	 deciding	 the	 basis	 on	which	 a	
person	could	be	considered	inside	or	outside	the	body	politic.	Under	the	common	law,	




and	 other	 writings,	 Jefferson	 proposed	 a	 series	 of	 reforms,	 beginning	 with	 his	 draft	
constitution,	 that	 changed	 Virginia’s	 laws	 to	 replace	 feudal	 subjecthood	 with	 a	 more	
flexible	republican	citizenship.	
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was	 inalienable.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 natural	 lawyers,	 including	 John	 Locke,	 argued	 that	





Robert	Calvin,	a	postnatus,	or	Scottish	child	born	after	 James’	accession	 to	 the	English	
throne,	 inherited	 lands	 in	 England.	 His	 inheritance	 was	 challenged	 by	 his	 English	
relations,	 Richard	 and	 Nicholas	 Smith,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 as,	 an	 alien,	 he	 was	 not	
eligible	 to	 inherit	 lands	 under	 common	 law.	 Calvin’s	 attorneys	 challenged	 on	 the	
grounds	that	a	subject	of	King	James	was	a	subject	of	any	realm	over	which	James	ruled.	
Coke,	as	the	chief	 justice	of	the	Court	of	King’s	Bench,	found	for	Calvin	and	laid	out	an	
intricate	 system	of	 subjecthood	 that	would	 govern	 inheritance	 throughout	 the	British	
Empire	 for	 the	 next	 two	 centuries,	 and	which	was	 binding	 in	 Virginia	 at	 the	 time	 of	
independence.28	
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Coke	 explained	 in	 his	 decision	 that	 there	 were	 four	 types	 of	 allegiance	 ‐	 natural,	
acquired,	local,	and	legal	‐	and	that	Calvin	was	bound	by	the	first,	since	he	was	a	natural‐
born	 subject	 of	 James.	 This	 natural	 allegiance	 established	 a	 bond	between	 James	 and	
Calvin,	 in	 which	 Calvin	 offered	 his	 allegiance	 in	 exchange	 for	 James’	 protection	 as	
sovereign	 ‐	 the	duplex	et	reciprocum	 ligamen.	This	bond	could	never	be	voided	 ‐	even	
were	 Calvin	 to	 reside	 in	 a	 territory	 conquered	 by	 a	 foreign	 power,	 and	 thus	 have	 a	
conflicting,	 acquired	 allegiance	 to	 a	 new	 sovereign,	 his	 natural	 allegiance	 to	 James	





were	 two	 legally	distinct	persons,	and	 that	 the	coincidence	of	 their	occupation	by	 the	
same	 individual	 was	 immaterial	 under	 the	 law,	 Coke	 rejected	 their	 argument	 and	
declared	that	the	crown	and	its	wearer	were	inseparable.	While	the	laws	on	inheritance	
to	the	English	and	Scottish	crowns	were	determined	by	the	two	separate	parliaments,	







postnati	 Scotsmen	 and	 native	 Englishmen	 together	 as	 fellow	 subjects,	 and	 it	 supplied	
authority	and	natural	obligation	to	those	legal	and	political	systems	created	by	man.”30	
This	 is	 an	observation	of	 crucial	 importance,	 for	 it	 shows	 that	while	Coke	 could	have	
relied	 simply	 on	 the	 parliamentary	 statutes	 establishing	 the	 separate	 monarchies	 of	
England	 and	 Scotland,	 and	 agreed	 with	 the	 Smiths’	 lawyers	 that	 the	 combined	
monarchy	 was	 a	 coincidence	 and	 nothing	 more,	 he	 chose	 instead	 to	 rely	 on	 natural	
principles	and	reason	that	surpassed	the	limited	scope	of	the	statutes	and	could	inform	
the	new	law	he	was	creating	to	deal	with	a	previously	unimagined	situation.	











by	 subsequent	 legislation	 and	 events.	 Recognising	 the	 need	 to	 justify	 their	 actions	
within	 the	 legal	 framework	of	Calvin’s	Case,	 the	 revolutionaries	 claimed	 that	 the	 king	
had	 abdicated	his	 office	 and	 that	he,	 not	 they,	 had	broken	 the	bond	of	 allegiance	 and	
protection.	The	revolutionaries’	contemporary,	the	philosopher	John	Locke,	justified	the	
revolution	 on	 different	 grounds,	 arguing	 that,	 as	 part	 of	 his	 contractarian	 theory	 of	
government,	a	right	of	resistance	that	superseded	natural	allegiance	could	be	 invoked	
when	the	monarch,	as	chief	magistrate,	had	betrayed	the	trust	which	merited	allegiance.	
Kettner	 notes	 that	 Locke’s	 natural	 right	 of	 resistance	 was	 not	 the	 same	 as	 a	 full	
natural	 right	of	expatriation.	Locke	could	 justify	 collective	 resistance	only	when	 there	
was	 egregious	 abuse	 by	 the	 ruler;	 an	 individual	 subject	 could	 not	 void	 his	 natural	
allegiance	on	a	whim.	Kettner	identifies	the	crucial	difference	between	Coke	and	Locke	
as	lying	in	how	they	perceived	nature.	Coke	“depended	upon	a	state	of	nature	in	which	




In	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 Locke’s	 philosophy	of	 political	 society	based	on	natural	
right	 was	 further	 developed	 by	 philosophers	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nations.	 It	 was	 the	 Swiss	
jurisprudential	writers,	Emmerich	Vattel	and	Jean	Jacques	Burlamaqui,	who	developed	
a	 full‐fledged	 concept	 of	 a	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation	 from	one’s	 birthright	 political	
community.32	 Even	 as	 they	 were	 incorporating	 expatriation	 into	 the	 law	 of	 nations,	
William	Blackstone	was	making	allowance	for	some	sort	of	annulment	of	allegiance	in	
the	common	law	itself.	While	early	editions	of	his	Commentaries	on	the	Laws	of	England	
emphasised	 the	Cokean	doctrine	of	natural	 allegiance,	 a	 later	 edition	made	allowance	
for	the	suspension	of	allegiance	with	“the	united	concurrence	of	the	legislature.”33	










of	 the	 Rights	 of	 British	 America	 in	 1774,	 he	 attempted	 to	 invoke	 a	 natural	 right	 of	
expatriation	while	avoiding	a	complete	break	with	the	Cokean	interpretation	of	natural	
allegiance.	 He	 did	 this	 by	 circumscribing	 his	 definition	 of	 the	 right	 of	 expatriation.	
Rather	 than	 claiming	 that	 the	 colonists	 had	 expatriated	 themselves	 from	 the	 crown,	
Jefferson	 claimed	 that	 they	 had	 expatriated	 themselves	 from	 parliamentary	 rule.	 By	
adopting	such	a	restrained	approach,	Jefferson	was	then	able	to	appeal	to	the	king,	on	
the	 grounds	 of	 natural	 allegiance,	 to	 protect	 his	 loyal	 subjects	 in	 the	 colonial	 realms	
from	his	other	subjects	in	Great	Britain.		
The	Summary	View	was	 predicated	 upon	 the	 king’s	 enduring	 place	 as	 the	 head	 of	
society.	The	Summary	View	was	“an	humble	and	dutiful	address”	to	the	king	regarding	
the	 “incroachments”	 [sic]	 by	 “the	 legislature	 of	 one	 part	 of	 the	 empire”,	 the	 British	







intended	 to	 invoke	 the	historical	 circumstances	 that	provided	 the	 context	 for	Calvin’s	
Case.	 In	 his	 Autobiography,	 he	 explained	 that	 he	 had	 thought	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 Virginia	 and	 Britain	 as	 similar	 to	 “that	 of	 England	 and	 Scotland,	 after	 the	
accession	 of	 James”	 and	before	 the	 1707	Union.35	 	 By	 framing	 the	 relationship	 as	 the	
same	under	law,	Jefferson	accepted	the	accompanying	legal	precedent	and	appealed	to	
it	for	his	own	advantage.	
At	 the	same	 time,	 Jefferson	also	 incorporated	elements	of	natural	 law	theory	 ‐	not	
the	 Lockean	 right	 of	 resistance,	 which	 was	 not	 yet	 called	 for,	 but	 the	 doctrine	 of	
expatriation	 that	 had	 been	 developed	 by	 Burlamaqui	 and	 Vattel.	 Jefferson	 sought	 to	







establish	 the	exercise	of	 this	right	within	England’s	past	 in	order	to	establish	 its	bona	
fides	 for	 Virginia’s	 present.	 Thus,	 he	 first	 explained	 how	 the	 Saxon	 emigration	 from	
Germany	 to	 Britain	 had	 been	 an	 exercise	 in	 “which	 nature	 has	 given	 to	 all	 men,	 of	





The	 invocation	 of	 a	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation,	 as	well	 as	 his	 first	 invocation	 of	
happiness	as	the	foundation	of	political	society,	places	Jefferson’s	thinking	on	the	matter	
squarely	within	the	natural	law	tradition	espoused	by	Burlamaqui,	Vattel,	and	others.37	
This	 was	 largely	 antithetical	 to	 Coke’s	 doctrine	 of	 natural	 allegiance,	 and	 indeed	
Jefferson	even	asserted	that	the	colonies	retained	the	kings	of	Britain	by	choice,	not	by	










England	 “that	 system	of	 laws	which	has	 so	 long	been	 the	glory	and	protection	of	 that	
country”,	and	the	American	colonists	had	made	a	 free	choice	 to	prudently	“adopt	 that	
system	of	laws”	for	themselves	upon	their	emigration.38	While	Jefferson	was	displeased	
with	the	king’s	passivity	in	the	face	of	Parliament	exceeding	its	authority,	and	while	he	
                                                     
36	“A	Summary	View	of	the	Rights	of	British	America”,	 in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	 I,	pp.	121‐
122.	
37	 Of	 the	 two	 Swiss	 philosophers,	 Jefferson	 seems	 to	 have	 leaned	 more	 towards	
Burlamaqui.	Burlamaqui	was	included	in	a	special	book	order	Jefferson	placed	in	1769	








of	 Queen	 Anne,	 he	 did	 not	 break	 with	 the	 king	 by	 overtly	 threatening	 to	 withdraw	
colonial	allegiance	because	of	the	lack	of	royal	protection.	
That	break	did	not	come	until	the	autumn	of	1775,	when	the	king	formally	declared	
the	 colonies	 out	 of	 his	 protection.	 The	 “Declaration	 of	 the	 Causes	 and	 Necessity	 for	
Taking	 Up	 Arms”,	 which	 Jefferson	 had	 co‐drafted	 with	 John	 Dickinson	 on	 behalf	 of	
Congress	 in	 July	 1775,	 explicitly	 stated	 that	 the	 colonial	 rebellion	 was	 against	
Parliament,	 not	 the	 king	 himself.	 When	 the	 king	 declared	 the	 colonies	 out	 of	 his	
protection	in	October	1775,	and	openly	supported	the	authority	of	Parliament	over	that	
of	 the	 colonial	 assemblies,	 Jefferson	 noted,	 George	 III	 voided	 the	 king’s	 share	 of	 the	
obligations	under	natural	allegiance,	“it	being	a	certain	position	in	law,	that	allegiance	




on	 expatriation.	While	 in	 the	 Summary	View	 he	 had	 been	 constrained	 by	 the	 need	 to	
balance	 natural	 right	 with	 natural	 allegiance,	 with	 independence	 Jefferson	was	 freed	
intellectually	as	well	as	politically,	and	no	longer	needed	to	conform	to	feudal	allegiance.	
In	 his	 rough	 draft	 of	 the	 Declaration,	 Jefferson	 charged	 the	 king	 with	 complicity	 in	
endeavouring	 “to	prevent	 the	population	of	 these	 states;	 for	 that	purpose	obstructing	
the	 laws	 for	 naturalisation	 of	 foreigners,	 refusing	 to	 pass	 others	 to	 encourage	 their	
migrations	 hither;	 &	 raising	 the	 conditions	 of	 new	 appropriations	 of	 lands.”40	 Nearly	
identical	 language	 was	 included	 in	 the	 preamble	 to	 the	 draft	 constitution	 which	
Jefferson	sent	to	the	Virginia	Convention.	
The	draft	constitution	contained	a	further	provision	regarding	emigration.	Under	the	
“rights	 public	 and	 private”,	 Jefferson	 codified	 the	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation	 by	
designating	 Virginia’s	western	 lands	 for	 settlement	 and	 eventual	 partition	 as	 “one	 or	
more”	new	states,	which	“shall	be	established	on	the	same	fundamental	laws	contained	
in	 this	 instrument,	 and	 shall	 be	 free	 and	 independant	 [sic]	 of	 [Virginia]	 and	 all	 the	
world.”	Likewise,	immigrants	coming	in	to	the	state	need	only	swear	an	oath	at	the	end	
                                                     
39	Jefferson,	Autobiography,	p.	14.	









In	 the	 period	 from	 July	 1774	 to	 July	 1776,	 the	 outbreak	 of	 war	 and	 the	 Crown’s		
renunciation	 of	 protection	 led	 Congress	 to	 formally	 end	 allegiance	 to	 the	 British	
monarchy.	 Jefferson	 de‐emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 natural	 allegiance	 accordingly	
with	these	developments.	It	might	be	expected	that,	upon	independence,	he	would	seek	





it	 to	have	departed	from	the	principles	of	natural	 law	that	 it	was,	 ideally,	supposed	to	
uphold.	
On	14	October	1776,	 the	same	day	he	 introduced	his	bill	 reforming	entail	 and	 the	
day	 before	 introducing	 the	 bill	 establishing	 the	 Committee	 of	 Revisors,	 Jefferson	
proposed	 a	 “Bill	 for	 the	 Naturalisation	 of	 Foreigners”.	 Once	 again,	 Jefferson	 found	
himself	 opposed	by	Edmund	Pendleton.	 In	a	bit	 of	 a	 twist,	 this	 time	 it	was	Pendleton	







immigration	 from	 foreign	 lands	 that	 did	 not	 share	 the	 national	 characteristics	 of	
Virginia.	“They	will	infuse	into	it	their	spirit,	warp	and	bias	its	direction,	and	render	it	a	
                                                     
41	“Third	Draft	by	Jefferson”,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	I,	p.	363.	At	first	glance,	this	might	not	
seem	 to	 involve	 the	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation,	 since	 Jefferson	 thought	 to	 bind	 the	
future	states	 to	Virginia’s	 fundamental	 law;	however,	since	 the	new	states	were	being	






heterogeneous,	 incoherent,	 distracted	mass,”	 Jefferson	warned.	 It	was	 in	 the	 common	
interest	 to	 put	 restriction	 on	 immigration,	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 society	 “more	
homogenous,	more	peaceable,	more	durable.”43		
Nonetheless,	 immigration	 could	 be	 a	 net	 good	 for	 the	 state,	 if	 it	 were	 targeted	
correctly.	 Thus,	 Jefferson	 thought	 that	 while	 if	 “they	 come	 of	 themselves,	 they	 are	
entitled	to	all	the	rights	of	citizenship,”	he	doubted	“the	expediency	of	inviting	them	by	
extraordinary	 encouragements.”	 The	 one	 group	 for	 which	 extraordinary	
encouragements	 should	 be	 offered	 was	 “useful	 artificers”	 who	 could	 economically	
develop	 the	 country.	 “The	 policy	 of	 that	 measure	 depends	 on	 very	 different	









and	 Lord	 Kames’	 Sketches	 of	 the	 History	 of	 Man,	 among	 others,	 held	 that	 the	
development	of	economy	and	society	was	linear	and	progressive.	In	the	Notes,	Jefferson	
was	 suggesting	 that	 the	 artisans	 and	 knowledge	 of	 an	 advanced	 commercial	 or	
manufacturing	society	could	be	assimilated	 into	Virginia’s	agricultural	society	without	
actually	changing	that	society.	In	fact,	he	was	saying	that	the	more	advanced	immigrants	





exactly	match	 the	 content	 of	 the	 legislation	 for	 which	 he	was	 responsible,	 indicating	
further	ambivalence	on	this	issue.	Jefferson’s	revision	of	Pendleton’s	draft	bill	made	two	
important	 changes.	 First,	 it	 broadened	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 bill	 to	 include	 all	 European	






immigrants,	 not	 only	 the	 Protestant	 denominations	 that	 made	 up	 the	 majority	 of	
Virginia’s	population.	This	was	at	odds	with	his	views	on	social	cohesion,	and	shows	the	
great	importance	he	placed	upon	religious	freedom.	In	a	battle	between	conscience	and	
cohesion,	 conscience	 won.	 Second,	 while	 Pendleton’s	 draft	 bill	 merely	 confirmed	 the	
existing	estates	of	aliens	who	wished	to	become	citizens,	Jefferson	added	inducements	
for	 immigration	 such	 as	 fifty‐acre	 land	 grants	 and	 twenty‐dollar	 reimbursements	 for	
travel	 expenses.45	 Far	 from	withholding	 “extraordinary	 encouragements”	 to	 potential	




Jefferson	 took	 up	 “A	 Bill	 Declaring	 Who	 Shall	 Be	 Deemed	 Citizens	 of	 This	
Commonwealth”	as	Bill	No.	55	of	the	Revisal	of	the	Laws.	The	bill	was	entirely	different	
in	 character	 from	 Jefferson’s	 proposals	 in	 the	 draft	 constitution	 and	 the	 Bill	 for	 the	
Naturalisation	 of	 Foreigners.	 While	 those	 works	 had	 concerned	 themselves	 with	 the	






residency	 requirement,	 he	 reduced	 this	 to	 five	 in	 the	 Bill	 for	 the	 Naturalisation	 of	




of	 the	birth	was	a	 citizen	by	birthright.	All	 non‐citizens	were	 to	be	 considered	aliens.	
This	largely	preserved	the	existing	common	law	system	of	natural	allegiance	intact.	
It	was	the	rest	of	the	bill	that	shattered	the	other	half	of	the	Cokean	equation:	that	
once	allegiance	was	established	at	birth,	 it	 could	not	be	given	up.	 Jefferson	 stipulated	
                                                     
45	“Bill	for	the	Naturalization	of	Foreigners”,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	I,	pp.	558‐559.	















Once	 Jefferson	 had	 redefined	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 polity	 through	 his	 citizenship	
laws,	he	was	still	confronted	with	how	to	organise	society	within	those	boundaries.	The	
existing	patriarchal	social	order,	which	he	was	already	doing	so	much	to	try	to	reform	






scholarship.	 Modest	 by	 later	 standards,	 in	 this	 context	 Jefferson’s	 education	 reforms	
were	an	 important	 complement	 to	his	 reforms	of	property	and	allegiance.	The	 school	




Prior	 to	 independence,	 Virginia	 had	many	 institutions	 of	 learning,	 but	 these	were	
not	 centralised	 or	 even	 regulated	 and	 did	 not	 comprise	 an	 “education	 system”	 in	 the	
modern	 meaning	 of	 the	 word.48	 Public	 provision	 for	 education	 was	 limited	 to	 the	
                                                     
47	Ibid.,	p.	477.	
48	 There	 is	 a	 lengthy	 historiography	 on	 education	 in	 colonial	 Virginia.	 See	 Holly	
Brewer,	 "Apprenticeship	Policy	 in	Virginia:	From	Patriarchal	 to	Republican	Policies	of	
Social	 Welfare."	 In	 Children	 Bound	 to	 Labor:	 The	 Pauper	 Apprentice	 System	 in	 Early	
America.	Edited	by	Ruth	Wallis	Herndon	and	John	E	Murray.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	





for	 indigent	 children,	 was	 subsequently	 re‐enacted	 and	 amended	 by	 the	 colonial	
assembly.49	 In	 addition	 to	 this	 law	 for	 vocational	 training,	 the	 parishes	 of	 the	
Established	 Church	 often	 provided	 schooling	 for	 a	 fee,	 and	 some	 philanthropic	
organisations	established	free	schools	scattered	throughout	the	colony.50	These	schools	
were	often	established	against	the	wishes	of	official	opinion.	One	early	royal	governor,	







intellectual	darkness	had	 run	 through	 two	 technological	 innovations:	 the	 invention	of	
paper	and	Gutenberg’s	movable	press.	Only	technology	was	able	to	“[usher]	in	the	light”	
of	greater	literacy,	leading	to	the	Reformation	and	then	the	Enlightenment.52	
The	 new	 education	 system	 which	 Jefferson	 proposed	 made	 universal	 literacy	 its	
most	 important	 priority.	 Jefferson	 envisioned	 a	 three‐tier	 system,	 with	 a	 universal	
system	of	primary	education	at	 the	bottom,	a	 selective	 system	of	grammar	 schools	 in	
the	middle,	and	the	College	of	William	and	Mary	at	the	top.	The	primary	schools	would	




General	 Diffusion	 of	 Knowledge”.	 The	 students	 were	 to	 receive	 three	 years	 of	
instruction	 in	 “reading,	writing,	and	common	arithmetick”	and	were	also	 to	be	 taught	
                                                                                                                                                                     
Richmond:	 Commonwealth	 of	 Virginia,	 1952.:	 Thomas	 Kirby	 Bullock,	 "Schools	 and	
Schooling	 in	Eighteenth	Century	Virginia."	Duke	University,	1961;	Sheldon	S.	Cohen,	A	
History	of	Colonial	Education,	1607‐1776.	New	York:	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	1974;	Lawrence	















With	equal	detail	 to	 that	of	 the	primary	 schools,	 Jefferson	 laid	out	 the	procedures	 for	
locating	the	grammar	schools	and	went	 into	some	detail	as	to	their	curriculum,	which	
should	 include	 “the	 Latin	 and	Greek	 languages,	 English	 grammar,	 geography,	 and	 the	
higher	 part	 of	 numerical	 arithmetick,	 to	 wit,	 vulgar	 and	 decimal	 fractions,	 and	 the	
extraction	of	 the	 square	 and	 cube	 roots.”54	The	Visitors	of	 the	College	of	William	and	
Mary	 would	 have	 the	 authority	 to	 further	 elaborate	 upon	 the	 grammar	 school	
curriculum	as	they	saw	fit.		
Finally,	the	College	of	William	and	Mary	would	be	reformed	and	turned	into	a	state	
university.	 This	 would	 be	 the	 least	 “public”	 of	 all	 the	 state	 educational	 institutions,	
maintaining	its	fee‐based	system	of	tuition.	Jefferson	proposed	to	secularise	it,	however,	
by	 removing	Church	of	England	 control	 and	 instituting	 curricular	 reforms	 that	would	
reorient	 its	 teaching	 around	 subjects	 of	 public	 usefulness.	 This	 included	 the	






Rhetorically,	 the	preamble	to	the	Bill	 for	 the	More	General	Diffusion	of	Knowledge	
reads	 like	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence.	 Jefferson	 deemed	 it	
“expedient	for	promoting	the	publick	[sic]	happiness	that	those	persons,	whom	nature	
hath	endowed	with	genius	and	virtue,	should	be	rendered	by	liberal	education	worthy	









citizens”.	 The	 leadership	 of	 Virginia	 should	 be	 drawn	 from	 its	 most	 able,	 “without	
regard	 to	 wealth,	 birth	 or	 other	 accidental	 condition	 or	 circumstance”.	 To	 avoid	 the	
concentration	 of	 education,	 and	 hence	 leadership,	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 hereditarily	
wealthy,	a	universal	system	of	primary	education	feeding	into	leadership	programmes	
at	the	secondary	and	collegiate	levels	should	be	instituted	because	“it	is	better	that	such	
should	 be	 sought	 for	 and	 educated	 at	 the	 common	 expence	 of	 all,	 than	 that	 the	
happiness	of	all	should	be	confined	to	the	weak	or	wicked”.56	
This	 preamble	 raised	 several	 philosophical	 questions.	What	was	 the	nature	 of	 the	
“happiness”	that	Jefferson	had	now	referred	to	twice	as	the	basis	of	public	policy?	What	
theory	 of	mind	was	 at	work	 in	 shaping	 his	 view	 of	 human	 improvability?	 How	were	
“genius	and	virtue”	defined?	How	could	the	rudiments	of	genius	and	virtue	be	refined	
from	basic	human	attributes	into	the	stuff	of	citizens,	and	how	could	citizens	be	refined	




as	 a	 natural	 right	 protected	 by	 the	 social	 contract,	 alongside	 Locke’s	 “life”	 and	




General	 Diffusion	 of	 Knowledge	 then	 seems	 to	 be	 straightforward:	 to	 implement	 the	
charge	of	 the	Declaration	of	 Independence	by	giving	each	citizen	the	basic	 intellectual	
tools	necessary	to	develop	themselves	so	that	they	could	enjoy	their	life	and	liberty	to	
the	fullest,	and	thereby	achieve	personal	happiness.	
But	 with	 the	 Bill	 for	 the	 More	 General	 Diffusion	 of	 Knowledge,	 he	 qualified	
happiness	with	the	word	“publick”.	Happiness,	as	defined	as	a	matter	of	public	policy,	
                                                                                                                                                                     








ceased	 to	be	an	 individual	goal	and	 instead	became	a	public	good.	By	stating	 that	 the	
purpose	 of	 his	 pyramidal	 system	 of	 education,	 and	merit‐based	 scholarships,	 was	 to	
create	 a	 feeder	 system	 for	 talented	 young	 leaders,	 Jefferson	 raised	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
collective	 happiness	 of	 society.	 The	 recipients	 of	 grammar	 school	 and	 collegiate	
education	 were	 expected	 to	 use	 their	 education	 to	 be	 responsible	 leaders	 of	 their	
communities	 and	 of	 the	 state.	 Education	 at	 all	 levels	 could	 very	 well	 have	 positive	
individual	effects,	but	what	justified	the	state’s	sizable	expenditure	of	resources	was	the	








Adrien	 Helvetius’	 De	 L’homme.59	 Helvetius	 began	 with	 Locke’s	 theory	 of	 mind	 and	
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all	 ideas	were	 learned.	 Therefore,	 the	 soul	 itself	was	 a	 construct	 and	was	 not	 innate.	









Jefferson’s	 interest	 in	 universal	 education	 could	 plausibly	 be	 attributed	 to	 his	
reading	 of	De	 L’homme,	 but	 the	 same	 cannot	 be	 said	 for	 the	 particular	 points	 of	 his	
educational	 program.	 If	 Helvetius	was	 correct,	 then	 universal	 and	 uniform	 education	
should	 yield	 universally	 uniform	 results.61	 Yet	 Jefferson	 had	 no	 intention	 of	 leveling	
society	 into	 a	 faceless	 mass	 of	 academically	 interchangeable	 automatons.	 The	 very	




In	 the	 preamble,	 Jefferson	 asserted	 that	 “genius	 and	 virtue”	 had	 not	 been	 equally	
distributed	by	nature,	and	that	some	people	were	simply	born	with	greater	innate	talent	
than	others.	The	purpose	of	the	Jeffersonian	education	system	was	to	locate	that	talent	
and	promote	 it.	 Jefferson	was	 interested	 in	a	Helvetian	system	of	universal	education,	
regardless	of	talent,	only	to	the	point	that	it	was	necessary	for	training	the	masses	to	be	
citizens.	Once	the	basic	level	of	civic	competence	had	been	reached	through	completion	
of	 the	primary	education	programme,	 the	public	 interest	 largely	ended	and	education	
returned	 to	 being	 a	 private	 good,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 those	 who	 demonstrated	
leadership	 potential	 but	 lacked	 the	 personal	 wealth	 necessary	 to	 afford	 further	
education.	




capable	 citizens	 be	 refined	 into	 leaders?	 The	 answer,	 given	 in	 his	 outline	 of	 the	
curriculum,	was	 that	basic	numeracy	and	 literacy,	as	well	 as	a	basic	understanding	of	
Western	political	history,	were	the	necessary	intellectual	attributes	of	a	citizen.		
Leaders	 were	 expected	 to	 be	 even	 more	 refined.	 The	 local	 leaders	 who	 would	
emerge	 from	 the	 grammar	 schools	would	 have	 a	 degree	 of	worldliness	 necessary	 for	
                                                                                                                                                                     
his	 educational	 proposals	 form	 a	 response	 to	 Helvetius.	 Jefferson	 does	 not	 cite	
educational	philosophy	at	any	point	 in	 the	Legal	Commonplace	Book,	 thereby	making	
his	engagement	with	sources	somewhat	more	difficult	to	follow,	though	sources	in	and	
of	 themselves	may	still	be	 identified.	 See	also	Stanley	E.	Ballinger,	 "The	 Idea	of	 Social	






level	 of	 competency	 than	 their	 primary	 school	 counterparts,	 and	 their	 knowledge	 of	
Latin	and	Greek	would	enable	 them	 to	 comprehend	 the	wisdom	of	 the	 classical	 texts.	
What	is	striking	about	the	secondary	curriculum	is	its	lack	of	subject‐based	content	to	
complement	 the	 language	 and	 mathematical	 skills.	 Jefferson	 clearly	 envisioned	 that	
grammar	 school	 graduates	 would	 go	 on	 to	 a	 lifetime	 of	 learning,	 picking	 up	 subject	
material	at	their	own	pace	out	of	their	own	personal	libraries.	
The	 state	 leaders	 would	 be	 the	 most	 refined	 of	 all.	 Not	 only	 would	 they	 have	
received	the	education	of	citizens	at	the	primary	level,	and	the	education	of	local	leaders	
at	 the	secondary	 level,	but	 their	 instruction	at	 the	College	of	William	and	Mary	would	
give	them	a	complete	liberal	education.	Jefferson	devoted	an	entire,	separate	bill	to	the	
reform	of	the	administration	and	curriculum	of	William	and	Mary	College.	His	goal	was	
to	 replace	 ecclesiastical	 and	 out‐dated	 subjects	 and	 professorial	 chairs	 with	 ones	 in	
areas	relevant	to	public	policy.	A	graduate	of	the	College	would	no	longer	be	the	product	
of	a	mere	aristocratic	finishing	school,	and	would	instead	be	a	degree‐holder	conversant	
in	 public	 policy	 and	 prepared	 for	 enlightened	 civic	 leadership	 as	 well	 as	 scientific	
plantation	management	or	entry	into	the	professions.	
While	Jefferson’s	proposed	system	was	radical	by	Virginia’s	own	stagnant	standards,	
in	which	the	 landed	aristocracy	resisted	any	hint	of	social	change,	 it	was	 in	turn	quite	
conservative	 by	 the	 standards	 of	 Helvetius	 and	 the	 philosophes.	 Jefferson’s	 education	
system	 was	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 class	 leveller,	 nor	 even	 to	 create	 greater	 mobility	
between	the	classes.	Instead,	the	intent	was	to	create	a	pool	of	citizens,	wide	in	numbers	
but	shallow	in	knowledge,	out	of	which	would	rise	to	the	grammar	schools	those	who	
could	 pay	 and	 those	 indigent	 few	 who	 could	 earn	 a	 scholarship.	 This	 “natural	
aristocracy”	of	“virtue	and	talents”	(and	wealth)	would	then	form	the	pool	of	candidates	
to	staff	 the	state’s	administration,	 its	courts,	and	 its	county	offices,	as	well	as	serve	as	
members	of	the	legislature.62	
Jefferson	 himself	 sometimes	 exaggerated	 the	 egalitarian	 nature	 of	 his	 reform,	
boasting	 in	 the	Notes	 on	Virginia	 that	 by	 “that	 part	 of	 our	 plan	which	 prescribes	 the	
selection	of	the	youths	of	genius	from	among	the	classes	of	the	poor,	we	hope	to	avail	
the	 state	 of	 those	 talents	 which	 nature	 has	 sown	 as	 liberally	 among	 the	 poor	 as	 the	











two	 years”,	 only	 the	 top	 twenty	 students	 state‐wide	 would	 have	 their	 scholarships	
renewed	for	up	to	four	additional	years,	at	which	point	ten	would	return	to	their	homes	
and	ten	would	receive	three‐year	scholarships	at	the	College.64		
For	 all	 of	 his	 exaggeration	 and	 post	 hoc	 modifications	 to	 the	 bill,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
Jefferson	did	realise	that	what	he	was	proposing	was	progressive	but	not	revolutionary.	
While	 primary	 education	was	universal,	 he	wrote	 that	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 bill	was	mainly	
concerned	with	 “furnishing	 to	 the	wealthier	part	 of	 the	people	 convenient	 schools,	 at	
which	their	children	may	be	educated,	at	their	own	expence.”65	This	was	a	declaration,	
not	an	admission.	Limiting	social	advancement	to	small	numbers	of	the	most	able	poor	
would	 foster	 social	 stability,	 both	 by	 convincing	 the	 poor	 that	 they	 had	 a	 chance	 for	
advancement	 in	 life	 and	 by	 assuring	 the	 wealthy	 that	 their	 positions	 were	 not	
threatened;	 and	 of	 course,	 the	 combined	 intellects	 of	 the	 meritorious	 poor	 and	 the	
educated	wealthy	would	provide	the	leadership	necessary	for	society	to	prosper.	
In	this	important	respect,	that	considerations	of	progress	were	balanced	by	factors	
of	 wealth	 and	 stability,	 Jefferson’s	 natural	 aristocracy	 was	 not	 the	 same	 as	 a	
meritocracy.	In	a	meritocracy,	an	individual	may	rise	or	fall	according	to	their	merits.	In	
the	 natural	 aristocracy,	 one	 could	 stay	 put	 or	 advance,	 but	 never	 fall	 back.	 Personal	
wealth	formed	a	social	safety	net	 ‐	only	by	becoming	too	poor	to	afford	school	 tuition	
fees	could	a	 family	see	 its	children	 fall	 in	 the	social	order.	This	meant	social	standing,	
and	 academic	 advancement,	 was	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 parents,	 particularly	 the	
father,	not	the	responsibility	of	the	student.	
The	 continuing	 prominence	 of	 wealth	 in	 educational	 opportunity	 indicates	 that	
while	the	primary	schools	would	have	quite	a	broad	student	enrolment	compared	to	the	
grammar	schools,	the	enrolment	at	the	grammar	schools	and	at	the	College	would	look	
quite	 similar.	 Parents	 who	 would	 have	 had	 to	 pay	 for	 three	 years	 of	 tuition	 at	 the	







beginning	 of	 their	 child’s	 education	 would	 now	 be	 able	 to	 spend	 those	 funds	 at	 the	





advanced,	but	 thanks	 to	 the	 free	education	at	 the	primary	 level	 those	 fee‐payers	who	
passed	grammar	school	were	virtually	assured	of	a	place	at	the	College	of	William	and	





all	 of	 the	 new	 schools	 would	 require	 masters,	 and	 at	 the	 state	 level	 Jefferson	 was	
sponsoring	bills	creating	new	executive	agencies	as	well	as	an	entire	system	of	superior	
courts.	 In	 some	 cases,	 the	 constitution	 forbade	 people	 from	 serving	 as	 officials	 in	
multiple	government	branches;	 in	others,	 the	work	 load	was	simply	 too	great	 for	one	
person	 to	do	multiple	 jobs.66	Candidates	 to	 fill	 these	offices	over	 the	 long‐term	would	
need	 to	 be	 found	 and	 trained;	 any	 candidate	 would	 need	 to	 be	 both	 well‐educated	
enough	 to	 handle	 the	 responsibilities,	 and	 socially	 advanced	 enough	 to	 command	 the	
respect	of	his	peers.	
To	the	extent	that	it	was	part	of	creating	a	large	middle	class,	the	Bill	 for	the	More	
General	 Diffusion	 of	 Knowledge	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 counterpart	 to	 Jefferson’s	 land	
reforms.	 Like	 his	 property	 reforms,	 the	 bill	was	 not	 a	 levelling	 project,	 but	 sought	 to	
decrease	 the	concentration	of	wealth	 (in	knowledge)	while	 fostering	 the	creation	of	a	
critical	mass	of	middling	citizens	that	would	provide	stability	to	the	commonwealth	and	
would	be	active	participants	and	 leaders	 in	civic	 life.	 It	also	 took	steps	 to	ensure	 that	
everybody	got	at	least	something:	as	the	property	reforms	provided	for	universal	land	
grants	 and	 equal	 inheritance,	 the	 Bill	 for	 the	 More	 General	 Diffusion	 of	 Knowledge	
sought	to	ensure	that	everybody	received	a	minimum	level	of	common	education.		

















planning.	 Jefferson	 argued	 that	 blacks	 were	 incapable	 of	 participating	 in	 the	 new,	
education‐based	natural	aristocracy,	and	therefore	could	not	be	a	homogenous	part	of	
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amor	 patriae	 for	 the	 republic	 and	 were	 a	 dissonant,	 dangerous	 element	 of	 the	
population	that	needed	to	be	controlled	or	expelled.	The	result	was	that	Jefferson,	while	
opposed	to	slavery	in	principle,	 justified	it	 in	practice	by	developing	a	social	theory	of	
racial	 distinctiveness	 that	 prohibited	 the	 integration	 of	 blacks	 into	white	 society	 and	
which	meant,	in	turn,	that	if	slavery	could	not	be	ended	and	the	slaves	transported	out	






Congress.	 Jefferson	 couched	 his	 opposition	 not	 against	 slavery	 itself,	 but	 against	 the	
international	slave	trade,	a	crucial	distinction	that	avoided	the	 issue	of	domestic	slave	
ownership	while	making	 the	 slave	 trade	 a	 piece	 in	 his	 larger	 criticism	 of	 the	 feudal‐
mercantile	 model	 of	 empire.	 The	 king	 “has	 waged	 cruel	 war	 against	 human	 nature	
itself”,	 Jefferson	 wrote,	 placing	 the	 trade	 within	 the	 “unnatural”	 defects	 of	 feudal‐
mercantile	 society,	 “violating	 [nature’s]	 most	 sacred	 rights	 of	 life	 &	 liberty	 in	 the	
persons	of	a	distant	people	who	never	offended	him,	captivating	&	carrying	them	into	
slavery	 in	 another	 hemisphere,	 or	 to	 incur	 miserable	 death	 in	 their	 transportation	
thither.”68	
What	 Jefferson	 declined	 to	 do	 was	 to	 discuss	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 slavery	 was	
damaging	 to	domestic	 colonial	 society,	 and	 to	 empathise	with	 the	plight	of	 the	 slaves	
themselves	 once	 they	 had	 arrived	 in	 America.	 His	 focus	 was	 clearly	 on	 how	 the	
abduction	 and	 transportation	 of	 slaves	 fit	within	 his	 larger	natural	 rights	 philosophy,	
especially	 considering	how	 in	 the	Summary	View	 he	had	articulated	a	natural	 right	of	
expatriation,	presumably	including	the	right	to	choose	not	to	expatriate.	That	right	was	
being	violated	every	time	a	ship	left	Africa	with	its	human	cargo.	This	focus	on	the	act	of	
transportation	 conveniently	kept	 the	 focus	on	mercantilism	and	off	 the	 actions	of	 the	
American	colonists	who	provided	the	markets	for	these	slaves.	






By	 the	 time	 the	Notes	on	Virginia	was	 published	 in	 1784,	 Jefferson	was	no	 longer	
emphasising	 expatriation,	 and	 was	 now	 focused	 on	 the	 domestic	 consequences	 of	
slavery,	 emphasising	 how	 slavery	 was	 corrupting	 society.69	 “The	 whole	 commerce	









which	 he	 is	 born	 to	 live	 and	 labour	 for	 another”.72	 This	 was	 further	 complicated	 by	




would	 result	 in	 a	 binational	 state	 that	would	 result	 in	 a	 civil	war	 between	 the	 races,	
unless	emancipation	were	followed	by	their	forced	expatriation.		
If	 Jefferson	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 hypocrisy	 of	 decrying	 the	 forced	 expatriation	 of	
Africans	 from	 their	 home	 continent	 by	 British	 traders,	 and	 then	 proposing	 the	 same	
thing	 for	 Afro‐Americans	 from	 Virginia,	 he	 gave	 no	 indication	 of	 it.	 Furthermore,	 he	

















Jefferson	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 religious	 freedom,	 it	 did	 satisfy	 him	 when	 it	 came	 to	 the	
freedom	of	slaves.	“I	think	a	change	already	perceptible,	since	the	origin	of	the	present	
revolution,”	he	mused	in	the	Notes.	“The	spirit	of	the	master	is	abating,	that	of	the	slave	




Jefferson’s	 firm	 belief	 that	 blacks	 could	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 same	 society	 with	
whites,	which	effectively	meant	the	continuation	of	slavery	despite	his	personal	support		
of	 a	 plan	 to	 expatriate	 blacks	 to	 a	 reserved	 colony,	 required	 some	 sort	 of	 intellectual	
rationale.	 The	 place	 Jefferson	 looked	 for	 justification	 was	 not	 in	 natural	 law,	 but	 in	




from	 providing	 him	 with	 a	 justification,	 Montesquieu	 confounded	 Jefferson	 at	 every	
turn.76	
Montesquieu,	 like	 other	 climate	 theorists,	 held	 that	 a	 temperate‐to‐cold	
environment	was	best	 for	a	virtuous	and	active	citizenry.	At	 first	 look,	 this	could	play	
into	 the	hands	of	 a	pro‐slavery	advocate.	After	all,	Europe	was	 in	 the	 temperate	 zone	
that	Montesquieu	touted	so	favourably,	and	Africa	was	in	the	indolent,	hot	zone	around	
the	equator.	But	Montesquieu	was	not	a	racial	 theorist.	The	origins	of	one’s	ancestors	
                                                     
74	 Jefferson	 claimed	 to	 have	 included	 emancipation	 and	 expatriation	 as	 an	
amendment	 to	 the	 slave	 bill	 presented	 to	 the	 Assembly	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Revisal	 of	 the	
Laws,	but	there	is	no	evidence	of	this.	Jefferson,	Notes	on	Virginia,	pp.	137‐138.	
75	Ibid.,	p.	163.	
76	 A	 small	 body	 of	 work	 concerns	 Jefferson’s	 tortuous	 relationship	 with	
Montesquieu,	 from	dutiful	 student	 in	 the	1760s	and	1770s,	 to	 critic	 in	 the	1790s	and	
disseminator	 of	 Destutt	 De	 Tracy’s	 rebuttal	 essay	 in	 the	 1800s.	 See	 Joyce	 Appleby,	
"What	 Is	 Still	American	 in	 the	Political	Philosophy	of	Thomas	 Jefferson?"	The	William	
and	Mary	Quarterly	39,	no.	2	(1982),	pp.	287‐309;	David	W.	Carrithers,	 "Montesquieu,	
Jefferson	 and	 the	 Fundamentals	 of	 Eighteenth‐Century	 Republican	 Theory."	 French‐
American	Review	 6,	 no.	 2	 (1982),	 pp.	 160‐188;	 James	 F.	 Jones,	 Jr.,	 "Montesquieu	 and	
Jefferson	Revisited:	Aspects	of	a	Legacy."	The	French	Review	51,	no.	4	(1978),	pp.	577‐














latitude	westwardly,	 the	climate	becomes	colder	 in	 like	manner	as	when	you	proceed	
northwardly.”77	Perhaps	not	coincidentally,	this	placed	Monticello	and	the	Piedmont	in	






owners	 of	 the	 Fall	 Line	 and	 Tidewater,	 where	 the	majority	 of	 Virginia’s	 slaves	 were	
held,	did	have	 to	worry	about	 such	 things.	 	Montesquieu	wrote	 “[t]hat	bad	 legislators	
are	those	who	have	favored	the	vices	of	the	climate	and	good	ones	are	those	who	have	
opposed	 them."79	 As	 a	 legislator,	 it	 was	 incumbent	 upon	 Jefferson	 to	 remedy	 the	
situation.	
Jefferson	could	be	excused	for	ignoring	Montesquieu	on	this	point	‐	that	is,	if	he	had	




Besides,	 he	 held	 out	 the	 hope	 of	 the	 problem	 solving	 itself.	 “A	 change	 in	 our	 climate	
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Finding	 nothing	 in	 climatic	 theory	 but	 reminders	 that	 slavery	 was	 unjustifiable,	
Jefferson	 turned	 from	 climate	 to	 race.	 Here	 he	made	 his	 stand,	 but	 he	made	 it	 alone.	
While	 the	Legal	Commonplace	Book	contains	entries	on	climatic	 theory,	none	 is	 to	be	
found	on	racial	theory.	The	digression	on	race	which	Jefferson	makes	while	discussing	
the	 Revisal	 in	 the	 Notes	 on	 Virginia	 appears	 to	 be	 based	 more	 upon	 his	 own	
observations	as	a	slave	owner	and	upon	snatches	of	half‐remembered	classical	history	
than	upon	any	Enlightenment‐era	study	of	 race.	His	 “suspicion”	 that	 “real	distinctions	
which	nature	has	made”,	that	blacks	lacked	the	same	capacity	for	refinement	as	whites	




Autobiography	 that	 the	purpose	of	 the	Revisal	was	 to	eliminate	 “feudal	and	unnatural	
distinctions”	within	Virginian	society.	
Jefferson’s	distinctions	between	whites	and	blacks	may	be	divided	into	two	groups:	
physical	 and	 moral.	 Physically,	 Jefferson	 considered	 blacks	 to	 be	 loathsome.	 “They	
secrete	less	by	the	kidnies	[sic],	and	more	by	the	glands	of	the	skin,	which	gives	them	a	
very	strong	and	disagreeable	odour	[sic],”	Jefferson	intoned,	apparently	forgetting	that	
people	 labouring	 in	 the	 fields	 all	 day	 do	 tend	 to	 sweat	more	 than	 their	 non‐laboring	
counterparts.83	In	addition,	dark	skin	was	aesthetically	unappealing	compared	to	white.		
And	blacks	seemed	“to	require	less	sleep”	than	whites,	though	on	the	other	hand	their	
laziness	 drove	 them	 to	 sleep	 whenever	 “abstracted	 from	 their	 diversions,	 and	











whites	 and	 blacks	 from	 interbreeding	 with	 each	 other	 ‐	 thus	 Jefferson	 was	 able	 to	
transform	 slavery	 from	 a	means	 of	 economic	 production	 to	 a	means	 of	 demographic	
control.	 “The	 circumstance	 of	 superior	 beauty,	 is	 thought	 worthy	 attention	 in	 the	
propagation	of	our	horses,	dogs,	and	other	domestic	animals,”	Jefferson	wrote,	so	“why	
not	 in	 that	 of	man?”	 He	 specifically	 conjured	 the	 spectre	 of	 bestiality,	 accusing	 black	
men	 of	 coveting	 white	 women	 “as	 is	 the	 preference	 of	 the	 Oran‐ootan	 for	 the	 black	






and	 fair‐minded	 to	 outside	 observers.	 “In	 memory	 they	 are	 equal	 to	 the	 whites;	 in	
reason	 much	 inferior,	 as	 I	 think	 one	 could	 scarcely	 be	 found	 capable	 of	 tracing	 and	
comprehending	 the	 investigations	 of	 Euclid,”	 Jefferson	 commented	 of	 slaves	who	had	
not	had,	and	would	never	have,	an	opportunity	for	the	kind	of	classical	education	that	
Jefferson	 was	 determined	 should	 be	 universal	 for	 whites.	 He	 avoided	 the	 issue	 of	
education	 by	 blaming	 household	 slaves	 for	 not	 having	 absorbed	 the	 culture	 of	 their	




Likewise,	 Jefferson	 accused	 blacks	 of	 having	 deficient	 imagination,	 which	 he	
described	 as	 “dull,	 tasteless,	 and	 anomalous.”	 In	 describing	 their	 literary	 abilities,	 he	
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above	 the	 level	 of	 plain	 narration;	 never	 see	 even	 an	 elementary	 trait	 of	 painting	 or	
sculpture.”88	
Together	 and	 taken	 at	 face	 value,	 these	 attributes	 formed	 a	 strong	 basis	 for	 the	
separation	of	the	races.	While	Jefferson	repeatedly	idealised	the	prospect	of	colonising	
Virginia’s	black	community	 in	a	 foreign	 territory,	his	unwillingness	 to	 take	any	action	
towards	that	end	meant	the	de	facto	retention	of	slavery.	The	slave	bill	that	he	proposed	
to	 the	 Assembly	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Revisal	 of	 the	 Laws	 re‐codified	 slavery	 as	 part	 of	
Virginia’s	 statute	 law,	 maintaining	 the	 strict	 separation	 between	 the	 races	 that	 he	






a	 working	 framework	 towards	 law	 can	 be	 established.	 It	 is	 helpful	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	
statement	 in	 his	 Autobiography	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Revisal	 of	 the	 Laws	 was	 to	
eliminate	 “feudal	 and	 unnatural	 distinctions”	 within	 Virginian	 society.	 Feudal	 and	
unnatural	were	not	 two	 complementary	 ideas,	 but	 rather	 two	ways	of	 expressing	 the	
same	 idea.	 In	 Jefferson’s	mind,	 there	were	 two	 kinds	 of	 distinctions:	 those	 occurring	
within	 nature,	 and	 those	 occurring	 within	 society,	 which	 were,	 strictly	 speaking,	
unnatural.	 His	 goal	 as	 a	 legislator	was	 to	 eliminate	 the	 social	 distinctions	 created	 by	
feudal	 law,	 and	 instead	 to	 bring	 social	 distinctions	 into	 harmony	 with	 natural	 law,	
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lost	 something	 valuable	 in	 the	 transition.	Writers	 of	 the	 socio‐political	 school	 of	 the	
Scottish	 and	 French	 Enlightenments,	 such	 as	 Lord	 Kames,	 William	 Robertson,	 and		
Helvetius	(all	of	whom	were	extracted	in	the	Legal	Commonplace	Book)	took	a	different	
view,	 that	 the	 line	 between	 nature	 and	 civil	 society	was	 not	 distinct,	 but	 rather	 that	
human	 society	 advanced	 through	 stages	 that	 proceeded	naturally	 from	one	 another	 ‐	
but	 that	 this	 natural	 progress	 could	 be	 interrupted	 and	 corrupted.	Nowhere	was	 this	
more	 explicitly	 stated	 than	 in	 Adam	 Smith’s	 The	Wealth	 of	Nations,	 published	 at	 the	
same	 time	 as	 Jefferson	 was	 formulating	 his	 own	 views	 on	 society,	 in	 which	 Smith	
explicitly	 singled	 out	 feudalism	 as	 having	 perverted	 the	 natural	 progress	 of	Western	
civilisation.	Jefferson	would	later	state	that	Smith’s	book	was	the	finest	work	of	political	
economy	yet	written.89	
The	 evidence	 from	 within	 Jefferson’s	 commonplace	 book,	 and	 his	 favourable	
comment	regarding	Smith’s		interpretation,	indicate	that	he	saw	his	role	as	a	legislator	
as	bringing	Virginia’s	law	into	conformity	with	nature	by	a	two‐fold	process	of	affirming	
distinctions	 found	 in	 nature	 while	 also	 eliminating	 distinctions	 formed	 solely	 by	 the	
feudal	 law.	 Where	 distinctions	 were	 naturally	 occurring,	 such	 as	 those	 between	
genders,	 races,	 or	 age	 groups,	 Jefferson	 retained	 them.	Where	 they	were	 contrary	 to	
natural	 law,	 and	 imposed	 by	 positive	 law,	 he	 either	 reformed	 them,	 as	 with	 feudal	
allegiance,	or	found	an	alternative	natural	justification	for	them	that	allowed	them	to	be	














commonwealth.90	 While	 it	 did	 establish	 birthright	 citizenship,	 the	 process	 of	
naturalisation	 and	 the	 process	 of	 expatriation,	 it	 did	 not	 go	 into	 detail	 on	 the	 citizen	
class’s	 constituent	 groups.	 One	 of	 the	 major	 groups	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 was	 that	 of	
white	 servants.	 Originally,	 the	 population	 of	 white	 immigrants	 in	 some	 condition	 of	
servitude,	be	it	at	will	or	under	some	form	of	indenture,	had	been	quite	large	and	had	
been	 the	 main	 means	 of	 white	 immigration	 into	 Virginia	 during	 the	 seventeenth	








their	 twenty‐first	 birthdays.91	 This	 linked	 an	 unnatural	 legal	 status,	 that	 of	 servitude,	
with	a	naturally	occurring	one:	age.	In	effect,	Jefferson	annexed	servitude	to	custody	law	







women.	 Jefferson	 chose	 to	 retain	 the	 common	 law	 category	 of	 the	 femme	 covert,	 in	
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which	married	women	 became	 submerged	 into	 the	 legal	 person	 of	 their	 husbands.93	
The	 citizenship	 bill	made	 clear	 that,	while	women	 could	 become	 citizens	 in	 the	 same	
way	as	men,	their	status	as	citizens	disappeared	once	they	married	and	only	re‐emerged	
in	widowhood.	 This	 system	 of	 coverture	meant	 that	 a	woman	who	was	 considered	 a	
citizen	and	person	under	the	law	on	the	day	before	her	marriage	ceased	to	be	both	the	
day	 after	 it	 ‐	 the	 only	 exception	 applied	 to	 dowries,	 which	 could	 be	 maintained	
separately	 from	 the	husband’s	 estate.	This	 further	 illustrates	 the	divide	 Jefferson	 saw	
between	property	rights,	which	he	sought	to	equalise,	and	civil	rights,	which	he	sought	
to	maintain	divided	based	on	what	he	saw	as	nature’s	separations.	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 great	 upheaval	 in	 citizenship	 law,	 the	 law	 on	 slavery	 remained	
largely	as	it	had	been	before	the	revolution:	statutory	and	based	upon	racial	distinction.	
Jefferson	 claimed	 that	 he	 had	 drafted,	 in	 secret,	 an	 amendment	 to	Bill	 No.	 51,	 “A	 Bill	
concerning	Slaves”,	which	would	have	instituted	gradual	emancipation.94	He	described	
this	amendment	in	the	Notes	on	Virginia	as	having	been	intended	to	liberate	the	slaves,	
move	 them	 out	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 resettle	 them	 on	 lands	 outside	 of	 the	 United	 States	
where	 they	 could	 form	 a	 black	 commonwealth	 under	 the	military	 protection	 of	 their	
white	 neighbours;	 however	 no	 record	 exists	 of	 this	 amendment,	 and	 it	 is	 unclear	
whether	it	was	ever	actually	considered	by	the	Committee	of	Revisors.95	It	is	also	worth	
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noting	 that	 the	 right	 of	 expatriation	presumably	 includes	 the	 right	 to	 stay	where	one	
already	 is,	 a	 right	 Jefferson	 noted	 had	 been	 violated	 by	 English	 slave	 traders	 in	 his	
original	 draft	 of	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence,	 and	 which	 he	 would	 have	 blithely	
violated	 again	 by	 declaring	 emancipated	 slaves	 outside	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 laws	
unless	they	emigrated	within	one	year	of	their	emancipation.96	
Jefferson	 did	 nod	 towards	 that	 passage	 of	 the	 Declaration	 when	 he	 included	 a	
provision	in	the	slave	bill	emancipating	any	outside	slave	brought	into	Virginia	for	more	
than	one	year.	But	this	was	counter‐balanced	by	such	provisions	as	those	of	Bill	No.	53,	
which	 gave	 the	 authorities	 permission	 to	 prevent	 a	 slave	 from	 exercising	 his	 natural	








property.	 The	 “Bill	 concerning	 Aliens”	 reaffirmed	 safe	 passage	 of	 foreign	 nationals	
under	the	law	of	nations,	and	provided	a	forty‐day	grace	period	for	foreign	nationals	to	
exit	 Virginia	 in	 the	 event	 of	 war	 with	 their	 home	 country.	 These	 provisions	 were	
augmented	by	one	of	 Jefferson’s	property	 laws,	Bill	No.	23	 “A	Bill	 Securing	 the	Rights	
Derived	from	Grants	to	Aliens”,	which	over‐rode	the	common	law	prohibition	on	aliens	
owning	 land,	 and	 allowed	 them	 to	 hold	 property	 “the	 same	 as	 if	 they,	 to	 whom	 the	
grants	or	conveyances	were	made,	had	been	citizens	of	the	commonwealth,	or	had	been	
such	 as	were	 formerly	 called	 natural	 born	 subjects.”99	With	 that,	 Jefferson	 closed	 the	
book	on	the	ties	between	land	ownership,	natural	allegiance,	and	subjecthood.		
	
                                                                                                                                                                     












The	 dichotomy	 of	 natural	 and	 unnatural	 distinction	 can	 partly,	 but	 not	 entirely,	
explain	 Jefferson’s	 three‐part	 division	 of	 society	 into	 citizens,	 slaves,	 and	 aliens.	 The	












sincerity	 as	 a	 private	 citizen	 expressing	 his	 personal	 views,	 it	would	 be	 a	mistake	 to	
extend	that	 judgment	to	his	sincerity	as	a	public	figure	writing	legislation.	Nowhere	is	
there	 any	 evidence	 that	 Jefferson	 actually	 took	 legislative	 action	 to	 remedy	 the	amor	
patriae	problem	via	emancipation	and	colonisation.	
Where	he	did	take	identifiable	legislative	action	was	in	forestalling	the	amor	patriae	




war.	 But	 Jefferson,	 who	 was	 willing	 to	 take	 on	 the	 vested	 interests	 of	 the	 state’s	
aristocracy	 to	 reform	Virginia’s	 inheritance	 and	 penal	 codes,	 and	who	was	willing	 to	
take	on	the	might	of	the	Established	Church	for	the	cause	of	religious	freedom,	could	not	
take	it	upon	himself	even	to	broach	a	solution	to	what	was	in	fact	a	far	greater	problem:	
the	specter	of	a	 race‐genocide	 that	 could	wipe	out	 the	entire	 society	he	was	 trying	 to	















had	 been	 defined	 as	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 patriarchal	 king	 and	 his	 subject,	
Jefferson	 redefined	 it	 as	 a	 fraternal	 relationship	 amongst	 equals	 under	 the	 social	
contract,	 voidable	 at	 any	 time	 under	 the	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation.	 Natural	
aristocracy,	 the	 re‐ordering	 of	 social	 rank	 based	 on	 individual	 refinement,	 would	
replace	 the	 feudal	 aristocracy	 based	 on	 land	 tenure	 and	 religious	 Establishment	 that	
Jefferson	targeted	with	his	other	reforms.	
Education	would	be	the	mechanism	by	which	Jefferson	would	effect	the	transition	to	
natural	 aristocracy.	 A	 system	 of	 universal	 education	 would	 give	 every	 child	 in	 the	
commonwealth	an	opportunity	to	learn	the	basics	of	Western	civilisation	via	three	years	
of	 classical	education,	and	 the	most	promising	males	would	be	promoted	 to	grammar	
schools	and	the	College	of	William	and	Mary	in	order	to	take	their	rightful	places	as	the	
leaders	 of	 society.	 While	 open	 to	 both	 genders	 at	 the	 primary	 level,	 this	 education	
system	 was	 closed	 to	 blacks,	 whom	 Jefferson	 deemed	 morally	 unworthy,	 and	
intellectually	 incapable,	 of	 receiving	 such	 education.	 Jefferson’s	 racial	 tautology	 ‐	 that	
blacks	were	unrefined	and	therefore	should	be	denied	the	opportunity	for	refinement	‐	




Jefferson’s	 success	 at	 instituting	 natural	 citizenship	 was	 mixed.	 With	 help	 from	
George	Mason	and	James	Madison,	 legislation	closely	following	his	citizenship	bill	was	
enacted,	but	 the	Bill	 for	 the	More	General	Diffusion	of	Knowledge	was	rejected	by	the	
Assembly.102	 The	 other	 class	 legislation,	 including	 the	 slave	 bill,	 were	 passed	 in	 the	
                                                     





years	 following	 the	 submission	 of	 the	Revisal	 of	 the	 Laws.	 This	meant	 that	while	 the	
classes	of	Virginian	society	were	well‐defined,	 there	was	no	more	social	mobility	than	
there	 had	 been	 before,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 white	 immigration.	 The	 end	 result	 was	
that,	 even	 as	 Jefferson	 was	 only	 partly	 successful	 in	 dismantling	 the	 apparatus	 of	
feudalism,	he	was	even	less	successful	at	raising	up	a	new	social	order	that	could	take	







In	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 thesis,	 I	 laid	 out	 three	 broad	 historiographical	 points.1	
One	was	that	the	liberal‐republican	synthesis	constructed	by	historians	from	Bailyn	to	
Pangle	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient	for	understanding	the	American	Revolution.	The	
second	was	 that,	 contrary	 to	Hartz,	 feudalism	did	 exist	 in	America	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	
Virginian	 feudal	 fragment.	The	 third	was	 that	 Jefferson’s	 liberalism	was	a	response	 to	
American	 feudalism,	 not	 a	 product	 of	 its	 absence,	 but	 that	 his	 liberal‐republican	
approach	to	abolishing	 feudalism	was	 inadequate	 to	 the	challenge	confronting	him.	 In	
this	 conclusion,	 I	will	 synthesise	 and	 summarise	my	own	 findings	 to	 fully	 explain	 the	
project	 of	 the	 “Jeffersonian	 moment”	 between	 1774	 and	 1786,	 and	 then	 offer	 some	




Jefferson	 identified	 the	 feudal	 system	 as	 consisting	 of	 three	 parts:	 corrupted	
common	law,	secular	and	ecclesiastical	aristocracy,	and	governance	by	prerogative.	 In	
chapter	 one,	 I	 introduced	 Jefferson’s	 historical	 thought	 and	 identified	 a	 feudal‐
mercantile	synthesis	in	his	historical	thinking,	by	which	the	colonisation	of	America	was	
actually	an	act	in	a	much	longer	feudal	drama	that	commenced	at	the	Norman	Conquest.	
Jefferson’s	 historical	 interpretation,	 particularly	 in	 the	 Summary	 View,	 introduced	 all	
three	 elements	 of	 feudalism	 as	 pertinent	 issues	 during	 the	 colonial	 crisis,	 tracing	 the	
root	of	 the	problems	 facing	 the	 colonists	 to	King	William	 I’s	 claim	of	 a	prerogative	 to	
grant	 lands,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 prerogative	 as	 the	 authority	 justifying	 feudal	 land	 tenures	
that	 corrupted	 the	 common	 law,	 and	 the	 use	 of	 those	 tenures	 to	 raise	 a	 hereditary,	




In	 chapter	 two,	 I	 began	 tracing	 Jefferson’s	 reforms	 as	 he	 sought	 to	 dismantle	 this	
three‐pillared	feudalism	piece	by	piece.	In	his	draft	constitution,	he	moved	to	establish	




powers	 between	 distinct	 legislative,	 executive,	 and	 judicial	 branches	 of	 government.	
The	prerogative	powers	previously	exercised	by	 the	Crown	were	either	 reassigned	 to	
the	 legislature	 or	 discarded	 outright,	 and	 the	 judiciary	 was	 carefully	 hemmed	 in	 to	
prevent	 judges	 from	 exercising	 their	 own	 prerogative	 via	 the	mixing	 of	 common	 law	
and	 chancery	 jurisdictions.	 Legitimate	 executive	 power,	 defined	 by	 Jefferson	 as	 the	
faithful	execution	of	legislatively	enacted	statute,	was	vested	in	an	“Administrator”	that	
operated	with	the	advice,	but	not	necessarily	the	consent,	of	a	Privy	Council.	In	contrast,	
the	 constitution	 that	 was	 adopted	 by	 the	 Virginia	 Convention	 in	 1776	 ignored	
Jefferson’s	 ideas	 and	 established	 a	 government	 that	 perpetuated	 the	 colonial,	 feudal	
system.	
Not	 to	 be	 daunted,	 but	 with	 the	 constitutional	 route	 now	 unavailable	 to	 him,	
Jefferson	 set	 about	 attempting	 to	 enact	 his	 reforms	 via	 legislation	upon	 resuming	 his	
seat	in	the	Virginia	legislature.	In	chapter	three,	Jefferson	took	on	Virginia’s	aristocracy	
directly	 by	 introducing	 reform	 to	 the	 land	 law.	 These	 reforms	 were	 intended	 to	
undermine	or	even	abolish	 feudal	 tenure	while	 securing	Virginia’s	western	 territories	
for	the	use	of	freeholders	instead	of	the	land	companies	formed	by	Virginia’s	wealthiest	





















In	 somewhat	 of	 a	 denouement,	 chapter	 five	 explored	 Jefferson’s	 reforms	 of	
citizenship,	 education,	 and	 slavery,	 which	 I	 have	 grouped	 together	 under	 the	 label	
“natural	citizenship”.	The	citizenship	bills	which	Jefferson	proposed	repeatedly	through	
the	 1770s	 were	 premised	 upon	 the	 natural	 right	 of	 expatriation,	 which	 would	 have	
replaced	 the	 common	 law	 artifice	 of	 “natural	 allegiance”	 to	 the	 Crown	 with	 natural	
allegiance	 to	 the	 polity	 of	 one’s	 choosing.	 Furthermore,	 Jefferson	 sought	 to	 structure	
society	by	creating	a	universal	public	education	system	that	would	allow	Virginia’s	most	







To	 what	 extent	 were	 Jefferson’s	 reforms	 successful,	 taken	 here	 as	 a	 whole	 and	
assessed	against	 the	three‐part	 feudal	system?	Did	his	 reforms	break	Virginia’s	 feudal	
aristocracy?	Did	he	adequately	reform	the	prerogative	and	the	common	law	to	remove	
their	 feudal	components?	The	record	on	this	 is	mixed.	He	was	notably	unsuccessful	at	
influencing	 the	 Convention	 with	 his	 draft	 constitution.	 While	 they	 banned	 the	 royal	
prerogative,	 they	 essentially	 reassigned	 it	 to	 the	 legislature,	 an	 entity	 Jefferson	







reforms	 of	 the	 draft	 constitution	 would	 have	 struck	 feudalism	 at	 its	 tenurial	 core,	
Jefferson	 did	 not	 even	 propose	 legislation	 eliminating	 feudal	 tenures	 and	 instead	
contented	 himself	 with	 nibbling	 away	 at	 inheritance	 regulation.	 The	 bill	 abolishing	






see	 their	 small‐holdings	 fragment	 among	 their	 children.	Nor	did	 Jefferson’s	proposals	
for	western	lands	turn	out	much	better.	While	he	secured	increased	representation	for	
western	 settlers	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Delegates,	 the	 land	 companies	 effectively	
commandeered	his	legislation	and	used	it	to	enhance	their	own	wealth	and	power.	
Another	 major	 oversight	 in	 the	 reforms	 was	 the	 divorcing	 of	 tenures	 from	 any	
system	of	military	 support.	 The	 imposition	 of	 feudal	 tenures	 in	Norman	England	 had	
been	 in	part	 to	provide	economic	support	 for	 the	costs	of	William	I’s	army,	not	 for	 its	
own	 sake.	 Jefferson	 seems	 to	 have	 overlooked	 the	 importance	 of	 political	 economy,	
failing	to	see	that	feudal	law	existed	to	fulfil	military	and	economic,	as	well	as	political,	
needs.	While	 Harrington,	 as	 Pocock	 points	 out,	 appreciated	 the	 relationship	 between	
land	and	arms,	Jefferson	saw	a	relationship	solely	between	land	and	political	authority.2	
Jefferson	 was	 conspicuously	 uninterested	 in	 military	 policy.	 His	 draft	 constitution	
banned	a	peacetime	 standing	 army	and	guaranteed	 the	 right	 to	bear	 arms	on	private	
land,	but	contained	nothing	regarding	a	 freeman’s	militia	or	other	alternative	military	
force,	as	Harrington’s	Oceana	did.	Nor	did	his	legislation	contain	any	military	policy	of	
note.	 This	 is	 all	 the	more	 curious	 given	 his	 anxiety,	 expressed	 in	 a	 post‐war	 letter	 to	






aristocracy,	 and	 Dissenters	 flourished	 in	 the	 decades	 following	 its	 passage.	 This	
decisively	severed	Virginia’s	 ties	 to	 the	Church	of	England	and	removed	state	support	
for	clergy.	It	also	undermined	the	landed	aristocrats	who	sat	on	the	parish	vestries,	who	
no	longer	were	able	to	use	the	church	Establishment	as	a	tool	of	their	social	and	political	












Back	 on	 the	negative	 side	 of	 the	 ledger	were	 Jefferson’s	 reforms	 aimed	 at	 natural	
citizenship.	He	eventually	got	an	 immigration	and	allegiance	bill	enacted	 into	 law,	but	
James	Madison	was	unable	to	salvage	the	education	bill	when	the	Assembly	passed	the	
Statute	 for	 Religious	 Freedom	 in	 1786.	 Natural	 aristocracy	 was	 thus	 a	 dead	 end.	
Furthermore,	 Jefferson	 never	 even	 attempted	 a	meaningful	 reform	 of	 Virginia’s	 slave	
laws.	 In	 not	 doing	 so,	 Jefferson	 failed	 to	 adequately	 account	 for	 the	 importance	 of	
slavery	in	promoting	the	emergence	of	the	secular	aristocracy.	In	his	relentless	focus	on	
tenures	and	the	legal	side	of	feudal	society,	he	seems	to	have	overlooked	the	importance	








While	 Jefferson	 had	 a	 long‐lasting	 concern	with	 aristocracy,	 that	 description	 does	
not	adequately	convey	the	extent	of	his	interest	in	things	feudal	in	the	1770s.	It	was	the	
feudal	 system	 which	 English	 settlers	 had	 brought	 to	 Virginia,	 not	 simply	 the	 social	
group	of	aristocrats	that	ran	the	colony,	that	Jefferson	had	in	mind	when	he	wrote	the	
Summary	View	 of	 the	Rights	 of	British	America	 and	 later,	 as	 he	 explained	 to	 Edmund	
Pendleton,	when	 he	wrote	 his	 draft	 constitution	 for	 Virginia.5	 Nowhere	 in	 Jefferson’s	
correspondence	of	the	1770s	is	the	issue	of	aristocracy	raised	explicitly.		Nor	can	issues	
as	diverse	as	 the	 royal	prerogative	or	 the	 infringement	of	 liberty	of	 conscience	under	
common	law	be	classified	under	a	meaningful	definition	of	aristocracy.		










“feudal”,	 while	 frequently	 used,	 has	 not	 attracted	 rigorous	 attention,	 having	 been	
relegated	to	quick	asides	and	used	in	rhetorical	 fashion.6	Yet	Jefferson’s	own	words	in	
the	1770s	indicate	that	feudalism	held	some	importance	to	him,	even	if	the	total	extent	





his	 return	 to	 the	 United	 States	 from	 France,	 including	 in	 his	 description	 of	 his	
revolutionary	 activities	 in	 his	 Autobiography;	 but	 it	 is	 equally	 fair	 to	 point	 out	 how	
absent	the	word	is	from	the	extant	revolutionary	writings	themselves.	There	appears	to	
be	a	break	in	Jefferson’s	language,	in	or	about	the	year	1789,	when	he	stopped	using	the	
word	 “feudal”	 and	 started	using	 the	word	 “aristocrat”.8	 I	 confess	 that	 I	 do	not	have	 a	
satisfactory	explanation	for	the	rhetorical	shift,	this	thesis	being	a	study	of	law	and	not	
rhetoric,	 but	 I	 do	have	 a	pair	 of	 hypotheses.	The	 first	 is	 that	 in	 the	 years	1774‐1779,	






Second,	 in	 the	 1770s	 Jefferson	was	 still	 steeped	 in	English	Whig	 political	 thought,	
which	looked	backwards	to	Saxon	times	and	took	the	concept	of	the	ancient	constitution	






to	 John	Banister,	 Jr.,	on	the	subject	of	European	education,	but	as	 late	as	1789	he	was	
still	talking	about	feudal	institutions.	See	“To	John	Banister,	Jr.”,	15	October	1785,	in	TJ	
Papers,	Vol.	VIII,	pp.	635‐638,	and	“To	James	Madison”,	6	Sept.	1789,	in	TJ	Papers,	Vol.	











independent	of	 feudal	 law,	 in	this	new	setting.	Indeed,	his	use	of	the	Roman	law	word	
“usufruct”,	 rather	 than	 the	common	 law	“allodial”,	 to	describe	his	generational	 theory	
may	have	been	a	first	step	down	this	road.10		
If	there	is	one	thing	which	I	hope	this	thesis	has	achieved,	it	is	to	have	rehabilitated	
the	 use	 of	 the	 adjective	 “feudal”	 as	 a	 serious	 description	 in	 historical	 discussions	 of	




as	 Jefferson	 pointed	 out	 in	 his	 correspondence	 with	 Edmund	 Pendleton,	 the	 feudal	
system	was	a	comprehensive	social	ordering	that	had	been	reformed	in	some	respects	
while	 enduring	 in	 others.	 A	 return	 to	 Hartz’s	 fragment	 thesis,	 and	 Berthoff’s	 and	
Murrin’s	feudal	revival	thesis,	helps	to	shed	light	on	the	matter.	
In	 thinking	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 Virginia	 might	 constitute	 a	 feudal	 fragment	 of	
English	 society,	we	 should	 think	 about	whether	 its	 feudal	 or	 liberal	 institutions	were	
dominant	 (in	 the	Hartzean	 sense).	 There	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 reformed	 feudalism	
and	 genuine	 liberalism.	 The	 most	 pertinent	 example	 here	 is	 Virginia’s	 system	 of	
landholding.	Socage	tenure	was	not,	as	Hartz	maintained,	a	liberal	form	of	freeholding.	It	
was	 a	 feudal	 tenure,	 just	 as	 much	 an	 intrinsic	 part	 of	 the	 feudal	 system	 as	 knight’s‐
service	or	grand‐serjeanty	 tenures.	Hartz	may	have	been	correct	 that	 it	was	 the	most	
free	of	the	feudal	tenures,	but	that	does	not	change	its	essentially	feudal	nature,	as	both	
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10	Peter	Onuf	may	yet	be	right	in	his	analysis	of	the	Jefferson	of	the	1790s	and	1800s,	
but	 I	 continue	 to	 believe	 that	 his	 interpretation	 of	 Jefferson	 and	 aristocracy	 is	
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their	 institutions	to	the	New	World.	Again,	 I	would	contest	Hartz	 in	 this	regard.	Hartz	
defined	his	 liberalism	as	approximately	 the	philosophy	of	 John	Locke	and	 the	various	
interpretations	 thereof,	 including	 unconscious	manifestations	 of	 said	 philosophy.	 But	
the	Virginia	colony	was	founded	decades	before	Locke	wrote,	at	a	time	when	liberalism	
was	but	 a	 gleam	 in	 the	 eye	of	 the	most	 radical	Reform	Protestants.	Virginia,	whether	
under	 Company	 or	 Crown	 rule,	 was	 not	 about	 fulfilling	 a	 dream	 of	 enlightened	
individualism.	It	was	about	making	money	while	maintaining	social	order,	first	through	
the	monopoly	of	 the	Virginia	Company	and	 later	 through	the	planter	aristocracy,	who	
added	the	trade	in	slaves	to	the	Company’s	trade	in	tobacco.	
While	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 find	 a	 liberal	mindset	 or	 institutions	 in	 Virginia,	 it	 is	much	
easier	to	see	indications	of	a	feudal	mindset	and	institutions	that	would	qualify	 it	as	a	
feudal	fragment.	The	Virginian	experience	was	one	of	hierarchy	and	inequality,	both	in	
the	 domestic	 social	 order	 and	 in	 the	 basis	 of	 its	major	 institutions,	 through	 the	 royal	
prerogative	 and	 the	 ultimate	 allegiance	 to	 the	 imperial	 Crown.	 The	 organisation	 of	
Virginia’s	 counties	 and	 parishes,	 the	 lord‐tenant	 relationship	 that	 characterised	 its	
landholding,	 its	widespread	 slavery,	 its	 solidifying	 aristocracy	 of	 gentry	 and	 resident	
peer,	and	its	governance	as	a	compromise	between	prerogative	and	 legislative	power,	
are	 all	 reminiscent	 of	 England’s	 feudal	 past,	 rather	 than	 its	 liberal	 future.	 Therefore,	
within	Hartz’s	fragment	paradigm,	Virginia	is	better	understood	not	as	a	liberal	society	
with	 some	 feudal	 elements,	 but	 as	 a	 feudal	 society	with	 growing	 tendencies	 towards	
liberalism,	which	Jefferson	became	the	spokesman	for.		
What	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 Virginia	 was	 taking	 part	 in	 a	 pan‐colonial	 feudal	 revival?	
Berthoff’s	 and	 Murrin’s	 interpretation	 is	 helpful,	 although	 Jefferson’s	 differed	 in	
important	 ways.	 The	 revival	 thesis	 emphasises	 the	 economic	 aspect	 of	 the	 feudal	
system.	Berthoff	and	Murrin	believe	that	the	feudal	revival	was	about	revitalising	feudal	
land	 tenures	 in	 order	 for	 proprietors	 to	 extract	 rents,	 and	 in	 the	 process	 acquiring	
incomes	that	rivalled	those	of	established	English	nobility.	The	result	of	this,	however,	





the	 proprietor	 than	 of	 mutual	 obligations	 between	 lord	 and	 man	 or	 landlord	 and	
community	that	might	have	harmonised	the	relationship”.12 
Jefferson	 argued	 something	 different.	 From	 his	 perspective,	 the	 feudal	 revival	
encompassed	the	pursuit	of	monetary	profit	through	rent‐seeking	while	also	including	
the	 resuscitation	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 hierarchical	 and	 deferential	 social	 arrangements	
characteristic	 of	 England,	with	 political	 consequences.	The	 very	 thing	he	was	 fighting	
against	was	the	gentry’s	capacity	for	equating	their	pursuit	of	profit	(and	power)	with	
the	common	welfare,	and	of	 re‐establishing	 the	 lord‐tenant	relationship	characteristic	
of	feudal	society.	Furthermore,	while	Berthoff	and	Murrin	emphasise	the	feudal	revival	
as	 a	 renewal	 of	 defunct	 feudal	 forms	 abandoned	 in	 the	 early	 decades	 of	 colonisation,	
Jefferson	 thought	of	 the	 revival	 as	 the	 strengthening	of	an	existing	system	of	 law	and	
social	 arrangements	 that	 had	 been	 subjected	 to	 continuous	 use	 and	 adaptation	 since	
Norman	times.	
Both	the	fragment	thesis	and	the	revival	thesis	can	help	to	shed	light	on	Jefferson’s	
feudal	 system,	 but	 neither	 is	 sufficient	 for	 explaining	 it.	 As	Berthoff	 and	Murrin	note,	
Hartz’s	 liberal	 fragment	 interpretation	 suffered	 from	 an	 anachronistic	 over‐emphasis	
on	 nineteenth‐century	 American	 society,	 reading	 Jacksonian	 egalitarianism	 back	 into	
the	colonial	period.13	This	does	not	mean	that	the	fragment	thesis	itself	is	incorrect,	but	
Hartz	may	 have	misapplied	 it.	 Had	 he	 taken	 the	 colonies	 individually,	 he	might	 have	
classified	the	southern,	slave‐holding	colonies	differently	than	the	northern,	free	labour	





need	 to	 be	 re‐evaluated.	 If	 Wood,	 and	 especially	 Pocock,	 are	 still	 correct	 that	
republicanism	 was	 the	 defining	 ideology	 of	 the	 American	 Revolution,	 then	 does	 the	
form	 that	 republicanism	 took	 have	 a	 different	meaning	 in	 a	 feudal	 context?	 Pocock’s	
work	becomes	more	meaningful	if	Americans	reforming	their	land	laws	were	conscious	
Harringtonians	rather	than	unconscious	Lockeans,	as	Hartz	deemed	them.	On	the	other	











for	 American	 revolutionaries	may	 help	 historians	 break	 out	 of	 the	 liberal‐republican	
dichotomy	 of	 the	 past	 fifty	 years.	 Joyce	 Appleby	 once	 challenged	 the	 republican	
revisionists	 for	 not	 adequately	 explaining	 why	 the	 colonists	 would	 choose	
republicanism	as	 their	 ideology,	but	 the	same	question	could	be	asked	of	 liberalism.14	
The	 answer	 I	 would	 posit	 is	 that	 republicanism	 and	 liberalism	 in	 eighteenth‐century	
America	were	 inter‐related	responses	 to	a	common	feudal	problem.	This	 is	consistent	
with	 the	 development	 of	 republicanism	 and	 liberalism	 in	 English	 thought,	 with	
Harrington	 and	 Locke,	 the	 fathers	 of	 the	 two	 respective	 traditions,	 self‐consciously	
framing	 their	 ideas	 in	opposition	 to	an	element	of	 feudal	 society,	be	 it	 landholding	or	
patriarchy,	that	they	found	undesirable.	
If	republicanism	and	liberalism	were	both	responses	to	feudalism	in	England,	and	if	
these	 ideologies	 were	 adopted	 in	 America	 during	 its	 own	 crisis,	 then	 the	 American	
revolutionaries,	 especially	 Jefferson	 and	 those	who	 supported	 him,	 stand	 even	 closer	
with	 the	 English	 commonwealthmen	 than	 has	 previously	 been	 recognised.	 This	
commonwealth	 ideology,	 a	 blend	 of	 Harringtonian	 republicanism	 and	 Lockean	
liberalism,	 emerged	 out	 of	 the	 crisis	 of	 English	 feudalism	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	
which	 was	 only	 resolved	 via	 the	 settlement	 to	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution	 in	 1689.15	
Americans’	 adoption	 of	 English	 commonwealth	 ideology	 and	 rhetoric	 becomes	 more	
explicable,	 and	more	meaningful,	 if	we	 recognise	 that	 they	were	participating	 in	 their	
own	crisis	of	feudalism,	in	which	their	choice	was	between	living	as	feudal	dependants	
like	 the	 Irish,	 or	 attempting	 their	 own	 revolution	 that	 would	 radically	 redefine	 the	





15	 See	 Caroline	 Robbins,	 The	 Eighteenth‐Century	 Commonwealthman.	 Cambridge,	
MA:	 Harvard	 University	 Press,	 1959.	 For	 the	 crisis	 of	 English	 feudalism,	 see	 Eric	 J.	
Hobsbawm,	"The	General	Crisis	of	the	European	Economy	in	the	17th	Century."	Past	&	
Present	 ,	 no.	 5	 (1954):	 33‐53;	Hobsbawm,	 "The	Crisis	of	 the	17th	Century‐‐II."	Past	&	





This	 in	 turn	raises	a	 further	question:	was	 the	American	Revolution	an	essentially	
British	 event?	 If	 the	 ideas	 in	 play	 were	 English,	 and	 the	 society	 in	 question	 was	 an	
English	 imitation,	 then	what	 in	 the	American	Revolution	was	American	as	opposed	 to	
simply	 extra‐British?	 Should	 1776	 stand	 alone,	 or	 should	 it	 stand	 with	 1649	 and	
1688?16	 What	 about	 Europe	 in	 1789,	 1848,	 and	 1917?	 Was	 Virginia’s	 revolution	 in	
particular	simply	political	or,	as	John	Ragosta	and	Michael	McDonnell	have	so	recently	
argued,	was	 it	a	 social	 revolution	as	well?17	 If	 it	was	 this	more	comprehensive	sort	of	






The	 findings	 in	 this	 thesis	 point	 the	 way	 to	 several	 promising	 avenues	 of	 future	
research.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 probe	deeper	 into	 the	 feudal	 nature	 of	Virginian	 society.	 The	
second	is	to	seek	to	expand	the	line	of	enquiry	outwards	to	other	colonies.	The	third	is	
to	examine	feudalism	as	a	rhetorical	issue	in	the	discourse	of	the	American	Revolution.	
As	 regards	 Virginia,	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	 necessarily	 limited	 in	 my	 choice	 of	
Jefferson’s	 reforms	 as	 the	 topic,	 rather	 than	 Virginian	 society	 itself.	 This	 was	 largely	
because	the	project	began	as	strictly	intellectual	history,	and	only	later	broadened	into	
the	history	of	society	itself	as	I	sought	to	contextualise	Jefferson’s	ideas.	Thus,	the	topics	
covered	 are	 biased	 in	 favour	 of	what	 Jefferson	 himself	 thought	 to	 be	 important.	 As	 I	









17	 See	 Michael	 A.	 McDonnell,	 The	 Politics	 of	 War:	 Race,	 Class,	 and	 Conflict	 in	
Revolutionary	Virginia.	Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2007;	and	John	A.	





lands,	 had	 parcelled	 out	 the	 proprietary	 colonies	 to	 some	 of	 their	 key	 supporters.	
Implicitly,	 Jefferson	 was	 making	 this	 statement	 as	 an	 analogy	 to	 William	 the	






Finally,	 aside	 from	 whether	 or	 not	 any	 of	 the	 other	 colonies	 were	 actual	 feudal	
societies,	 there	 is	 the	 separate	 question	 of	 whether	 “feudalism”	 was	 a	 concept	 with	
rhetorical	 importance	 during	 the	 American	 Revolution.	 In	 at	 least	 the	 case	 of	 John	
Adams’	A	Dissertation	on	the	Canon	and	Feudal	Law,	feudalism	was	invoked	as	an	actual	
issue	with	which	 the	 colonists	 had	 to	 deal,	 although	 in	 Adams’	 case	 he	was	 invoking	
feudalism	as	a	future	danger	rather	than	a	present	reality.	It	also	seems	that	much	of	the	
opposition	 to	 the	 Quebec	 Act	 was,	 in	 part,	 a	 reaction	 against	 the	 perceived	
authoritarianism	of	French	Canadian	feudal	society,	embodied	in	its	seigniorial	political	
economy,	its	lack	of	a	constituent	assembly,	and	an	established	Catholic	Church.	Indeed,	
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